Moral views of commerce society and politics in twelve discourses

Contents

Page DISCOURSE I.

On the Moral Laws of Trade, . . . . 9

DISCOURSE II.

Preface

The character of some of the following Discourses will, doubtless, be thought unusual for the pulpit. The subjects themselves, indeed, are out of the ordinary course of preaching. I might say in their defence, that such topics have been sometimes admitted into occasional Sermons ; and that Commercial Morality, in particular, has been made the subject of, at least, one entire volume of Religious Discourses, which has not offended the popular taste. But this defence, I must confess, does not satisfy me. In justice to my own convictions, I must be allowed to place the following discussions on a broader ground than that of exception. If I deserve blame, I cannot fairly escape on such a plea. For I am persuaded, not only that such discussions are entirely proper for the gulpit, but that it is the bounden duty of the pulpit to entertain them.

If, indeed, I have violated the proper decorum of religious discourse, such an error is capable of no defence. But I must be allowed to say, that when I had determined that it was my duty as a preacher, to discuss certain subjects, I could not allow any formality or fastidiousness of the pulpit, to prevent me from doing so with as much thoroughness and detail, as were compatible with the gravity of the place. Thus, with regard to the first discourse— -on the Moral Law of Contracts — knowing, as I did know, that the consciences of men around me, were deeply involved in the questions that arose, I could not hesitate about going into the necessary specifications, however unusual, in preaching ; — the serious business of such a discourse, would not allow me to stand on pulpit ceremony, as to terms and phrases and instances. I could not well be understood without them ; and as the object of speaking is to be understood, I knew of no

VI PREFACE.

sanctity of time or place, that was to contravene the laws of that very instrument, speech, which I was using.

I am not ignorant, at the same time, in what manner any thing unusual in the subjects or style of religious discourses is likely to be received. I know that there will be some readers, as there have been hearers of these discourses, to say, that a part of them would be more suitable for the Lyceum and lecture-room. Nay, I will confess, that in delivering them, I have had certain feelings of reluctance to contend with, in my own mind ; so powerful are old prepossessions against new or singular views of duty. Since I understand the feeling of objection, therefore, will the kind reader who may entertain the same feeling, permit me to reason the matter a little with him and with myself, in the remainder of this preface ?

Let me ask, in the first place, if our ideas of propriety in this case, are not very much matters of convention and usage ? If we had always been accustomed to hear discussions in our churches, on such subjects as the Morals of Traffic, of Politics, and of our social well-being as a nation — if the terms and phrases appropriate to such subjects had found a place in the pulpit, should we ever have doubted their propriety ? It is observable, indeed, that certain topics have forced their way into the pulpit, within the last quarter of a century, which, it is probable, sounded as questionably and strangely in ears accustomed only to the old scholastic preaching, as any grave moral topics can now. I allude to discussions on War and Peace, on Temperance, Abolition, and the various religious enterprises of the day.

The question then is — what is the proper range of the pulpit ? What is the appropriate business of preaching ? The answer is plain — to address the public mind on its moral and religious duties and dangers. But what are its duties and dangers, and where are they to be found ? Are they not to be found wherever men are acting their part in life ? Are human responsibility and exposure limited to any one sphere of action — to the church or to the domestic circle — or to the range of the gross and sensual passions ? Are not men daily making shipwreck of their consciences in trade and politics ? And wheresoever conscience goes to work out its perilous problem, shall not the preacher follow it ? It is not very material, whether a man's integrity forsakes him at the polls in an election, or at the board of merchandise ; or at the house of rioting, or the gates whose

PREFACE. VII

way leadeth to destruction. Outwardly it may be different, but inwardly it is the same. In either case, the fall of the victim is the most deplorable of all things on earth ; and most fit, therefore, for the consideration of the pulpit. I must confess, I cannot understand, by what process of enlightened reasoning and conscience, the preacher can come to the conclusion, that there are wide regions of moral action and peril around him, into which he may not enter, because such unusual words as, Commerce, Society, Politics, are written over the threshold.

