The difficulties of infidelity

Front matter

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UNITED STATES OP AMERICA, f

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Preface

The theological system of a Christian is, that God, who, at sundry limes and in divers manners, spake in time past unto the fathers by the prophets, hath in these last days spoken unto us by his Son, whom he hath appointed heir of all things, and by whom also he made the worlds : who, being the brightness of his glory, and the express image of his person and upholding all things by the word of his power, when he had by himself purged our sins, sat down on the right hand of the majesty on high,*

The theological system of the infidel is, that all religions, claiming to be revelations from heaven, are alike impostures upon the blind credulity of mankind; that the only religion, worthy of a philosophical deist, is uninspired natural religion $ and that, as human reason alone is amply sufficient to guide us into all needful truth, a divine communication is no less unnecessary in the abstract, than all pretensions to such communication are false in the concrete.

If we ask the specific ground, on which the latter system is

VI PREFACE.

preferred to the former ; we are told, that the religion of the Bible is hampered by too many difficulties to be rationally credible : and these difficulties are forthwith produced and expatiated upon with no small degree of triumphant satisfaction.

But here a question naturally rises, whether the deistical scheme itself, in all its component parts, be free from difficulties and objections : for that which is preferred to Christianity, on the express score of the difficulties attendant upon revealed religion, ought certainly in reason to be as free as possible from all liability to the unpleasantness of a direct and well-founded retort.

In the following discussion, the question now before us is answered in the negative. Its purpose is to show, not only that Infidelity has its own proper difficulties as well as Christianity, but that those difficulties are incomparably greater and more formidable : for, while the alleged difficulties attendant upon Christianity have repeatedly met with an adequate solution, though deistical writers are accustomed confidently to urge and re-urge them, without taking the slightest notice of the answers which have been so often afforded ; the difficulties attendant upon Infidelity are of such a nature, that they never can be solved to the satisfaction of an unbiassed and rational inquirer. Hence results the plain and self-evident conclusion, that, since Infidelity is encumbered by more and greater difficulties than Christianity, to adopt the infidel system evinces more credulity than to adopt the Christian system.

The principle, in fine, of the argument, which has been prosecuted throughout the ensuing pages, is the reductio ad ahsurdum. By a specification of the immense and insuperable difficulties which on all sides beset his system, the deistical

PREFACE.

infidel, even on ground of his own selection, is convicted of gross irrationality.

It will be proper to state, that this work was written as a competitory Treatise on the proposition, That there is more credulity in the disbelief of Christianity, than in the belief of it : a proposition, which was adopted by the Church Union Society in the Diocese of St David's, as the subject of their Essay for the year 1823.

January 20th, 1824.

Section I

The difficulties attendant upon deistical Infidelity in regard to its possible grounds and reasons, p. 17.

It is useful not to suffer Infidelity to be always the assailant of revealed religion, but occasionally to carry the war into the country of the enemy himself. By such a process it will be found, that to reject revelation evinces more credulity than to retain it: because the difficulties attendant upon unbelief are greater than the difficulties attendant upon belief, p. 17.

I. A statement of the possible grounds and reasons of Infidelity, p 18.

1. A discussion of the first possible ground, that a revelation from hea-

ven cannot, in the very nature of things, take place, p. 19.

2. A discussion of the second possible ground, that a revelation from

heaven is in itself so improbable an occurrence that it beggars all credibility, p. 19.

3. A discussion of the third possible ground, that the evidences, upon

which our reception of a system claiming to be a divine revelation is demanded, are so unsatisfactory, that they are insufficient to command our reasonable assent, p. 21.

4. A discussion of the fourth possible ground, that numerous objections

exist in the case of each system claiming to be a divine revelation ; which objections cannot be answered, p. 22.

5. A discussion of the fifth possible ground, that, as various theolo-

gical systems have alike claimed to be revelations from heaven, the presumption is, that all these systems are equally impostures, p. 24.

6. A discussion of the sixth possible ground, that our unassisted rea-

son is sufficient, and therefore that a revelation is unnecessary, p, 26. b2

CONTENTS.

