The elements of intellectual science

Front matter

Glass B 9JjL-

WA .V53H?

THE WORKS OF NOAH PORTER, D.D., LL.D.

Preface

In accordance with the wishes of many instructors and friends of education, the author has prepared an abridged edition of his work entitled, The Human Intellect, which was first published in 1868. In doing this, he has retained all the leading positions of the original work, with many of the illustrations, occasionally condensing the language, and not infrequently changing the order and method of the argument. Many important topics, less adapted to an elementary work, have been omitted altogether. The controversial and critical observations, have to a large extent been dropped, or greatly abridged. The historical matter has been in part retained, so far as seemed appropriate to a strictly elementary manual. In order, however, to meet the wants of schools, as well as of colleges, some of the matter which is less adapted to beginners, has been printed in smaller type. This may be reserved for a review, or omitted altogether. The author did not feel at liberty, however, to forego for the sake of beginners, a thorough discussion of the important speculative questions which occupy the concluding part of the treatise. For the convenience of those teachers and pupils who may wish to

IV PREFACE.

consult the larger work the leading divisions and titles in both volumes are the same. With many thanks for the favor with which the previous treatise has been received, this manual is now offered to the public, and especially to teachers and pupils in schools and colleges.

N. P.

Yale College, July, 1871.

Introduction

PSYCHOLOGY AND THE SOUL.

TAG*

I.- -Psychology Defined and Vindicated 1

§ 1. Psychology and kindred terms. \ 2. Psychology is a science. § 3. Its relations to physiology and anthropology. £ 4. Its phenomena known by consciousness. § 5. Its phenomena impel to scientific study. $ 6. Value of Psychology. It promotes self-knowledge and moral culture — Disciplines to moral reflection. g 7. Trains to the knowledge of human nature. \ 8. Is indispensable to educators. § 9. Disciplines for the study of literature. § 10. Psychology the mother of the sciences which relate to man. § 11. Its special relation to logic and metaphysics. § 12. Is a discipline to method.

II.— The Kelations of the Soul to Matter. . . .11

§ 13. Psychology is a branch of physics. § 14. Reasons why its facts are at first distrusted by the student. § 15. Material phenomena are the earliest known. § 16. Materialistic misgivings and impressions. # 17. These should be set aside. In what way. \ 18. The arguments of the materialist. (1). The soul is connected with a body— 2. The soul is developed with the body— 3. Is dependent on the body for its knowledge and enjoyment — 4. Also for its energy and activity— 5. It terminates a series of material existences — The conclusion of the materialist. # 19. Counter arguments. (1). Its phenomena are unlike material phenomena— 2. The soul distinguishes itself from matter— 3. The soul is self-active — 4. Is not dependent on matter in its highest activities — 5. Gradation of existence does not prove the soul to be material. § 20. The phenomena of the soul real. § 21. Phenomena of one sort cannot be judged by those of another. g 22. The phenomena, and language in which they are described, g 23. Misleading influence of language.

HI. — The Faculties of the Soul 24

\ 24. Question concerning the faculties. § 25. Faculties not parts or organs — Each faculty does not act at a separate time. # 26. States of the soul are like and unlike one another — Their elements are like and unlike in quality— They are

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VI CONTENTS.

dependent on one another — One element is preponderant in each state. £ 27 Faculty denned. General authority — Special authority. § 28. These faculties common to all men. $ 29. The faculties not independent of one another. § 30. The unity of the soul — Different kinds of unity — Psychical unity is the highest of all. § 31. Unity does not exclude complexness. $ 32. Powers of the soul, threefold. § 33. Faculty, power, capacity. § 34. Function, state, phenomenon.

IV. — Is Psychology a Science, and what are its Principles and Methods? 34

§ 35. Materials of psychology; It is an inductive science, and the science of induction. $ 36. Some hold psychology too vague to be a science, g 37. The materialistic view of psychology. § 38. The cerebralist theory. § 39. The phrenological theory. § 40. The Associationalist theory — Usually materialistic. § 41. Metaphysical or a priori Psychology.

