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The necessary existence of Deity

William Honyman Gillespie · 1840 · Scanned text

96,319 words · about 6 h 45 min to read

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About this book

Author
William Honyman Gillespie
Language
English
Published
1840
Length
96,319 words · about 6 h 45 min
Sections
22 reader sections
Text
Scanned text, read from page scans by OCR; may contain errors
Rights
Public domain

 

Contents (22)

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Front matter

Glass BlaiOQ Book « - f

THE

NECESSARY EXISTENCE

Appendix to Part IV., . . . Page 261

VIII.

Appendix A, . . . . . 270

B, .... 273 Appendix to Part X.

Appendix 281

... ^ . . . . 282 Appendix to Part XII.

Appendix N . . . 283

... 1^ . . . . 284

ADVERTISEMENT TO THE SECOND EDITION.

The first edition, of 1000 copies, being now exhausted, a second is become necessary.

In presenting which to the public, it is right briefly to state wherein it differs, in any essential respect, from the preceding edition.

In the present edition, the head lines, indicating Part and Section,] will be a great help to readers, in a work containing so many references backwards and forwards.

Besides a few alterations, some less some more important, a good deal of new matter has been introduced, which Ave presume to think will not be found either useless or uninteresting.

To say nothing more concerning the improvements which have been made, in a few instances : the new matter includes a passage of great moment, occurring in the fourth Part, J and an Appendix big with the fates of an Atheistical Society, and of an Atheistical Newspaper.||

t It may be proper to mention on what principle the sectioning proceeds. A section-'mark (§) occurs at the beginning of every paragraph ; the section-marks being used for the sake of reference merely. In short, they denote topical as opposed to logical divisions.

I See the note (t) to § 22.

!| See Appendix to Part. XII : Appendix ^

ADVERTISEMENT.*

From the many highly favourable opinions, expressed by persons whose authority is entitled to much weight, which have been communicated to the author, he feels very confident as to the ultimate result of his undertaking, to establish the necessary existence of Deity. Whatever misgivings the author may have had as to the reception which his mode of treating his subject might meet with ; he never allowed himself to have any misgivings as to the goodness of his cause, generally or particularly : Generally, or as to the Being of a god ; particularly, or as to the applicableness and validity of a priori reasonings in reference to that momentous topic. The age we live in is certainly the age of superficialness. Much ground is indeed gone over, but then little of the ground is thoroughly explored : Men rather knowing that there are many sciences, and having at command a few common-places with regard to each, than caring to be complete proficients in any one branch of knowledge. But notwithstanding this circumstance, the author has now no uneasiness as to the fate of his production. The age is superficial, but there are exceptions to the general rule : And it is very fortunate that no age receives those impressions which are to be lasting, and to influence the sentiments of posterity, from any but the more profound thinkers. The skimmers over the surfaces of things may make a little noise as they pass along, but in a short while all trace of them is vanished.

The author, then, anticipates that ere long a great change will take place in the public mind, in relation to the question of the fitness and value of the species of reasonings employed in this work. >Tis beyond all question, that a priori reasonings on subjects out of the mathematical sciences have descended to a low point in the general estimation, though it is equally certain, that at a former period such reasonings used to occupy a very high and conspicuous position. But there are signs that better treatment is awaiting argumentation from the necessity of the case for a First Cause.

The immediate consequences, or rather th e concomitants, of a change so ardently desired, would be the following — to specify no more at present. 1. A sudden stop in the tune of your mere a posteriori men. We should no longer have thrust into our hands whole volumes of anatomy, botany, astronomy, and what not, called, in virtue of an exceedingly small sprinkling of other matter, treatises on Natural Theology ; we should no longer, I say, have such thrust

ADVERTISEMENT.

upon us as containing the only sound arguments to be met with, for proving the first grand article of all religion. We should no longer, therefore, be told, that the infinity^ and the unity of the Divine Nature cannot be made out. 2. The quick disappearance of speculative, or avowed, atheism — a consummation, however devoutly to be wished for, which has never been brought about under the long, presumptuous reign of the oracular responses issuing from the experimental School.

