Methods of knowledge; an essay in epistemology

Preface

)ME parts of this work have already been published in articles in the philosophical journals. The germ of it is in an article that appeared in Mind for October, 1895 ; and a few of the discussions have been presented in The Philosophical Review, Education, and The International Journal of Ethics. I wish to thank the editors of these journals for the courtesy by which I have been allowed to make use of this material. The portions of it which have been selected have been in most cases considerably changed.

I wish to express my indebtedness to my brother, Professor William G. Smith, of Smith College, for criticisms and suggestions.

WALTER SMITH.

n

Introduction

1. The love of knowledge religion

3. The benefits of science .

4. The conflict of science with morality, art

5. The widespread influence of science

6. The need for a critical examination of knowledge

7. Has philosophy already made this criticism ? .

8. The assumption of science and philosophy that know

ledge consists in concepts .

9. The need to examine this assumption

10. Psychology indispensable in this criticism

11. Result of this criticism anticipated .

12. Misapprehension to be avoided

13. Plan of this investigation

PAGE 1

2 2 3 6 6 7

CHAPTER I Definition of Knowledge

1. A survey of epistemological theories necessary . . 14

2. Empedocles. "Like is known by like." This view of

knowledge characteristic of the Greek mind . . 14

3. Plato. Metaphysical theory. The vision of ideas. Unity

with the ideas 17

4. Aristotle's metaphysical theory. Definition of truth.

Knowledge by sense and by reason. Identity of thought with its object 19

5. The mysticism of Plotinus. Mysticism as a form of

knowledge-theory 21

vii viii CONTENTS

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6. Transition to modern philosophy. Contrast of spirit

and nature .23

7. Modern agnosticism 24

8. Locke 24

9. Hume. Unknown cause of impressions. Philosophical

ideas of relation 24

10. Kant. Things in themselves unknown. The categories

are not knowledge of things in themselves. Hints

toward another theory of knowledge ... 26

11. Later agnosticism 28

12. The agnostic view of knowledge 28

13. Absolute idealism. Hegel. T. H. Green ... 28

14. The element of truth in this view. Its neglect of the

problem, how individual persons and things are known. Its treatment of matter . . . .30

15. Theory of truth as consistency. Its inadequacy . . 33

16. Summary. Theories fall into two groups: one regards

knowledge of the not-self ; the other self-knowledge . 34

CHAPTER II Sensation, Feeling, and Volition as Cognitive Factors

1. The unreflecting view of the cognitive value of sensation 37

2. Distrust of the senses 38

3. The transcendental and scientific grounds of this distrust 38

4. The extent to which the criticisms of sensation are valid 40

5. Sensation is cognitive of sensation. Sensations are facts ;

not mere utilities or instruments of reason. Knowledge of them by what is like them .... 41

6. Importance of sensations as being facts of consciousness

and as largely constituting experience ... 44

7. The connection of sensation with self-knowledge . . 46

8. Feeling and volition as cognitive 47

9. Connection of the three factors to be studied ... 48 10. Relation of feeling to sensation. Study of mental growth

necessary. The emotions . . . . . .48

CONTENTS IX

11. Relation of volition to sensation. Attempts to identify

12. Testimony of physiology to psychical continuity . . 52

13. Evolution of mind 53

14. Meaning of psychical continuity 53

15. Evidence from this discussion that the mental elements

are intelligible and cognitive. Introduction to the study of concepts . . . . . . .54

CHAPTER III The Conceptual View of Knowledge

1. The history of this view to be presented ...

2. Socrates. The concept used by earlier thinkers. Soc

rates used it as the explanation of things .

3. Plato's idea. His treatment of sensation. His system

of ideas

4. Aristotle. His account of the relation between the indi

vidual and the universal. His system of concepts The place assigned to sensation ....