Nay more ; is not the greatest possible disservice done to the highest interests of mankind, by this limitation as to subjects, under which the pulpit has laid itself. The confined and technical character which belongs to the common administration of religion, does more than any thing else, in my apprehension, to disarm it of its power, I am not insensible, when I say this, to the greatness of those obstacles in the human heart and in human life, with which it has to contend. I am not, now, measuring the strength of those obstacles, but simply considering the force that is brought to bear upon them. That force is moral, spiritual force ; and the leading form of it, in the public estimation, is preaching. The pulpit is the authorised expositor to men, of their duties. Those duties, it will not be denied, press upon every action and instant of human life. But what now, is the consideration which the pulpit generally, gives to this wide and busy field of duty ? Are not whole spheres of human action left out of the account ? With the exception of some occasional and wholesale denunciations, are not business, politics, amusements and fashionable society, passed by entirely ? Are not men left to say, when engaged in those scenes — " religion has nothing to do with us here ?" Do they not, naturally enough, feel that these engagements are, in a manner, set apart from all sense of duty ? Is it strange, then, that the public conscience is lax in these matters ? It seems to me, I must confess, rather a hard measure that the pulpit deals out to these departments of life, It never recognizes them as spheres of duty : it does nothing for the correction or culture of men's minds in them ; and yet, every now and then, it comes down upon their aberrations with cold, bitter and unsparing censure.

Let me not be supposed to forget, that the pulpit has to deal with topics and questions of duty, that go down into the depths of the human heart — with faith, and repentance, and love, and

Vlll PREFACE.

self-denial, and disinterestedness — and that its principal business is thus to make the fountain pure. But religion has an outward form, as well as an inward spirit. That form is the whole lawful action of life. And to cut off half of that action from all public and positive recognition — what is it but to consign it over to irreligion, to unprincipled license, and worldly vanity ?

There is time enough in the pulpit for all things. Nay, it wants variety. It is made dull by the restriction and reiteration of its topics. It would gain strength by a freer and fuller grasp of its proper objects. What it can do, I believe, yet remains to be seen. We complain of the corruptions of fashion and amusement, of business and politics. The calm, considerate, concentrated, universal attention of the pulpit, to these things, would, in one year, I believe, produce a decided and manifest effect.

But the great evil, I am sensible, lies deeper — too deep for any sufficient consideration, within the narrow limits of a preface. The pulpit not only fails in this matter, but it fails on firincifile, and on a principle almost universally adopted. The evil is, that sermons, pulpits, priests — all the active agents that are laboring in the service of religion — are, by the public judgment as well as by their own choice, severed from the great mass of human actions and interests

DISCOURSE I

ON THE MORAL LAW OF CONTRACTS.

I THESSALONIANS IV. 6. That no man go beyond and

DEFRAUD HIS BROTHER IN ANY MATTER.

I propose to invite your attention in a series of three or four Sabbath evening discourses, to the moral laws of trade, the moral end of business, and to the moral principles which are to govern the accumulation of property. The first of these subjects, is proposed for your consideration this evening ; and it is one, as I conceive, of the highest interest and importance.

This country presents a spectacle of active, absorbing, and prosperous business, which strikes the eye of every stranger, as its leading characteristic. We are said to be, and we are a people, beyond all others, devoted to business and accumulation. This, though it is often brought against us as a reproach, is really an inevitable result of our political condition. I trust that it is but the first development, and. that many better ones are to follow. It does, however, spring from our institutions ; and I hold, moreover, that it is honorable to them. If half of us were slaves, that half could have nothing to do with traffic. If half of us were in the condition of the peasantry of Europe, the business transactions of that half would be restricted within a narrow sphere, and would labor under a heavy pressure. But where liberty is given to each one to act freely for himself, and by all lawful means to better his condition, the consequence is inevitably what we see — an universal and unprecedented activity among all the classes of society, in all the departments of human industry. The moral principles then, applicable to the transaction of business have strong claims upon our attention ; and seem to me, very proper subjects of discussion in our pulpits.

There are moral questions too, as we very well know, which actually do interest all reflecting and conscientious men who are engaged in trade. They are very frequently discussed in conversation ; and very different "grounds are taken by the disputants. Some say that one principle is altogether right, and others, that another and totally different one is the only right principle. In such circumstances, it seems to me not only proper but requisite, for those whose office it is to speak to men of their duties, that they should take up the discussion of these as they would any other moral questions. I am obliged to confess that we are liable, scholastic and retired men as we are, to give some ground to men of business, for anticipating that our reasonings and conclusions will not be very practical or satisfactory. I can only say, for myself, that I have, for some time, given patient and careful attention to the moral principles of trade ; that I have often conversed with men of business that I might understand the practical bearings and difficulties of the subject ; that I have also read some of the books in which the morality of contracts is discussed ;

