The Human Intellect

Preface

THE work now offered to tlie public was prepared primarily and directly as a text-Look for colleges and higher schools. It was also designed secondarily, though not less really, as a manual for more advanced students of psychology and speculative philosophy. It was hoped, also, that it might find a place in the libraries of some of the many readers and thinkers who wish to form clear and well-grounded opinions in respect to the nature and limits of human knowledge, and to read with intelligence and satisfaction the history of philosophy.

The- designs of the author in preparing the volume may serve in part to explain, the selection and arrangement of the matter of which it consists, and to give greater force to a few suggestions in respect to its use as a text-book.

1. The more important definitions, propositions, and arguments are printed in the largest typo, in distinct paragraphs, and the paragraphs arc grouped, according to the principal topics, in separately numbered sections. The matter in this type is somewhat technically phrased and formally propounded, in order that it may be learned more readily for the examinations of the class-room.

At the ftiuno time the aspect of too great technical formality has been studiously avoided by a free expansion, in somewhat varied phraseology, of the leading doctrines and definitions of the work. While the author has desired to avail himself fully of all the advantages which accrue from formal definitions and technical terms, he lias not hesitated to repeat and illustrate his opinions in language somewhat popular in its character, and with a less rigid adherence to scholastic or precise terminology.

VI PREFACE.

2. The matter which is properly explanatory and illustrative of the leading propositions is printed in smaller type. This occupies a large portion of the volume, and will be the most interesting to the student and the general reader. In this part of tho work the author has used copious illustrations wherever they were needed to render clear what might otherwise have been obscure, concrete what might have been abstract, practical what was in danger of being scholastic, and familiar that which required to bo repeated. Philosophical treatises and text-books fail very often of being perused with interest and profit for lack of concrete illustrations and varied and familiar applications ; and against these defects the author has Fought to guard this treatise. He has no fear that it will not be considered sufficiently abstruse and scientific. In preparing this part of the work he has sought to meet the wants of both elementary and advanced students, and trusts that he has not entirely failed of success.

3. The historical, critical, and controversial matter is printed in the smallest type, in which will be found most of that which is especially abstruse and metaphysical. This part of the volume is designed for a smaller and more select class of students and renders. Tho insertion of matter of this kind was absolutely essential to the usefulness of the work for the library, and was almost equally required for its authority as a text-book with the higher classes of students. There is at present so lively an interest in tho history and criticiwn of speculative opinions, and so great activity in the scrutiny of those principles which are fundamental to physical, ethical, and theological science, that the author felt compelled to introduce this critical and historical matter in order to indicate the higher relations of elementary truths, as well as to guide the student in his reading of more extended works in the history and criticism of philosophical systems lie is aware that his own sketches and criticisms are somewhat condensed and abstract, but is sanguine in the opinion that some of them will not be without value as an aid in the use of more elaborate and minute histories of philosophy.

It would have been, comparatively easy to prepare a manual embodying the principles of psychological science, with little or no illustration or criticism ; but a compendious manual of thi* kind

PEEFACE. TO

must either be so abstractly dry as to be unintelligible ; or so superficial as not to command the respect of the learner and reader ; or so imaginative as to fail to inspire confidence* The applications of metaphysical philosophy must be familiarized to the mind by ample illustrations and frequent repetition, in order that the meaning and importance of the principles themselves may be understood and appreciated.

The following suggestions in respect to the use of the volume as a text-book may not be unacceptable. The matter in the largest type ought, in general, to regulate the length of the lessons. The examinations upon this should invariably be minute and severe. The explanatory and illustrative matter may be enforced more or less rigidly, or not at all, according to the interest and capacity of the student, and the methods and aims of the instructor. The less capable and less ambitious student may perhaps be held to the leading propositions, and to a very general acquaintance with the explanatory and illustrative matter. The more gifted and aspiring may be encouraged to master as much of this, and as thoroughly, as he is disposed, and may be ranked and rewarded accordingly. Such of the discussions" as might be more intelligibly and profitably studied on a second perusal, may be reserved for the review. The historical and critical notes may be used as topics and guides for more minute researches and more exact criticisms, in written essays, by students and readers still more advanced. The volume is capable of being used in the various methods which have been indicated, and allows liberal opportunities for the skill and invention of the teacher. The marginal or side-notes are designed for the convenience of both pupils and teachers, and are reprinted in the synoptical table of contents.