"Who does not at once perceive of what mighty consequence it were to have the mouth of avowed speculative atheism closed for ever \ Have not the very bad kinds of practical atheism too often been prone to seek shelter under the wings of speculative atheism % To live in all respects as if there were no God : Therefore, to wish most anxiously that there were no God : Therefore, to confirm oneself in saying that there is no God : — Are not these not unfrequently bound together as links in the same dreadful chain \\ And to make application to the circumstances of the present day : Where is it that Socialism, the prevalent form of Infidelity, takes refuge when hard pressed by pursuers \ Where, but in downright atheism \

There are very few persons among us who are not aware of the alarming progress which Socialism, or Owenism, is making in the British dominions, — to say nothing of the state of matters on the Continent. Socialism is just another name for Infidelity. It was j ust the favourite disguise under which Infidelity proceeded to extend itself in all directions. Certain events, which are still but recent, have had the effect of tearing off the mask which Socialism chose to wear* on many occasions, and of rendering apparent, to all but the most stupid and unthinking, that that widely-spread system is at bottom nothing less than a thoroughly God-denying system.

In conclusion : It cannot be too often repeated, that the being of a god constitutes the fundamental point of all religion. To the

+ This word is here taken in the popular, that is the loosest, acceptation.

{ Faults in the life hreed errors in the brain, And these reciprocally those again.

The mind and conduct mutually imprint And stamp their imago in each other's mint : Each, sire and dam, of an infernal race, Begetting and conceiving all that's base.

Cowper's * Progress of Error."

ADVERTISEMENT.

doctrine of human immortality and future retribution, Theism is a necessary preliminary. The Christian faith does not lay, but it builds on, this foundation — There is a god. Remember at all times, therefore, that to set out the proof for the existence of God, is the first step to the demolishing of Infidelity, of what description soever the Infidelity may be,

Edinbobqh; August, 1840,

Preface

It seems to be a duty which is due to the public in general, to give some account of the circumstances which led to the present controversy. Antitheos's production was " called forth 1 ' in consequence of a challenge, sent by the author of " An Ar- " gument, a priori, for the Being and Attributes of God," to a society of professed atheists in Glasgow, " to answer and re- " fute the reasonings contained in the aforesaid work." The letter containing the challenge gave a detail of those incidents which had conducted to it. And for this reason, and for another to be subsequently alluded to, that letter shall be inserted here, word for word.

" To the Society of Atheists which calls itself ' The Areo- " P a g us »' or 4 The Zetetic Society,' Glasgow.

" Before proceeding to the proper business of this letter, it " may be but proper to give you a short account of the manner 44 in which I was led to think of addressing you.

44 Some months ago, seeing, in the window of a small book- 44 shop in a conspicuous street in this city, a newly printed copy 44 of Paine's 4 Age of Reason,' I determined on speaking to the 44 person who sold the work, in order to know whether he be- 44 lieved the book to be infamous, and sold it merely for the

A

PREFACE.

" sake of gain, or whether he was, in every sense, a patron of 4 1 so infamous a publication.^

" In the book-shop to which I allude, I saw a person who " gave me to understand, there was a society of Atheists in " Edinburgh, who met on the Sunday evenings, for the sake of " confirming each other in infidelity. J Subsequently, I met a " member of the Society, (who is said to be one of their best " hands,) who, indeed, made no secret of his sentiments. He " told me, that there neither was, nor could be, in the universe, " any being greater than himself ;| that his body and brain (for " he positively assured me, he had no soul but his brain,) had " been produced by unintelligent necessary causes ; and that, " after his death, the particles of his body and brain might " compose a cloud or a dung-hill, but could never, by any chance,

" compose, again, the person , for so this (by no means

"fortuitous) concourse of atoms was called.

" i undertook to answer, with ease, any thing that

" could be urged in favour of Theism. I challenged him, and, " through him, all his atheistical associates, to refute my * Ar- " gument a priori? Sec. * * * A copy of which had been

" forwarded to the body. I was soon informed, that

" did not hesitate for a moment to engage to refute me. With

| The sight of infidel works, in a public shop, was new to me three years ago. Matters are so much altered since about the beginning of 1837, that sheets and volumes of infidelity, much more hideous than Paine's, may be seen, any day, vended publicly enough.