5. Later thinkers

6. The testimony of logic as the ethics of thought to be con

sidered

7. The account of the concept given by logic

8. The relation of the judgment to the concept .

9. The relation of the syllogism to the concept .

10. Induction and the concept. The induction of Aristotle

Modern induction. The ideas of energy and law

11. The emphasis in modern logic on the judgment

12. Summary

57 58

60 61

62 64

67 70 71

CHAPTER IV The Origin of Concepts

1. The evolution of the concept to be studied. Order of

investigation 72

2. Concept may be any sense-quality, or idea . . .78

3. Complex concept 74

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4. Concept of individual 74

5. The concept that is unlike any particular reality ; being

a first vague image that has survived ; or a composite image 75

6. The relation of the general concept to individuals : the

concept is the essence. Is it numerically repeated ? Unrerlective thinking. The doctrine of the one in the

many 77

80 80 81 81

7. Other changes in the concept

8. Substitution of words for other ideas

9. Conclusion : concepts are sensory in their origin .

10. The " categories " to be studied ....

11. The doctrine that categories are not sense-derivatives

Its basis. Its incorrectness 82

12. Particular categories to be considered .... 83

13. Space. All contents of consciousness are spatial : illus-

trated by time. Extensity may not be necessary to all experience, but belongs to human experience. The qualitative manifold. Quantity derived from quality. The study of touch, etc. , omitted. Concept of space as indicating its own origin. Its universality. In what sense it is conceptual. Conclusion reached . 83

15. Being derived from touch. Why touch is the reality-

sense. The category is a composite image. Its universality 90

16. Transition to higher categories. Ejection of inner feelings 92

17. Essence. Feeling of the strain of holding by anything . 94

18. Similarity. Not a part of the ideas of objects, but an

idea distinct from them. Probably a visceral feeling 95

19. Substance. The self-feeling or the "somatic conscious-

ness." The unknowable substrate of phenomena . 97

20. Causality. Feelings of effort 101

21. Energy and force the modern substitutes for causality . 103

22. Categories derived from observation of mind and will . 104

23. Teleology due to observation of a special sequence of

phenomena. Immanent teleology .... 104

24. The categories of self, reason, will . .... 106

CONTENTS xi

25. The categories are the products of experience. Univer-

sality of categories explained 106

26. Are the categories implicit in all experience ? Meaning

of " implicit." How can categories absent from consciousness act upon it ? The sensuous content of the categories 107

27. Kant's view of the origin of the categories considered.

The newness of each part of experience . . . 109

28. Kant's view that principles of synthesis are requisite for

experience. Sense-experience is not made of discrete units, and the act of the mind is not synthesis . . 110

CHAPTER V The Cognitive Value of Concepts

1. The problem stated 112

2. The composite image is unlike individuals . . . 112

3. The concept as an abstraction is unlike individuals . 113

4. The one in the many. The relation not found in spatial

forms, or in conscious experiences. The universal if not separate from the individuals ceases to be cognitive of any one of them 115

5. Knowledge of the universal is outside the knowledge of

the concrete 118

6. Is the individual to be known as a plexus of universals ? 118

7. The universal as synthetic is not cognitive . . .119

8. Reason and the validity of the doctrine of the one in the

many 119

9. Requisites of knowledge 120

10. Categories to be considered 121

11. Space. Its claim to universality. It does not resemble

the sense-data from which it is derived. Intensity of psychical states not truly given in quantitative terms. Is space objective ? Yes ; in other finite minds. Is it independent of the mind ? It is an idea. If objective, it is not made known by mathematics . . 121 xii CONTENTS

13. Being. Not the truth of touch-sensations. Its universal

application unwarranted : not applicable to other sensations ; or to nature 125

14. Essence. Its claim to objectivity examined . . . 127

15. Similarity is a relation that is purely mental . . . 128

16. Substance. Not the truth of the soul. Its application

to matter. Spinoza's use of the category. The scientific use of it 128

17. Causality. Its claims do not find support in conscious

experiences ; or in physical phenomena . . . 130

18. Energy. Transformations of energy ; the doctrine of

the one in the many ; the problem of transformation ; correlation of forces. Conservation of energy: a quantitative account of what is qualitative. Value of these principles for science ...... 133

19. The will in modern metaphysics . . . . 136

20. Teleology. No special efficiency in the idea of the end.

Immanent teleology not given in any experience. The

use of the category in recent philosophy . . . 137

21. Reason 139

22. The self 140

23. Concepts found to be wanting. The faith in them to be

put aside 140

24. Even if a priori in their origin, they are not cognitive . 141

25. Other criticisms of the concept 142

26. Necessities of thought. Laws of thought. Meaning of

necessity 143

27. Utility of concepts 145

CHAPTER VI Empiricism

1. Reason for estimating empiricism 147

2. The doctrine of empiricism. Natural history of mind.

Influence of evolution-theory. Recent psychology . 147

3. Its failure to deal rightly with the problem of episte-

mology. Agnosticism 149

4. Yet empiricism is not necessarily agnostic . . . 151

CONTENTS

Xlll

10. 11.