and although a clergyman, I shall venture, with some confidence as well as modesty, to offer you my thoughts on the points in question. I say the points in question ; and I have intimated that there are points in debate, questions of conscience in business, which are brought into the most serious controversy. I have even known conscientious and sensible men, themselves engaged in trade, to go to the length of asserting, not only that the principles of trade are immoral and unchristian, but that no man can acquire a property in this commerce without sacrificing a good conscience ; that no prosperous merchant can be a good Christian. I certainly think that such casuists are wrong ; but whether or not they are so, the principles which bring them to a conclusion so extraordinary, evidently demand investigation.

In preparing to examine this opinion, and indeed to discuss the whole subject, it will not be improper to observe in the outset, that trade in some form, is the inevitable result of the human condition. Better, it has been said, on the supposition already stated — better that commerce should perish than Christianity ; but let it be considered whether commerce can perish. Nothing can be more evident than that the earth was formed to be the theatre of trade. Not only does the ocean facilitate commerce, but the diversity of soils, climes, and products, requires it. So long as one district of country produces cotton, and another corn ; so long as one man lives by an ore-bed which produces iron, and another, on pasture-lands which grow wool, there must be commerce. In addition to this, let it be considered that all human industry inevitably tends to what is called " the division of labor."

The savage who roams through the wilderness, may possibly, in the lowest state of barbarism, procure with his own hand all that suffices for his miserable accommodation, — the coat of skins that clothes, the food that sustains, and the hut that shelters him. But the moment that society departs from that state, there necessarily arise the different occupations of shepherd, agriculturist, mechanic, and manufacturer ; the products of whose industry are to be exchanged ; and this exchange is trade. If a single individual were to perform all the operations necessary to produce a piece of cloth, and yet more a garment of that cloth, the process would be exceedingly slow and expensive. Human intelligence necessarily avails itself of the facility, the dexterity, and the advantage every way, which are to be obtained by a division of labor. The very progress of society is indicated by the gradual and growing development of this tendency.

Besides, it has been justly observed by a celebrated writer on this subject,* that " there is a certain propensity in human nature to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another. It is common to all men," he says, " and to be found in no other race of animals, which seem to know neither this nor any other species of contracts. Nobody," he observes, " ever saw a dog make a fair and deliberate exchange of one bone for another, with another dog. Nobody ever saw one animal by its gestures and natural cries signify to another, this is mine, that yours ; I am willing to give this for that."

Trade, then, being a part of the inevitable lot of cultivated humanity, the question is, not about abolish-

*Adam Smith.

ing, but about the moral principles that are to regulate it. And the grand question which I propose now to examine is, the only one that presses upon the conscience, and therefore proper for discussion in the pulpit ; and one, too, of daily recurrence — the question, that is, about the moral law of contracts. The question, to state it more definitely, is, whether, in making contracts, it is right for one party to take any advantage, or to make any use, and if any, what, of his superior sagacity, information, or power of any kind ?

Let us first inquire, how we are to settle this question ? What is the process of mind by which we are to ascertain and establish the moral laws of trade ?

Does tile natural conscience declare them ? Is there any instinctive prompting of conscience, that can properly decide each case as it arises in the course of business ? Is there any voice within, that says clearly and with authority, " thou shalt do thus, and so T I think not. The cases are not many, in any department of action, where conscience thus reveals itself. But in business they are peculiarly rare, because the questions there, are unusually complicated. You offer to sell to your neighbor an article of merchandise. You are entitled of course — i. e. in ordinary circumstances — to some advance upon what it cost you. But what that is, depends on many circumstances. Conscience will hardly mark down the just price in your account-book. Conscience, indeed, commands us to do right ; but the question is, what is right ? This i§ to be decided by views far more various and comprehensive, than the simple sense of right and wrong.

The Scriptures, like conscience, are a general directory. They do not lay down any specific moral laws of trade. They command us to be upright and honest ; but they leave us to consider what particular actions are required by those principles. They command us to do unto others as we would have them do to us ; but still this is not specific. A man may unreasonably wish that another should sell him a piece of goods at half its value. Does it follow that he himself ought to sell on those terms 1 The truth is, that the golden rule, like every other in Scripture, is a general maxim. It simply requires us to desire the welfare of others, as we would have them desire ours. But the specific actions answering to that rule, it leaves us to determine by a wise discretion. The dictates of that discretion, under the governance of the moral law, are the principles that we seek to discover.

