The Russians at the gates of Herat

Front matter

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Preface

In my " Russian Advance Towards India," published in 1882, I made these remarks : " In my writings on Russia I try to be impartial. I know I have a greater love for Russia, the country of my youth, and a better appreciation of the Russian people, than the so-called i Russophile ' traders in politics, who lauded her indiscriminately in 1877, from motives of self or party interest, and abandoned her afterwards to false attacks ; and the public know, from my writings, that I am a vigilant and anxious observer of the Russian advance towards India. I am thus, I suppose, both a Russophile and a Russophobe. As for my local opinions, my youth was passed in a country which has no political parties corresponding with our Liberal and Conservative factions, and does not want them ; while my studies have led me to survey politics from the standpoint of one who considers himself more in the light of a citizen of the English Empire — of that great empire that embraces the live empires of England, of Canada, of Australia, of South Africa, and of India — than merely a Liberal or Conservative Englishman of Lesser England only.

IV PREFACE.

Being, in this sense, an Imperialist, and a non-party writer, I claim immunity from any charge of unduly favoring Liberal or Conservative policy in my remarks on the Central Asian Question. At the same time, I would have it with equal clearness understood, that the opinions expressed are not merely the heedless and ephemeral views of an irresponsible writer, but the deep conviction of one who is conscious that they may some day be called up against him, in other spheres than that of Journalism and Literature."

These remarks cover all that I need say by way of a preface to the present volume, except that the entire work having been written and got out in eight days, I may ask indulgence for any errors that may have escaped my eye in the volume.

CHARLES MARVIN.

Grosvenor House,

Plumstead Common, Kent, March 23d, 1885.

CONTE NTS

Chapter I. How Alikhanoff First Went To Merv

The landing of the Russians at Krasnovodsk— Early Turcoman campaigns— Alikhanoff joins Lomakin's army as a private soldier—Acts as special correspondent of the Moscow Gazette— Skobeleff 's siege of Geok Tepe— Russia determines to secure a military survey of Merv— Alikhanoff proceeds to the oasis disguised as a trader— How he obtained plans of the fortress- Persuades Makdum Kuli, the principal Merv warrior, to attend the Czar's coronation at Moscow Page I

Chapter II. The Swoop Upon Merv

Russia, angry at our continued occupation of Egypt, resolves to seize the gates of Herat — Secret concentration of troops at points commanding Merv — Colonel Muratoff goes to the Tejend oasis "to return," but remains — Sudden appearance of Lieutenant Alikhanoff at Merv — The intrigues resulting in the acceptance of the Suzerainty of Russia — Russia promises to place only one officer in the oasis — Sudden advance of the Tejend force behind the Askabad deputation of chiefs — The Merv Tekkes hurriedly resist, but are defeated, and the Russians enter the fortress — Alikhanoff made governor of Merv Page 24 vi CONTENTS.

Chapter III. The Advance To The Gates Of Herat

General Petrusevitch's secret survey of Afghanistan in 1878 — His suggestion that Russia, after occupying Merv, should insert a wedge between Herat and Meshed — Concentration of troops at Merv — General Komaroff seizes Old Sarakhs — Alikhanoff 's intrigues with the Sarik Turcomans — His attempt on Penjdeh — Lumsden finds the Russians advancing up the Hari Rud, and posted at Pul-i-Khatun — Russia delays the despatch of General Zelenoi in order to push further toward Herat — Occupation of the Zulfikar Pass, Ak Robat, and Pul-i-khisti Page 49

Chapter IV. The Question Of The Boundaries

Russia's claim to the gates of Herat— The original agreement between England and Russia as to the Afghan frontier— The disputed territory— Discrepancies in English official maps— The frontier generally recognised by the two countries — Skobeleff's map of Merv and Herat, showing what Russia regarded as the frontier in 1881 — Lessar's mission to London — The Russian claims impartially considered Page 79

Chapter V. How Herat Is The Key Of India

Misconceptions respecting Herat — What Russian and English generals really mean when they call it the Key of India — The midway camping-ground between the Caspian and India — Russia's intrusion on the camping-ground — Character of the country claimed or occupied by Russia — Impossibility of severing it from Herat — No mountain barrier whatever between Herat and the new Russian outposts — The tribes on the Russo-Afghan frontier — Russia's design on Afghan Turkestan Page 96

CONTENTS. Vii

Chapter VI

skobeleff's plan for THE INVASION OF INDIA.

