The grounds of theistic and Christian belief

Front matter

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

GEORGE P. FISHER, D.D., LL.D.

Chapter I. The Personality Of God And Of Man

Page.

The Two Beliefs Associated . . 1

The Essentials of Personality 2

The Reality of Self 2

Self-determination 3

Theories of Necessity and Determinism 6

The Codsciousness of Moral Law 18

Religion not of Empirical Origin 19

H. Spencer on the Origin of Religion 21

The Feelings of Dependence and of Obligation 26

The Consciousness of God and Self-consciousness .... 28

The Tendency to "Worship 33

The Element of Will in Religious Faith 35

Religious Presentiment 35

CHAPTER H.

THE ARGUMENTS FOR THE BEING OF GOD.

The Ultimate Source of Faith in God 37

The Intuition of the Unconditioned 38

The Ontological Argument 39

The Cosmological Argument 41

The Argument of Design 42

Order and Design 43

Mind in Nature 44

The Immanence of Design 47

Use and Intention 48

Criticisms by Kant 48

The Atomic Theory of Chance 51

Xll CONTENTS.

Paoe.

Evolution and Design 52

Variability in Organisms . 50

Darwin on Variability and Design 57

Is Final Cause an a priori Principle ? 04

The Moral Argument 07

The Historical Argument G9

Personality consistent with Infinity 09

Atheism an Affront to Humanity 72

Chapter III. Tiie Principal Anti-theistic Theories : Pantheism

POSITIVISM, MATERIALISM, AGNOSTICISM.

"What is Pantheism ? .... 73

The System of Spinoza 73

The German Ideal Pantheism 75

Pantheism involves Necessity 77

Positivism 78

Materialism 79

Relation of Consciousness to Physical States 80

The Mind and the Brain . . 83

Spencer's Agnostic System . . . .85

The Question of the Reality of Knowledge 95

Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Beid, Kant 9G

Hamilton and Mansel 98

J. S. Mill and H. Spencer 100

Chapter IV

THE POSSIBILITY AND THE FUNCTION OP MIRACLES, WITH A REVIEW OF PROFESSOR HUXLEY'S COMMENTS ON HUME.

Natural and Supernatural Revelation 103

Christianity and the Light of Nature 104

Christianity an Historical Religion 105

Christianity not an Afterthought of God 107

Miracles a Constituent of Revelation 107

The Relation of Miracles to Natural Law 108

Hume's Argument 109

Huxley's Modification of Hume's Position Ill

The " Order of Nature " 115

The Relation of Miracles to Internal Evidence .... 110

Indispensable Need of Miracles 118

CONTENTS.

Chapter V

CHRIST'S CONSCIOUSNESS OF A SUPERNATURAL CALLING VERIFIED BY HIS SINLESS CHARACTER.

Page.

Proofs of Christianity outside of the Scriptures .... 121

The Claims made by Jesus 124

Hypothesis of Mental Aberration 126

No Parallel in other Religious Founders 128

The Sobriety of Jesus 132

The Sinlessness of Jesus 134

No Consciousness of Evil in Him 137

The Ordeal through which He went 142

Miraculous Aspect of his Sinless Character 145

Chapter VI

PROOF OF THE MIRACLES OF CHRIST INDEPENDENTLY OF SPECIAL INQUIRY INTO THE AUTHORSHIP OF THE GOS- PELS.

The Apostles professed to work Miracles 148

Injunctions not to report the Miracles 151

Excessive Esteem of Miracles forbidden 153

Teaching that is inseparable from Miracles 155

No Miracles ascribed to John the Baptist 161

No Miracles of Jesus prior to his Baptism 162

The Persistence of the Apostles in their Faith 162

The Mythical Theory of Strauss 163

The Miracles are Links in the Nexus of Events .... 164

The Resurrection of Jesus 166

The " Vision-Theory " 168

Hallucination disproved 170

Keim's Admission of the Miracle 173

Concessions of the Ablest Disbelievers 175

Renan's Idea as to the Miracles 177

CHAPTER Vn.

