Values, immediate and contributory, and their interrelation

Preface

IT would seem that an apology is due from me to Professor W. M. Urban for not having discussed his significant contribution to value-philosophy, entitled, Valuation, Its Nature and Laws. My omission is not due to any failure to recognize that Professor Urban is, in this country, the most eminent representative of a large school of value-philosophers, among whom are A. Meinong, C. V. Ehrenfels, and G. Simmel. My reason for not discussing their views in the present work is similar to that which prompted me to pass by Miinsterberg's The Eternal Values. Here are two schools of value-philosophy with presuppositions radically different from my own. That school which Professor Urban so well represents finds the locus of value in the "worth-fundamental," discovered by an analysis of mental life. Miinsterberg finds value in the region of the human will, and he believes that value implies an over-personal, metaphysically absolute will. Both find value primarily to be a quality which colors certain mental states — Miinsterberg believes that it points toward an objective " Oversell" In contrast to this subjective point of devi PREFACE

parture, I have treated value as relational, occurring in definite situations. I have used the psychological basis of values not as the sum and substance of valuation, but as a description of one term of value-relations, the other term, that of the environment, calling for equal attention. Thus I have been able to avoid the acrostic philosophy of the value-psychologists, which tends in the direction of epistemological realism, and the lack of concreteness incidental to it. I may note, however, that Professor Urban considers briefly, in the last chapter of his book, some of the problems which I discuss in detail.

To Professor Herman Harrell Home of New York University, I am indebted for numerous suggestions and for a final reading of the proof; and to Professor Arthur Huntington Nason, Director of the New York University Press, for critical oversight of publication. Above all, however, my gratitude is due to Professor Dickinson S. Miller of General Theological Seminary, for his kindness in reading my manuscript and making many helpful suggestions as to the method of treatment of my subject.

M. P.

New York City, January 31, 1920.

THE INTERRELATION OF VALUES

Chapter I. Two Classes of Values 7

Values as means or 'given as good,' 7. — Their psychological basis in cognition and feeling, 9. — Independent character of contributory values, 13. — Objective and subjective, 14. — Questionable status of logical, moral, and aesthetic values, 15. — Distinction between values and value- judgments, 16.

Chapter II. Truth and Immediate Value . . 20 Verification vs. recognition, 20. — Rickert's argument, 21. — Metaphysics and epistemology, 24. — Truth a matter of inference, not simple affirmation, 25. — Rickert's psychologizing tendency, 26. — Various oppositions, 28.

Chapter III. The Interrelation op Values

with Respect to Their Origin. . 31 Values not dependent upon presence of judgment, 32. — Standpoints of the agent and the observer, 33.— Value and the earliest stage of consciousness, 36. —

vii viii VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

Presence of interest the criterion of presence of value, 38. — Biological concomitants of the earliest value-situation, 39. — Values from the observer's standpoint all contributory, 43. — Introspective and sympathetic methods, 44. — Earliest stage of the standpoint of the individual, 45. — Introspective determination of values of this stage, 46. — Values in the earliest stages of consciousness, 48. — Sensations and feeling-attitudes, 48. — Two directions of the development of conscious activity, 50.

Chapter IV. The Interrelation op Values

with Respect to Knowledge . . 54 Judgments as values and judgments of values, 54. — The value of acts of judgment, 57. — Content of judgments and their future usefulness, 59. — True judgments and their value, 61. — Value of false judgments, 66. — Degrees of contributory value, 69. — Value of theoretical judgments, 73. — Limits of the discussion of judgments of values, j6. Origin of immediate judgments, 78. — Origin of contributory judgments, 80. — Tendency of contributory judgments to become independent of particular individual needs, 82.

Chapter V. The Interrelation op Values with Respect to Their Co-existence 85 CONTENTS ix

Different uses of the term 'environment', 85. — Biological and psychological uses, 88. — Difference between the biological viewpoint and that of instrumental pragmatism, 90. — Environment and perception, 92. — Relevant disputes about aspects of consciousness, 94. — Conscious activity related to environment through cognition and feeling, 97. Contact with environment through feeling, 99. — Cognitive and affective relations of conscious activity, 104. — Relation of mature to primitive conscious activity, 106. — Sensation as a bridge between cognition and feeling, no. — Further deductions, 112.

