The New Testament idea of hell

Preface

r I ^HIS little book is written for readers of -*• the English Scriptures, and not for those havinor access to the wide ran^e of theological discussions found in the ponderous works on Systematic Divinity, which crowd the libraries of the learned. It therefore avoids, as far as possible, the use of foreign words and elaborate criticisms, keeping an eye to the needs of ordinary inquirers and seeking to lead them to the knowledge of the meaning and use of the original terms translated Hell in the New Testament.

Xo pretension is made to having discovered any meaning in those words, or any fact in regard to their origin, history, or use not previously known, and not well established in the minds of all who have given particular attention to the subject. The reader will find, however, that the Scriptures containing them are classified a little differently, and that the terms are so applied as to bring their specific differences into greater prominence and into right relations. This is one of the chief features of the work, and if this aim is realized the result will be accepted as a sufficient reason for its publication. It will enable the reader of moderate culture to study the subject in f elligently, knowing in every instance whether the passage in hand relates to Hades, Tartarus, or Gehenna, an advantage not to be lightly esteemed.

Some will be disappointed in finding so little said directly upon those knotty questions which arise in connection with the subject of future punishment, and it may not be satisfactory to be told that such discussions have been purposely omitted, in order to keep attention to those points which relate to the fact itself, and which are necessarily preliminary to the consideration of the nature and duration of punishment, and of the methods adopted for the vindication of the divine proceeding which inflicts the penalty of eternal death upon the impenitent. But the course pursued accords with the writer's best judgment, and will be appreciated when the scope and design of the volume are taken into the account. One fault with many writers on this subject is, that they too readily plunge into the mysteries which baffle the keenest intellect and the stoutest heart.

The first thing necessary is to clear the subject of embarrassments, by ascertaining as nearly as possible what the Scriptures teach. In many instances this will remove the most serious difficulties from the mind, for the reason that those difficulties arise from misconceptions of the truth, or from wrong impressions in regard to it. The next thing of importance is to study carefully what is proposed for our acceptance in lieu of that which we find in the Scriptures. Just here many miss their footing. They listen to broad assertions, and reject unpalatable truth because it is unpalatable, without looking whither they are drifting or where they are to land. Human life is a fact, sin is a fact, the approach of death is a fact, and entrance into the unseen world is a fact. The Scriptures tell us what is there to be expected. Men object. They quibble ; but they do not change the facts, nor bring us clearer light, or point us to firmer ground.

In this little book Hades is treated as a fact. The word itself is of little consequence. The fact exists. It is a world unseen, but real, and it would have existed and filled its office, if the name had been different, or if no name had ever been given to it. The Mississippi River poured its waters along the same channel for ages before the word Mississippi was known, and it would have continued as deep and wide if no name had been applied to it. So with the invisible world. It does not depend on its name for existence or character. In the course of human events, and perchance of human follies, it so happened that the word Hades was used among men as the name of the unknown regions inhabited by departed souls ; and the Savior adopted it as suitable to his purpose, because it would be understood, and in using it he sanctioned the general idea of a world of spirits, without sanctioning the fanciful notions prevailing in regard to its location, or the pursuits of its inhabitants, because these ideas were neither contained in the name nor conveyed by its use. The origin of the word, and its use prior to its application to the nether world, is of no significance, except as showing how it took the meaning it bore in the days of Christ, and how it became suitable for his purpose.

The same remark is true of Gehenna. The name is a mere incident. The eternal state of the wicked is a fact — a necessity. Its terribleness grows out of the nature of sin, and the relation of sin to the divine government. The word Gelienna has nothing to do with the nature of sin, and sheds no light on the problem of evil. It only happened, by a very natural process, to become so related to the punishment of sin, in the mind of the Jewish people, that it could be very easily carried over into the eternal state, and applied metaphorically to the final perdition of the ungodly. This was done before Christ came, and he adopted the word and used it in that sense. The use of the word elsewhere, and before it received this application, is of no consequence. The punishment it denotes does not depend on the name; nor does the name reveal the cause or degree of the punishment. We study the name in view of its uses, and we gather all our ideas of the punishment from the surroundings of the word, and its application, knowing that all that to which it applies might have existed and been revealed under some other name, as we claim it does exist, and has been made known without reference to this name. The name presupposes the thing, but does not determine its nature or qualities. The use of the word is every thing. It is applied to a state of punishment, and the incidents of the punishment are so distinctly marked as to render it certain that the punishment is after death, and yet not in the separate state, but in the final state, where soul and body share the retribution.