The philosophy taught in this volume is pronounced and positive in the spiritual and theistic direction, as contrasted with the materialistic and anti-theistic tendency which is so earnestly defended by its advocates as alone worthy to be called scientific. The author, though earnest in his own opinions, has aimed to adhere most rigidly to the methods of true science, and to employ no arguments which he did not believe would endure the severest scrutiny.

While Ms criticisms of opposing systems may seem to be polemical, he trusts they are not open to the charge of "being unjust or unscientific.

It is with some diffidence that the author brings to the tribunal of public criticism the results of his solitary and almost unaided studies. Studies of this kind must, from their very nature, be prosecuted in a lonely way, and with the disadvantage of being often subjected to a superficial or partisan criticism. The publication of their results almost necessarily involves a critical, and often a controversial judgment of the opinions of others. As a writer upon such subjects cannot, if he would, avoid criticising others, so he ought not himself to expect or desire to bo exempt from the severest ordeal of criticism, provided his own opinions arc fairly and fully stated, and the counter opinions are thoroughly reasoned. The author has been tempted to delay the publication of his own opinions by the desire to mature them into a more complete philosophical system ; but ho did not think it right to do this for an indefinite period, especially at a time when the need of a comprehensive manual for higher instruction has been very extensively acknowledged, and when there itj inculcated, in forms- that are varied and imposing, u psychology that seems to him at once to be pretentious and superficial, and to involve a philosophy that is either defective or erroneous.

The author expects, if he continues to labor in the field of hia chosen studies, to be able himself to detect some of the inadvertencies and errors into which he may have fallen. Should he 1)0 aided in doing this by the labors of friendly or unfriendly critics, lie hopes to remember the words of the acute and excellent Berkeley : " Truth is the cry of all, but the game of a few. Certainly, when it is the chief passion, it doth not give way to vulgar cares and views; nor fe it contented with a little ardor in the early time of life ; active, perhaps, to pursue, but not so fit to weigh and consider. Itc that would make a real progress in knowledge must dedicate his age as well as youth; the later growth as well as first-fruits, at the altar of Truth* * Gujus* vis etf on*are, nullius nisi insi/pientis in errorepcrsewerare? "

NOAH POKTER,

YALE COIXEGE, October, 1808.

TABLE OP OO£5"TE:N"TS.

Introduction

PSYCHOLOGY AND THE SOUL.

I. — PSYCHOLOGY DEFINED ANX> VINDICATED 5

§ 1. Psychology and kindred terms. § 2. Psychology a science — Limited to the human soul. § 8. Relations to physiology and anthropology. &J, Phenomena known by consciousness. § 5. Its phenomena impel to scientific study — Are legitimate objects of science — Prejudices against psychology and metaphysics. §6. Value of psychology. It requires and promotes self-knowledge— Trains to self-control. §7. Trains to the knowledge of human nature. §8. Is indispensable to educators —Variety of Educators. §9. It aids in moral culture. §10. Disciplines for the study of literature— Is not unfavorable to creative power. § li. Disciplines to moral reflection. § 12. Psychology the mother of the sciences which relate to man — Its relation to ethics — To political and social science— To law — To aesthetics— To theology. § 13. Special relation to logic and metaphysics — Relation of logic to metaphysics — Psychology subject to, yet before logic and metaphysics — "Why psychology is so often called philosophy. § 14. A discipline to method,

