The necessary existence of God

Front matter

E

SUBDH

ERNIN ts

Contents

General Preface.

An Inquiry into the Defects of mere a posteriori Arguments for A God.

Reviews of the Demonstrations by Mr Locke, Dr Samuel Clarke, the Rev. Moses Lowman, and Bishop Hamilton, of the Existence and Attributes of A Deity.

Preface

ix treatises on Natural Theology ; we should no longer, I say, have such thrust upon us as containing the only sound arguments to be met with, for proving the first grand article of all religion. We should no longer, therefore, be told, that the infinity^ and the unity of the Divine Nature cannot be made out. 2. The quick disappearance of speculative, or avowed, atheism. A consummation, however devoutly to be wished for, which has never been brought about under the long, presumptuous reign of the oracular responses issuing from the experimental School.

Who does not at once perceive of what mighty consequence it were to have the mouth of avowed speculative atheism closed for ever % Have not the very bad kinds of practical atheism too often been prone to seek shelter under the wings of theoretical atheism \ To live in all respects as if there were no God : Therefore, to wish most anxiously that there were no God : Therefore, to confirm one-self in saying that there is no God : — Are not these not unfrequently bound together as links in the same dreadful chain ]

There are too many persons among us who are not properly aware of the alarming progress which Infidelity, Infidelity of the deadliest kind, even downright Atheism, is making in the British Isles, and throughout our numerous and vast Colonies ; in the United States of America ; and, in short, wherever the English language is spoken : To say nothing of the deplorable state of mat-

t This word is here taken in the popular } that is, the loosest, acceptation.

X ters on the Continent of Europe, and indeed throughout the civilized, or the intelligent and reflecting, portion of the world generally.

And I cannot forbear adverting pointedly to the circumstance, that the age we live in is witness to the existence of " a monstrous species of men," who live in spite, as 'twere, of nature, they are so very odd a sort of compound : "I mean the zealots in atheism." One might beforehand have prophesied, with a lively assurance of prophesying correctly, that zeal in behalf of so utter a negation as Atheism, "f were a sheer impossibility. An Atheistic Propagandist seems a nondescript monster, created by nature in a moment of madness.

:i But so it is," says Addison, in a paragraph needing almost no alteration to render it suitable to the present aspect of affairs : " But so it is, that infidelity is propagated " with as much fierceness and contention, wrath and in- " dignation, as if the safety of mankind depended upon " it. There is something so ridiculous and perverse in " this kind of zealots, that one does not know how to set " them out in their proper colours. They are a sort of " gamesters who are eternally upon the fret, though " they play for nothing. They are perpetually teasing

t " What lias atheism to teach but mere negations ? — that there is no " First Cause, no Creator, no intention in all the beautiful and beneficial " arrangements of nature ; that there is no such thing as mind or spirit in " the universe ; no God, no angel, no hereafter for man, no future judgu ment, no heaven or hell, no rewards for virtue or punishments for " vice beyond this life. Its object is, in fact, to teach men to disbelieve u what all ages have believed.'''' Lectures on the Atheistic Controversy, by the Rev. B. Godwin. Lect. VI.

PREFACE.

xi

" their friends to come over to them, though at the same £< time they allow that neither of them shall get any " thing by the bargain. In short, the zeal of spreading " atheism, is, if possible, more absurd than atheism it- " self."t " But so it is."

The various pieces which compose this volume were never before brought together within one pair of boards. Each piece or work is complete in itself : nevertheless, the works may be said to have a relation to each other. They severally handle the different departments of the subject. The one follows the other in a regular order : And the consecutive treatises may, not without reason, be held to constitute an entire compact body of information respecting the a 'priori, or synthetic, method of arguing for the existence of God.

First of all, there are exhibited the defects of mere a posteriori arguments for the Being and Attributes of A Deity. And the inherent imperfections of the a posteriori plan are exposed for this reason principally, — that an impression favourable to the pretensions of the rival method may be begotten. The value of the one mode of arguing shall be enhanced, by the inferiority of the other being established.