THE HUMAN INTELLECT: ITS FUNCTION, DEVELOPMENT, AND FACULTIES.

A PRELIMINARY CHAPTER 42

§ 42. Knowledge defined. What is it to know ? § 43. The process which prepares objects of knowledge. § 44. To know, implies the certainty of being. § 45. Also the reality of relations. § 46. When is the process of knowledge complete ? $ 47. The act of knowing is diverse in its energy. Attention. § 48. The psychological and logical relation of processes and products — The critical, or speculative, application of knowledge. # 49. Order of intellectual development, growth and studies. § 50. Principles of classifying the powers of the intellect. § 51. The presentative faculty. g 52. The representative faculty. § 53. Thought, or intelligence — Two aspects or forms of thought.

CONTENTS. VU

THE HUMAN INTELLECT.

Part First. Presentation And Presentative Knowledge

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I.— Consciousness — Natural Consciousness. . . 61

§ 54. Consciousness denned. Variously applied. $ 55. Two forms of consciousness. $ 56. Natural consciousness as an act. $ 57. Consciousness the object. # 58. Relation of consciousness to each of the elements of a psychical state. $ 59. The activity may be chiefly noticed. £ 60. Consciousness of the ego. $ 61. The relation of consciousness to the objects of psychical activity. § 62. The object of consciousness is a state of being — Special sense of cogito, ergo $um. § 63. The validity of relations is also established. $ 64. The development and growth of consciousness. § 65. Latent modifications of consciousness.

II. — The Reflective, or Philosophical Consciousness. . 78

$ 66. The reflective consciousness defined — The abnormal consciousness in children and adults — The ethical consciousness. § 67. The scientific reflective consciousness. Characterized by persistent attention. $ 68. It attends to all the psychical phenomena. \ 69. Compares and classifies them. $ 70. Interprets and explains them by powers and laws. § 71. Relations of the philosophical to the natural consciousness. § 72. Office of language in respect to each — The language of common life sometimes the most trustworthy. $ 73. The actions of men also an important test of truth. § 74. Conditions of reaching the decisions of consciousness. $ 75. Uncertainty and slow progress of psychology explained. § 76. Peculiar difficulties in the study of the soul.

III.— Sense-Perception : The Conditions and the Process. 93

§ 77. Sense-perception defined and distinguished — Is developed earliest of all the powers — Seems to be the most familiar. Is not the most easily understood — Distinguished from other mental acts — Knowledge of matter not gained by sense-perception — What are acts of sense-perception ? — Knowledge that is gained by sense-perception — Results of analysis. Eight topics proposed. $ 78. The conditions enumerated. The first condition — The nervous system. The sensorium — The reflex action of the nerves. \ 78 a. The second condition is an object or exeitant. § 79. The third condition. Its action on the sensorium. $ 80. The process of sense-perception in the simplest form ; what is it ? — It is psychical, not physiological — It is complex of two elements — The elements unequal in energy ; in the same, and the different senses, g 81. Sensation proper pertains to the sou', § 82. Yet experienced by the goul connected with an organism. $ 83. The sensations localized. § 84. Differ from one another in quality and definiteness. g 85,

Vlll CONTENTS.

Perception proper, an act of pure knowledge. § 86. Its object a non-ego. What kind of a non-tvjro. § ^7. An extended non-ego. \ 88. Perception attends all the sensations — The extension and externality of all objects not given with equal clearness. £ 89. The varying relations of sensation and perception proper — In different sensations of the ume sense — In the different senses.