IL — THE RELATIONS OF THE SOUL TO MATTER 16

§ 15. Psychology a branch of physics; in what sense. § 16. Why, then, are its facts at first distrusted by the philosopher ? §17. Material phenomena are the earliest known. §18. Materialistic misgivings and impressions. § 19. These should be disproved ; in what way. § 20. The arguments of the materialist ; the soul is connected with a body— The soul is developed with the body— Is dependent on the body for its knowledge and enjoyment — Also for its energy and activity — It terminates a series of material existences — Conclusion of the materialist. § 21. Counter arguments. Its phenomena unlike material phenomena — The soul distinguishes itself from matter — The soul is self-active — Is not dependent on matter in its highest activities — Gradations of existence do not prove it to be material — § 22. The phenomena of the soul real. § 23. Phenomena of one sort cannot be judged by those of another. § 24. The phenomena and language in which they are described. § 25. Misleading influence of language.

THE RELATIONS OF THE SOUL TO LIFE AND LIVING- BEINGS. — 1. Life and ttving Icings. . . 29

§ 25. Reasons for discussing the subject further — Terms defined and question stated — Opinions of the ancient philosophers — Opinions of the moderns — Various appellations for vital force — Life originates only from a living being — The process of nutrition and growth peculiar — Growth proceeds after a plan- — Matter changes, but form is preserved — Life admits repair — Opposite views stated and defined — Carpenter's illustration and argument— Two other expedients resorted to— Not enough that they are possible— Supposed special conditions— Organization resorted to — Also creative power — Vital force admits of decay — No objection that it is individuaL

2. Relations of the Soul to Life 36

History of opinions — Vital phenomena precede the psychical— The energy of the two proportional—Sometimes inversely ? — The conscious depenp^on unconscious activities — The soul acts on

3C TABI.E OF COOTJEOTS.

matter— Tho soul adapted to the body— The body is moulded by the soul— The body manifests the soul — Objections ;' the t\vo cannot be related — But they are related—Animals and plants must hare souls— Inconsistent with the soul's immortality— Consciousness testifies to the opposite.

HI.— THE FACULTIES or THE SOTJL 40

§ 20. Question concerning the faculties. § 27. Faculties not parts or organs— Faculties often misconceived— Each faculty does not act at a separate time. § 2$. States of the soul like and unlike one another— Elements like and unlike in quality— Dependent on one another — One element preponderant in each state— Elements as related to agent, act, and object. $ ao. Faculty defined ; general authority — Special authority. § 30. These faculties common to all men— But not in the same proportion, § 31. The faculties not independent of one another, § f!2. Relation of faculties in education. § 03. Illustrates the unity of the soul— Unity: mechanical, chemical, organic— Psychical unity is higher. § 34. Unity .docs not exclude comploxnesa. $ 85. Powers of the soul threefold— History of the division into faculties— Modern opponents of faculties, § 00. Power, faculty, capacity. § 37. Function, state, phenomenon,

TV. — Is PSYCHOLOGY A SCIENCE ? — Can there be a Science of the Jfuman Soul? and what are its Principles and Methods $ . , 51

8 Oft. Materials of Psychology ; and inductive science— Is also the science of induction, § SO. Psychology too vague ; not mathematical— Reply : would render a science of life impossible. § 40. Views of materialists. § 41. The cerebralists' theory— Their theory refuted — They suppose consciousness. § 42. The phrenological theory — In what senne is the brain the soul's organ. § 43. Tho Associationalist theory— Explanation of necessary truths— Error of the associutionaUsts —Usually materialistic— Theory of Ilcrbart. § 44. Metaphysical or a priori Psychology. $ 45. Psychology of the German schools.

THE HUMAN INTELLECT.

ITS FUNCTION, DEVELOPMENT, AND FACULTIES 61

A I'BELIMISTARY OUAPTEK.