In the next place, the reader is presented with the failures of my predecessors in the field of a priori argumentation : manifesting, as those failures do, the room and

t Spectator, No. 185.

xii the need there is for something better ; should it be possible to supply the desideratum. Amongst the circumstances which have brought the synthetic method into discredit, not the least prominent place ought to be reserved for the inefficiency of the labours of former demonstrators. The whole method generally has been charged with an impotence which is exclusively chargeable on the attempts of certain patrons, who purposed better things than their fates enabled them to accomplish. To point out the errors of former reasoners, is to proceed one step in the right direction.

Thirdly, the reader is shown the connection betwixt necessary existence and infinite extension ; in order that an argument which makes infinite extension an attribute of the Being it seeks to reach, may be viewed with a favourable eye by all those who admit the existence of a necessary Being, the Intelligent Author of the universe. Infinite extension — a necessarily existing Mind, the cause of all the things of nature : if these are inseparably related, he who allows the one, cannot reject the other. In short, the third work is a sort of argumentum ad hominem, to be used with the generality of Theists.

It is obvious, that none of the three treatises already referred to, can be considered as adapted to the case of Atheists, as Atheists.

In the fourth place, " The Argument, a priori, for the " Being and Attributes of a Great First Cause," comes in sight.

And, fifthly and lastly, in the " Examination" of Antitheos there is a defence, against the assaults of the

PREFACE.

xiii chosen champion of Atheism, of one of the two precisely similarly situated foundations of the " Argument."

Since the talented and skilful author of the " Refuta- " tion" is unable to reply to our " Examination" ;t it may be confidently predicted, that no atheist, be he who he may, will ever be capable of doing so successfully. In fine, by means of the " Examination," the " Argument, a " priori" is shown to be, in very deed, an irrefragable demonstration. The desideratum (alluded to, above) will be perceived to be supplied.

— The "Examination" contains within it two subtreatises. One of these gives, within the limits of a Part, a full proof of " the non- infinite divisibility of extension " and of matter." The other, though it takes the humble guise of a digression running through several Parts, is, in reality, a complete and separable treatise, " Of the " Sentiments of Philosophers concerning Space." A piece which will perhaps be reckoned not the least valuable — as it is likely to be the most generally interesting — portion of the work wherein it occurs. —

It need hardly be said, that those two productions, the " Argument" and the " Examination," to wit, are to be held as especially intended for Atheists. Without doubt, some classes of Theists might read the works with profit to themselves, were the truths insisted on to be sufficiently pondered, and duly digested. Nevertheless, the works are adapted and addressed to Atheists, primarily.

— It is our fervent prayer, that, by the perusal and consideration of those productions, many who are Infidels,

t See Postscript thereto.

xiv as touching the Great Fundamental Doctrine of ONE Infinite and Eternal Being, the Cause of all the Phenomena and of all the Matter in the Universe ; may be converted from the error of their portentous disbelief. — The sort of relation which the various works in this volume bear to each other is, by this time, apparent. They are consecutive : and the order of their actual sequence could not be altered without infringing upon the order of proper sequence.

We have demonstrated the All-power fulness, the Entire Freeness, and the Perfect Goodness of the Supreme Being.f Whence, then, evil ? for the existence of evil is admitted on all hands. Whence evil ? physical evil, and moral ? or to put things after a better order, moral evil, and physical \ How comes it that evil exists in a world, the work of a Being " All-powerful," " Entirely Free," and " Perfectly Good V- This is the question of questions, the mystery of mysteries.

No doubt, that, in connection with the a priori proof of the Perfect Goodness of an All-powerful and Entirely Free Author of nature, that question must arise in the mind of every person ; however feeble may be the powers of reflection. No doubt, that, in connection with such a proof, some relative solution of the grand riddle, the enigma of the universe, is reasonably to be expected.