THE GOSPELS A FAITHFUL RECORD OF THE TESTIMONY GIVEN BY THE APOSTLES.

The Reception of the Gospels in the Second Century . . . 182

The Value of the Testimony of Irenams 185

Froude on the Testimony of Irenaeus 187

Justin Martyr's Testimony 188

References to the Gospels in Justin 190

XIV

CONTENTS.

Page.

His "Memoirs" were tho Canonical Gospels 202

Early Non-canonical "Writings 205

Apocryphal Gospels 206

Testimony from the Gnostics 207

Celsus 209

Papias 210

Marcion a Witness to Luke's Gospel 214

The Tubingen Premise untenable 215

Internal Proof of tho Early Date of the Synoptists . . . 216

Origin of the Synoptical Gospels 217

The Integrity of the Gospels 219

Chapter VIII. The Apostolic Authorship Of The Fourth Gospel

It was one of the " Homologoumena " 221

The Modern Attack by the Tubingen School 225

The Testimony of Irenams 22G

John's Residence at Ephesus 227

Patristic Testimonies to this Gospel 230

The Internal Evidence 235

The Apocalypse and the. Fourth Gospel 237

The Fourth Gospel and Philo 238

The Author a Palestinian Jew 241

Relation of the Fourth Gospel to the Synoptists .... 242

Discourses of Christ in the Fourth Gospel 247

Alleged Dualism in the Fourth Gospel 255

View taken of Miracles 257

Indirect Proofs of Personal Recollection 258

Not a Pseudonymous Writing 259

Disclosure of the Author's Personal Traits 261

Chapter IX

THE TRUSTWORTHINESS OF THE APOSTLES' TESTIMONY AS PRESENTED BY THE EVANGELISTS.

The Apostles regarded by themselves as Witnesses .... 267

Always-conscious of being Disciples 269

Relate Instances of their own Weakness 270

Relate their Serious Faults and Sins 272

Describe the Human Infirmities of Jesus 273

Submit to Suffering and Death 274

Not Victims of Self-delusion 276

The Gospels not moulded by Doctrinal Bias 277

The Gospel Narratives not Mythical 278

The Life of Jesus prior to his Ministry 279

CONTENTS.

Chapter X

THE MIRACLES OF THE GOSPEL IN CONTRAST WITH HEA- THEN AND ECCLESIASTICAL MIRACLES.

Page.

The Gospel Miracles are to attest Revelation 281

They are wrought in Opposition to Prevailing Beliefs . . . 283

Ahsence of Motives to Fraud 284

Ecclesiastical Miracles explained by Natural Causes . . . 285 Incompetence of Witnesses to Ecclesiastical Miracles . . . 286

Gospel Miracles not Tentative 288

Grotesque Character of Ecclesiastical Miracles 289

Possibility of Post-apostolic Miracles 291

Alleged Miracles in the Early Church .292

Miracles reported by Augustine 29S

The Biographies of St. Francis 30G

Sort of Miracles ascribed to St. Francis 302

The Truthfulness of the Apostles .304

CHAPTER XL

THE ARGUMENT FOR CHRISTIANITY FROM THE CONVERSION OF SAUL OF TARSUS, WITH AN EXAMINATION OF RENAN'S THEORY OF THAT EVENT.

Personal Characteristics of Paul 306

Naturalistic Explanation of his Conversion 807

None of the Antecedents of Hallucination 309

His Conversion not a " Vision " 310

The Moral and Spiritual Change in him 311

Chapter XII

THE ARGUMENT FOR CHRISTIANITY FROM PROPHECY, WITH COMMENTS ON THE THEORY OF KUENEN.

The Main Design of Prophecy 314

Characteristics of the Prophet 316

The Predictive Element in Prophecy 317

The Relation of Prediction to Chronology 320

Messianic Prophecy 321

Particular Predictions 325

Dr. Kuenen's Theory 326

True Prophets and " False Prophets " 329

Criteria of the True Prophet 332

Deistic Spirit of Dr. Kuenen's Theory 3. n >2

Prophecies in the New Testament 334

CONTENTS.

