Preface
We are standing on the threshold of an unpolitical age. Politics has fallen from its high estate. Since the floodgates of political privilege have been opened, and participation in political affairs has been vouchsafed to all, we find everywhere a progressively increasing apathy in matters relating to politics. The preeminence of the State politically conceived, has been called into question. Its sovereignty has been shorn of many of its mystical characteristics. Other forms of corporate organisation are pressing for recognition. We may in turn see arising before our eyes a new, great social institution. Like feudalism it is in its essence unpolitical. As Lord Bryce has pointed out "feudalism was a social and legal system, only indirectly and by consequence a political one." We may to-day note that "industrialism," which may serve to denominate this new institution, is a social and economic system, only indirectly political. Such would appear to be the trend of history.
History is the book of life of mankind. Its function is primarily interpretative. Historical interpretation means the selection of those relevant factors out of the mass of past events which stand In significant relation to the present moment. Every age may thus be said to have historical ties which at first sight seem Incongruous. In our own times the interest in guild organisation, the assertion that occupation or function rather than geographical distribution is destined to become the basis of more adequate social organisation, hark back to the Middle yiii PREFACE
Ages, and are closer thereto than to the theories of State and the political practice which were still more or less universally accepted before the World War. Thus history must ever be written afresh, for after a few years such writing inevitably becomes obsolete, except as of literary or antiquarian interest. But history Itself Is never obsolete. The historical present Is the outcome of a past which it Is the purpose of history to trace. In our own times the transformation which is taking place in the theory of social organisation requires that the method of historical writing be revised.
Hitherto history has generally been conceived In an exclusively political sense as a record of the res gestae, and of the men who brought them to pass. As long as politics remained dominant It was natural that history should have remained primarily political In character. But we can now perceive that political history or any other partial survey of events in their Isolation, such as Is embodied In a biography or even In a national history. Is no longer adequate. History must henceforth be approached from an institutional, not from an Individual or national standpoint. The theoretical background of social practice must be Inquired Into. In this brief survey I would point the way to this new method of history. To trace through the tangled maze we call the course of events the logical antecedents and coefficients thereof Is to discover the trend of history, the process of social life. Such Is the purpose of this volume.
The chaotic state of mind which exists so widely among all manner and condition of persons is in a great measure due to the fact that the relevant factors of history, the connective tissue between the past and the present, are obscure. The great obsolete mass of dead matter incorporated In the average historical survey illustrates
PREFACE
IX significantly the point I wish to make. I would not infer that political data have been omitted from this book. On the contrary as it reviews a predominantly political period, in fact traces in outline the rise, maturity and decay of modern political practice, politics has found a large place therein. But I have endeavoured in so far as possible to present the theory of the age and illustrate it by the practice of politics, and I trust that I may have succeeded in a measure in pointing beyond this theory and practice to the newer theory that was being developed.
Though politics can no longer be held to be pivotal, in history, we cannot disregard the fact that the aim of politics is to arrive at some workable functioning of what we term social life. But in this politics has no exclusive monopoly. Religion, politics and economics are the three great regulative factors of human intercourse subsumed under the term — Society. At various epochs the principal emphasis has been placed now on one, now on another of these elements, according to a certain historically relevant relationship which may be traced. It is a one-sided distortion of historical truth to attempt to claim absolute preeminence for any one of these factors, though the dominance first of one and then of another is confirmed by a perusal of history. As a consequence the manner and mode of the civilisation of a given epoch, the cultural life of a period is colored by the dominant characteristic of the age, be it religious, political or economic. In this first volume I would present for your consideration the origins and background of present-day social phenomena. I would trace in this new historical spirit the course of relevant events which has led up to those of the epoch which we may conveniently call our own. It is sheer pedantry or an utter misunderstanding of the aim of history to declare that the events of his own times are
X PREFACE
too vivid, too fresh for an historian to undertake to interpret them. In point of fact the only history that is adequate is contemporary history; that is, history that is related to the present. All the research of historians, all the delvings of students into texts and yellowed parchments to eke out the minutiae of facts, which Macaulay nearly a century ago significantly termed the "mere dross of history," are in themselves worthless unless linked up with the current of events.