However, the only answer to be afforded at present is

t See " The Argument, a ipriori" Div. II. Part. II. and Part III. Div. III. Sub-Prop.

PREFACE,

XT a general one ; (one, notwithstanding, which would be satisfactory, even were a more particular one not to be gotten ;) taken from the Prince of modern Sceptics, if not the Prince of modern Atheists also. A more full solution of the difficulty, we propose, indeed, to put forth, some time or other. But, meanwhile, the public must rest satisfied with one to the following effect : — If the Perfect Goodness of the Supreme Being is demonstrated

But let us hear Mr Hume himself. He speaks by

the mouth of his representative, Philo.

£C Let us allow, that, if the goodness of the Deity (I " mean a goodness like the humanf) could be established " on any tolerable reasons a priori, these [evil] pheno- " mena, Jioiuever untoward, would not be sufficient to sub- " vert that principle ; but might easily, in some unknown ; ' manner, be reconcileable to it." Dialogues concerning Natural Religion. Part XI.

And in a former Part of the same masterly performance, Philo, that is to say, Mr Hume, had laid down the same thing, by means of a more extended principle. " There are many inexplicable difficulties in the works of " Nature, which, if we allow a perfect author to be proved " a priori, are easily solved, and become only seeming " difficulties," &c.

In conclusion : It cannot be too often repeated, that the being of A God constitutes the fundamental point of all religion. To the doctrine of human immortality and

t Philo means, by like, of the same generic character as, xvi

GENERAL PREFACE.

future retribution, Theism is a necessary preliminary. The Christian faith does not lay, but it builds on, this foundation — There is A God. And therefore, to set out the proof for the existence of God, is the first step to the demolishing of Infidelity, of what description soever the Infidelity may be.

TORBANE-HILL.

m

INQUIRY INTO THE DEFECTS

OF

MERE A POSTERIORI ARGUMENTS

FOR

A GOD.

" By this method of reasoning, you renounce all claim to infinity in any of the attributes of the Deity. For, as the cause ought only to be proportioned to the effect, and the effect, so far as it falls under our cognizance, is not infinite ; what pretensions have we, upon your suppositions, to ascribe that attribute to the Divine Being?"

Mr Hume.

AN INQUIRY INTO THE DEFECTS, &c.

Chapter I. Of The Argument From Experience

§ 1. 'Tis evident, on the slightest reflection, that there can be no more than two ways of proving the being and attributes, or any of the attributes, of the Deity. If it be possible to establish his existence at all ; 'tis possible to prove, either, merely, that he is ; or, that, besides being, he must be. The reasonings which would demonstrate his being, are called a priori : Those which give probable evidence, only, for his being, a posteriori.

§ 2. The more common a posteriori argument may be called, the argument from experience. Not that experience can discover a God ; but this argument infers the existence of a God, by a process similar to that by which we conclude, that certain appearances have been preceded by a cause, which we have discovered almost as often as we have set out in the search. This argument takes a survey of the universe, — and examines, more minutely, one of its parts ; asserts, it there discovers marks of design ; and, from these marks of design, infers the existence of a designer, or an intelligent cause. It is level to all men's capacities. And unless men resolve to shut their eyes, and stop the operation of their understanding, they can-

DEFECTS OF not avoid coming to the conclusion, that the phenomena of nature imply the existence of a cause of them.

§ 3. But, though the a posteriori argument be good, so far as it goes, yet its discoveries reach only a little way. If we confine ourselves merely to its evidence, we shall, inevitably, find ourselves surrounded by many serious difficulties, — difficulties which will oppress, if they do not discourage, the minds of the more inquisitive.

§ 4. But before taking notice of the disadvantages attending this argument, if the aid of the other sort of reasoning is nowise introduced, let it be premised, that we are not, in any way, to enter upon the merits of that argument, but shall take the validity of it, so far as its evidence reaches, entirely for granted : the object, here, being only to point out the defects it labours under, admitting its inference to be irresistible.