IV.— Classes of Semie-Perceptions 109

$ 90. Three classes of se^se-perceptions. The muscular. $ 91. The organic: §92. The special sense-perc^tions. Smell; its organ, conditions, and objects* § 93. Taste: organs and objects. Variety of the sensations. §94 Hearing; its organ and objects — The sensb,dons various. In what respects distinguishable — Sounds in succession and combination. Melody and harmony — The condition of oral language. Expressive ui feeling. § 95. The sense of touch. Its organ — Essential condition of toucL. § 96. Variety of sensations involved in touch. Sensations of gentle touch — I ensations involving violence or injury — Sensations of temperature — Sensations w pressure and weight — The muscular sensations — Sensations localized. § 97. Perceptions proper of touch — Extension perceived by touch. Not explicable by extension in the organism, g 98. The perception of externality by touch — Two meanings of externality — ExternaHty in the first signification — Objection answered. § 99. Sense of touch the leading sense — Furnishes intellectual terms. \ 100. Sight; its organ and the conditions of vision — Function of the image on th.3 retina — Sensations proper of vision. \ 101. Perception proper in vision. Tne object of vision — Is always extended — Visible extension superficial only — A dingle object seen with two eyes — Original place of the visible percept. $ 102. Dignity of the eye.

V. — The acquired Sense-Perceptions 132

# 103. The sense-perceptions, as original and acquired — Impoi-tancc and time of gaining the acquired perceptions. § 104. The acquired perceptions of smell and hearing. § 105. Acquired perceptions of sight. Distance judged by size — Judgments of magnitudes by distance — Judgments of distance by color, outline, clearness, etc. — Judgments of size by other equidistant objects — Influence of Intermediate objects. § 106. Judgments of form, etc., by sight. § 107. Acquired sense-perceptions of place, motion and expression within the body — The provisions of nature for these ends — The control by the intellect of these arrangements — How we learn to talk and to walk — Feats of dexterity. Expressional effects. § 108. The errors of the senses explained. § 109. The acquired perceptions as forms of knowledge — They involve induction — Objections from the cases of animals — Reasons why the perceptions of animals and of man should differ.

VI.— Development and Growth of Sense-Perception. . 150

# 110. Nature, interest, and difficulty of the problem. § 111. The intellect, condition of the, before sense-perception begins — The beginnings and development of attention. # 112. The order in which the perceptions are developed. § 113, The development of touch — Hamilton's theory of the perception of the extra-organic. # 114. Development of vision. $ 115. Combination of touch and vision — Observations upon infants. § 116. The blind from birth, upon the recovery of light.

CONTENTS. IX

PAGE

VII. — The Products of Sense-Perception; or, The Perception of Material Things 165

§ 117. Material things and sense-percepts, g 117 a. The first stage of perception; limited to coincidence in space and time. §118. The second stage: Tha relation of substance and attribute — This relation supposes reflex and indirect knowledge. g 119. The conditions of complete perception. § 120. Can we attend to more than one thing at a time ?

VIII. — Activity of the Soul in Sense-Perception . . 180

§ 121. Sense-perception held by many to be passive only — Grounds on which the theory rests. £ 122. Evidence that the soul is active. § 123. Different modea of this activity — Is elementary, and easily exercised.

Sense-Perception: Summary and Eeview. . . .187 IX. — Theories of Sense-Perception. . ' . . . 189

$ 125. Interest of the theories and their history. $ 126. The early Greek philosophers — Aristotle. $ 127. The schoolmen. Their doctrine of species. <? 128. Descartes, Malebranche, and Arnauld. $ 129. John Locke. $ 130. Bishop George Berkeley, David Hume. $ 131. T. Reid, Dugald Stewart, Dr. T. Brown. \ 132. Sir William Hamilton. $ 133. Immanuel Kant, and the German school.

Part Second. Representation And Representative Knowledge

I. — The Eepresentative Power Defined and Explained. 206

$ 134. Representation defined and illustrated. \ 135. Appellations for the power. £ 136. Objects of the representative power. $ 137. These objects involve relations. § 138. Conditions and laws of representation considered. $ 139. Representation divided into several varieties. $ 140. Interest and importance of the representative power.