X An atheistical society is no rarity to me now. And that there are societies of ath ists, and that the societies are studded, thickly studded, over the country, every one by this time knows ; thanks to the Bishop of Exeter and the House of Lords.

|| All that was here meant to be conveyed was this : That the person spoken of asserted, there neither was, nor could be, in the universe, a being of a species superior to the human. Surely I never could intend to convey, that the atheist in question had maintained, it was a downright impossibility that there should be a cleverer man than he in the world. And that, for very obvious reasons.

PREFACE.

** regard to the proposed refutation, I imposed on him two con- 44 ditions only. 1st, That the answer should be on paper. And 44 2dly, That it pointed out some (alleged) specific fallacy in my " alleged demonstration. After waiting long for the promised 44 refutation, I was, at length, made aware, by a friend of — —

** % that the said . could not answer it. However,

44 to make up for my disappointment, I was told, that there was '* a society of Atheists in Glasgow, more numerous, more clever, " and more learned, and that there neither was, nor could be, any " ground to doubt, that the 4 Areopagus' would, on being chal- ** lenged, step forward and (endeavour to) overturn my reasonings.

" Shortly after receiving this piece of news, I came to the " determination of challenging you, each of you and all of you : As, accordingly, I now hereby do challenge you to answer and " refute the reasonings contained in the aforesaid work. Two " copies of which are herewith sent to you.

" You challenge the world to prove, to you, that there exists 44 an Intelligent Great First Cause. The work in question " professes to demonstrate that matter by the most rigid ratio- " cination. It asks you to grant no proposition but tyose pro- M positions which constitute the starting points of your Atheism, " to-wit, that there is Infinity of Duration, and that there is 44 Infinity of Extension, — be that extension of matter merely, " or of space merely, or of matter and space together. How 44 plain must those truths be which are insisted on by all sound " Theists, (I might have said, by all men sound in their minds,) 44 and are the primary assumptions in Atheism itself.

" We shall soon see whether you are able to do all that you 4< profess to have a capacity for, j" or whether, like the Edinburgh

t Certainly I formed an estimate of atheistical talent from what I ha 1 seen of the metropolitan atheists. But, it must he confessed, the western antitheists can command talents and acquirements very superior to what the easterns have at their service. A certain piece of information allude*! to in this challenge was quite correct.

PREFACE.

" Atheists, you must be altogether dumb before one of that class " of persons who are (in your opinion) so weak and foolish as " to believe in a necessary Being who contains within himself " all possible perfections.

" I have to lay down to you the same conditions which I im- " posed on the Atheists here. The conditions are (in one re- " spect) not hard. I am, being very truly desirous of yOur " attaining to a better mind,"

(Signed) " William Gillespie."

" Edinburgh, 21st August 1837."

To this letter and challenge, a letter, dated Glasgow, 28th August 1837, was received in answer, in which it is said :

" What you say of — denying to any one in the uni-

" verse, an iota of superiority to himself in the scale of intelli- " gence, is not exactly the mode in which atheists commonly " express themselves. * * * * It has frequently been said, " that we know of no intelligence superior to that of man (and " I think any one is warranted in so saying.)"

The concluding paragraph, &c. are as follows : " Relative to " your clfeallenge, it is hereby accepted upon your own terms. " A reply to your 4 Argument' will be commenced forthwith; " but as the writer has not much time to spare, it cannot be " expected to proceed very rapidly. But as the Society intend " publishing it at their own charges, and are anxious that the " thing should be proceeded with, you may rely on no time " being lost. A copy will be forwarded to you as soon as it " comes out of the press. I have the honor to be," &c.

(Signed) " "

" To William Gillespie, Esq.' 1 ''

About the middle of April 1838, I was put in possession by the writer of that letter, according to his promise, of a copy of his reply. It is entitled, " Refutation of the Argument a priori " for the Being and Attributes of God ; shewing the lrrele-

PEEFACE.