In most discussions of future punishment, the terms which express duration occupy large space; but in these pages, those terms are not mentioned. They are not forgotten, however, nor is any theory advanced that ignores or disregards them. They are simply not reached. They were not necessary to the end in view, if pertinent to the present purpose, and it was deemed best not to overload the argument under this title, especially as another volume is in contemplation, as soon as pressing duties will permit its preparation.

The theories claiming consideration in this connection are numerous. That which represents all punishment as reformatory, and necessarily limited as to duration, leads all the others, and commands the largest share of attention. It assumes a post-mortem probation, and sets up a new standard of retribution, unknown to the Scriptures — namely, not according to deeds, but according to needs. Its fundamental thought is, that men are punished just enough to reform them, and with that sole object in view. This theory is deficient in philosophy and in Scripture warrant. We find no room for probation after death, but such facts established, and such principles alleged, as preclude the possibility of such a thing.

The soul-sleeping and annihilation theories have been encountered only incidentally, and refuted so far as the necessity of the argument required. They belong more properly to the discussion of the nature of punishment. The Scriptural idea, however, of the separate existence of the soul, has been presented, and thereby the crude philosophy of all materialistic conceptions of the soul has been antagonized.

PREFACE. II

The objections usually urged against eternal punishment are of two classes — those which arise out of false and unscriptural views of the subject, and those which are merely fault-finding and have no tendency to disprove the doctrine. Of the first class are those which perplexed Canon Farrar. His greatest trouble is with the "accretions," and especially the notion of "physical tortures," and the direct agency of God in tormenting the lost. In the outcome he does not deny that sin involves the condition of the soul in eternity, and may keep it out of heaven forever. The other objections are fallacious. They fault the thing itself, and stand with equal force whether the doctrine be true or false. They are aimed against the fact, and not against the proofs of the

fact.

Of this class are those which depend on

a priori reasonings. All arguments of this

kind are necessarily inconclusive, for the

reason that we are insufficiently acquainted with the premises to warrant us in affirming the conclusion. We can not comprehend the nature of God, and to reason from his nature is to reason from what we do not know. But some of God's attributes are revealed. He is just and holy, and we may safely reject any doctrine that arrays itself against justice and holiness. He is good and true, and we may and must reject any doctrine opposed to goodness and truth. This is all plain enough; but it is quite different from arguing from the divine nature, so imperfectly understood, to any conclusion with reference to the rightful method of revealing the justice and holiness of God, or with reference to the degree of punishment that is compatible with his goodness. This last requires not only the knowledge of the fact that God is holy and just and good, but the comprehension of the degree and power of these perfections, and also the comprehension of the nature and desert of sin as a disturbing* element in the moral universe.

"Such knowledge is too wonderful for me; it is too high, I can not attain unto it." Therefore all reasoning from the nature of God to the nature or degree of the punishment which he can or can not inflict is reasoning from premises which are imperfectly and inadequately understood.

Some will imagine, no doubt, that too much attention has been given to the details of opposing opinions and expositions. Possibly this is true. Nevertheless, careful observation among those troubled by these things has convinced me that many pass too easily over these details, which appear so absurd to themselves, not realizing what influence ingenious quibbling has on minds just grappling for the first time with these questions, and doing it without antecedent training in the arts of reasoning, and without the knowledge of the rules of interpretation. Hundreds of minds are swayed by little things which seem unworthy of formal refutation. It is therefore well not to regard any thing too small to notice, which we have reason to believe appears formidable to other minds, and controls their decisions in relation to important questions.

The chapters on topics which do not necessarily belong to the use of the terms rendered Hell are added because of their connection with the general subject, and as illustrative of the thought that the essential fact of Hell is revealed independently of the use of these words. The theme is the same, and the pertinency of these chapters will be recognized on perusal of them in connection with the whole argument.

With the hope that this effort to set the subject in a clear light before the reader, so far as it is treated, will not be useless labor, this little volume is sent forth with the prayer that the blessing of God may attend it, and make it instrumental in leading many seekers after truth into safe and Scriptural views of the retributions of eternity. S. M. M.

Chicago, III., July, 1878.

Contents

PAGE.