II.— The Eepresentative Object— Its Nature and Importance 21&

\ 141. Why the object of representation needs special discussion. $ 112. It is a pyschical object. $ 143. It is a transient and short-lived object. $ 144. It is an intellectual object. \ 145. The relation can be compared to no other. $ 146. Representative ideas of objects of consciousness and sense-perception do not resemble them. Memory. § 147. Positive characteristics of mental pictures. $ 148. In thought, we prefer ideas to realities. $ 149. Ideas especially useful in comparison and generalization. § 150. Images prepare for and aid to action.

I CONTENTS.

FAGt

III. — The Conditions and Laws of Representation — The

Association of Ideas , 225

§ 151. Association of ideas. Importance and interest of the subject. § 152. Laws of association. $ 153. Association not explained by bodily organization. § 154. The laws of association cannot be referred to any attractive power in ideas as such. $ 155. Nor into the force of relations as such — Are not other relations supposable? $156. The law of redintegration. $157. The real explanation. How enounced — Associations with home. $ 158. The secondary laws defined — How far reducible to the same principle with the primary. \ 159. Apparent exceptions to the law of association. $ 160. Representation unceasingly active. How it can be interrupted. $ 161. Law of association and law of habit. § 162. Higher and lower laws of association.

IV. — Representation. — (1.) The Memory, or Recognizing

Faculty. 254

§ 163. The elements essential to an act of memory. $ 164. Memory technically defined. Relation of memory to representation. $ 165. The spontaneous memory. $ 165 a. The intentional memory. $ 166. Memory as the power to retain, and to lose. $ 167. Dependence on the body. $ 168. Varieties of memory; how explained — Development of memory. Its characteristics in the several periods of life. # 169. The education of the memory. \ 170. The cultivation of the memory; mnemonics.

V. — Representation. — (2.) The Phantasy, or imaging

Power 278

$ 171. Phantasy defined and illustrated. $ 172. The interest of its problems — The power of association is operative in them all — Deviations accounted for. (1.) By changes in the relative proportion of the powers. $ 173. Sleep physiologically considered. $ 174. Sleep considered psychologically. $ 175. Somnambulism, or abnormal sleep. $ 176. Hallucinations, apparitions, etc. \ 177. Insanity.

VI. — Representation. — (3.) The Imagination or Creative

Power 295

$ 178. Conditions and materials common to the imagination. $ 179. The power of the imagination to create new products. § 180. The combining and arranging office of the imagination. $ 181. The idealization of the relations of apace and time in art, and mathematical science. £ 182. 3. The formation of an ideal standard for psychical acts and states. $ 183. The imagination is capable of growth and culture. # 181. Is developed from the earliest till the latest periods in life. $ 185. Special applications of the imagination. The poetio imagination. $ 186. Its medium is language. $ 187. The philosophic imagination. $ 188. The practical and ethical imagination. $ 189. Relation of the imagination to religious faith.

CONTENTS. Xl

Part Third. Thought And Thought-knowledge

PAGB

§ 190. Thinking and the thought power denned. \ 191. Appellations for the power of thinking, etc. £ 192. Relation of thought to the lower powers. § 193. Concrete and abstract thinking. § 194. Relations of thought to language.

II. — The Formation of the Concept or Notion. . . 327

§ 195. The processes involved in forming the concept. \ 196. The product, its nature and appellation. § 197. Concepts as concrete and abstract, as simple and complex ; their content and extent. $ 198. Classification, its origin and different species. $ 199. How much do we gain by knowing by concepts. \ 200. Relation of knowledge by concepts and by intuitions.

III. — The Nature of the Concept. — Sketch of Theories. 339

§ 201. The doctrines of Socrates and Plato, and Aristotle. $ 202. Porphyry's questions and the scholastics. § 203. Modern Philosophers — G. W. Leibnitz. § 204. G. W. F. Hegel.