History reveals life in its manifoldness and complexity. In order to introduce some semblance of unity, to take history out of the realm of chronicles, to free it from a parity with fiction or a disparity with romance, we must assure ourselves that it is made understandable in terms of contemporary interest and usage. History in this sense is not merely the book of life, it may if read aright become the book of wisdom of mankind. I do not mean to imply that it should be looked upon as a collection of recipes to be followed in guiding individual action, or that it can serve, as it is so often held, as the magister vitae of a person calling himself a statesman. But presenting those events which are closely related to our own times and showing the relationship that exists between the past and the present, not only may we hope to arrive at an understanding of the significance of the course of events, but we may even discern a pattern of purpose in social life. This purposive element is in itself only discernible a posteriori and should not be taken as implying some rigid notion of historical causality. For history which recounts the story of the life process in its entirety admits of no such notion as an efl'icient or final cause. It is nevertheless with these causal factors that history is primarily concerned. It is by weaving them into a unity, by setting forth cogently whatever may serve to explain their mean-
PREFACE xi
ing, that the course of events, the trend of history is revealed.
In selecting the historical data used to illustrate this inquiry, much had perforce to be abridged, much omitted which might possibly have found a place in these pages. Thus, for example, in discussing the rise of the modern State, the influence of the Counter-Reformation, and the part played by the Jesuits in joining hands with the liberal movement in undermining the concept of the divine right of kings, and their struggle against monarchical absolutism, some might aver, should have been included. This very interesting episode has like others been omitted not only because of the need of limiting the scope of the narrative within reasonable bounds, but also because the Counter-Reformation and the work of its protagonists were historically negative. What the Jesuits sought was the restoration of papal supremacy in matters temporal, and not the positive progress of the new and more liberal political practice. Other omissions might be cited, but a careful study has led me to conclude that in the main their influence was negative, and had no preeminently positive influence on the course of history.
W. K. Wallace
Contents
PAGB
Introduction i
CHAPTER I The Politico-Theistic Concept of the State
Machiavelli — Bodin — The Precursors of the New Politico-Juridic Movement — Locke — Althusius — Grotius 17
CHAPTER H
The Genesis of Constitutional Government
The Moral Attributes of the State — The Role of England — The Declaration and Bill of Right — Influence of the Middle Class — Spread of Liberalism 25
CHAPTER ni
France of the Eighteenth Century — Humanity — Liberty — Progress — Montesquieu — Turgot — Condorcet — Rousseau 35
Causes and Aims — Temper of the Colonists — Influence of French Political Theory — English Practice 54
Free Humanity — Cosmopolitanism — Economic Interest — Influence of the Physiocrats — Adam Smith — Political Liberty — Economic Independence ^5
xiii xiv CONTENTS
CHAPTER VI The French Revolution
, PAGE
Foreign Influer.-ce — The New Spirit — The Tiers Etat — The Rights of Man — The Constitution of 1791 73
CHAPTER VII
The Idea of Nationalism
The Effects of the Revolution — The New Concept of Liberty — National Self-Consciousness — Napoleon I — His Political Importance — His Historical Role 80
CHAPTER VIII
The Spread of Constitutional Government — Sicily (1812) — Spain (1812) — France (1814) — Minor German States — The Destiny of Europe — The Congress of Vienna — The Holy Alliance — The Policy of Legitimacy — Aix-la-Chapelle — Troppau — Laibach — The Monroe Doctrine 88
The Aftermath
The Temper of the Early Nineteenth Century — New Schools of Politics — The Socialist Doctrine — St. Simon — The Increasing Importance of Economics 97
Greek Independence — The Revolution of 1830 — Louis Philippe, King of the French— The Whigs in Power— The Reform Act (1832) — Belgian Independence — Economics and Politics — The Competitive Ideal — Capitalism and Nationalism — The Business Man in Politics — The Case of Algeria — Portents of Decay — Chartism . ... 104.