Skobeleff's great aim in life — The solution of the Eastern Question on the Indian frontier — His plan for invading India in 1876 — Adopted before the walls of Constantinople in 1878 — Kaufmann's advance toward India — Great changes in Central Asia since — Were Skobeleff alive, his plan would be totally different now — What it would probably be— Feasibility of the invasion of India from the point of view of various Russian generals Page 126

Chapter VII. The Russian Railway To Herat And India

The advance of the Russian locomotive — Immense changes it will occasion in Central Asia — Inevitable junction of the Indian and European railway systems via Candahar and Herat — Only £4,000,000 needed to complete the link — Charing Cross to India in nine days — Statistics of the line Page 149

Chapter VIII. The Future Of The Afghan Barrier

Impossibility of maintaining the Afghan barrier as it is — The Sepoy must confront the Cossack — The expansion of Russia — Will Russia let us garrison Herat ? — Skobeleff's Afghan programme — England must herself organize the Afghan frontier, and man it with troops Page 164

LIST OF MAPS AND PORTRAITS.

Map of the Russo-Afghan Region <. .Frontispiece.

General Kouropatkin Face page 8

Major Alikhanoff " 36

General Alexander Komaroff " 56

Major-General Sir Peter Stark Lumsden,

Map showing the disputed Territories " 84

Lord Dufferin " 182

The Russians at the Gates of Herat.

Chapter I. How Alikhanoff First Went To Merv

The landing of the Russians at Krasnovodsk— Early Turcoman campaigns — Alikhanoff joins Lomakin's army as a private soldier — Acts as special correspondent of the Moscow Gazette — Skobeleff's siege of Geok Tepe — Russia determines to secure a military survey of Merv — Alikhanoff proceeds to the oasis disguised as a trader — How he obtained plans of the fortress — Persuades Makdum Kuli, the principal Merv warrior, to attend the Czar's coronation at Moscow.

There are two Russian movements in the direction of India. One originated at Orenburg, and had for its objective Cabul. Commencing before the Crimean war it rapidly developed itself afterward, and engulfed in succession the Kirghez tribes and the khanates of Khokand, Bokhara, and Khiva. Practically speaking, this movement ceased shortly before the last Turkish war, and has. not been continued since. The interest in Turkestan for the moment, therefore, being purely historical, we may exclude an account of the advance in the direction of Cabul from this volume.

The second movement was from the Caspian, and had for its objective Herat. A deal of confusion and bad statesmanship has arisen from confounding this advance with that made from Orenburg and Tashkent. The troops have been always different, the officials different, and conditions regulating the advance different. We have only to specify one popular error to show how essential it is that the public should clearly realize the difference between the two movements. For instance, it is often said that colossal mountain ranges bar the Russian advance to the Indian frontier. This is quite true as regards troops marching from Tashkent and Samarcara upon Cabul and Peshawur. The lofty Hindoo Koosh, that must be traversed to reach the Ameer's capital, ranges in height from 15,000 to 20,000 feet. But there is nothing of the kind between the Caspian and Herat, nor yet again between Herat and the Indo- Afghan frontier. Setting out from Krasnovodsk, a Russian could drive a four-in-hand all the way to the Indian frontier near Quetta.

If this fact be clearly borne in mind, the reader will readily understand how rapid the Russian advance has been since Skobeleff broke down the Turcoman barrier, and how essential it is that the disadvantage of there being no physical obstacle to a powerful military movement from the Caspian should not be enhanced by allowing Russia to secure the great midway camping ground of Herat.

In the time of Peter the Great, and again in the reign of Nicholas, Russia seized points on the East Caspian Coast, but the so-called Caspian advance toward India did not definitely commence until a descent was made upon Krasnovodsk in 1869. In the autumn of that year a flotilla left the Caucasus port of Petrovsk, and landed on the opposite side of the Caspian a few Cossacks and infantrymen, and half a dozen guns. Attached to this expedition were three men who subsequently figured prominently in Central Asian history. One was Stolietoff, the envoy Russia sent to Cabul in 1878, the second Grodekoff, who made a famous ride to Herat in the same year, and the third Captain Skobeleff, then a harum-scarum subaltern.