§40. Knowledge defined; what is it4o know ?—To know is an active operation— Exercised tinder conditions — These conditions or objects are diverse: subject-objects and object-object*. § 47. Tho process which prepares objects of knowledge, § 48. To know implies the cortainty of being — Beings or realities differ in their kind. § 49. Also the reality of their relations — Objections—The truth admitted directly and indirectly— No objects without relations— Kxwtonce not known before or apart from, relations. § CO. Knowledge of two forms ; analysis and synthesis, § 51. Objects and relations different and numerous. § $2. When i« the process of knowledge complete ? § 53. The act diverse in its energy ; attention. § 51. Somo objects more costly discerned than others, § 55. Intellectual development; the psychological order. § 0iJ. Tho logical relation of processes and products. § 57. Empirical and philosophical knowledge. $ !& Theae relations do not always coincide—The critical stage of knowledge. $ 00. Order of intellectual development and growth. § 81. Order and rules for intellectual culture. $ 02. Principle* of classifying the powers of the intellect §03. Faculties enumerated. §04. Tho pmseutativo faculty— Its objects j how distinguished— Its conditions. JJ 05. The representative faculty— Its objects— Its conditions ; association of ideas. $ GO. Thought or intelligence, developed last of all— Its products— The conditions of thought— Two aspects or forms of thought.

TABLE OP CONTENTS. XI

PART PIRST.

PRESENTATION AND PRESENTATION KNOWLEDGE.

Chapter I. — Consciousness. I. Natural Consciousness. 83

§ 67. Consciousness defined — Applied to the power and its acts. § 68. Consciousness used to designate knowledge of any kind. § 69. A collective term for all the intellectual states. § 70. Metaphorical definitions of consciousness. § 71. Proper meaning of consciousness. § 72. Apperception; why so called. § 73. Consciousness and reflection as defined and used by Locke. § 74. Two forms of its activity. § 75. Natural consciousness defined as an act / necessary to many acts —An act of knowledge involving relations and product— A peculiar act ; in its conditions. § 76. Peculiar in the language by which it is described. § 77. Consciousness the object — Psychical states, complex objects. § 78. Relation of consciousness to each of these elements. § 79. These elements not always viewed with equal attention. § 80. The activity may be chiefly noticed. § 81. Consciousness of the ego — Involved in the nature of a psychical state — If not known could not be inferred— Proved by every act of memory — Admitted by those who deny it— The relations to the ego not always reflected on— The JSgo not the whole substance of the soul. § 82. Consciousness of the object. § 83. Summary respecting the object of consciousness. § 84. The object of consciousness is a being — Special import of cogito, ergo sum — Skepticism emphatically excluded — The conscious act does not create its object by the act. § 85. Validity of relations also established— The soul a microcosm — All the categories involved in consciousness— Man assumed to be the image of Gtod. § 86. Development and growth of consciousness — Unconscious life- Sensation and self-feeling — Sensations discriminated— Emotions distinguished from sensations — The self not the ego — Differences in individuals — The capacity for consciousness not developed —Consciousness not a product of circumstances. § 87. Latent modifications of consciousness — Consciousness susceptible of degrees.

Chapter II. — Reflective, Or Philosophical Consciousness. . 104

§ 88. The reflective contrasted with the natural consciousness. § 89. The reflective consciousness defined — The morbid consciousness in children and adults — The ethical consciousness. § 90. The scientific reflective consciousness. § 91. Characterized by persistent attention. § 92. It attends to all the psychical phenomena. § 93. Compares and classifies them. § 9£. Interprets and explains them by power and laws. § 95. Relations of the philosophical to the natural consciousness. § 90. Does the philosophical consciousness impart new knowledge — Illustrated by the knowledge of the ego and of the self. § 97, Office of language in respect to each— Language does not create the facts — Dangers of mere technology and system — The language of common life sometimes the safest— How much do uncultivated men know? — The language of common life useful. § 98. The actions of men also an important test of truth. § 99. Conditions of reaching the decisions of consciousness. § 100. Uncertainty and slow progress of psychology explained. § 101. Peculiar difficulties in the study of the soul.

PRESENTATION AND PRESENTATIVE KNOWLEDGE.