I. The Terms Employed, 17

II. Errors Antagonized, 33

Chapter I. THE TERMS EMPLOYED

THE punishment of sinners is an alternative fact. It is God's " strange work," the last resort of his wisdom and goodness, the final expression of his holiness. It is never to be considered as the primary design of the law, or of the government which makes the law, or of the administrator bearing the responsibility of maintaining the public order for which the law and government exist. In it God takes no delight. Yet the necessities of good government, the maintenance of order under rightful authority, and the highest regard for the welfare of the good, require this ultimate vindication of righteousness at the expense of the incorrigibly wicked.

To the Bible alone do we look for light on this subject. There are voices in nature and voices in our own souls which speak with reference to it; but their utterances are indistinct and inharmonious, and without the authoritative teachings of the Scriptures these other revelations can not be safely interpreted. We therefore come to God's Word to learn the facts, so far as they are declared to us, and to accept the statements therein contained as final, so far as we can understand and apply them.

It is not to be expected, however, that our curiosity will be gratified. The more we learn of God and of his government, and of the dispensations of his providence, and of the moral relations of his creatures, and of the possibilities of destiny, the more deeply are we impressed with the incomprehensibleness of his nature, and the unfathomableness of his purposes. The light he gives us is the "true light/' It is sufficient for our probational necessities. As a lamp to our feet, it will not misdirect our steps; but it does not scatter all the darkness from our surroundings, nor make luminous the entire pathway of our future being. We know in part. We see through a glass darkly. But the assurance is given that hereafter the fuller light will come, and with it will come the higher revelations of the divine glory, and the more perfect vindications of the divine government.

The subject of future punishment, in the nature of the case, is the hardest to understand. It grows out of moral conditions which are abnormal, and moral relations which are distorted. It belongs to the darker side of the divine dispensations. In every aspect in which we can view it, there is necessarily something beyond the apparent — something deeper and darker — something that evades our sight and thought, that recedes at our approach, and bids defiance to our wishes. We stand before it with awe. We look with amazement. A strange misgiving, an indefinable consciousness of timidity comes over us as we think of the insoluble mystery, and yet apprehend the dreadful reality of a world of woe. A thousand questions arise, and a thousand conjectures come and go, and yet the darkness is not driven away, nor the stubborn fact removed. It stands out before us in outline, commanding our attention, and yet refusing to disclose its interior form or furnishment. We study it as a mystery.

There are several features of this subject which have hitherto received much attention, and are worthy of it, but which, for lack of space in this little treatise, we will not at all consider. The nature, duration, and results of punishment in the future world will possibly afford a theme for another volume, but this one must be devoted to matters preliminary to the discussions which such a work would contain; namely, the fact of Hell. And by this term is meant a state of punishment beyond death, which is final, and from which there is no deliverance. I shall indulge no speculations concerning its location, its structure, or dimensions; but shall aim to follow the light of the Scriptures concerning the fact, and seek so to identify the feet as to be able rightly to apply all the passages bearing on the subject, each in order. This will avoid confusion of thought and of argument, a most important point. In a majority of instances this is not done. Many turn aside, unconsciously it may be, from the main question of fact, to its modes, its nature, its conditions, and then the difficulties that necessarily belong to these incidents are allowed to encumber the primary question, which ought to be settled, first of all, upon a sure foundation, supported by the testimonies which relate to it, independently of human conjectures, wishes, or prepossessions of any sort.

That there is confusion in the popular mind on the subject of Hell is not to be questioned. It exists in the Church and out of the Church, among the othodox and the heterodox, believers and unbelievers. It is found among the learned and the unlearned, and not one of us dares assume entire freedom from its influence. In our earlier thoughts we were undoubtedly biased by traditional impressions, which partook of the current opinions, and were shaped by them, without escaping the effect of those accretions which the truth had gathered to itself in its contact with human thoughts and passions. But all the crudities of opinion that have found currency are not chargeable to these early biases. Some are inevitable from the conditions of the subject, as found in our standard version of the Scriptures. Let us look at this a little. There are four words translated Hell in the Bible, and not one of them answers to the popular idea which has become nearly universal where the English Scriptures are read. This is a fact known to scholars conversant with the original, but scarcely suspected by the ordinary reader; and why should it be? He has no means of knowing, when he sees the word Hell, whether he has before him one or the other of these original words, and therefore he can not tell whether he is reading of Hades or Gehenna. The result is inevitable. He confounds things that differ. He applies passages indifferently that contain these different terms, and that ought not to be so applied.