Chapter VI. Subjective and Objective 119

The place of function in value-relations, 119. — Are tastes objective or subjective? 121. — Possible existence of norms, 122. — Attractiveness of theory of objective immediate values, 124.

Chapter VII. The Theory op Norms 126

I. Kant or Realism? 128

Windelband's contradictory theories, 129. — Norms and natural laws, 130. — Relation of norms to particular consciousnesses, 132.

x VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

II. Evolution and the Norms 134

Qualitative and quantitative factors, 135. — Their incompatability with the theory of natural selection, 136.

III. The Parallel between Denken,

Fuklen, and Wollen 137

Falsity of the parallel between Denken and Wollen, 137. — A psychological scruple, 139.

IV. The Independence of the Norms

of Particular Consciousnesses . . 140 Independence of particular consciousnesses not proved for norms, 141. — The case for parallelism of three realms of norms, 145. — Evolution of morality does not presuppose norms of morality, 148. — Supposition of moral and logical norms unnecessary, 152. — Aesthetic appreciations and the law of survival, 153.

V. Freedom and Responsibility 155

Freedom said to subsist in determined processes, 157. — Assumption of autonomy on part of the individual, 160. — Causality, necessity, and responsibility, 162. — Ambiguity in use of the word 'character', 165. — Choice of possible decisions, 166. — Responsibility as a function of the judgment, 169.

Windelband's General Position . . 172

VALUES

IMMEDIATE AND CONTRIBUTORY

AND THEIR INTERRELATION

INTRODUCTION

IN this thesis, I purpose taking as my starting point the general agreement among writers as to the existence of values belonging to two distinct classes, immediate and contributory. In order to put the distinction between the two classes beyond question, I shall limit the class " immediate " to those immediate values which are agreed to be subjective, i.e., dependent for their existence upon some particular individual who holds them as values. The propositions, therefore, which I shall assume to be matters of general agreement are, " There is a class of values which may be named i contributory \" " All contributory values are objective." " There is another class of values which may be termed ' immediate \" " Some immediate values are subjective."

Having distinguished two classes of values as subject-matter for discussion, I proceed to treat of their interrelations. But, before this can be done effectually, it is found to be necessary to disprove a theory which, if true, would render the distinction between immediate and contributory values of slight importance. It has been held that the values known as contributory are dependent for their validity upon certain a priori immediate values because all truth is said to rest upon immediate recognition of its presence. I therefore devote a chapter to disproving this theory.

With two classes of values of unquestioned distinction, I next discuss their interrelation with reference to their origin, with reference to knowledge, and with reference to their co-existence.

Part II examines immediate values with a view to demonstrating that there are no objective immediate values. This result confirms the validity of the initial distinction between objective-contributory and subjective-immediate values, and carries the proposition " Some immediate values are subjective " to the wider application of the proposition " It cannot be proved that there are any immediate values which are not subjective."

PART I THE INTERRELATION OF VALUES

Chapter I

THE method to be pursued, as stated in the introduction, is to begin the discussion by finding some point of agreement among writers on value. It is not to be expected that there may be discovered groups of values to whose clear cut distinctions all writers will subscribe. It is not unlikely, however, that there may exist a fundamental distinction in kind between certain values and certain other values, and that the points at issue may be due to differences of opinion as to the correct assignment of other particular values. First, I shall point out two radically different types of value; secondly, I shall indicate the nature of those values which may not be assigned summarily to one of the two classes.

§ i. The distinction which I have in mind is between contributory or instrumental values and immediate values. The adjectives " instrumental " and " immediate " indicate that the distinction is a logical one, distinguishing values as given goods or as means. Contributory values are not self-sufficient; they look beyond themselves to some end-in-view. They comprise objects that are "good for" something, or acts that conduce to the attainment of some specific end. Thus, this pen is good for writing; apples are good for food. I visit my physician in order to obtain treatment from him; he prescribes for me in order that I may get well. Pen, apples, and the acts of visiting and treatment are of contributory value.