CONTENTS XV
BOOK II CHAPTER I Political Maturity
PAGE
Comparative Methods — ^The Time Element — Metaphysical Character of Politics — Physical Factors — Duration 115
Louis Napoleon — Consolidation of Middle Class Control in France — Comte — The Teachings of Positivism — Utilitarianism in England — The Situation in Germany — The Zollverein — Fichte — ^Racial Influences 122
Chapter III
The Influence of Hegel — His Political Ideas — Their Widespread Acceptance — Comparison of German, French, and English Theory — The Accession of Frederick Wilhelm IV — Economic Development — The New Nationalism 133
Louis Philippe — Economic Factors — Attitude of the Middle Class — The Right to Vote — The Extension of Suffrage — Revolutionary Outbreaks of 1848 — Causes — Italy — France — Germany — Austria — Historical Motives 143
The Manifesto of 1848 — The Marxian Theory — Historical Materialism — The Influence of Hegel — Economic Interpretation of History — Opposition to Democratic Doctrines — Revolutionary Tactics 157 xvi • CONTENTS
CHAPTER VI
PAGE
The French Constitution of 1852 — The Second Empire — The Centralisation of Authority — Colonial Expansion — The British Empire — Industrial Exhibitions — Prosperity and Politics 172
CHAPTER VH
Napoleon HI
His Nationalist Policy — Relations with Foreign Powers — The Position of Russia — Pan-Slavic Movement — The Crimean War — The Role of England — The Congress of Paris — Russophile Tendencies . 181
CHAPTER Vin
Survey of the International Situation — Relations between States — Napoleon III and Italian Unity — The War with Austria — Villafranca — Effects of Union of Italy — Poland — Franco-Russian Tension — The Mexican Expedition — Bismarck and the War with Denmark — Annexation of the Danish Duchies — Prussia and Austria — Sadowa — The Treaty of Prague — The North German Confederation — The Collapse of the Mexican Empire — The Luxemburg Incident — The German Menace — The War of 1870 — Sedan — The Foundation of the German Empire 190
The Motives of Public Policy — Neo-Machiavellianism — Morality and Politics — The Personalised Nation-State — Definition of Realism — Philosophic Background — The Influence of Pessimism — Schopenhauer — Decline of the Politico-Juridic Theory of State — The State as Power — Volitional Factors 209
The Politico-Economic Theory of State
Term Defined — The End of the State — Role of the Individual- Union of the State and Its Members — Phases of Transition — Classification of States — New Functions of the State — Education — Public
CONTENTS xvii
PAGE
Welfare — Economic Enterprise — Motives of Public Policy — The New Absolutism — Survey of the Contribution of the Middle Class to Political Theory 223
Chapter I
The Decline of Nationalism — Quantitative Values — Imperialism and Internationalism — The Part of England — Organisation of International Movement — Its Character — Rapid Growth — The Congress of Basel — The Paris Commune — The Attitude of the Middle Class . 245
Imperialism
Relation to Capitalism — Role of the Proletariat — Megalomania of the Epoch — Processes of Decay — Influence of Pessimism . . . 256
Chapter III
Dualism in Politics — Principles of Public Policy — Disraeli — His Place in History — Leader of Imperialist Movement — His Affinity with the Proletariat — Aristocracy, Middle Class, and Proletariat — Interpretation of their Political and Social Theories 263
Relative Position of the Powers — The Predominance of Germany — The Dreikaiserbund — The Rapid Recovery of France — The Crisis of 1875 — The Situation in the Balkans — British Foreign Policy — England and Turkey — Plans for the Pacification of the Balkans — The Suez Canal Incident
Conflicting Influences — ^Reforms a la Turque — The Programme of the Three Emperors — The Berlin Memorandum — Firm Attitude of xviii CONTENTS
PAGE
England — War in the Balkans — The Reichstadt Agreement — Bulgarian Atrocities — Abdul Hamid — The Constantinople Conference — The Porte Proclaims a Constitution — Efforts to Keep the Peace — Russia Declares War — British Threat of Intervention to Protect Constantinople — Austria and the Western Balkans — Plevna — Bismarck and German Interest in Balkan Affairs — Russia Victorious — The Treaty of San Stefano 283
CHAPTER VI The Congress of Berlin
Objects of the Congress — Treaty of San Stefano Revised — Distribution of Territory — Erection of Independent Balkan States — Bosnia and Herzegovina — Cyprus — The New Orientation in Foreign Affairs — Maturity of Nation-States — Plans of Expansion — The European Viewpoint 295