13. 14. 15.

It makes contributions to epistemology in its emphasis on sensation and the historical method

The empirical account of universals. Locke. Berkeley. The denial of universals by Hume and the later empiricists. Recent modifications of empiricism .

Even when universals are denied the method of empiricism is that of universals in disguise ....

Association of ideas. Fact of association to be distinguished from the recognition of association. The recognition is the scientific ideal of empiricism

This recognition means a return to the doctrine of categories. Coexistence. Succession. Similarity

The principles of association are not cognitive

If emphasis be put on the particular ideas that are associated together, there is offered, instead of knowledge, continual reference from one thing to another .

Empiricism fails more fatally than transcendentalism to reach the method of knowledge ....

Microscopic research

Utility of association

Examination of the claim that science seeks laws for the sake of facts, not facts for the sake of laws

159 160

162 163 163

CHAPTER VII Knowledge by Sympathetic Imitation

1. Thesis : Knowledge of the not-self is possible through

sympathetic imitation • 167

2. Illustrations of imitation in the lower animals and man . 168

3. Imitation is association 170

4. It depends on past experience 171

5. Yet habits are modified by the imagination . . .171

6. Imitation defined as a mode of perception . . .172

7. The place of the external movement in imitation. The

thought of an action is incipient action. In the child it often becomes overt action. In observing an action the child thinks it so as to act it. Hence the extent of its imitation 173

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8. Is imitation an act of will ? 177

9. Keasons for referring to the child's imitations . . 177

10. Results stated 178

11. Imitations in which muscular movement is absent or

imperceptible. They may have various physiological consequences, but are not images of motor ideas . 178

12. This method of knowledge designated the method of

sympathetic imitation 180

13. Comparison of the knowledge it offers with that offered

by science and philosophy 182.

14. Summary 184

15. The relation of imitation to utility to be considered . 184

16. Actions useful and useless : the actions of the organism

are not necessarily utilitarian 185

17. Imitation is not necessarily utilitarian. It is determined

by the object. It has now this objective character, even if it was originally utilitarian. Spencer's derivation of imitation 187

18. Imitation not due to the desire for pleasure . . . 190

19. Imitation due to growth of perceptive power. It is a

form of play 191

20. The new departure in psychical development . . . 192

21. The cognitive faculty is always imitative. Animism.

Philosophy. The true principles of imitation not observed 193

CHAPTER VIII Sympathetic Imitation in Art

1. Imitation cultivated by art 196

2. Widespread interest in art. It flourishes beside science 196

3. Art, in contrast with science, deals with the concrete . 197

4. Its treatment of the concrete : sensuous and sympathetic

art 198

5. Why sensuous art is here considered .... 199

6. Its function is to minister pleasure, but not merely to do

this 199

7. Sensuous art probably the earliest 200

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PAGE

8. Illustrations of sensuous art : colour ; sound ; muscular

sensations, etc. 200

9. Art, to reach the concrete, must also be sympathetic . 201

10. Transition from sensuous to sympathetic art . . . 202

11. Even the immediate sense-experience may be objectified

by the artist. Meaning of the sympathetic imitation

it seems to involve 202

12. Treatment of inorganic nature by sympathetic art . . 204

13. Architecture. Schopenhauer's theory of burden and

support. The character of the knowledge of this principle 204

14. How far the painter and sculptor appreciate the beauty

of a living creature by sympathetic imitation. Their presentation of the inner life is sympathetic . . 206

15. Possible objections to this interpretation of these works

of art. Yet sympathy is unmistakably present in music and poetry 208

16. Music is in part sensuous ; yet sometimes, at least, it

evokes sympathy 208

17. Poetry uses symbols which suggest conscious experiences

associated with them. The lyric expresses the poet's subjective experience : it evokes sympathy with the poet. In the epic the poet sympathizes with others. The novel. Limits of sympathy in epic and novel. Complete objectivity reached in the drama . . 209

18. Summary of results 214

19. The theory, that art is meant to give pleasure, shown to

be incorrect. Art is objective, and may even give pain. The theory of Mr. H. E. Marshall . . . 215