Nor have those who read the original been as careful to classify the Scriptures containing these terms as the importance of the matter demands. Perhaps the majority of ministers a PPb' those passages indiscriminately to the same state of being in which the different original terms are found. This is a mistake which is scarcely excusable. But it would not be so bad if the original terms were synonyms, or had a meaning so nearly alike that they could be used interchangeably in the language to which the)' belong. Such use of them would not then be misleading. But they can not be used interchangeably. They are not alike in origin, history, use, application, or meaning. And yet they are translated by the same English word. To say the least of it this is unfortunate and necessarily misleading.

The Old Testament word Sheol is used with some latitude of meaning and application. It, however, always relates to the state of the dead, unless used in a metaphorical sense of something in this world; but sometimes it expresses the state of the body, and at other times of the soul. It does not express duration. It means in general the unseen world, the state of departed souls. It is not the decisive term in this discussion, and its use will occupy but little of our attention.

Tartarus occurs but once in the Scriptures, and will require but brief consideration. It is found in 2 Peter ii, 4: "For if God spared not the angels that sinned, but cast them down to hell — Tartarus — and delivered them into chains of darkness, to be reserved unto judgment," etc. It is the prison of the fallen angels, this side of the judgment, and should have been treated as a proper name — that is, it should have been transferred without translation. Then its meaning, as found in classic usage, and in the connection in which it is found, would have followed it and become familiar to all Biblical students.

Hades is a more important word. It occurs eleven times in the New Testament, and is translated "hell" ten times, and "grave" once. It is the Greek equivalent for the Hebrew Sheol. When a passage is quoted in the New Testament from the Old, containing Sheol, it is rendered by Hades. There is no disagreement among scholars as to the meaning of Hades. Some difference of application may be found, but, upon the whole, there is substantial agreement. This fact renders our task comparatively easy, so far as this word is concerned. It means the unseen world, the place of departed souls, and expresses nothing as to their character or condition. It always relates to the soul in a disembodied state, and never to the body; so that it should never be rendered grave. There are other Greek words that express the receptacle of the dead body, such as are rendered grave, tomb, sepulcher, etc.; but this word has no such meaning, and admits of nothing material. Hence, its true and only application is to the state of the dead, between death and the resurrection. This point is to be emphasized in this treatise. Gehenna is the next word. It occurs in the New Testament twelve times, and, with a single exception, James iii, 6, where it is used metaphorically, it occurs in the discourses of our Lord alone. It related to the Jews, primarily, and would only be understood by them. Here, also, there is substantial agreement among scholars. The or join and meaning; of the word are not in dispute. It is composed of two Hebrew words which together mean the valley of Hinnom. This was a place in the valley south of Jerusalem, once the seat of idolatrous worship, where stood the image of Moloch, where the Canaanites, and afterward the Israelites in their backslidden state, performed the cruel rites that distinguished the worship of that monstrous idol. King Josiah destroyed this worship, and polluted the place, so that it became the receptacle of the filth of the city. In the old Testament it was also called Tophet, in allusion to the beating of drums that was kept up during the worship of Moloch. The name of this place became the synonym of all that was opposed to God and hateful to his people, and very naturally came into use to express the Jewish idea of the punishment of the enemies of God after death. In this condition of things, and in this sense, our Savior used Geheitna, with reference to the ultimate punishment of the wicked. Its use comes nearer to the meaning which the popular sentiment attaches to the English word Hell than does any other of the terms so translated; and yet it is a proper name — the name of a place well-known — and should have been transferred, and not translated. The discussion of this word has reference, not to its origin, history, or meaning, but to its application. The questions raised are as to whether the Savior used it literally or figuratively; and whether he designed it to apply to punishment in this world, or the next world.

With those who believe in eternal punishment the practice is quite common of applying this word to the state immediately after death; that is, to punishment in Hades; but this is evidently improper. It should apply only to the final state of the wicked; and therefore, never to any state, or place, or condition this side of the resurrection of the dead. To correct this mistake, and to classify the Scriptures containing these different words so as to avoid the confusion that has resulted from their indiscriminate use, is largely the purpose of this volume. Indeed, this is about all that is necessary to the vindication of the Scriptural doctrine of retribution.