Chapter XIII

THE ARGUMENT FOR CHRISTIANITY FROM ITS ADAPTEDNESS TO THE NECESSITIES OF HUMAN NATURE.

Rage.

Practical Character of Christianity 336

The Conscious Need of God 337

The Consciousness of Sin and Guilt 340

The Miseries of Life 343

Recognition in the Bihle of the Facts of Life 344

Reconciliation to God 345

The Life of Faith 347

The Testimony of Experience 348

CHAPTER XEV.

THE ARGUMENT FOR CHRISTIANITY FROM THE CHARACTER OF THE CHRISTIAN SYSTEM OF DOCTRINE.

Christianity a System 349

Relation of Reason to the Gospel 351

The Pure Theism of Christianity 352

The Christian Doctrine of Providence 354

The Christian Doctrine of Man 355

The Christian Doctrine of Sin 356

The Christian Doctrine of Salvation 358

The Incarnation and Atonement 360

The Influence of the Spirit of God 361

The Theodicy 361

Chapter XV

THE ARGUMENT FOR CHRISTIANITY FROM CHRISTENDOM AS AN EFFECT OF CHRIST'S AGENCY.

The Progress of Christianity 367

Character of its Influence 368

New Ideal of Man and of Society 369

Effect of Christianity on the Family 372

Christianity and the State 373

Christianity and Liberty 374

Christianity and Charity 379

Christianity and Slavery 384

CONTENTS.

Chapter XVI. *

THE ARGUMENT FOR CHRISTIANITY FROM A COMPARISON OF IT WITH OTHER RELIGION'S.

Page.

Character of Heathen Eeligions 388

Peculiarity of the Christian Religion 390

Confucianism 391

Buddhism 392

The Religion of Egypt 392

The Religion of the Greeks 393

Mohammedanism 393

Polytheism and Monotheism 394

Christianity fitted to be Universal 401

Hebrew and Christian Monotheism 402

CHAPTER XVH.

THE RELATION OF BIBLICAL CRITICISM TO THE CHRISTIAN FAITH.

The Practical Influence of the Bible 407

The Place for Criticism 408

Revelation is through Redemption 410

Revelation is Historical . 411

Revelation precedes Scripture 414

The Old-Testament Literature 417

The Authority of Christ and the Apostles 423

CHAPTER XVIH.

1EIE CANON OF THE NEW TESTAMENT IN ITS RELATION TO THE CHRISTIAN FAITH.

Significance of "Canon" 427

The Need of Historical Inquiry 428

Gradual Formation of the Canon 428

The Syrian Canon 430

The Old-Latin Version 430

The Muratorian Canon 431

Irenreus, Tertullian, Clement, Origen 432

Authority of Apostolic Fathers 433

Eusebius on the Canon 435

Jerome and Augustine 436

Luther on the Books of the New Testament 437

Calvin and Tyndale . • 438

The Disputed Books . . .440

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE CONGRUITY OF THE NATURAL AND PHYSICAL SCI- ENCES WITH THE CHRISTIAN FAITH.

Tage.

Alleged Hostility of Christianity to Science 445

Persecution of Scientific Men 447

The Case of Galileo 448

Opposition to Geology and to other Sciences 450

Causes of Intolerance toward Science 452

Wrong Position taken by Theologians 455

The School of Buckle 457

The Historical Theory of Draper 458

Arabic and Christian Science 4G0

Christianity has promoted Science 4G2

Distinction of Science and Philosophy 467

Views of Nature in the Old Testament 469

The Unity of Nature recognized 470

The Reality of Second Causes recognized 471

Nature viewed as a System 471

The Narrative of the Creation in Genesis 473

The Bible and Evolution 478

The Idea of Creation 479

The Fact of Death 479

The Transfiguration of Nature . 481

The Greatness and the Littleness of Man 482

THE GROUNDS OF THBISTIC AND CHRISTIAN BELIEF.

THE GROUNDS OF THEISTIC AND CHRISTIAN BELIEF.