Neither, on this subject, can I accept without question the teachings of the common law ; because, I find, that its ablest expounders acknowledge that its decisions are sometimes at variance with strict moral principle. I do not think it follows from this, that the general principles of the common law, are wrong, or abet wrong. Nay, I conceive that they may approach as near to rectitude as is possible in the circumstances, and yet necessarily involve some practical injustice in their operation. This results, in fact, from their very utility, their very perfection, as a body of laws. For it is requisite to their utility, that they should be general, that they should be derived from precedents and formed into rules ; else, men will not know what to depend upon, nor how to govern themselves ; and there would neither be confidence, nor order, nor society. But general rules must sometimes bear hard upon individuals ; the very law which secures justice in a thousand cases, may, and perhaps must, from the very nature of human affairs and relationships, do injustice in one. Indeed, the law of chancery, or of equity, has been devised on purpose to give relief. But oven chancery has its rules which sometimes press injuriously upon individual interests ; and no human laws can attain to a perfect and unerring administration of justice. For this perfect justice, however, we seek. We are asking what it is to do no wrong to our fellow-man, whether the law permits it or not. We are asking how we shall stand acquitted, not merely at the bar of our country, but at the bar of conscience and of God.

I must add, in fine, that questions about right and wrong in the contracts of trade, are not to be decided by any hasty impulses of feeling, or suggestions of a generous temper. I have often found men, in conversation on this subject, appealing to their feelings ; but however much I have respected those feelings, it has seemed to me, that they w T ere not the proper tribunal. Nay, they have often appeared to me to mistake the point at issue. If a merchant has a large store of provisions in a time of scarcity, would it not be a very noble and praise-worthy thing, it is said, for him to dispose of his stock, without enhancing the price ? But the proper question is not, what is generous, but what is just. And besides, he cannot be generous, or what is the same thing in effect, he cannot establish a generous principle in the distribution of his store. For if he sells in large quantities, selling, that is, at a low rate, it will avail nothing, because the subordinate dealers will raise the price. Or, if he undertakes to sell to each family what it wants ; any one of them may take the article to the next warehouse, and dispose of it at the enhanced price. On the contrary, there are circumstances, undoubtedly, in which a man may take undue advantage of a monopoly ; but this will be a case for future consideration. For the present, it is sufficient to observe, what I think must be obvious, that the great question before us is to be decided, not by any enactments of law, nor any immediate dictate of conscience, or specific teaching of Scripture, or single impulse of good feeling, but by broad and large views of the whole subject. Conscience, and Scripture, and right feeling are to govern usf but it is only under the guidance of sound reasoning.

Let me beg your indulgence to one or two further preliminary observations. The questions to be discussed are of great importance, and scarcely of less difficulty. It is hardly possible to overrate the importance of a high, and at the same time, just tone of commercial morality. I am addressing merchants and young men, who are to be the future merchants of this city and country. I am addressing them on the morality of their daily lives, on the principles that are to form their character for time, and eternity ; and while I task myself to speak with the utmost care and deliberation, I shall not be thought unreasonable, I trust, if I invite the patient attention of those who hear me, to share in the task.

There is then, on this subject, a distinction to be made between principles and rules. Principles, the principles that is to say of truth, justice and beneficence, are clear and immutable ; the only difficulty is about the application of them — i. e. about rules. Principles, I say, are to be set apart, at once and entirely, from all doubt and uncertainty. They hold their place on high, like unchanging lights in the heavens. The only question is, how, in obedience to their direction, we are faithfully and surely to work our traverse across the troubled ocean of business. Here, I say, is all the difficulty. Rules, I repeat, result from the application of principles to human conduct, and they must be affected by the circumstances to which they relate. Thus, it is an immutable principle in morals, that I should love my neighbor, my fellow-being, and desire to promote his happiness. This principle admits of no qualification ; it can suffer no abatement in any circumstances. But when I come to consider what I shall do in obedience to this principle ; what I shall do for the poor, the sick, or the distressed ; by what acts I shall show my kindness to my neighbor, or my interest in the welfare of the world, — when, in other words, I come to consider the rules of my conduct, I am obliged at once to admit doubts and difficulties. The abstract principle cannot be my law, without any regard to circumstances, though some moral reformers w r ould make it such. I must go on the right line of conduct, it is true, but where that line shall lead me, is to be determined by a fair consideration of the cases that come before me. If it is not, I shall contravene the very principle on which I am acting. If, for instance, I do nothing but give, give to the poor, I shall be doing them an injury, not a kindness. The great law of benevolence, in fact, as truly requires discretion as it enforces action.