" We made a great mistake when we landed at Krasnovodsk," said the latter to me, shortly before his death. " Instead of going ahead we dawdled about, reconnoitring the country. A strong forward movement was not approved of by the Government. The result was, we gradually taught the Turcomans how to fight, and at last they fought so well that it needed a series of great campaigns to crush them."

Our space is too limited to describe in detail those reconnoitrings and skirmishes which, during the period from 1869 to 1878, converted the Tekke Turcoman from an undisciplined horseman into a skilful builder of big redoubts. No headway whatever was made after Skobeleff left in 1873 to join the expedition to Khiva, and a long series of reverses culminated in a crushing defeat and rout of the Russians at Geok Tepe in the autumn of 1879.

This was the campaign in which two notable personages participated — Mr. Edmund O 'Donovan, and Private Alikhanoff. The former was attached to General Lazareff's force, and spent the whole of the summer in the Caspian. Unluckily he fell ill when the advance took place, and was thus debarred from seeing anything of the fighting. What we know of the campaign is mainly derived from the letters of a few Russians attached to the force. The best appeared in the columns of the Moscow Gazette, and were signed " Arsky." The writer was Alikhanoff, the present Governor of Merv.*

This Alikhanoff is a very remarkable man. He was born at Baku, and by birth is a Daghestani. Russia's Asiatic subjects have a happy way of identifying themselves with their masters, which our language renders impossible in the case of India— they turn their names into Russian ones, by placing an " off " (son) at the end of them. Alikhanoff is simply Ali Khan, with an " off " added to it. When Sir Peter Lumsden proceeded to the Afghan frontier, he took with him from London a very accomplished Indian official as interpreter, also, curiously enough, one "Ali Khan." But England had failed to effect such a transformation in her Ali Khan as Russia has with hers. I saw him depart from Charing Cross. He was highly educated and thoroughly devoted to England ; but he had never thought of identifying himself with us by changing his name from Ali Khan into Mr. Alikhanson, or, better still, Mr. Alison.

The case is totally different in Russia's Asiatic provinces. The people not only identify themselves with the Russians, but the Russians identify themselves with the people Englishmen would never think of, placing their home army under a Sikh or a Mahratta, or permitting a Bengali to become a Cabinet Minister. An Indian has practically no career in England ; on the other hand, every avenue in Russia is open to the Caucasian. The Armenian, Louis Melikoff, rises there to a

* See " The Disastrous Russian Campaign against the Turcomans." London: W. H. Allen and Co., 1880.

position next to that of the Czar. Generals Tergoukasoff and Lazareff, two other Asiatics, commanded Russian troops in the Turkish war of 1877-78, and when Alikhanoff accomplished his famous raid upon Merv, the exploit is extolled as a Russian exploit, and not as the achievement of a mere native.

Alikhanoff received a good education, and developed a remarkable talent for drawing. Skilful with pen and pencil, had he lived in England he would have doubtless become one of the foremost correspondents of the day. At an early age he entered the army, and after serving in the Khivan expedition as a captain of the cavalry under Skobeleff, received the appointment of aide-decamp to the Grand Duke Michael, Viceroy of the Caucasus. At the close of the Turkish war he suddenly fell into disgrace. A quarrel occurred between him and a superior officer, and he challenged him to fight a duel. The true particulars of this affair have never publicly transpired. Some say Alikhanoff was a boisterous officer, given to insulting people when in his cups, others that his superior officer was a scamp, hated by everybody in the regiment. Whichever story was current, Alikhanoff was tried by court-martial, deprived of all his appointments and decorations, and reduced to the condition of a common soldier.

" You need to measure soldiers by a different standard from that which you apply to civilians," said Skobeleff to the writer in 1882. " I have had much experience in warfare, and have found that the men who fight best are precisely those who are apt to be troublesome in time of peace. A government should be always very indulgent to its troops in time of peace. Those who are most difficult to deal with in time of peace often prove to be the best fighters in time of war."

Skobeleffs remarks referred to General Valentine Baker, whom he characterised as our " one good general." We were discussing the different modes of treating officers in disgrace adopted by England and Russia. In England we dismiss an officer who has made a false step from the army, and however good a man he may be professionally, he is practically lost to the country. In Russia, on the other hand, he is simply reduced to the ranks, stripped of his titles, and sent to some frontier district in Asia to serve as a private soldier. Such a man naturally becomes a desperado, and forms capital material for leaders of the stamp of Alikhanoff. In many cases they retrieve their reputation, and it is the custom, if they display extraordinary courage, or render any particular service, to restore them at a stroke to their former position. This was done in the case of Alikhanoff, when he successfully accomplished his swoop upon Merv. It is obvious that the presence of such inflammable materials on the Russian frontier is even far more dangerous to peace than the predatory characteristics of the Afghan tribes Russian diplomats make so much fuss about.