" vancy of that Argument, as well as the Fallacious Reasoning " of Dr Samuel Clarke and others, especially of Mr Gillespie, " in support of it. By AxTiTHEOS."t

I have hinted, that there was another reason for giving a copy of the letter which contained the challenge. My adversary alleges in his Preface, that the letter was guilty of " containing " passages which could by no means militate in favor of the " writer." After asserting this, need it have been added that my respondent wished to take no advantage of the " passages ?" What ever operates more to one's prejudice than to say that the conduct of one has been faulty in some instance, but the informant is too charitable to communicate the impropriety ? But of the matter before us, the public have now been constituted the proper judges.

" Mr Gillespie," * * * says Mr Gillespie's opponent, " had been disappointed, it seems, in finding an antagonist " elsewhere,J notwithstanding has anxious endeavours to pro- " voke opposition. The gauntlet was thrown down, but no one " was fully prepared to take it up." (Preface.) If Antitheos h in his eye, as his words may tend to lead his readers to suppose he had, any thing besides the affair with the Edinburgh Atheists, (who certainly, though they had taken up the gauntlet, had not been " fully prepared" for the combat ;) he might have been informed, had he made inquiry, that very soon after the appearance of the " Argument," the author thereof found an antagonist, an unchallenged antagonist, an antagonist of very considerable and acknowledged metaphysical abilities, an antagonist who wrote laborious strictures on the work as long as the work itself.

t Published for the Glasgow Zetetic Society, 1838.

+ Mr Gillespie had been disappointed — not in finding, as Antitheos has it but — in not finding an atheistic antagonist. See the narration in the chal lenge, (p. 14—15 hereof.)

PREFACE.

The " "Refutation" gives very satisfactory evidence that its author is a person of no mean talents. The topics which, incidentally and briefly, or otherwise, have been introduced into the work, are very numerous : so numerous, indeed, that there is very little one could say, in conjunction with that which is the grandest of all subjects, but what would find something bearing upon it there. For these two reasons, — in connection with this discussion, we propose to meet and to remove every metaphysical difficulty which atheists can possibly start ; in a word, we shall, first or last, entirely exhaust the subject, to the complete and everlasting confusion of the deniers of A God.

It is to be regretted that Antitheos has not numbered his paragraphs. When I quote or animadvert on his words, I shall give not only the chapter but the paragraph : the reader who wishes to look at the passage under discussion must count for himself.

In quoting, I may occasionally leave out, for brevity's sake, or perspicuity's sake, words which make nothing to the point as to which the passage is adduced. With regard to every such case, I most willingly leave it to others to decide, whether I have, to the least extent, misrepresented my author.

EXAMINATION

OF

ANTITHEOS'S " REFUTATION."

Part I. The Relevancy Of A Priori Argumentation For A Real Existence

§ 1. There are two tilings which the author of the " Refutation" has undertaken to do. One of them is, to shew that the a priori mode of procedure is directed wide of the mark when applied to the question of the being of A God ; and the other is, to overturn the particular reasonings of those who have adopted that method of argumentation.

§ 2. The first chapter of that work is devoted to the former, and the remaining chapters are occupied with the latter undertaking.

§ 3. Our atheist begins by being very merry on the subject of the irrelevancy of a priori argument for the existence of Deity. " To hear of the existence of a GoDf " being made the subject of demonstration by argument, " is," he remarks, " altogether astounding. Theannounce- " mentonthe other hand," he adds, " sounds so oddlg,asto " mitigate the effect of the first impression, if not to ex- •« cite ridicule at the wonderful discrepancy between the

t We have given capitals to certain of the words used by Antitheos, on which he had not bestowed one capital letter. That he is so desirous of degrading, so far as he can, certain collocations of letters, is a good evidence of someth in >j.

RELEVANCY OF A PRIORI ARGUMENT. [Part I.

" end in view, and the means laid out for the attainment 44 of it." (Chapter I. paragraph 1.)