§ 5. First, One of the disadvantages, then, or, rather, a class of disadvantages, attending mere a posteriori reasonings, is, that they can never make it appear, that infinity belongs, in any way, to God.

§ 6. First, The a posteriori argument can only entitle us to infer the existence of a Being of finite extension : for by what rule known in philosophy, can we deduce, from the existence of an effect finite in extent, (and nothing is plainer than that the marks of design which we can discover, must be finite in their extent,) the existence of a cause of infinity of extension ?

§ 7. What becomes, then, of the omnipresence of the Deity, according to those who are content to rest satisfied with the reasonings from experience ? Those who seek not the aid of the other species of reasoning must let their system of Theism preserve a cautious silence upon so unaccountable a matter. It will be vain to talk of the Deity being present by his energy, although he may not be present by his substance, to the whole universe. For, 'tis

A POSTERIORI ARGUMENTS.

natural to ask, not so much how it is proved, that God can be virtually present, though not substantially present, in every part of nature, as what can be meant by being every where present by mere energy ?

§ 8. Add to this, that, even admitting the foolish distinction in question, a posteriori reasoning can no more make out, that the Deity is omnipresent by his virtue, than that he is omnipresent as to his substance. Admit the distinction : 'tis of no service.

§ 9. And from the inaptitude of the reasoning under consideration, to show that immensity or omnipresence belongs to God, it will be found to follow, directly and immediately, that his wisdom and power cannot be shown to be more than finite, and that he can never be proved to be a free agent.

§ 10. First, It is very plain, that omnipresence (let it be only by energy) is absolutely necessary in a Being of infinity t of wisdom. And, therefore, the a posteriori argument is unable to evince that the Deity is in possession of this attribute.

§ 11. Secondly, It, likewise, plainly follows from the inaptitude of this argument, to show that God is omnipresent, that, thereby, we cannot prove infinity of power to belong to him. For, if the argument cannot make out that the Being it discovers is every where present, how can it ever make out that he is every where powerful \ By careful reflection, too, we may perceive, that omnipotence of another kind than power which can exert itself in all places, requires the existence of immensity.

§ 12. Thirdly, Without calling in the aid of subtle reasoning to prove, that if the argument a posteriori cannot show that God is omnipresent, it can never evince that he is a free agent ; let those who may contend that

t The terms infinity, infinite, are frequently employed, in the course of this " Inquiry," in their popular, lax sense.

DEFECTS OF by the reasonings from experience, it can be made to appear, the Deity is a free agent, be pleased to tell us, what is that logical process by which they deduce, from the premises they have obtained, such a conclusion. Of what nature is the middle term, which puts beyond doubt the agreement of subject and predicate in the proposition, that the God whom the argument from experience doth reveal is entirely free ?

§ 13. But, indeed, without having been at pains to show, that, if we cannot prove the immensity or omnipresence of the Deity, we can, for that reason, never show that he is omniscient — that he is omnipotent — that he is entirely free : It had been sufficient simply to say, that if the Deity cannot be proved to be of infinity in any given respect, it would be nothing less than absurd to suppose that he could be proved to be of infinity in any other respect.

§ 14. Secondly, Not to lay any weight on the truth just announced, that if we cannot prove God to have a particular infinite attribute, we can never show that infinity of any kind whatever belongs to him : or, not here to insist on this point, that we shall never be able to make out that there is an eternal being, if we be not able to make out that there is an immense being ; the eternity of a being as much implying his immensity, as his immensity would evidently infer his eternity : (Truths these most unquestionable :) The a posteriori argument can do no more than prove, that, at the commencement of the phenomena which pass under its review, there existed a cause exactly sufficient to make the effects begin to be. That this cause existed from eternity, the reasonings from experience can, by no means, show. Nay, for aught they make known, the designer himself may not have existed long before those marks of design which betoken his workmanship.