Alikhanoff fell into disgrace about the time General Lomakin returned to the Caspian from an unsuccessful attack upon the Tekke stongholds in Akhal. He at once elected to be sent to Tchikishlar to join the expedition General Lazareff was preparing to lead against the tribesmen. There he met O'Donovan, and one of the last letters that lamented correspondent wrote to me before proceeding to the Soudan contained a request that I should give his hearty wishes to Alikhanoff if I met him during my journey in the Caspian. He said Alikhanoff was a "capital fellow, a brave and capable soldier, and much liked in the camp."

During this campaign Alikhanoff attained the highest rank as a non-commissioned officer. When Skobeleff arrived the following year to retrieve the broken fortunes of the Lazareff-Lomakin expedition, he was accorded every opportunity of distinguishing himself. However, attached to the force were so many heroes, as dashing as himself, that his exploits were lost among the crowd of great achievements.

The history of Skobeleff 's siege of Geok Tepe yet remains to be written. . O 'Donovan saw nothing of it, except the final rout through a telescope from a hill on the Perso-Turcoman frontier. Hence he left it undescribed in his book on Merv. None the less, it was a campaign full of exciting incident, and a clear account of it would be very popular in this country.

Retreating from their line of settlements, stretching along the Akhal frontier, from Kizil Arvat to Geok Tepe, the Tekkes collected to the number of 40,000 families at the latter place, and forming a camp, with tents pitched closely one against the other, built round it a huge clay wall, reminding the Russians of an immense railway embankment. The defence was mainly controlled by two chiefs, Mahdum Kuli Khan and Tekme Sardar. The latter had submitted to Russia the year before, but being badly treated by Lomakin, had fled the camp and joined his countrymen afresh. There he instructed in the art of building rapidly large earthworks, after the manner he had observed practised by the Russians during their advance.

The expedition the previous year had been despatched up the Atrek river, from its mouth at Tchikishlar. Skobeleff changed the base to Krasnovodsk, or more properly to Port-Mechaelovsk, a small harbor on the southeast side of Krasnovodsk, and considerably nearer Akhal. It is from this point that the railway now runs in the direction of India.

At that time the Turcoman barrier was considered so difficult to break down that Russia was ready to resort to extraordinary efforts to hasten the submission of the tribes. During the debates on Candahar, Lord Salisbury said that he had always believed that the Turcoman barrier would last his lifetime. Even in Russia, so severe was the resistance apprehended, that General Tergoukasoff, Skobeleff 's predecessor, did not think that the barrier could be broken with less than three years' hard fighting. To quicken matters, Russia therefore selected Skobeleff for the task, and very wisely gave him .carte blanche as to the resources he was to employ to accom, plish it.

Stowed away in the magazines at Bender, on the south-west frontier, were one hundred miles of railway, which Russia had purchased to use in the Balkan campaign in the event of a failure of the Berlin Congress. At Skobeleff's request, the material was shifted to the Caspian, and laid down in the direction of Geok Tepe\ In this casual manner originated the Russian railway to India, which has effected so many changes in Central Asia, and promises to completely revolutionize the relations of England and Russia with the region.

The railway, however, proved of very little service in the actual campaign, and we must, therefore, reserve an account of it for a future chapter. While.it was being built Skobeleff pushed on a force to Bami, the first

General Kouropatkin.

stronghold of any size in the Akhal oasis, and there gradually accumulated the munitions of war and food supplies essential for the siege. When everything was ready he advanced to Geok Tep£, and, seizing a fortified point close to the walls, commenced attack upon the fortress.

The Tekke stronghold was fully as difficult to take as the Russians had expected. Their artillery made no impression with the huge clay rampart ; they had to resort to every form of siege operations to reduce the fortress. The conflict lasted nearly a month, during which the Russians suffered heavy losses, and expert enced severe privations. Step by step, however, Skobeleff pushed his way entil he got close enough to sink a mine, which was carried to the foot of the rampart. At the same time, his 69 guns fired daily from 100 to 500 shots into the place, and the expenditure of ammunition by the infantry ranged from 10,000 to 70,000 rounds a day.