Chapter I. The Personality Op God And Op Man

Theism signifies not only that there is a ground or cause of all things, — so much every one who makes an attempt to account for himself and for the world around him admits, — but also that the Cause of all things is a Personal Being, of whom an image is presented in the human mind. This image falls short of being adequate, only as it involves limits, — limits, however, which belong not to intelligence in itself, but simply to intelligence in its finite form.

Belief in the personality of man, and belief in the personality of God, stand or fall together. A glance at the history of religion would suggest that these two beliefs are for some reason inseparable. Where faith in the personality of God is weak, or is altogether wanting, as in the case of the pantheistic religions of the East, the perception which men have of their own personality is found to be in an equal degree indistinct. The feeling of individuality is dormant. The soul indolently ascribes to itself a merely phenomenal being. It conceives of itself as appearing for a moment, like a wuve-

l let on the ocean, to vanish again in the all-ingulfing essence whence it emerged. Recent philosophical theories which substitute matter, or an " Unknowable," for the self-conscious Deity, likewise dissipate the personality of man as ordinarily conceived. If they deny that God is a Spirit, they deny with equal emphasis that man is a spirit. The pantheistic and atheistic schemes are in this respect consistent in their logic. Out of man's perception of his own personal attributes arises the belief in a personal God. On this fact of our own personality the validity of the arguments for theism depends.

The essential characteristics of personality are self-consciousness and self-determination : that is to say, these are the elements common to all spiritual beings. Perception, whether its object be material or mental, involves a perceiving subject. The " cogito ergo sum " of Descartes is not properly an argument. I do not deduce my existence from the fact of my putting forth an act of thought. The Cartesian maxim simply denotes that in the act the agent is of necessity brought to light, or disclosed to himself. He becomes cognizant of himself in the fluctuating states of thought, feeling and volition. This apprehension of self is intuitive. It is not an idea of self that emerges, not a bare phenomenon, as some philosophers have contended ; but the ego is immediately presented, and there is an inexpugnable conviction of its reality. Idealism, or the doctrine that sense-perception is a modification of the mind that is due exclusively to its own nature, and is elicited by no object exterior to itself, is less repugnant to reason than is the denial of the reality of the ego. Whatever may be true of external things, of self we have an intuitive knowledge. If I judge that there is no real table before me on which I seem to be writing, and no corporeal organs for seeing or touching it, I nevertheless cannot escape the conviction that it is I who thus judge. To talk of thought without a thinker, of belief without a believer, is to utter words void of meaning. The unity and enduring identity of the ego are necessarily involved in self-consciousness. I know myself as a single, separate entity. Personal identity is presupposed in every act of memory. Go back as far as recollection can carry us, it is the same self who was the subject of all the mental experiences which memory can recall. When I was a child I spake as a child, I understood as a child, I thought as a child ; but I who utter these words am the same being that I was a score or threescore years ago. I look forward to the future, and know that it is upon me, and not upon another, that the consequences of my actions will be visited. In the endless succession of thoughts, feelings, choices, in all the mutations of opinion and of character, the identity of the ego abides. From the dawn of consciousness to my last breath, I do not part with myself. " If we speak of the mind as a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future, we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind, or ego, is something different from any series of feelings, or of accepting the paradox that something which is ex hypothesi but a series of feelings can be aware of itself as a series." So writes Stuart Mill. Yet, on the basis of this astounding assumption, that a series can be self-conscious, he was minded to frame his philosophy, and was only deterred by the insurmountable difficulty of supposing memory with no being capable of remembering.