CHAPTER Vn
Bismarckian Doctrines — Relation to Marxism — The Interpretation of Treitschke — Objective Concept of Power — Church and State — Berlin and the Vatican — The Significance of the Kulturkampf — Social Problems — Bismarck's Programme of Social Welfare — Disraeli's Attitude — England and Germany 301
CHAPTER Vni
Results of the Congress of Berlin — Crisis in Egypt — British Occupation — A Scientific Frontier — The Afghan War — Russo-German Tension — ^The Balkans Again — Austro-German Alliance — England and the Alliance — The Temper of the Times — The Passing of Pessimism — The Super-Man and the Super-State — Tunis — Franco- Italian Rivalry — An Imperialist Comedy — The French in Tunis . 314
CHAPTER IX The Triple Alliance
The Civilising Mission of the State — The New Basis of Competition — Tendency to Coalition — Position of Italy — Foundation of the
CONTENTS
PAGB
Alliance — Its Historical Significance — The Role of Austria and of Italy — Economic Factors — Peaceful Penetration — Supernationalism — Politics Subservient to Economics — Social Benefits — The Theory of Exploitation 323
The New Economic Basis of the State — Bismarck as Minister of Commerce and Industry — Protective Tariffs — Markets — Communications — The Reinsurance Treaty of 1884 — Its Economic Motives — Armed Peace — Colonial Expansion — France — England — Italy — Germany — Leopold II of Belgium — The Congo — Berlin Conference — First Participation of the United States in a European Congress — The Partition of Africa — The New Era 330
CHAPTER XI
Estimate of Bismarck's Historical Mission — The New Ethics of Government — The Justification of the Use of Force — Cultural Superiority 34Z
Introduction
IN periods of historical transition, the stress of new ideas is greater than can be equably borne. The passing of the old order is attended by upheavals and disturbances which are in themselves manifestations of this overburdening, and must not be confounded with the positive progress of the new tenets. The natural conservative forces, latent in all living matter, render smooth transition difficult. Reactionary principles remain dominant, relatively intact, until the crumbling process is accelerated and new and more appropriate theories find spontaneous acceptance.
It no longer suffices that the political philosopher, the doctrinaire sociologist, or the ethically-minded economist should seek to discover and array in historically accurate, logically sound argument the factors which contribute to the ideal governance of society. It no longer suffices that the historian, after a minute inquiry into the episodes and events in the life of a people, should present those relevant details which may appear to have led to the rise, grandeur, and fall of empires, so that we may profit by the experiences of the civilisations which have preceded our own. The time is past when the mission of the historian is to arouse the patriotic fervor of his compatriots as a spur to national unity or political independence, which influenced so much of the historical writing and the so-called philosophy of history during the 19th century. Theories of the siimmum bonum, politically arrived at, or panaceas based on worn-out political creeds into which the historian would seek to breathe a breath of new life can no longer be accepted.
Western civilisation, and in its train that of the rest of the world, has entered upon a new historical epoch. If we are to be in a position to interpret aright the significance of the course of events, to understand the meaning of the historical moment we call the present, we must be equipped to view dispassionately and without prejudice the origin and growth of the State as we know it, and trace the decay of its present constitutional form. To do this we must inquire with greater precision into the plan, investigate with clearer insight the principles upon which the social organisation of our epoch has been built. A new method of historical inquiry, a new historical viewpoint is required.
When, after the barbarian invasions, the political organisation of the Roman Empire was disrupted, men turned in disgust from the secular world and found what solace they could in the contemplation of the glories of the "City of God." In the West, politics in its proper sense disappeared and we have the period known as the Dark Ages, devoid of history. In the course of these centuries, roughly from the end of the 5th to the loth, the Church entrenched itself firmly and filled the whole life of the individual.