This distinction fully applies to the subject we are about to examine. Rectitude, justice, benevolence, truth-telling, are immutable laws of trade, as they 2* are of all human conduct. There is no certain extent to which they go ; they apply without limit to every department and every transaction in business ; they are never to be contravened. But in laying down practical rules for traffic, we immediately meet with difficulties, and are obliged to leave a great deal to the honest judgment of the trader. He must do right, indeed ; that is the great law ; but what is right 1 Let us now more nearly approach this question, having narrowed it down to a question about rules, and more closely apply ourselves to the difficulties involved in it. And here, I must ask you to consider as a further and final preliminary topic, the language of the legal writers on this subject. It is common w T ith those writers to make a distinction between moral and legal justice ; or, in other words, between the demands of conscience and the decisions of their courts. Conscience, for instance, demands that a certain contract shall be annulled, because there was some concealment or deception, but the courts will not annul it, unless the injury be very great. In short, it is a matter of degrees. Up to a certain extent, the law will, in fact, protect a man in doing what is wrong, in doing that which violates his conscience ; beyond a certain extent, it will not protect him. This distinction is founded on the policy of the law, and the policy of trade. " In law," says Pothier, " a party will not be permitted to complain of slight offences, which he, with whom a contract is made, has committed against good faith ; otherwise there would be too many contracts to be rescinded ; which would open the way for too much litigation, and would derange commerce."* And again, "the

* Traits des Obligations, Part I. ch.'l. Sec 1. Ki U 3. § 3.

interests of commerce will not easily permit parties to escape from bargains which they have concluded ; they must lay the blame to their not having been better informed concerning the defects of the article sold."* And again he says, "this rule is wisely established for the security and freedom of commerce, which demand that no one should easily be off from his bargains; otherwise men would not dare to make contracts, for fear that he with whom they had bargained, should imagine that he was injured, and upon that ground (of mere imagination or pretence) should commence an action." Hence, Pothier says, that the wrong of which the courts will take cognizance, must be an enormous wrong, f

Now there is, doubtless, a certain expediency here ; a certain policy of trade, a certain policy of the law. It is expedient that a fair field be opened in business for ingenuity, sagacity and attention ; and that ignorance, indolence and neglect, should meet with loss. " The common law," says Chancellor Kent, " affords to every one, reasonable protection against fraud in dealing ; but it does not go the romantic length of giving indemnity against the consequences of indolence and folly, or a careless indifference to the ordinary and accessible means of information."J

What is the nature, and what is the amount of this concession to expediency ? Let us carefully consider this question, for much depends upon it.

Legal expediency, then, is not to be so construed as to warrant the supposition, that it lends a sanction to

* Traits du Contrat de vente, Part. II. ch. 2. Art. 2.

t Traits des Obligations, Part. I. ch. 1. Sec. 1, Art, 3. § 4.

% Commentaries, what is wrong. It may, from necessity, permit or protect fraud, but does not abet it. A man is not to consider himself an honest man, simply because the law gives him deliverance. For the law cannot take cognizance of the secret intentions, nor of slight deviations from truth. If every man who says he has got a bad bargain, and who thinks he has been cheated, could be heard in court, our tribunals would be overwhelmed with business. No human tribunal can descend to the minutiae of injustice. But the law, I repeat, does not sanction what it does not undertake to prevent, any more than the infinite providence sanctions those abuses which arise from its great law of freedom.

This being the nature of the concession to expediency — no principle being compromised — we may say, that the extent of the concession must be considerable. It is certainly expedient that every man be put upon his own discretion, sagacity and attention, for success. In business, as in every thing else, a premium is set upon these qualities by the hand of providence. It is expedient, in other words, that every man should take care of himself. Others are not to step forward at every turn to rescue him from the consequences of his indolence or inattention. The seller is not required to give his opinion to the buyer. If he knows of any defect in his merchandise, not apparent to the buyer, he is bound to state it ; but he is not required to give his opinion. The buyer has no business to ask it of him ; he is to form an opinion for himself. If he is relieved from doing this, he will always remain in a sort of mercantile childhood.