20. The idealistic theory. Hegel. The idea cannot be known

to sense. Unity in diversity not the distinctively aesthetic factor 217

21. Art truer than history, for history adopts the methods of

science. Truer than other sciences . . . .218

22. Yet it cannot take the place of science, for it idealizes,

and fails to give knowledge of what is actual . . 219 xvi CONTENTS

CHAPTER IX Sympathetic Imitation in Morality PAGE

1. Sympathy as the ideal of man's social relations . . 222

2. The Christian view of social duty 222

3. There is a form of love which is the pleasure of the lover.

Its legitimacy. It is not the only love. Benevolence exists even if love was originally selfish . . 223

4. But sympathy does not seem indispensable to benevo-

lence. And it is not inculcated by moralists as if it

were of supreme moment 224

5. Yet it is part of the Christian ideal 225

6. Its relation to self-regarding love 226

7. The relation of love to knowledge 226

8. Criticism of the Kantian doctrine of knowledge through

morality 227

9. Limitations of morality : it is utilitarian ; does not regard

the whole of the universe ; does not contemplate the

past 228

10. Morality and art compared 229

11. The doctrine that knowledge is a virtue .... 229

12. Result reached 230

13. Sympathy in religion 230

CHAPTER X Synthesis of the Methods

1. Need to combine the methods of science and art . . 232

2. Sense-data or phenomena to be observed . . . 233

3. Coexistences and sequences of sense-data. The true

rendering of the concept 234

4. Space and time not to be taken as metaphysical entities,

but as the empirical forms of experience . . . 235

6. Space and time described as symbols .... 236

6. Other categories have a symbolic value .... 238

7. Reality is that which is matter for knowledge. F. H.

Bradley's definition of the judgment .... 238

8. Substance indicates a certain coexistence . . . 240

CONTENTS xvii

PAGE

9. Causality indicates the order of phenomena . . . 241

10. The laws of energy refer to the order of phenomena . 241

11. Essence ; similarity ; teleology 241

12. Summary of the conclusions in regard to concepts as

symbols 242

13. The meaning of the universality of laws . . . 242

14. Restatement of need for synthesis of science with method

of sympathetic imitation 243

15. Kant's theory of knowledge. Space and time are forms

of sense. The function of thought is to unite or synthetize this material 244

16. The value of this account of science .... 245

17. Yet thought is not merely synthesis. Kant's treatment

of the analogies 245

18. Kant's "intuitive understanding." Its function is dis-

charged by sympathy 247

19. The validity of the distinction between phenomena and

things in themselves 249

20. The synthesis of the methods in the light of the develop-

ment of intellect 251

21. The synthesis as applied to the relations of mind and

brain 252

22. Correlation of physical and psychical states. Doctrine

of parallelism 253

23. Meaning of the parallelism : both series of facts are

conscious facts ' . . . 254

24. The place to be assigned to matter. "Double-aspect"

metaphysical theory 255

25. How is knowledge of the person observed to be gained ?

It is ideally complete in scientific observation of his brain and sympathetic imitation of the associated conscious states . . 257

26. Is there not a science of these conscious states ? Falsity

of psychology 257

27. Apparent inconsistency of discrediting the categories

and at the same time representing them as essential to knowledge. The categories are used as symbols, but into the truth gained by sympathy they do not, xviii CONTENTS

PAGE

as universals, directly enter. Further, they may be used for the overthrow of their own claim to be the

absolute truth 259

28. Categories are necessary because of human finitude . 261

CHAPTER XI The Limits of Knowledge

1. Is this method of knowledge practicable ? 262

2. Idealistic claim to absolute knowledge. Its rejection . 262

3. Agnosticism. Its general principle .... 263

4. Kant's agnosticism. Its connection with his view of the

function of thought. Its derivation from the idea of substance. The contradiction involved in it . . 263

5. Spencer's arguments : the absolute exists out of relation ;

and cannot be classed 265

6. The agnosticism of positivism 267

7. Dogmatic agnosticism being unjustifiable, the practical

difficulties in the way of knowledge must be considered 268

8. How far the knowledge of a thing is changed by a know-

ledge of the whole of which the thing is a part . . 269

9. The knower cannot in knowledge pass beyond his

conscious states. Yet these may be a copy of the not-self 271

10. Infinite minuteness needed in the knowledge of any

phenomenon. Knowledge of the brain. Memory. Element of uncertainty in the problem ; Weber's law. The difficulties are practically those which science has to face in its effort to know a concrete fact 272