II. A summary of the grounds of a Christian's belief, p. 2&

III. A summary of the grounds of an infidel's unbelief, p. 29.

IV. Conclusion, p. 30.

Section II

The difficulties attendant upon deistical Infidelity, in the abstract rejection of all revelation from God. p. 31.

Deism presents so many difficulties, that, unless they can be satisfactorily removed, the presumption will be, that a revelation from God to man has actually been made. p. 31.

I, Though the deist may be able to prove from the frame of the world, that it must have been created, he is unable to prove that it was created by one only God. p. 31.

II. If it be allowed to him for the sake of argument, that there is one only God, he is unable to demonstrate the moral attributes of that being, p. 34.

1. He cannot demonstrate the justice of God. p. 35.

2. He cannot demonstrate the mercy of God. p. 38.

3. He cannot demonstrate the goodness of God. p. 40.

III. Thus unable to demonstrate the moral attributes of God, he is of

necessity ignorant what service will be pleasing to him. p. 42.

IV. All these difficulties in the deistical scheme draw after them the

crowning difficulty, that God, whose works evince his wisdom, yet acted 'so unwisely as to place his creature man in the world without giving him the least instruction or information relative to his duty. p. 45.

Section III

The difficulties attendant upon deistical Infidelity in regard to historical matter of fact. p. 49.

From the fact of the general deluge, taken as a specimen of the mode of reasoning from historical matter of fact, may be demonstrated the additional fact of a direct intercourse between man and his Creator, or (in other words) of a revelation from God to man. p. 49. I. Proofs of the fact of the universal deluge, p. 50. 1. Historical proof, built upon the attestation of all nations to the fact of a general deluge, p. 50. (1.) The substance of the tradition prevalent among all nations* p. 51.

CONTENTS. XI

(2.) The tradition embodied in the national mythology and religion of every people, p. 52.

2. Physiological proof, built upon the existing phenomena of the globe

which we inhabit, p. 53.

(1.) No circumstance is more thoroughly established in geology, than that the crust of our globe has been subjected to a great and sudden revolution by the agency of water, p. 54.

(2.) Various physical matters testify, that this great revolution cannot have happened at a more remote period than five or six thousand years ago. p. 55.

3. Moral proof, built upon the progress of civilization, p. 61.

(1.) Civilization has always a natural tendency to spread itself more and more widely, while barbarism has a natural tendency to contract itself within more and more narrow limits, p. 61. (2.) With this view of the matter, all history, down to the present

time, perfectly agrees, p. 62. (3.) The necessary inference from such facts, p. 63. II. The additional fact, of a direct intercourse between man and his Creator or (in other words) of a revelation from God to man, demonstrated from the established fact, of an universal deluge, p. 64.

1. The supposition, that the deluge did not cover the tops of the

mountains and that men and animals preserved themselves by escaping to their summits, shown to be untenable, p. 65.

2. The supposition, that a family escaped in a ship built accidentally

and not in consequence of a divine revelation, shown to be equally untenable, p. 66.

3. The final result is, that, if the fact of the deluge be admitted we : shall find ourselves compelled to admit also the additional fact,

that a revelation of God's purposes to his creature man has assuredly taken place as we find it recorded in Holy Scripture, p. 68*

Section IV

The difficulties attendant upon deistical Infidelity in regard to actually accomplished prophecy, p. 69.

The prediction, selected as a specimen of the argument from accomplished prophecy, shall be that of Moses respecting the future destinies and fortunes of the Jews. p. 70.

I. Abstract of the prophecy, p. 70.

II. View of the accomplishment of the prophecy, p. 72. 1. Its accomplishment has taken plaee in all the numerous particulars of which it is composed, p* 72.

Xll CONTENTS.

(1.) The first particular, p. 73. (2.) The second particular, p. 73. (3.) The third particular, p. 74. (4.) The fourth particular, p. 74. (5.) The fifth particular, p. 74. (6.) The sixth particular, p. 75. (7.) The seventh particular, p. 75. (8.) The eighth particular, p. 75. (9.) The ninth particular, p. 76. 2. The estimate of their own situation by the Jews themselves, p. 76,

III. The train of reasoning, which springs from the prophecy and its

accomplishment, p. 80.