IV.— The Nature of the Concept. — General Names. —

Language 45

\ 205. Essential characteristics of the concept. $ 206. How far the conceptualist and nominalist are both right. $ 207. The imaging of concepts — Different images illustrate the same concept. £ 208. The truth represented by realism — The classifications of Botany. $ 209. Value of naming and of language. § 210. The relation of symbolic to intuitive knowledge.

V. — Judgment, and the Proposition 358

g 211. Judgment implied in the formation and use of the concept. § 212. Judgments are psychological and logical — How the subject of a judgment is expressed in language. § 213. The Signification of the copula. £ 214. Classes of judgments. Judgments of content. § 215. Judgments of extent. § 216. Scientific and common knowledge.

VI. — Reasoning. — Deduction of Mediate Judgment. . 366

§ 217. Nature and importance of reasoning. \ 218. Reasoning, inductive and deductive. § 219. The forms of deduction. § 220. The syllogism not a but the form of deduction. g 221. The dicta or formula of the syllogism. $ 222. Deduction rests on the relation of reason to consequent. \ 223. The relation of logical reasons to cause and laws. § 224. Geometrical reasons.

VII. — Reasoning. — Varieties of Deduction. . . 373

§ 225. The varieties are three; these subdivided. # 226. Probable reasoning. § 227. Mathematical reasoning, materials of. § 228. Definitions and axioms. \ 229. The construction of geometrical figures. Auxiliary lines, etc. § 220.

Xll CONTENTS.

Geometrical reasoning explained by an example. $ 231. Immediate syllogisms. \ 232. Two elements in most acts of deduction. $ 233. Deduction adds to our knowledge. In what sense ?

VIII.— Inductive Seasoning or Induction. . . .391

§ 234. Inductions properly and improperly so-called. $ 235. Inductions of common life and inductions of science. $ 236. Why are the indications of science more difficult? $ 237. The a priori relations assumed in induction. $ 238. The three rules of induction. $ 239. The conditions of a successful hypothesis and discovery. § 240. The choice between hypotheses. \ 241. The place of experiment.

IX. — Scientific Arrangement. — The System. . . 416

$ 242. Scientific arrangement. System in its lower import. § 243. System in its higher significance.

Part Fourth. Intuition. — The Categories. — First Principles

I. — The Intuitions Defined and Enumerated. . . 419

§ 244. The critical and speculative stage of our studies — They have bee.i referred to a separate faculty — The appellations by which they are known. \ 245. Not first in the order of time, but in logical importance — They are, in fact, attained last in the order of time. § 246. Various significations of a principle. § 247. The relation of intuition to experience. £ 248. The Three Criteria of '^irst Truths. # 249. They are independent of one another — Hegel's development of the categories. $ 250. Divided into three classes.

II. — Theories of Intuitive Knowledge. . . . 433

I 251. The theory of a direct mental vision of first truths. § 252. The theory that they are discerned by the light of nature. § 253. That they are innate or connate. $ 254. The views of Locke and his school. $ 255. Dr. Reid and the Scottish School. \ 256. Kant and his School. $ 257. Hamilton's Positive and Negative Necessity. § 258. The theory of Faith as contrasted with knowledge. I 259. J. G. Fichte. \ 260. Schelling's view of the categories. £ 261. Hegel's theory of pure thought. § 262. Hcrbart's theory.

III.— Formal Eelations or Categories. . . . 446

\ 263. The category of being. — In what sense fundamental, $ 264. The most abstract of all the categories, $ 265. Is indefinable and indeterminate. # 266. Relationship. Diversity and similarity. — Relative notions. Negative notions, g 207. Substance aud attribute formally conceived. #208. The logical axioms of identity, eto.