During the long continuance of the domination of the cultural life of Europe by the Church, its control had become so absolute that in order to emancipate mankind from what had come to be recognised as an intolerable servitude, it was felt that a new theory of social organ-
Isation was required. Whereas religion may assure a primitive stability to society and make possible a rudimentary form of social organisation, with the growing complexity of social life secularisation invariably ensues, which awakens a fresh interest in politics.
In contrast to the religious instinct common to mankind, we find among civilised peoples what we may term political consciousness. Religion has to do with the life and conduct of the individual; politics with the life and conduct of the State. Religion is primarily moral; politics primarily ethical. Religion demands conformity to creed; politics conformity to law. Religion is static; politics dynamic.
The social order of the Middle Ages which bore a religious imprint was essentially immobile. Society was established on a permanent, hereditary basis. Its hierarchy was fixed, apparently indissoluble. The interdependence of the various social orders was secondary only to their independence as a class. Each class, according to the measure of its strength, looked out for its own welfare, endeavored to safeguard its own interests; in some instances even maintained its own armed force, and provided and paid for its own representatives in the Diets. The gradual decay of this social system, in which the dominant position of the Church was everywhere recognised, was primarily due to the reawakening of political consciousness, and in a far less degree to the abuses and corruption of the Church. To overthrow the authority of the Church in secular affairs involved the displacing of religion as the focal factor in society and the introduction of a new pivotal interest. It meant that religion was to give way to politics; that the guidance of mankind by transcendental revelation was to be replaced by an empirical rationalism.
The substitution of the State politically conceived for the Church, which had in the past performed the dual function of spiritual and social supervision, meant not only the usurpation by the State of many of the functions formerly performed as religious rites but, what was to prove more important, the assertion of the preeminence of the secular world.
Whereas the Church had left a wide latitude to the individual in regard to his political beliefs, and had loosened the bonds of his allegiance to the State, that intolerable servitude of antiquity the tradition of which still survived, the Reformation, by wresting the control of the social order from the hands of the Papacy, introduced the concept of nationality in ecclesiastical affairs, raised the political status of the individual, and revived with renewed intensity his interest in his allegiance to a secular state. It must be acknowledged that these were merely incidental consequences of the process of rehabilitation of the Church, undertaken by the champions of the Reformation, and were not considered by them as the objectives which they strove to attain. One need but call to mind the inquiring attitude of Erasmus, the shrewd fearlessness of Luther, the uncompromising severity of Calvin, as they surveyed the world of their day. The ulcer of society as they clearly saw it was the decadence of the Church. The longings, the strivings of men were directed towards the planning of a new era, a new relation of man to his God and indirectly of man to man. The time was ripe for a new social order. The sun of theism still glowed in the West with effulgent splendor. The aim of those who were destined to bring about its eclipse was not to extinguish its beneficent rays, but rather to dissipate the clouds of superstition, vice, and ignorance which obscured It. They were In the first instance solely concerned with the reform of the Church, its purification, its strengthening, and its reaflirmation as the dominant force in society. Nevertheless, the first fruit of the teaching of the Protestant reformers not merely resulted in undermining the doctrine and dogma of the Church, but at the same time awakened an unquenchable interest in the theory and practice of political affairs. The disciplined faith of Catholicism, which had bred a spirit of obedience and orderly acquiescence in the existing social structure, was to give way to private judgment, based on private conviction which was soon extended from religious to secular affairs.
II
It Is In the nature of human affairs that the Instruments man uses to attain his objects survive long after the objects themselves have been attained and disappear. The ideal is the goal towards which man's striving is directed. It is usually held, and sincerely so, as a bettering of the existing, its improvement, rather than a substitution by something radically different or new. Such was the case when religious interest gave way to political enthusiasm at the opening of the modern epoch.
Historical Inquiry appears to confirm the fact that as religion was supplanted by politics as the pivotal Interest of civilised man, almost by way of accident in so far as fixed motives were concerned, so politics will in turn be supplanted by the Instruments made use of to regenerate it. It is by the clear-visioned acknowledgment of these probable consequences, by a careful examination thereinto, that it will be possible to discern with increasing accuracy the trend of historical development.