11. Distinction between method and its application. By

aiming at sympathetic imitation we move toward truth 276

12. Application to the various orders of being. Extent of

sympathy with other men ; with animals . . . 276

13. Knowledge of our own bodies 278

CONTENTS xix

PAGE

14. Sympathy with inorganic nature. Doctrine that matter

is sentient. Poetical view 279

15. Possible extension of sympathy in the future . . . 281

Chapter XII

1. The method of sympathetic imitation may apply to a

man's knowledge of his past, but not to present self-consciousness 282

2. Need to examine the doctrine of self-consciousness which

implies that there is a distinct idea of the self as a separate entity 282

3. This distinction not found at the beginning of the con-

scious life 283

4. Its development. Its prominence in the life of practical

activity 283

5. It may be absent in intellectual activity .... 284

6. It is a particular idea, and may be excluded by other

ideas. There is a sense in which it is specially persistent 285

7. It is not necessarily present in its complete form as the

centre to which experience is referred . . . 286

8. Even when it is present, it does not give knowledge of

the self 287

9. The transcendental doctrine of the self as a universal

given in its particular experiences .... 288

10. Self-consciousness not a cognition that imitates the de-

tails of experience 288

11. Self-consciousness explained : conscious states are self-

conscious 289

12. Confirmation of this view by reference to sympathetic

imitation 290

13. Knowledge of the self not in psychological concepts

more than in any conscious state. Kant's "intuitive understanding" 290

14. How far subjective idealism is justified , . . . 292

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15. The absoluteness of self-knowledge 292

16. All knowledge is in a sense self-knowledge. How the

self is transcended. Individuality preserved, yet unity with others. Lotze's view of the relation between knowledge and its object .... 292

17. The tendency in human life to individuality, and the

tendency to sympathy 296

18. Definition of knowledge recalled 297

CHAPTER XUI The Philosophical Problem

1. Epistemology is part of philosophy 298

2. It is the foundation of philosophy. Some theory of

knowledge is always adopted by philosophy. Influence of epistemology illustrated by reference to the history of philosophy. The present doctrine of knowledge may bear on the philosophical problem . 298

3. The function which has historically been assigned to

philosophy must be studied, and its true function discovered 300

4. Philosophy ceased early to be merely practical . . 301

5. The claim of philosophy in relation to the special sci-

ences. The science of the sciences .... 301

6. Materialism. Its prevalence 303

7. Materialism and physical science. The achievements

and hopes of science 304

8. The successful explanation of the physical world. Me-

chanical energy 305

9. Materialism and the organic world 305

10. Materialism and human consciousness .... 306

11. Summary of materialistic claims ..... 307

12. Criticism of materialism, as offering a system of concepts ;

and as being self-contradictory in its account of

knowledge 307

13. Dualism. Partly materialism. Partly an implicit idealism 308

14. Idealism. Its criticism of conception of matter . . 309

CONTENTS xxi

PAGE

15. Undeveloped forms of idealism 310

16. Developed systems of idealism. Hegel. The Absolute

is self-consciousness. The process of thought is necessary. Relation of the Absolute to human experience. The place of science. Philosophy as science