Here then is the arrangement to be observed. Sheol is translated by Hades; and Hades, being the New Testament word, we take it in its truest sense, as applying to the invisible world, the state of the dead between death- and the resurrection, and never to any thing beyond the resurrection. Tartarus is another word for the same thing, with only the difference that it is the prison of the fallen angels this side of the judgment. It is therefore substantially the same as Hades, and may be considered as a part of Hades. In other words, Hades covers the entire ground this side of the resurrection. Gehenna applies to nothing till Hades is past. It relates to the period beyond the resurrection and the judgment, the final state. This is the true distinction and it is certainly plain, and easily comprehended, and quite as easily demonstrated.

Not one of these words expresses duration. This is simply a fact, and to state it is no concession to any one, or to any doctrine. The idea of duration is incidental and consequential. Hades has duration, of necessity, as this world has, and as any thing has which has being. Its duration is limited, so far as humanity is concerned, to the period of this world's history, or to the time of the existence of souls in the disembodied state. In the resurrection it will give up its dead, and pass away, at least so far as we are concerned. Therefore the punishment in it is not forever. And, therefore, those who prove that Hades is not a place of eternal punishment, have not gained a point, as they suppose they have, against the orthodox teaching, because they have not met the issue in dispute.

So Gehenna has duration, though it is not expressed by the word. The duration is implied. But the state to which it applies is in eternity. It is beyond the resurrection. And there is no great fact beyond it. There is neither resurrection nor judgment to follow. So far as the Scriptures indicate, there is no limit to the state expressed by Gehenna. It follows from all this that Hades and Gehenna are quite different, and that they must be so recognized and treated, in order to an understanding of the New Testament idea of the state of the dead, and the doctrine of future punishment.

It often happens that when an issue is correctly stated, the argument is half completed. At least much useless labor is saved. In the latest discussions of this subject, like the older ones, much time and learning and energy have been expended on false issues, or no issue at all. The learned Dr. Farrar, in his book called "Eternal Hope" betrays weakness in this respect. He finds ample reasons for objecting to the translation of so many original terms by the same English word, Hell, and then, instead of examining critically the original terms, he discusses at length the translation. In this he meets no issue. So also does he confuse the subject, and embarrass himself, by treating incidentals as the main subject.

Take an example. He thus states what he calls ''the common view," to which he objects: ''These four elements — which make the popular view far darker than that held in the Roman Church, and far darker even than that of St. Augustine — are I. The physical torments, the material agonies, the ' sapiens ignis,' of eternal punishment; 2. The supposition of its necessarily endless duration for all who incur it; 3. The opinion that it is thus incurred by the vast mass of mankind, and 4. That it is a doom passed irreversibly at the moment of death on all who die in a state of sin."

Of these "four elements," three are "accretions." They do not form any necessary part of "the common doctrine" of eternal punishment, as taught in the New Testament. The "physical torments," and "material agonies," may be at once eliminated. They are no part of the doctrine. In the discussion of the nature of future punishment, they might be considered, if any one should affirm a view that would require it; but in an inquiry concerning the fact of eternal punishment, this "element" is out of place. So also is it immaterial to the issue whether the "vast mass of mankind," or only relatively a small portion, shall incur the final doom. It is not a question of numbers, for the fact is equally palpable, and the doctrine just as true, if only a small number are finally lost, as if the vast mass were involved. Nor does it make any difference whether the doom is passed irreversibly at the moment of death, or is morally determined by the accumulations of guilt during life, and judicially announced in the day of judgment. If it ever becomes "irreversible" there must be a moment when the crisis is reached. Whether that be at death, or before, or after, is not the material fact. Thus these "four elements" are reduced to a single point, and that is the fact to be determined by testimony. It is simply a question — the same old question — whether eternal punishment is the possible doom of any portion of the human race.

The time was when, in this discussion, it was necessary to affirm and maintain the fact that there is punishment after death. Now nearly all, if not quite all, who take the Scriptures as authority, admit this fact. Mr. Austin — Universalist — says, i * Universalism neither rejects nor adopts the doctrine of future punishment." It leaves its adherents to take such views on this subject as seem the most consistent to them. This prudence saves labor. It narrows down the issue, leaving only the question of finality or duration to be determined. This issue will be met by the application of the word Gehenna. It is met by Hades only in part. The examination which we propose of these terms will settle the main fact, and lay the foundation for the study of terms which express duration.