CONTENTS. Xiii

PAGE

IV. — Mathematical Relations: Time and Space. , 454

$ 269. Development of the several relations of extension. $ 270. Duration, how related to the acts of the soul. § 271. The mind discerns extended and enduring objects together. $272. Limitations of sense-perception. §273. Beyond these we use the imagination. $ 274. Measures of time-objects are imaginary. — ■ Different capacities in different men. — Differences in the estimates of time. — ■ Whence standards for both space and time are derived. § 275. How the relations of space and time objects are generalized. £ 276. Two classes of mathematical concepts. The geometrical. — Postulates of geometrical quantity. § 277. The concepts of number. \ 278. The application of number to magnitude. § 279. Why, and how mathematical concepts are applicable to material objects. £ 280. Time and space relations can be still further generalized. § 281. Extended and enduring objects are limited. \ 282. Extension and duration distinguished from, but related to space and time. § 283. They limit objects and events. § 284. In what sense space and time are unlimited. § 285. Space and Time cannot be generalized under higher concepts. $ 286. They are known as the conditions of their limited correlates. $ 287. What are space and time ? Conclusion.

V. — Causation and the Relation of Causality. . 480

$ 289. Causation as a law, and as a principle. § 290. Event defined. § 291, Cause distinguished from conditions. § 292. The relation cannot be resolved into a time-relation. § 293. The principle of causality intuitively evident. § 294. Counter theories. The belief not acquired by induction or association. £ 295. Not resolvable into outward or inner experience, or both. Locke and De Biran. § 296. The theory which resolves causality into a relation of concepts. § 297. Hamilton's theory of causation. — Conclusion. Our position re-affirmed.

VI. — Design of Final Cause 498

§ 298. Terms explained. Formal, material, efficient, and final causes. § 299. Design and adaptation, how related. £ 300. The relation assumed as necessary and a priori. $ 301. Reasons. The mind impelled to connect objects by this relation. § 302. The relation is higher than that of efficient causation. § 303. The principle has been of essential service in scientific discovery. § 304. The foundation of the inductive philosophy. § 305. Required to explam the phenomena of organic existences. § 306. Relation of final to efficient causes in the higher orders of being. § 307. Objections : (1.) Men mistake in their judgments about final causes. £ 308. (2.) Our interpretations can neither be tested nor confirmed. § 309. (3.) This relation derived from conscious experience. — The relation unquestioned in some applications. \ 310. (4.) Two principles introduced into philosophy which may possibly conflict. § 311. (5.) The search after final causes has hindered discovery. \ 312. (6.) The adaptations of nature are only the conditions of existence. § 313. (7.) Adaptation is limited to organic existence. £ 314. (8.) We are not warranted in affirming it of all kinds of existence. § 315. (9.) Adaptation cannot be affirmed of an unlimited Being. § 316, The principle is illustrated and confirmed by its application to metaphysics. § 317. Applied in geometrical construction and deduction. $ 318. Applied in geology* etc. \ 319. Applied in geography and history; § 320. Also in comparative an

XIV CONTENTS.

tomy and physiology. § 321. Applied in anthropology ; — In the provisions foi and the capacities of language. § 322. Application to psychology. $ 323. Applied and assuumed in ethics. § 324. Application to theology. — The commoii argument for the Divine existence.

VII. — Substance and Attribute: Mind and Matter. . 524

§ 325. Uses and etymology of the terms. § 326. Substance and attribute in the abstract. $ 327. Spiritual or mental substance. § 328. Material substance denned. $ 329. Space occupation and identity of matter. $ 330. The production of new substances. — The real Essence or Thing in itself. § 331. A material substance not necessarily independent. — Dogmas that seem to deny permanence. § 332. Tbe reciprocal relations of material and spiritual substance. — Mind and matter directly and indirectly known. \ 333. The qualities of matter as primary and secondary. $ 335. Real and phenomenal or relative knowledge.

VIII.— The Finite and Conditioned. — The Infinite and Absolute. 541

§ 336. To know, a limiting process. $ 337. The finite universe \ how conceived. % 338. The import of the terms infinite and absolute. $ 339. The unconditioned is the non-conditioned. — Applied to quality and quantity. $ 340, The absolute, several causes of. The Hegelian sense. $ 341. What is not truo of the absolute, etc. g 342. The absolute, etc., are knowable. — Views of Kant, Hamilton, and Mansel. — Herbert Spencer dissents in part. § 343. The absolute apprehended by the intellect. § 344. Not know exhaustively or adequately. — The finite universe infinite to our knowledge. — The absolute a thinking agent. § 345. Must be assumed to explain thought and science.