The second constituent element of personality is self- . determination. This act is likewise essential to distinct self-consciousness. Were there no exercise of will, were the mind wholly passive under all impressions from without, the clear consciousness of self would never be evoked. In truth, self in that case would have only an inchoate being. That I originate my voluntary actions in the sense that they are not the effect or necessary consequence of antecedents, whether in the mind or out of it, is a fact of consciousness. This is what is meant by the freedom of the will. It is a definition of " choice." Thoughts spring up in the mind, and succeed one another under laws of association whose absolute control is limited only by the power we have of fastening the attention on one object or another within the horizon of consciousness. Desires reaching out to various forms of good spring up unbidden : they, too, are subject to regulation through no power inherent in themselves. But self-determination, as the very term signifies, is attended with an irresistible conviction that the direction of the will is self-imparted. We leave out of account here the nature of habit, or the tendency of choice once made or often repeated to perpetuate itself. That a moral bondage may ensue from an abuse of liberty is conceded. The mode and degree in which habit affects freedom is an important topic ; but it is one which we do not need to consider in this place. That the will is free — that is, both exempt from constraint by causes exterior, which is fatalism, and not a mere spontaneity, confined to one path by a force acting from within, which is determinism — is immediately evident to every unsophisticated mind. We can initiate action by an efficiency which is neither irresistibly controlled by motives, nor determined, without any capacity of alternative action, by a proneness inherent in its nature. No truth is more definitely sane- .

tioned by the common sense of mankind. Those who in theory reject it, continually assert it in practice. The languages of men would have to be reconstructed, the business of the world would come to a stand-still, if the denial of the freedom of the will were to be carried out with rigorous consistency. This freedom is not only attested in consciousness; it is proved by that ability to resist inducements brought to bear on the mind which we are conscious of exerting. We can withstand temptation to wrong by the exertion of an energy which consciously emanates from ourselves, and which we know that, the circumstances remaining the same, we could abstain from exerting. Motives have an influence, but influence is not to be confounded with causal efficiency. Praise and blame, and the punishments and rewards, of whatever kind, which imply these judgments, are plainly irrational, save on the tacit assumption of the autonomy of the will. Deny free-will, and remorse, as well as self-approbation, is deprived of an essential ingredient. It is then impossible to distinguish remorse from regret. Ill-desert becomes a fiction. This is not to argue against the necessarian doctrine, merely on the ground of its bad tendencies. It is true that the debasement of the individual, and the wreck of social order, would follow upon the unflinching adoption of the necessarian theory in the judgments and conduct of men. Virtue would no more be thought to deserve love : crime would no longer be felt to deserve hatred. But, independently of this aspect of the subject, there is, to say the least, a strong presumption against the truth of a theorem in philosophy that clashes with the common sense and moral sentiments of the race. The awe-inspiring sense of responsibility, the sting of remorse, emotions of moral condemnation and moral approval, ought not to be treated as deceptive, unless they can be demonstrated to be so. Here are phenomena which no metaphysical scheme can afford to ignore. Surely a theory can never look for general acceptance which is obliged to misinterpret or explain away these familiar facts of human nature.

How shall the feeling that we are free be accounted for if it be contrary to the fact? Let us glance at what famous necessarians have to say^ in answer to this inquiry. First, let us hear one of the foremost representatives of this school. His solution is one that has often been repeated. " Men believe themselves to be free," says Spinoza, " entirely from this, that, though conscious of their acts, they are ignorant of the causes by which their acts are determined. The idea of freedom, therefore, comes of men not knowing the cause of their acts." 1 This is a bare assertion, confidently made, but absolutely without proof. It surely is not a selfevident truth that our belief in freedom arises in this manner. Further: when we make the motives preceding any particular act of choice the object of deliberate attention, the sense of freedom is not in the least weakened. The motives are distinctly seen ; yet the consciousness of liberty, or of a pluripotential power, remains in full vigor. Moreover, choice is not the resultant of motives, as in a case of the composition of forces. One motive is followed, and its rival rejected. Hume has another explanation of what he considers the delusive feeling of freedom. " Our idea," he says, "of necessity and causation arises entirely from the uniformity observable in the operations of nature, where similar objects are constantly conjoined together, and 1 Ethics, P. ii. prop. xxxv.

the mind is determined by custom to infer the one from the appearance of the other." 1 This constant conjunction of things is all that we know; but men have "a strong propensity" to believe in "something like a necessary connection " between the antecedent and the consequent. " When, again, they turn their reflections towards the operations of their own minds, and feel no such connection. of the motive and the action, they are thence apt to suppose that there is a difference between the effects which result from material force, and those which arise from thought and intelligence." 2 In other words, a double delusion is asserted. First, the mind, for some unexplained reason, falsely imagines a tie between the material antecedent and consequent, and then, missing such a bond between motive and choice, it rashly infers freedom. This solution depends on the theory that nothing properly called power exists. It is assumed that there is no power, either in motives or in the will. Hume's necessity, unlike that of Spinoza, is mere uniformity of succession, choice following motive with regularity, but with no nexus between the two.