§ 4. But when the laugh is over, and it becomes time to serve us up something more substantial, we are disappointed at the meagreness of our fare. Such as it is. we shall probe every piece of it.

§ 5. It being granted, argues our author, that " a God a * * must be held as a real being," " argument' 1 (he means a priori argument) 44 appears quite out of place." — Now for the proof, Sir, if you please ? — 44 It would " never do to talk of proving the existence of the man # 44 in the moon by argument ; neither would it be of any 44 avail to employ a syllogism or a sorites to demonstrate 44 the existence of a navigable channel between the At- 44 lan tic and Pacific oceans, through the arctic regions of 44 America r — All that is here meant may be quite unobjectionable. Our author goes on : — 44 If the reasoning " under review be relevant, these must be so too. If " an a priori argument be capable of proving the exist- 44 ence of one thing, another may be proved by the same a * * process." (Par. 2.) The proof, the proof of this ? where is it to be found X

§ 6. Passing over two pages and a half, where* not a word on the subject occurs, we come, in the eighth paragraph, to something that looks as if it would turn out to be what we want. 44 The truth is, the argument in ques- 44 tion" (the argument a priori) 44 is nothing else than an attempt to establish the application of mathematical' 1 (this word should be metaphysical, vide infra, § 47, et sequentes) 44 reasoning to what it has nothing in earth or t4 heaven to do with, — namely, real existences." — The proof? — C£ How vain and preposterous the attempt V 9 — This metal will not pass. — " As well might it be maini( tained, that as the whole is in the abstract a perfect 44 quantity, it must contain within itself all the qualities

6< of the different parts of which it is composed ; that, as " some of these parts are small and some large, some " round and some square, some black and some white ; " it must be white and black, and square and round, and " large and small at the same time !" — Neither will this do. Where is the proof of the AS well might it be maintained, kc. ? the proof of the analogy between the cases ? It is to seek. Well, we have had nothing like proof as yet. But we approach a syllogism, and Antitheos does not deny, that " every sound argument is capable of " being reduced to the syllogistic form." We may hope then to get some satisfaction at length.

" Whatever necessarily possesses absolute perfections " is God;

" Metaphysical abstractions possess absolute perfec- " tions ; —

" Therefore, metaphysical abstractions are God."

§ 7. " If this be not, 11 says Antitheos, " a fair state- " ment of the whole argument in the most logical form, I ,4 am at a loss to know what is." — But I am not. — 44 Should it be any way wrong, and should some ardent u disciple of the metaphysical school of theology deign " hereafter to take a part in this discussion, it would be ** well were he to consult the Stagyrite and correct it." (Par. 9.) I mean to correct it, though I do not know that the Stagirite here will be of vast service, for the principal fallacy to be pointed out is not of a strictly logical character.

§ 8. Passing over the major proposition, the minor is, " Metaphysical abstractions possess absolute perfections." What are metaphysical abstractions \ They compose a certain class of thoughts. The minor proposition therefore amounts to this ; A certain class of our thoughts, to-wit, metaphysical abstractions, possess absolute perfections. — But by the bye, this minor proposition

RELEVANCY OF A PRIORI ARGUMENT. [Part I.

omits a word, to us a very necessary word. Antitheos should have known that the Stagirite does not allow the middle term as it occurs in the major, to contain a complete element not to be found in the middle term when it appears in the minor. This instance of high treason against the Prince of Logicians cannot be suffered to pass. Supplying the word which has been kept back, we have " Metaphysical abstractions" " necessarily" " possess ab-

" solute perfections" Do they indeed ? Metaphysics

have been in very bad repute for a good while. Berkeley and Hume, not to mention any other metaphysician, have, (it seems) brought them into everlasting disgrace with the majority of people. But behold how far Antitheos runs in an opposite direction. He is downright in love with metaphysics. Metaphysical abstractions, he has it, necessarily possess absolute perfections. The metaphysical abstractions which this gentleman has been eonver- , sant with, must be very superior indeed to the generality of those with which other people have been brought into acquaintance in these days.t

§ 9. After having said so much about the minor, we hardly need to draw the conclusion, the full and proper conclusion, to the premises set down by our author. It runs thus : Therefore, a certain class of our thoughts, to-wit, metaphysical abstractions, is God. The conclusion, like the minor, speaks for itself.