INTRODUCTION.

PSYCHOLOGY AND THE SOUL.

PSYCHOLOGY DEFINED AND VINDICATED.

§ 1. Psychology is the science of the human soul. _ . ,

m J Psychology,

The appellation is of comparatively recent use by and kindred English writers, but is now generally accepted as the most appropriate term to denote the scientific knowledge of the whole soul, as distinguished from a single class of its endowments or functions. The terms in frequent use — mental philosophy, the philosophy of the mind, intellectual philosophy, etc. — should be strictly limited to a single power of the soul, i. e., its power to know, and should never be extended to its capacity to feel and to will, or to all its endowments collectively. The terms metaphysics and philosophy, when used without an adjunct, cannot designate any special science, but only one which is general and fundamental to all the sciences, both material and psychical.

§ 2. Psychology is a science. It professes to exhibit what is actually known or may be learned con- ^'aSenS "* cerning the soul, in the forms of science — i. e., in the forms of exact observation, precise definition, fixed terminology, classified arrangement, and rational explanation.

It is the science of the soul; i. e., the science which has the soul for its subject-matter. Soul differs from spirit as the species from the genus ; soul being limited to a spirit that either is or has been connected with a body or material organization ; while spirit may also be applied to a beiDg that has at present no such connection, or is believed never to have had any.

The term soul originally signified the principle of life or motion in a material organism. It was especially appropriated to the vital principle which was supposed to animate the body, whether in man or the lower animals. This signification is apparent in the threefold division of man into body, soul, and spirit, in which the soul occupies the place between the corporeal element, and the spiritual. This intermediate part was sometimes called the animal soul, and was Relieved to perish with the body. Hence, the term spirit was applied to a nature that had never been fixed in a body, or soiled and degraded by connection with it. But in the New Testament, (poyjxoq — -psychical — is often applied to the body _ji the sense of animal, to distinguish it from the spiritual body. We recognize somewhat of the earlier and lower meaning in the phrases, "The soul of the universe," " The soul of a plant," "The soul of an enterprise or interest;" i. e. the animating principle of the universe, etc., etc.

§ 3. Psychology is distinguished from physiology to pifySgy an d anthropology. Both these sciences have man as iooio anthro " their subject. Physiology studies man as a material organism ; distinguishing the several organs of which it is composed, the special functions of each, and the combined activity of all in a living being. It is true the structure and arrangement of some of these organs cannot be explained without a distinct recognition of their relations to a spiritual agent. But while physiology must recognize the functions of the soul, it need only consider those phenomena which are familiarly known. For all its purposes, the knowledge and the terminology of common life are entirely sufficient ; as when physiology explains the structure of the eye, the ear, and the hand, by their relations to human vision and hearing, to tactual or mechanical skill. Its principal and almost exclusive sphere is the bodily structure and functions, as phenomena that can be explained with reference to the animal economy, and the conditions of bodily development and life.

Anthropology, as the term imports, treats of the whole man, as body and soul. It differs from psychology in treating of these factors when combined so as to form one product in many varieties. Of this product it gives the natural history. It investigates man as this complex whole, as varied in temperament, race, sex, and age; and as affected by climate, employment, or a more or less perfect civilization. It inquires how man is formed ! and changed in body and soul by inherited peculiarities and accidental circumstances. It discusses the influence of the soul upon the body and the influence of the body on the soul, .^ whether in the normal or the abnormal states and functions of 3ach. But it notices and records these phenomena, only so far as they are open to general observation and require no scientific analysis or explanation. To psychology it leaves the special and profound study of the soul ; to physiology, the more thorough examination of the functions of the body.