Since we are conscious of exerting energy, this theory, which holds to mere sequence without connection, we know to be false. J. S. Mill, adopting an identical theory of causation, from which power is eliminated, lands in the same general conclusion, on this question of free-will, as that reached by Hume. Herbert Spencer holds that the fact " that every one is at liberty to do what he desires to do (supposing there are no external hinderances)" is the sum of our liberty. He states that " the dogma of free-will " is the proposi-

1 An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, P. i. § 8 (Essaya, ed. Green and Grose, vol. ii. p. 07).

tion " that every one is at liberty to desire or not to desire." That is, he confounds choice and volition with desire, denies the existence of an elective power distinct from the desires, and imputes a definition of free-will to the advocates of freedom which they unanimously repudiate. As to the feeling of freedom, Mr. Spencer says, " The illusion consists in supposing that at each moment the ego is something more than the aggregate of feelings and ideas, actual and nascent, which then exists." 1 When a man says that he determined to perform a certain action, his error is in supposing his conscious self to have been " something separate from the group of psychical states " constituting his " psychical self." The " composite psychical state which excites the action is at the same time the ego which is said to will the action." The soul is resolved into a group of psychical states due to " motor changes " excited by an impression received from without. If there is no personal agent, if J is a collective noun, meaning a "group" of sensations, it is a waste of time to argue that there is no freedom. "What we call a mind," wrote Hume long ago, " is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations, and supposed, though falsely, to be endowed with a perfect simplicity and identity." Professor Huxley, who quotes this passage, would make no other correction than to substitute an assertion of nescience for the positive denial. He would rather say, " that we know nothing more of the mind than that it is a series of perceptions." 2

Before commenting on this definition of the mind, which robs it of its unity, it is worth while to notice

1 Principles of Psychology, vol. i. p. 500.

2 Huxley's Hume, p. 61.

what account the advocates of necessity have to give of the feelings of praise and blame, tenants of the soul which appear to claim a right to be there, and which it is very hard even for speculative philosophers to dislodge. On this topic Spinoza is remarkably chary of explanation. "I designate as gratitude" he says, "the feeling we experience from the acting of another, done, as we imagine, to gratify us ; and aversion, the uneasy sense we experience when we imagine any thing done with a view to our disadvantage ; and, whilst we praise the former, we are disposed to blame the latter." 1 What does Spinoza mean by the phrase " with a view to our advantage " or " disadvantage " ? As the acts done, in either case, were unavoidable on the part of the doer, — as much so as the circulation of blood in his veins, — it is impossible to see any reasonableness in praise or blame, thankfulness or resentment. Why should we resent the blow of an assassin more than the kick of a horse ? Why should we be any more grateful to a benefactor than we are to the sun for shining on us? If the sun were conscious of shining on us, and of shining on us " with a view " to warm us, in Spinoza's meaning of the phrase, but with not the least power to do otherwise, how would that consciousness found a claim to our gratitude? When Spinoza proceeds to define " just " and " unjust," " sin " and " merit," he broaches a theory not dissimilar to that of Hobbes, that there is no natural law but the desires, that "in the state of nature there is nothing done that can properly be characterized as just or unjust," that in "the natural state," prior to the organization of society, "faults, offences, crimes, cannot be conceived." 2 As

1 Ethics, P. iii. prop. xxix. schol.

2 Ethics, P. iv. prop, xxxvii. schol. 2.

for repentance, Spinoza does not hesitate to lay down the thesis that " repentance is not a virtue, or does not arise from reason ; but he who repents of any deed he has done is twice miserable or impotent." 1 Penitence is defined as " sorrow accompanying the idea of something we believe we have done of free-will." 2 It mainly depends, he tells us, on education. Since free-will is an illusive notion, penitence must be inferred to be in the same degree irrational. To these immoral opinions the advocates of necessity are driven when they stand face to face with the phenomena of conscience.