The brunt of the attack fell upon General Kouropatkin, commanding the Turkestan Contingent. As this officer is spoken of as likely to command the Russian arms, in the event of a conflict at the gates of Herat, it may be well to take advantage of the opportunity to say a few words about him.

Among rising Russian generals, there is probably no one more admired by the army than Kouropatkin. He was Skobeleff's right hand man in most of his campaigns. He served with him in the Khivan expedition, and in the Khokandese campaign. He acted as chief of his staff at Plevna, and during the march upon Constantinople, and he exercised immediate control, under Skobeleff, of the forces before Geok Tepe\

When Skobeleff was appointed to the charge of the army against the Turcomans, one of his first acts was to telegraph to Kouropatkin, then in the Kuldja frontier, to join him with a contingent of Turkestan troops. His march across Central Asia excited universal admiration at the time. After being weeks on the road, proceeding from Tashkent to Khiva, Kouropatkin had to accomplish a difficult march across the desert, by a route almost unknown, to the concentrating point of Bami. General Annenkoff was at Bami at the time and went out to meet him. " Kouropatkin," he said to me, in dilating enthusiastically on this achievement — " Kouropatkin had been twenty-six days marching over a sandy and waterless desert ; yet his force marched in clean and trim, and as fresh as a daisy."

When, at the invitation of Skobeleff's friends, I accompanied the funeral party, conveying the body of that great hero from Moscow to its last resting-place at Spasskoe Selo, in South Russia, in 1882, I was thrown for several days among Skobeleff's favorite officers ; and more than once I heard a controversy among them as to whether Kouropatkin was not almost as good a leader as their lost general. " Kouropatkin," said a Turkestan officer to me during one of these discussions, " possesses all the characteristics of Skobeleff, cast in a cooler mould. They worked admirably together, Kouropatkin imparting coolness and calculation to Skobeleff, and Skobeleff fire and enthusiasm to Kouropatkin. I am quite desolate now that Skobeleff is gone " — here his eyes filled with tears — " but it is a consolation to all of us that we have still got Kouropatkin. He is now the Skobeleff of Russia."

During the first few days succeeding Skobeleff's death

HOW ALIKHANOFF FIRST WENT TO MERV. II

a strong and angry feeling prevailed in Russia against the Government. It was felt that the deceased hero's merits had never been properly appreciated by the State, and I encountered various officers at Moscow who were persuaded he had been poisoned. To appease the army the Emperor felt he could not do better than summon Kouropatkin from Central Asia and give him a high appointment at home. Since then he has been treated as a favorite at Court, and, if he has secured no notoriety abroad, it is simply because he has always devoted himself to his profession and left politics alone. Skobeleff had in him all the elements of a great statesman as well as of a great general. His political influence was becoming positively embarrassing to the Czar's ministers when he died. Kouropatkin has never sought to form a party in Russia — he is quite content to be a great general, and nothing more.

During the siege of Geok Tepe he had charge of the advanced positions and displayed extraordinary coolness and courage. Unobtrusive almost to a fault, he carefully supervised the mechanical parts of the siege operations, while Skobeleff applied himself to keeping the troops in that rollicking, reckless mood he considered so valuable in the presence of the enemy. Seated at the mouth of the mine, Skobeleff used to time the progress of the sappers underground tunneling in the direction of the fortress. If the officer in charge accomplished the specified portion in less than the time fixed, he was kissed and caressed, and perhaps treated to champagne or vodky ; if- the reverse was the case, he was roundly abused before all the soldiers.

Throughout the greater part of the siege Alikhanoff, who was now a cornet of the Pereslaff Dragoons, was employed in foraging operations, or reconnoitring that portion of the fortress facing the desert, which was uninvested by the Russians.

At length the day of the assault arrived. More than a ton of gunpowder was laid at the head of the mine, immediately under the rampart, and, on being fired, laid bare a broad entrance into the enemy's defences. Through this, and another breach made by the artillery, the Russians rushed into the place, and perpetrated all the horrors usual when orders are given to infuriated and semi-barbarous troops to give no quarter to either sex.