1. Insufficiency of the first possible deistical solution : the political

foresight and sagacity of Moses, p. 81.

2. Insufficiency of the second possible deistical solution: a lucky acci-

dent, p. 82.

(1.) Essential difference between the leading characteristic of the real prophecy of Moses, namely complexity ; and the leading characteristic of the pretended prophecy of Seneca, namely indefinite simplicity, p. 83.

(2.) Dissimilarity in the grounds and reasons, on which each prophecy is supported, p. 86.

(3.) A tradition of the discovery of America by the Phenicians was not unknown to Seneca : whence his prophecy becomes a mere poetical ornament, p. 87.

IV. Summary of the argument, p. 90.

Section V

The difficulties attendant upon deistical Infidelity in regard to the facts and circumstances and character of the Christian Dispensation, p. 91.

No small difficulties also attend upon Infidelity in regard to the facts and

circumstances and character of the Christian Dispensation, p. 91.

I. The present existence of Christianity is a naked fact j hence the

only question between the believer and the unbeliever is, how

it first started into existence, p. 91.

3. The account of its rise and progress is contained in the historical

books of the New Testament, p. 91. 2 Suppressing for the present the question of miraculous interference^ we may say, that to deny the praise of general veracity to the narrative, is to unhinge all historical evidence, p. 92.

CONTENTS. Xlli

3. Speculations of Mr Volney as to the personal existence of Christ.

4. Conclusion as to the character of the evangelical histories, p. 96. II. The infidel, on his principles, must maintain, that Christ was either

an impostor or an enthusiast, p. 96.

1. The difficulties attendant upon the hypothesis, that Christ was ar.

impostor, p. 97.

(1.) Statement and practical demonstration of the necessary conduct of an impostor, as an impostor, in the times during which Christ appeared, p. 98.

(2.) Statement of the actual directly opposite conduct of Christ, p. 100.

2. The difficulties attendant upon the hypothesis, that Christ was an

enthusiast, p. 110. (1.) The sobriety of Christ's conduct, as exemplified in his words.

p. 111. (2 ) The sobriety of Christ's conduct, as exemplified in his actions.

3. Numerous contingencies were associated with his claim of the Mes-

siaship, which were quite out of the control either of an impostor or of an enthusiast, p. 116. 111. The conduct of the apostles and first preachers of Christianity, p. 120.

1 . The common notion entertained by infidels respecting the apostles.

2. The difficulties attendant upon this notion, p. 122.

(1.) The first stage of the proceedings of the apostles, p. 123. (.2.) The second stage of the proceedings of the apostles, p. 124.

3. The effects produced by the alleged resurrection of Christ. Grounds

for believing the truth of the alleged fact. Difficulties attendant upon the denial of it. p. 131.

4. Evidence specially afforded by the conduct of two of the apostles.

p. 137. (1.) Conduct of Judas the traitor, p. 137. (2.) Conduct of Paul, first a persecutor, then a convert, p. 140.

Section VI

The difficulties attendant upon deistical Infidelity in regard to the rapid propagation of Christianity, and the evidence by which the performance of miracles is supported, p. 149.

The necessity of accounting for the fact of the rapid propagation of Christianity is felt and acknowledged by all. p. 149.

XIV CONTENTS.

I. A consideration of the five natural reasons or causes proposed by Mr Gibbon as sufficient to account for the fact. p. 149.

1. The first reason: the inflexible and intolerant zeal of the early

Christians, p. 150.

2. The second reason : the doctrine of a future life. p. 151.

3. The third reason : the miraculous powers ascribed to the primitive

church, p. 153.

4. The fourth reason : the pure and austere morals of the primitive

Christians, p. 154.

5. The fifth reason : the union and discipline of the church, p. 155.

II. Concerning the aspect, which Christianity must have presented to the Gentiles at its first promulgation among them : and whether Mr Gibbon's five reasons are sufficient to account for its success. p. 156.

III. A consideration of the two supernatural reasons proposed in Scripture, p 163.

1. The first reason: the operation of the Holy Spirit to incline the

heart, p. 163.

2. The second reason : the performance of miracles to convince the

head. p. 165. (1.) The testimony, by which the performance of works purporting to be miraculous, is established, p. 169. (2.) The evidence, by which these works are proved to have been real, not simulated miracles, p. 178.