Mill, in seeking to vindicate the consistency of punishment with his doctrine of determinism, maintains that it is right to punish ; first, as penalty tends to restrain and cure an evil-doer, and secondly, as it tends to secure society from aggression. " It is just to punish," he says, "so far as it is necessary for this purpose," for the security of society, " exactly as it is just to put a wild beast to death (without unnecessary suffering) for the same object." 3 It will hardly be asserted by any one that a brute deserves punishment, in the accepted meaning of the terms. Later, Mill attempts to find a basis for a true responsibility ; but in doing so he virtually, though unwittingly, surrenders his necessarian theory. " The true doctrine of the causation of human actions maintains," he says, " that not only our conduct, but our character, is in part amenable to our will ; that we can, by employing the proper means, improve our character ; and that if our character is such, that, while it remains what it is, it necessitates us to do wrong, it will be just to apply motives which will necessitate us

i Ethics, P. iv. prop. liv. 2 P. iii. def. 27.

8 Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy, vol. ii. p. 292.

to strive for its improvement, and to emancipate ourselves from the other necessity." l Here, while verbally holding to his theory of the deterministic agency of motives, he introduces the phrases which I have put in italics, — phrases which carry in them to every mind the idea of free personal endeavor, and exclude that of determinism. " The true doctrine of necessity," says Mill, " while maintaining that our character is formed by our circumstances, asserts at the same time that our desires can do much to alter our circumstances." But how about our control over our desires ? Have we any more control, direct or indirect, over them than over our circumstances ? If not, " the true doctrine of necessity " no more founds responsibility than does the naked fatalism which Mill disavows. It is not uncommon for necessarian writers, it may be unconsciously to themselves, to cover up their theory by affirming that actions are the necessary fruit of a character already formed ; while they leave room for the supposition, that, in the forming of that character, the will exerted at some time an independent agency. But such an agency, it need not be said, at whatever point it is placed, is incompatible with their main doctrine.

The standing argument for necessity, drawn out by Hobbes, Collins, et id omne genus, is based on the law of cause and effect. It is alleged, that if motives are not efficient in determining the will, then an event — namely, the particular direction of the will in a case of choice, or the choice of one object rather than another — is without a cause. This has been supposed to be an invincible argument. In truth, however, the event in question is not without a cause in the sense that would be true of an event wholly disconnected from an effi- 1 Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy, vol. ii. p. 299.

cient antecedent, — of a world, for example, springing into being without a Creator. The mind is endued with the power to act in either of two directions, the proper circumstances being present ; and, whichever wayit may actually move, its motion is its own, the result of its own power. That the mind is not subject to the law of causation which holds good elsewhere than in the sphere of intelligent, voluntary action, is the very thing asserted. Self-motion, initial motion, is the distinctive attribute of spiritual agents. The prime error of the necessarian is in unwarrantably assuming that the mind in its voluntary action is subject to the same law which prevails in the realm of things material and unintelligent. This opinion is not only false, but shallow. For where do we first get our idea of power or causal energy? Where but from the exertion of our own wills? If we exerted no voluntary agency, we should have no idea of causal efficiency. Being outside of the circle of our experience, causation would be utterly unknown. Necessarians, among whom are included at the present day many students of physical science, frequently restrict their observation to things without themselves, and, having formulated a law of causation for the objects with which they are chiefly conversant, they forthwith extend it over the mind, — an entity toto genera different. They should remember that the very terms "free," "power," "energy," "cause," are only intelligible from the experience we have of the exercise of will. They are applied in some modified sense to things external. But we are immediately cognizant of no cause but will: and the nature of that cause must be learned from consciousness ; it can never be learned from an inspection of things heterogeneous to the mind, and incapable by themselves of imparting to it the faintest notion of power.