§ 10. Having thus paved the way, I proceed to do what was promised, and shall now correct Antitheos 1 's syllogism. I do not mean to say, it will be unobjectionable even in a

t Antitheos may say, that the absurdity of this minor proposition is not to be fathered upon him, he doing no more than putting a certain collection of words into the mouths of your metaphysical theists. The more shame to him ! To write sheer nonsense is bad enough. But to write sheer nonsense, and call it other people's reasoning, is neither more nor less than — what Antitheos has done. But let him keep what is his own, and nobody's else.

§5 9-13.] RELEVANCY OF A PRIORI ARGOIEXT. 25 corrected form. But if one make the best that can be made of it, he shall do very well. Here then it comes as corrected.

Whatever necessarily possesses absolute perfections is God.

But that about which certain of our metaphysical abstractions are employed necessarily possesses absolute perfections.

Therefore, that about which certain of our metaphysical abstractions are employed is God.

§ 11. Antitheos next proceeds to say : " Our reasoners " a priori have either to acknowledge the absurdity here " set forth in mood and figure, or deny that they appro- " priate abstract reasoning to questions of ontological " science. 1 ' These reasoners will not deny, that they appropriate abstract reasoning to questions of ontological science, but they will acknowledge the absurdity there set forth in mood and figure, and that even as has been shewn.

§ 12. We go on to the words which succeed : " If their " God be a real being — an "agent, he cannot be a heap " of abstractions," that is, a heap of our thoughts, for abstractions are thoughts of ours. — True, He cannot. — " If made up of abstractions,' 1 or men's thoughts, " He " cannot be an agent." — Most true. — " No reasoning ima- " ginable can make Him both." — Surely. — " Yet to no- " thing short of working out this impossibility does the " argument aim." How was that made out? By the syllogism ? Oh, then, as I have corrected the syllogism — " I say no more. 11 ^

§ 1$. Well : no great things as 'yet in the way of proving, that if A God be a real being, a priori argument is quite out of place. Perhaps we shall alight on the thing we are in search of, at last. Of a truth, the proof (such as it is) which we are seeking we come up to at the twelfth paragraph, but the reasonings which constitute the proof are not Antitheos's own, nor yet those of the Reviewer who is cited, they having been employed by Mr Hume, and being very ancient indeed.

§ 14. " The character of irrelevancy here laid at the " door of the a priori argument, is not unwarranted by " the authority of good judges among the religious them- " selves. Abundance of quotations might be adduced, " but I shall content myself with an extract from the " Edinburgh Review for October 1830, (vol. Hi. p. 113,) " in an article upon Dr MoreheacT s ' Dialogues on Na- " ' tural and Revealed Religion.' That the reviewer rea- " sons upon theistical principles is evident from the allu- " sion he makes to ' the will of the Creator,' to which, " T may remark in passing, he allows the most orthodox " latitude." (Why, does Antitheos suppose, he may meet an atheist at every corner he can turn V) " Relative to " our argument a priori he observes : — £ The truth is, it " ' involves a radical fallacy which not only renders it " ' useless but dangerous to the cause it is intended to " ' support. The question as to the being of a God, is " ' purely a question of fact : he either exists or he does " ' not exist. But there is an evident absurdity inpretendtc 1 ing to demonstrate a matter of fact, or to prove it by " 'argument a priori; because nothing is demonstrable, ** ' unless the contrary implies a contradiction, and this " ' can never be predicated of the negative of any pro- " 4 position which merely affirms or asserts a matter of fact. " ' Jlliatever we conceive as existent, we can also con- " « ceive as nonexistent, and consequently there is no being" " ' whose non-existenoe implies a contradiction, *>r, in " 1 other words, whose existence is a priori demonstrable. " 4 This must be evident to every one who knows what « ' demonstration really means. It is a universal law, << < that all heavy bodies descend to the earth in a line di-

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