Section VII

The difficulties attendant upon deistical Infidelity in regard to the internal evidence of Christianity, p. 185.

In discussing the internal evidence of Christianity, two particulars only shall be selected, as a specimen of the mode of reasoning from it. p. 185.

I. The character of Christ, p. 185.

1. The favourite ideal character of a hero variously exemplified, p. 186.

2. The opposite character of Christ, p. 188.

3. Conclusion drawn from the contrast, p. 190. II. The spirit of Christianity, p. 191.

1. The spirit of confessedly false religions, p. 191. (1.) The Scandinavian theology of Odin. p. 192. (2.) The Arabic theology of Mohammed, p. 192. (3.) The imposture of Alexander of Pontus. p. 194. (4.) The theologico-political system of Hindostan. p. 196.

CONTENTS. XV

2. The directly opposite spirit of Christianity, p. 197.

3. Conclusion drawn from the contrast, p. 199.

SECTION VIII. Recapitulation and conclusion, p. 201

Previous to the general conclusion, the several difficulties which encumber the march of Infidelity, shall be briefly recapitulated, p. 201.

1. The difficulties in question are as follows, p. 201.

.1. The insufficient grounds and reasons of Infidelity itself, p. 201.

2. The impossibility, on infidel principles, of either proving the unity

of God, or of developing his moral attributes, p. 201.

3. The difficulties of Infidelity in regard to historical matters of fact.

4. The difficulties of Infidelity in regard to accomplished prophecy, p.

5. The difficulties of Infidelity in regard to the facts and circumstances

and character of the Christian Dispensation, p. 203.

6. The difficulties of Infidelity in regard to the rapid propagation of

Christianity, p. 203.

7. The difficulties of Infidelity in regard to the internal evidence of

Christianity, p. 203.

II. General conclusion from the whole discussion, that the rejection of Christianity involves a higher degree of credulity than the acceptance of it, and that we find it more difficult to pronounce the Gospel an imposture than to admit it as a revelation from heaven, p. 204.

Section I

THE DIFFICULTIES ATTENDANT UPON DEISTICAL INFIDELITY, IN REGARD TO ITS POSSIBLE GROUNDS AND REASONS.

In their various controversies with infidel writers, the advocates of Revelation have generally contented themselves with standing upon the defensive. Against the enemies of their faith they have rarely undertaken offensive operations. Difficulties indeed they have removed, and objections they have answered, when started by the ingenuity of a deistical opponent : but they have for the most part neglected to urge the manifold objections and the serious difficulties, which attend upon his own system. Hence, so far as I can judge, they have needlessly given him the advantage, which an assailant will always at least seem to possess over a person assailed.

With this view of the question, it is not my purpose to consider the sundry matters, which from time to time have been brought forward by deistical authors against the Holy Scriptures : such a task, in the present state of the controversy, may well be deemed superfluous ; for, in truth, it would be merely to repeat and to answer objections, which have already been made and answered again and again. I am rather inclined to state a few of the numerous difficulties with which the infidel scheme itself is encumbered. Whence, unless indeed they can be satisfactorily removed, there will arise a strong presumption, that, at some time, and in some place, and after some manner, the Supreme Being has expressly revealed himc self to his creature man : and, as the Christian Dispensation, viewed as grounding itself upon the preceding Patriarchal and Levitical Dispensations, is the only form of religion, which, with any reasonable show of argument, can claim to be a revelation from heaven ; we may not impossibly be brought to a conclusion, that, however much has been said by infidels respecting the easy faith of those who have embraced the Gospel, there is, after all, more real credulity in the disbelief of Christianity than in the belief of it.

I. A discussion of this nature will not improperly commence with a brief examination of what we may suppose to be the possible grounds and reasons of deistical infidelity.

Now, except the following, I am unable to discern, upon what principles an unbeliever can take his stand with even a moderate share of plausibility.

Either a revelation from heaven is a matter in itself abstractedly impossible.

Or, a revelation from heaven is so utterly improbable an occurrence, that it beggars all credibility.