II. SENSE-PERCEPTION.

Chapter Iii.— Sense-perception— The Conditions Anx> The Pjro- Cess. 119

§ 102. Sense-perception defined and distinguished. § 103. Is developed earliest of all the powers ; seems to bo the most familiar. § 104. Is not the most easily understood. § 105. Distinguished from other mental acts — Knowledge of 'matter, not gained by sense-perception. § 10G. Knowledge that is gained by sense-perception. § 107. Results of analysis— Eight topics proposed.

Xil TABLE Off CONTENTS*

I. TJie Conditions or Media of Sense-Perception. 123

§ 108. The conditions enumerated—The first condition— The material organism— The nervoua system — The sensorium — The reflex action of the nerves. § 100. The second condition is an object or excitant. § 110. The third condition ; its action on the sensorium.

ii. The Process of Saw-Perception 127"

§111. The process of sense-perception in the simplest form; what?— It is psychical, not physiological — It is complex; of two elements — The elements unequal in energy; in the same and the different senses. § 113. Sensation proper pertains to the soul. § 113. Yot experienced by the soul connected with an organism. § 114. The sensations localized. § 115. Differ from one another in quality and denniteness. § 11 1>. Perception proper, an act of pure knowledge; its object §117. Its object a non-tvptf; what kind of a non-<y<?. §118. An oxtended nou-<y<>. § 110, Perception attends all the senses— The extension and externality; all objects not given with equal clearness. § 120. The varying relations of sensation and perception proper— In different sensations of the same sense*

Chapter Iv.— Classes Of Sense-perceptions, . .135

§121. Three classes of sense -perception ; the muscular— Banked as tho lowest. §122. The organic— Common sensibility . § 112.'». The special sense-perceptions— Smell ; Its organ, conditions, and objects— Names and character of the sensations— They are sense-perceptions. § liM. Tuate: Organs and objects — Variety of the sensations — How designated — Gratifications— Objective relations. § 125. Hearing: its organ— Sonorous bodies; how characterized— The sensations various — In what respects distinguishable — Sounds in succession and combination ; melody and harmony. $ 186, The condition of oral language— Expressive of feeling— The dignity of hearing— Sounds ; senne -perceptions. § 127. The sense of touch; organ — Weber's experiments— Essential condition of touch, jj W. Variety of Ht'utmt ions involved in touch— Sensations proper of gentle touch— Sensations involving violence or injury — Sensations of temperature — Sensations of pressure and weight— The muscular .sensations— Sensations localized. § 129. Perceptions proper of touch — Extension and externality perceived in the concrete — Perception of extension by touch ; not explicable by extension in tho organism — Physiological conditions aud psychical act— Not by local Higrw -The aousorium known as extended — § 130. The perception of externality by touch— Two meanings of externality — Externality in the first signification — Brown's theory — Externality in tho second signification. $ 131. Sense of touch the leading sense — Furnishes intellectual terms. § 102. Sight ; its organ— The conditions of vision— Function of tho image on tho retina— Sensations proper of vision. § 133. Perception proper in vision; the object — Is always extended — Visible extension superficial only— Contrary view; tho stereoscope. §134. A single object seen with two eyes. § 133. Original place of tho visible percept. § 130. Dignity of the eye.

Chapter V. — Tiie Acquired Sense-pebceptions, . . . 158

§ 107. Sense-perceptions original and acquired. § 138. Importance of, and time of gaining tho acquired perceptions. § 130. Tho acquired perceptions of smell— Tho acquired perceptions of hearing. §140. Acquired perceptions of sight; distance judged by size,— Judgments of magnitude by distance — Judgments of distance by color; outline, clearness, etc.— Judgments of aizo by other equidistant objects— Influence of intermediate objects. § 141. Judgments of form, etc., hy sight. §142. Form, distance, and magnitude; how far learned from touch. § 143. Acquired sense-perceptions of our own body — Acquired perceptions required to manage and control tho body* § 141. What docs nature provide in the construction atid impulses of tho body ?— Arrangements and impulses for bodily expression— Arrangements for the combined activity of different parts. § 145. How docs tho intellect avail itself of these arrangements? — How wo learn to talk — How wo learn to walk — Feats of dexterity; expressional effects — Summary and inferences. § 140. The errors of the senses explained— How distinguished from another class. § 147. The acquired perceptions as acts of knowledge. § 148. They involve induction — Reasons why infuntv can make these inductions. § 140. Objections from the case of animals— Reasons why the perceptions of animals and of man should differ.