A POSTERIORI ARGUMENTS.

§ 15. And, because reasoning of the kind in question cannot prove, that the God whom it reveals, has existed from all eternity, therefore, for any thing it intimates, God may, at some time, cease to be ; and the workmanship may have an existence when the workman hath fallen into annihilation. For, of that being only, who never had a beginning, the non-existence implies a contradiction.

§ 16. Concerning the topics alluded to, the argument leaves us quite at a loss. It gives some little information, and then is found inadequate to extend our knowledge the least way farther.

§ 17. It would be worse than useless to expend many words in showing, that the argument a posteriori cannot prove that God is of infinite goodness, and justice, and all other infinite moral perfections. Without insisting that there must be infinite natural attributes as a foundation whereon to build infinite moral attributes : (A thing certain :) 'Tis evident, that the same reason that prevents us from proving the first, will for ever prevent us from proving the second.

§ 18. Secondly, Another defect that mere a posteriori reasonings labour under, is, perhaps, still weightier than their inability to prove that infinity, in any way, belongs to God. How can such reasonings ever assure us of the unity of the Deity ? 'Twill be granted that the question as to the unity of God, involves a point of much importance : the point, perhaps, of greatest moment connected with our speculations as to his existence. But, whether there be but one God, or not, the argument from experience doth, by no means, make clear. It discovers marks of design in the phenomena of nature, and infers the existence of at least one intelligent substance sufficient to produce them. Farther, however, it advances not our

DEFECTS OF knowledge. Whether the cause of the phenomena be one God, or many gods, it pretends not to determine, past all doubt.

§ 19. The contrivances we observe in nature, may establish a unity of counsel : how can they establish a unity

of substance ?

§20. In the phenomena that surround me, I see certain means adapted to certain ends. Without hesitation, I conclude, there was a designer. But did this designer create the matter in which the design appears ? Of this, the argument a posteriori cannot convince us. For that argument does no more than infer a designing cause from certain appearances ; in the same way as we would infer, from finding some well contrived machine in a desert, that a human being had left it there. But point out marks of design, certain means adapted to certain ends, in gross, un tractable matter itself ?

§ 21. Now, because this reasoning cannot convince us of such a creation, it cannot convince us that there is not a plurality of deities, or of the causes of things. As thus : If the designer whom this argument discovers, did not create the matter containing the design, but that was created by some superior agent, then here is a complete destruction of the unity of God. If matter was not created at all, then we are involved in the supposition of that strange plurality of gods, in which there is, at least, one physical substance, and that, it may be, the more ancient member of the Ditheism.

§ 22. But even though we hold, that the designing cause of the phenomena we see, created the matter in which they appear, (an opinion for which the argument in question gives us no evidence,) what the nearer are we to a real proof of the unity of G od ? Did he who created and fashioned an inconsiderable part of the universe,

A POSTERIORI ARGUMENTS.

create and fashion universal nature \ Perhaps he did not. Then, we have no proper evidence for the doctrine of his unity.

§ 23. Besides, to insist on no other topic, if we cannot prove the eternity of God, it is not possible that we can prove the unity of God. To say that, for any thing we know to the contrary, he may not have existed from all eternity, being much the same thing as saying, that, for any thing we know to the contrary, there may be another god or many gods, besides.

§ 24. We see, then, what the argument a posteriori amounts to. That, at the commencement of the phenomena, or designs which do appear, there existed as the cause, an intelligent substance, or several intelligent substances, of sufficient extension, wisdom, power, and freeness, goodness, justice, and other moral qualities, to make the effects begin to be : this is all that that species of reasoning can make known. And if we think that, without assistance from another source than the reasonings from experience, we shall be enabled to ascend higher in our investigations, we but weakly impose upon ourselves, and mistake, for the exercise of the understanding, the uncertain flights of the fancy.