Or, the evidences upon which our reception of every system claiming to be a revelation from heaven is demanded, are so weak and unsatisfactory, that they are insufficient to command our reasonable assent.

Or, in the case of every system claiming this divine character, numerous objections and difficulties exist ; which objections and difficulties are so formidable, that they cannot be answered and removed.

Or, as various systems have alike claimed to be revelations from heaven, and as the advocates of each system are equally forward in maintaining their own to the exclusion of every other, the shrewd presumption with a philosophical inquirer will be, that all these systems are, without exception, mere interested impositions upon the credulity of mankind.

Or, lastly, as our unassisted reason is the sole instrument by which our duty is to be determined ; so our natural reason, when properly and honestly used, is, in itself, quite sufficient for this purpose: consequently, a revelation from God is no

Sect. I.] OF INFIDELITY. 19

less unnecessary in the abstract, than the claim of any particular theological system to be received as a revelation from God is unfounded in the concrete.

These several grounds and reasons of Infidelity shall be considered in the order wherein they stand.

1. The first possible ground is the position, that, in the very nature of things, a revelation from heaven cannot take place.

If this position has ever been seriously maintained by any writer of the deistical school, the difficulty, inseparably attendant upon it, will be found in the necessary consequence which it involves ; a consequence no less formidable than an eventual denial of God's omnipotence.

That such is indeed its necessary consequence, will appear from the following syllogism.

God can do every thing, which is not in itself a contradiction. But it can never be shown, that a revelation from God to man implies any contradiction. Therefore a revelation from God to man is abstractedly possible.

From the terms of this syllogism it is evident, that the abstract possibility of a revelation from God to man cannot be denied, without a concomitant denial of God's omnipotence. A denial therefore of God's omnipotence is the necessary consequence of maintaining the position before us. Whence it follows, that the present position, involving a denial of God's omnipotence, involves also, in the creed both of the deist and of the Christian, a gross and palpable absurdity.

2. The second possible ground of Infidelity is the position, that a rev elation from heaven is in itself so improbable an occurrence, that it beggars all credibility.

Respecting this position, the deist himself will allow, that man, a rational and intellectual being, has been placed in the present world by no other than by an all-wise Creator.

But, that he must have been placed here for some adequate purpose correspondent with the rational and intellectual character both of his Creator and of himself, cannot be controverted, without controverting at the same time the wisdom of God : for it could be no proof of wisdom, that man should have been placed in his present sphere of existence purely through unmeaning caprice, and without any suitable definite end being proposed.

This point, therefore, being granted (as I presume it must be granted by a candid and sensible deist), the question immediately arises : whether God's purpose in creating intellectual man, would more probably be accomplished, by a regular communication, or by a systematic withholding, of instruction ?

Such is the question, which forthwith arises from the necessary concession before us.

Now for any one gravely to assert, that the most probable mode, in which God could accomplish his purpose, would be studiously to withhold all instruction from his rational creature, seems so very paradoxical, and so entirely contrary to every analogy which presents itself to us, that I can scarcely believe such an assertion would ever be made in sober earnest. But to allow, that the most probable mode in which God could accomplish his purpose, would be to communicate instruction to man, is the same as to allow, that communicating of a divine revelation is a more probable circumstance, than the withholding of one.

Nor can this conclusion be ever avoided, save through the medium of demonstrating, that the best mode of insuring the accomplishment of God's purpose in creating man, is carefully to refrain from giving him the least instruction or information ; so that, thus having the full benefit of complete ignorance, he may be the more amply qualified to answer the end and purpose of his creation. For, let it only be granted that God is all-wise, and then it must also be granted, that he will always take the most effectual means to accomplish his purpose. Hence the question will finally be brought to the following point: whether it be easier to believe, that knowledge or ignorance on the part of man, respecting the purpose of his Creator, is the most efficacious in the way of securing its accomplishment. They who contend for the superior efficacy of ignorance, will adhere to the party of the deist : they, on the contrary, who maintain the superior efficacy of knowledge,

Sect. I.] OF INFIDELITY. 21

will join the ranks of the Christian. A difference of opinion on this subject there doubtless may be : but the question in that case must ever remain, whether the deist who pleads for the efficacy of ignorance, or the Christian who pleads for the efficacy of knowledge, evinces the higher degree of credulity. 3. A third possible ground of Infidelity is the position, that the evidences upon which our reception of every system claiming to be a revelation from heaven is demanded, are so weak and unsatisfactory, that they are insufficient to command our reasonable assent.