TABLE OF CONTENTS. Xlii

CHAPTER VL — DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH OF SENSE-PEKOES TION. 178

§ 150. Nature, interest, and difficulty of the problem. § 151. The problem perplexing to the imagination, but not insolvable to the intellect — Data and grounds of inference. § 152. The intellect and soul before sense-perception begins— The beginnings and development of attention. § 153. Muscular and vital perceptions first developed— Hearing, taste and smell. § 154. The eye and the hand ; which acts first? — "We begin with the hand. § 155. Extra-organic non-e^o/ how perceived— Combination of muscular and tactual perceptions — Space-relations of the extra-organic ; how acquired — Hamilton's theory of the perception of the extra-organic. § 156. With the eye another problem begins— Observations upon infants. § 157. Development of vision. — Why percepts of vision are projected in space— Most plausible explanation. § 158. The connection of the hands as seen and the hands as touched— The world of the eye and the world of the hand. §159. Other acquisitions of infancy — How the world appears to an infant. §160. The blind from birth, upon the recovery of sight.

Chapter VII. — The Products Of Sense-perception, Or The Per- Ception Of Material Things 192

§ 161. Material things and sense-percepts. § 162. By what relations are percepts made into things ? § 163. The first stage of perception ; when complete. § 164. Material things capable of various significations — Percepts recalled under relations of time. § 165. The second stage ; the relation of substance and attribute— General definition of this relation. § 166. Relations most frequently used as attributes— Sensations of smell, taste, and sound, first used as attributes- Coexistence in space and time previous to substance and attribute— This relation supposes reflex and indirect knowledge— This relation denied to sense-perception ; Kant ; Hamilton. § 167. Of touch and sight percepts conjoined ; which is substance and which is attribute ? § 168. When either are taken alone. § 169. Attributive quality of form and size. § 170. Conditions of permanent perception — Ideation of sense-objects. § 171. When is perception complete ? § 172. First condition of completed perception : energy, contrast, and resemblance — Resemblances and contrasts, objective and subjective— Force of contrast. §173. Second condition is motion. § 174. Third condition, repetition— Need of repetition according to the receptive school. § 175. Need of repetition according to the active school ; because it excites greater interest — In single percepts — This as true of things as it is of percepts. § 176. Repetition more essential for the mastery of large and complex objects— Some objects are beyond the natural limits of the soul— The first perception often a mere effort of discovery and selection— Very large and complex objects require repetition— More frequent repetition if the objects are irregular. § 177. Fourth condition of successful perception is familiarity. § 178. Repetition not necessarily recognition. § 179. Continuance of time necessary for successful perception— Feats of jugglery involve quickness of movement. § 180. Can we attend to more than one thing at a time ? — Objections to Stewart's theory —Attention to an object and its image— The mind can attend to more than one thing at a time —Can the mind use the utmost attention upon more than one object ?

Chapter VIII. — Activity Of The Soul In Sense-percep- Tion 210

§ 181. Sense-perception held to be passive only — Grounds on which the theory rests. § 182. That the soul is active is attested by consciousness. § 183. Its activity is developed by degrees, and to varying perfection— Attention the condition of success and progress. § 184. Differences in the perceptions of the same and of different men. § 185. Different modes of this activity ; innervation of the organs— Partial suspension of certain organs. § 186. The attention fixes upon selected objects. § 187. Activity shown in selecting and combining sense-objects — The recognition of this activity important for the explanation of imagination and memory. § 188. This activity in selection and combination shown in early life — The same activity continued in mature life. § 189. Differences in special activities of adults. § 190. This activity directed and stimu-, lated by the interest felt in the object. § 191. This activity is a limited and dependent activity. § 192. Is elementary and easily exercised. § 193. Sense-perception ; summary and review.