Even when the Turcomans, no longer offering resistance, streamed out in a disorderly mob across the desert in the direction of Merv, men, women, and children mingled together, no mercy was shown to them. Artillery followed in their rear, and mowed them down, until darkness put an end to the pursuit. During that short few hours' chase the 1,000 pursuing Russians slaughtered 8,000 of the fugitives. Hundreds of women were saved. 6,500 bodies were also afterward found under the fortress. At Kertch the year before last I met an Armenian Jew, Samuel Gourovitch, who had accompanied as interpreter a secret Russian mission to Cabul in 1882, and was present at the sack of Geok Tepe. He told me that the carnage was fearful.

" One thousand Russians cut down 8,000 Turcomans in a few hours. The whole country was covered with corpses. The morning after the battle they lay in rows, like freshly mown hay, as they had been swept down by the mitrailleurs and artillery. I myself saw babies bayoneted or slashed to pieces. Many women were ravished before being killed."

" But Skobeleff told me that not a woman had been dishonored."

" Lots were," he replied, energetically. " They were ravished by the soldiers before my eyes. Skobeleff may not have known it. I could tell you many horrible things that took place ; but (tapping his lips significantly) it is better to be silent in this world. The plunder at Geok Tepe was immense. The troops were allowed to get drunk, plunder, and kill for three days after the assault."

During the assault, and in the subsequent pursuit, the infantry engaged fired 273,804 rounds, the cavalry 12,510, and the artillery 5,864 rounds; 224 military rockets were also expended. The total loss of the Turcomans during the siege was estimated by Skobeleff at 20,000. In other words half the defenders perished.

The two leaders, Tekme Sardar and Makdum Kuli, escaped, and fled to Merv. Pushing on their rear, Skobeleff occupied Askabad, the capital of the Akhal Tekkes, twenty-seven miles east of Geok Tepe, and despatched Kouropatkin thence almost half-way to the Merv oasis. It was these reconnoitrings of Kouropatkin that occasioned so much excitement at the time. The belief was general that Skobeleff would occupy Merv.

It is almost unnecessary to state that he did not ; but it is well to disperse any doubts that may exist as to the reason he did not push on any further. It is generally supposed that a disinclination to displease England, and a desire to keep his promises, caused the Emperor to restrain the ardor of Skobeleff. This is a mistake. By the terrific blow he struck the Akhal Tekkes at Geok Tepe, Skobeleff shattered to pieces the Turcoman barrier Lord Salisbury had fondly believed would last his lifetime ; but he was too mauled to reap the full advantage of it for the moment. He only had a striking force of 2,000 men after he occupied Askabad, and having used up nearly all his ammunition during the siege, he was not in a condition to push on to an unknown oasis, and expose himself to a repetition of the hard knocks he had received at Geok Tepe.

So he returned home ; but before he left Akhal an incident occurred which shows what a deep personal interest he took in the Central Asian Question. In spite of Russia's avowed intention of keeping the country she had won, and notwithstanding that the Turcoman barrier had been shattered, the English Government decided to evacuate Afghanistan. The ablest English writers on the Russo-Indian Question were averse to surrendering Candahar, but the Government persisted in its policy, and it received the warmest concurrence of the Marquis of Ripon.

Speaking at Leeds, on January 28, 1885, the Ex- Viceroy said : " We withdrew at a time which suited our purpose, and which we believed to be to the advantage of the Afghan people ; and as our troops marched away with steady steps from Candahar, no voice was lifted against us, and no dog barked at our heels."

Yet, as a matter of fact, a voice was lifted against us, and poisoned the motives of our departure. That voice was Skobeleff's. In an official account of Skobeleffs campaign, General Grodekoff, the chief of his staff at Geok Tepe, has just published, the following passage occurs : " To raise Russia's prestige in Central Asia and to depress that of England, General Skobeleff sent native agents into the bazaars of Central Asia to spread throughout the region the report that it was the White Czar who had compelled England to evacuate Afghanistan."

Such a revelation cannot be very pleasing to those who held at the time that we were conciliating Russia by evacuating Candahar. As a matter of fact, our retirement encouraged the Russians to advance. They thought we had had enough of Afghanistan and would never enter the country any more. In an official Russian account of the war which I have in my possession, and which is to be found in every military library in Russia, the writer, General Skobeleff, asserts that we retired because we were so repeatedly defeated by the Afghans ; that the people of India were excited to a mutinous condition by our disasters. If our army had not fallen back in time the whole of India would have risen against us !