Should this position be assumed by the unbeliever, while we disclaim the vindication of any theological system except that which is propounded in the Bible, as being a matter wholly foreign to the question at issue between us, we have a clear right to expect and demand a regular confutation of the arguments, which are advanced in our best treatises on the evidences of Judaism and Christianity; such, for instance, as the well-known and popular writings of Leslie and Paley : for it is nugatory to say, that the evidences in favour of the Bible being a divine revelation are weak and unsatisfactory ; while yet no regular confutation of the arguments, upon which those evidences rest, is pretended to be brought forward. To start difficulties is one thing : to answer arguments, another. Now the mere starting of an insulated difficulty is no answer to a regular argument. The work, which we have a right to demand, is a work in which the author shall go regularly through the treatises (we will say) of Leslie and Paley ; taking argument after argument, successively showing their utter inconclusiveness, and then bringing out the triumphant result, that the evidences of a divine revelation are too weak and unsatisfactory to command our reasonable assent. Let this be done ; and we may allow the present ground of infidelity to be tenable : but simply to assert that the evidences are insufficient, while not an attempt is made to give a regular answer to the various arguments which have been brought forward by writers on the evidences, is plainly an assertion without proof. If the evidences be indeed insufficient, it must doubtless be easy c 2 to answer the arguments. Why, then, has no reply been given to them 1 Why is a mere naked, gratuitous assertion made, as to the insufficiency of the evidences, while the arguments yet remain unanswered? Such silence is not a little suspicious: and it is difficult to refrain from conjecturing, that vague assertion is found to be more easy than regular confutation, and a starting of insulated difficulties less toilsome than a formal reply to a series of close reasoning.

4. Accordingly, a fourth ground of Infidelity is the position, that numerous objections and difficulties exist in the case of each system claiming the character of a divine revelation ; which objections and difficulties cannot be answered and removed.

Here, as before, it may be remarked, that with the objections and difficulties which exist in the case of any system, save that contained in the Bible, we have no concern : the only point between the infidel and the Christian is, whether any such position can be reasonably taken up in regard to that scheme of religion, which is set forth in Scripture as being of divine origin and authority.

The present position, as being likely to produce a very considerable effect with but a small expense of labour and trouble, has ever been a prime favourite with the deistical school, from generation to generation : and, accordingly, it is upon this principle, that the works of infidel writers are generally constructed. As I have already observed, no attempt is made to combat the strong and invincible arguments, by which the divine authority of Judaism and Christianity is established : but various difficulties are industriously produced, more or less plausible ; and on the strength of these difficulties it is contended, that our religion has no legitimate claim to the character of a revelation from heaven.

Now, even if the objections and difficulties in question could not be answered and removed, it may be doubted whether the argument of the deist, which is founded upon them, could well be deemed logically conclusive. When honestly thrown into the form of a syllogism, the argument will run as follows :

Sect. L] OF INFIDELITY. 23

A religion, claiming to be a revelation from heaven, is demonstrated to be such by a train of close reasoning upon its evidences ; which it has been found impossible to confute through the medium of a regular answer, article by article. But, in regard to sundry matters connected with this religion, objections may be made and difficulties may be started. Therefore such religion has no legitimate claim to be deemed a revelation from heaven.

Here, when divested of much noise and smoke, we have the sum and substance of the argument, which, in the opinion of the infidel, is sufficient to overturn Christianity. A fact is established by the highest possible degree of moral evidence : but certain difficulties may be started : therefore the fact must not be credited.

In good truth, if we admit the conclusiveness of such reasoning as this (and it is the only reasoning which occurs in the writings of most authors of the infidel school), we shall make but short and sorry work with history. Where is the best established fact, against which objections may not be raised? But, if objections may be raised against it ; then, according to the deistical argument before us, it is not to be believed.

By way of specimen, let us take the case of Cyrus, and reason upon it after the deistical fashion.