XIV TABLE OF CONTENTS.

CHAPTER IX. — THEORIES oir SENSE-PERCEPTION. . , 221

§ 194. These theories universal— Determined by the prevailing philosophy— Thou reflex influence often mischievous — "Why especially liahlo to be erroneous —More usually theories of vision. §lur>. The early Greek philosophers—Diogenes of Apollonia— Heraclitus and Empedoclcs— Democritus. § 106. The Soerutic school — Plato — Aristotle — The intellectual element — The common, sensory or percipient— Matter and form, or species. § U>7. The schoolmen— Their doctrine of spccieB. §193. Gassendi, P., 151)2-1055. §100. Descartes, R., 15fJ(MG.")0— Geulincx, 1025- 1000— Malebranche, N., 10S8~lTir>. §200. Arnauld, A., 1012—1004. g liOl. John Locke, 1032- 1704. § 202. Berkeley, Geo., 10S-i-1753-David Hume, 1711-1770. § '203. Dr. Thomas Reid, 1710- 17%. § 204. Dugald Stewart, 1753-1825. § 31V>. Dr. Thomas Brown, 1778-1820. § 206. Sir William Hamilton, 1783-1856. § 207. Do Condillac, S. B., 1715-1780. § 208. Laromiguiere, P., 1750-183T. § 200. Royer Collard, P. P., 1T03-1843. § 210. Maine de Biran, P. P. G., 1760-1824. § 211. Leibnitz, G, \V., 1640-1716. § 212. Tetens, J. K, 1730-1807. § 213. Irnrnanuel Kant, 1724r 1804. § 214. Herbart, J, I<\, 177G-lS.il. § 215. Schlciermacher, 1708-1804. § 210. John MtUler, 1801-1858.

CHAPTER I. — THE KEPBESBXTATIVB POWBU DEFINED AND Ex- I»LAINED. 248

§ 217. Representation defined — Not limited to sensible objects— Is also a creative power. § iilS. Appellations for the power — Appellations in common use* § 219, Objects of the representative power—Arc individual and not general — In what sense these objects aro the same. § 220. These objects involve relations— -Relations peculiar to Representation itself— No technical name * for the objects of this power. §221, Conditions and laws of representation considered. §222, Representation divided into several varieties— Perfect memory — Imperfect memory — Phantasy- Imagination ; its varieties— Tho mathematical imagination — Phantasy proper— Poetic fancy — Poetic imagination in tho higher sou so— Philosophical imagination. § 223. Interest and importance of the representative power.

CHAPTER IT. — THE KEPRESBOTATIVE OBJECT — ITS NATUKB ANJ> IM- PORTANCE 258

$ 224. Why tho object, of Representation needs special discussion.

X. The Nature and Mode of j&jtiatencc of tfie Representative Object. . . , 259

1 225. They are psychical objects. § 220. Aro transient and short-lived objects. § 237. They should be distinguished from spectra and hallucinations— They are intellectual objects.

ir. The relation of the Representative Idea to the Original. . , . 2C1 ;:f 228. Tho relation can bo compared with no other — Two classes of representative objects* § 229. Representative ideas of consciousness and sense-perception do not resemble their objects — Contradictions in such a theory. § 230. In memory and recognition no discernment of resemblance; none in simple memory — None iu recognition— The acts of memory and recognition known by consciousness only— Alternation of perception, memory, and recognition. S 231. Mental pictures less exciting than real objects. § 232, A mental picture consists of fewer elements than a real object. § 280. The mental picture is recalled in parts, slowly, and by successive acts —Example from a scene in nature, as seen and remembered—Objects of imagination.