of the sciences 310

17. How far idealism is justified by epistemology . . 313

18. Idealism has sought knowledge in categories . . . 314

19. Claim of Hegel that he presents the concrete , . . 314

20. Empirical origin of the categories recalled. No necessary

connection among them 315

21. The failure of philosophy illustrated by Hegel . . 316

22. True function of philosophy. It is not a system of the

universe 317

23. Philosophy is not an explanation of things . . .317

24. It gives the ideal of thought 31 8

25. It gives the method of knowledge 319

26. Can truth be exhausted ? 320

CHAPTER XIV Practical Applications

1. The practical questions to be considered . . . 322

2. The effect on scientific work. Science may be merely

utilitarian 322

3. As truth-seeking it is imperfect by itself. Need for a

poetical science 323

4. Lesson for art. Rhyming philosophy not needed. The

place that abstractions may have in poetry . . 324

5. Is a scientific treatise a poem ? 325

6. Influences that affect poetry and pervert it 327

7. The dependence of poetry on sympathetic imitation . 328

8. The sensuous function of art. The revelation of the self 328

9. Education. Its aims 330

10. Place of utility 330

11. Utility in its relation to truth. Its ministry to self-

consciousness 331 xxii CONTENTS

PAGE

12. Education in the truth of other things .... 332

13. Science and truth. Emerson's view .... 332

14. The educational curriculum. Classics versus science . 333

15. The "humanities" deal with the subjects most accessi-

ble to human knowledge 335

16. Literature often a pretext for scientific study . . 335

17. Absence of truth-giving literature 336

18. Cultivation of the faculty of sympathetic imitation . 336

19. The moral life. The inspiration of examples . . . 337

20. Is knowledge always desirable ? 339

21. Is knowledge of other things an end in itself ? . . 339

INTRODUCTION

1. "Who loves not knowledge?" "The desire to know," says Aristotle, the master of them that know, " is natural with all men, and an evidence of this is the love we bear our senses, they being loved for themselves alone even apart from their practical use ; " and he further finds that man has his perfect happiness in the exercise of his rational faculty. Aristotle in ascribing supreme value to truth is only expressing the conviction of very many of the sages of antiquity.

Knowledge is desired not less earnestly in modern times. The zeal shown in its pursuit is one of the remarkable characteristics of the present age. It would be too much to say that the love for science and philosophy is greater now than in ancient times. It would be difficult to match the enthusiasm of Plato or Aristotle. There was, similarly, an ardour in the love of the early Christians, which in the present day is seldom, if ever, reproduced. There

B 1 is generally a glow in the zeal of pioneers which their successors do not exhibit. Yet the work of the pioneers, if it prove of value, can still call for devotion and sacrifice. Christianity is probably more fruitful now than at any period in its history. And, likewise, the devotion of modern workers for knowledge, if less rapturous than that of its first great apostles, is not less capable of disinterestedness. Some may say with Spinoza and Hegel that knowledge is the highest ideal of life ; and many, who hesitate to go so far in words, show that they are offering their lives on the altar of science.

2. Not less remarkable is the modern advance of knowledge. Many questions which baffled the ancients have been answered. Many illusions which dazzled them have passed away. Moreover, many problems in mental and physical science of which they did not dream have presented themselves and have received their solution. The conquests of science are among the greatest achievements of modern times.

'3. The knowledge thus gained is gradually working a revolution in the world. The advantages attending the revolution are apparent. By means of science man is able to control nature and to increase the comfort of life. The discoveries of physics are followed by mechanical inventions ; the researches

INTRODUCTION 3

of the physiologist and pathologist are made tributary to the medical art ; psychology teaches how the mind should be trained. In every sphere of life it is being found that science is giving men new and better methods of living. Even in the redemption of those who are evil the procedure is becoming more scientific. The crimes of men are not regarded as the expression of an inexplicable freedom, as if a thunderbolt had fallen from a clear sky, but are traced back to physical and mental antecedents ; and this knowledge of their relations is turned to account in the work of reformation and prevention. Moreover, science is inducing a certain habit of mind in the contemplation of the universe. The world is no longer thought of as full of capricious and malevolent powers. Everywhere there is felt to be order and unchanging law. Light has come into the world, and superstition and other creatures of the night have vanished. And many other benefits might be credited to science. If these are the works of knowledge, who would not love her. "Let her mix with men and prosper." 4. This revolution, however, has phases of a more doubtful kind. The knowledge which is most eagerly sought is of the kind yielded by the positive sciences. These sciences profess to offer nothing but facts and the principles or laws on which these facts may be strung. A system of Positive Philosophy is thought to present the sum of knowledge. There has consequently come into view a certain want of harmony between science and other important human interests.

Thus it seems to come into conflict with the moral consciousness. It represents man as simply part of the world of phenomena, woven like everything else into the network of causes and effects, or sequences and coexistences. It considers him only in these relations, and finds in him no other value. Further, science shows its opposition to morality in its neglect of human emotions. Even when these are considered by the science of psychology, they are studied in that dry light which Bacon commended ; they are viewed simply in their casual connection with other facts. It is charged against the scientific man that he can " peep and botanize upon his mother's grave."

There is a similar opposition between science and art. There is, indeed, a sense in which science helps art, even as it helps morality. When science cultivates close attention to the details of objects, the art which aims at the faithful reproduction of the appearance which things present to the senses is promoted. But when art claims to find pleasure in the colours and sounds of the world, science is