For the tome of social history must not be conceived, as it has been hitherto, as bound between its board covers, complete in its form and content^ — however admirable these may seem — to which a new volume is added from time to time; but rather like a loose-leaf ledger in which fresh pages are to be inserted as the new is uncovered, as the old is outworn. This does not mean continued compromise, or work half done; it does not mean that the negative will never be inserted where the positive held sway, owing to a passing change of mood. It means that the course of history need not be held to be in process of continuous disruption; nor yet that the growth of the newer forms of social organisation need be retarded by the apparent finality of its existing form. It means that there is a possibility for perpetual renovation, naturally and smoothly arrived at; the old no longer encumbering the new. It is on this economy that the polity of the future must be built.
By an acceptance of this view we can with more simplicity reach an understanding of what is meant by that perplexing term, "progress"; we can conceive the plausibility of perfectibility. We can understand progress in its essential nature, not as an end in itself, as it is so often held to be, but merely as an incidental factor in human affairs, to be made use of in the manner and with the ease with which an outworn page can be removed, and a new page can be inserted. The elemental principles have been determined, bound by the nature of man, but the infinite variations, progress and regress, stretch on before us.
I have given this brief outline in order that it may be clear that when, after the Reformation, religion came to be supplanted by politics as the pivotal factor in social life, the theistic concept, long held the fundamental tenet in Western Europe, was introduced into political life. It need, therefore, excite no surprise, as it was a logical development, that we should find a Hobbes proclaiming the State the "Mortal God." We see here the transference of allegiance from the theistic to the political Godhead. Machiavelli in Italy and Bodin in France had, before Hobbes, exalted the supremacy of the State, and their political doctrines had found a ready acceptance among the very limited number of men in a position to comprehend the true nature of politics. Looked at from this standpoint, it is not difficult to trace the growth of monarchical absolutism in Europe, which led to the introduction of the concept of the divine right of kings.
From the i6th to the i8th century absolutism was the commonly accepted theory of government. The divinity of the will of the monarch, his direct responsibility to God, his irresponsibility towards man, was the common creed. The King was God's anointed. To his support rallied his subjects. Papal Rome was overshadowed by Paris, London, Madrid, and a number of German centres, each of which had set up a political Godhead. Religion was relegated to the sphere of speculation. Politics became the primal preoccupation, and with it rose the empirical mind, which tested and investigated the tangible. In an ever-widening circle the field of experimentation was extended, and brought within the realm of the human mind useful and practical solutions of all manner of problems, which had never hitherto been investigated. Civilisation had entered upon the path of perfectibility and progress. Such was the work of the Reformation. Who shall say that it was consonant with the aims of its initiators?
In a futile attempt to arrest the decay of religious ascendancy the Papacy had sanctioned a system of persecution of the heretical adherents of the Reformation, more terrible than that suffered by the early Christians at the hands of the Romans. In the ferocity of the methods used, and in the number of victims resulting therefrom, it far distanced its earlier prototype. For a century and a half Europe was racked by internecine religious wars and persecutions, which spared no man, no land. Throughout the 17th century these convulsions continued. Civil wars in England, the Thirty Years' War in Germany, the Dragonnades in France, the Inquisition in Portugal and Spain, the massacres in Holland — all had as their apparent motive the suppression of Protestant heresy. In reality they were phases of a bloody struggle for the supremacy of a new ideology. The latent forces of politics had pushed upward. Politics was about to supplant religion as the motive-force of social life.
From the positive worship of one immortal God the attention of men had been diverted. Religious worship was not abolished, but it became avocational. The vocation of men was henceforth political. Their energy was no longer engaged in religious strife. Finally, the Papacy itself realised the irrevocable character of the new trend, and sought to retain at least a loose-woven spiritual hegemony. It no longer excommunicated and fulminated, no longer insisted on asserting its temporal sovereignty on the field of battle, but associated itself with, and lent the sanction of its approval to, the rule of temporal sovereigns favorable to its religious creed, and thus assisted actively in the creation of a politico-theistic organisation of society.
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