Immediate values, on the other hand, are " non-mediate." They do not look forward to an end, but are intrinsic, self-sufficient. They are ends-in-themselves in the sense that they are simply given as good when stated, requiring neither reference to any object or act beyond themselves, nor verification of any kind. Of such character are objects and acts which I like, demand, admire, approve, wish, want, etc. I admire a beautiful vase; it thus becomes of value to me, irrespective of any other vases that I admire. I disapprove of the act of taking human life; the act of killing thereby becomes of negative value to me. Sailing and smoking are valuable to me.

8 2. The fundamental character of the distinction between immediate and contributory values will appear when their psychological basis is taken into account. Observe first that objects and acts of contributory value demand for their existence other objects or acts to which they may be related. They cannot stand alone. For a government note to be of the value of ten dollars, the ten dollars must actually exist somewhere. Apples, considered as good for food, imply the existence of some suitable digestive apparatus. If my visit to my physician is to be valuable as a means to getting well, I must now be capable of improvement in health beyond my present state. Now, as both contributory and instrumental values are here spoken of with reference to man, it is obvious that the psychological basis of contributory values must be sought in some aspect of the human mind by which objects and acts may be related to other objects and acts. Cognition alone satisfies this requirement. We may say, therefore, that contributory values are closely associated with the cognitive aspect of consciousness, where comparison, memory, and reasoning furnish a mechanism for relating portions of our experience.

io VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION

Immediate values, on the other hand, do not require relation of two ideas in consciousness. They are simple, unique, self-sufficing facts. They are matters of taste, and " de gustibus non disputandum." What is the importance of the cognitive aspect of conscious activity with respect to such values? Must I know them in order to have them? Not any more than that the leopard must know that he has spots in order to have them. Knowledge of values, therefore, is quite distinct from values themselves, and we shall do well always to bear this fact in mind.

If cognition is merely incidental to immediate values, the psychological basis of immediate values must be sought in some aspect of consciousness other than the cognitive aspect. There remain, in the popular division, the fields of will and feeling. The words " like," " demand," "want," "admire," "approve," "wish," etc., which describe the type of relation that exists between the individual and the objects or acts which he immediately values, are all expressive of feeling. It is also noteworthy that, if the feeling is toward an object or act which the individual is not possessing or doing at the

TWO CLASSES OF VALUES n

time, there is also frequently present an impulse to gain possession of the object or to do the act. If I am sufficiently eager to sail, I am impelled to go down to the lake to get the boat ready. If my liking for peanuts affects me deeply, I am likely to go out and buy some. It appears, therefore, that immediate values are also closely associated with the will-aspect of consciousness, and this can be said without committing oneself to any particular theory as to the nature of that will-aspect. In the case of contributory values, however, there is a hypothetical characteristic which makes their relation to will quite different. Apples are good for food if I am hungry. My pen is good for writing when I want to write. In these examples, there is no impulse aroused by the act of contributory valuation; I may put the object or the act valued to service whenever a suitable occasion is presented, but the object or act will not itself create the occasion. I may conclude, therefore, that will and feeling are peculiarly associated with immediate values, and cognition with contributory values. § 3. I must not leave this preliminary consideration of the psychological basis of value without a caution and a deduction. The caution is that the assignment of two classes of values to different fields of psychological manifestation must not be held to imply that the individual ever acts exclusively in any one " field " of consciousness. Cognition, feeling, and will are aspects of a conscious activity which is undivided. The distinction with reference to value is one of emphasis rather than one of division. More than that, the distinction implies that we human beings, in our discussion and discrimination of values, recognize that we value things in different ways, according as we think, feel, or do them. But this is not to deny the presence of a minimum of feeling and impulse necessary to the presence of a thought. There are all gradations of emphasis of cognition, feeling, and will in conscious activity, and it is not unlikely that we may find situations of conscious activity in which both classes of value are simultaneously present. The interrelation of the two classes is, in fact, a subject of future discussion in this thesis. At this juncture, it is necessary only to point out that I do not mean to isolate any "field" of consciousness in the act, but only to emphasize that the two classes of value refer exclusively to different aspects of conscious activity.

The deduction which I wish to make is that contributory values have a measure of independence of any one individual, which immediate values cannot claim. Two facts make this evident: (a) The cognitive function by its process of comparison and relation of ideas one to another makes contributory values independent of a particular time or moment in the activity of the individual. If my umbrella is good for keeping off the rain, it is good for that purpose when next it rains, be it today, next Wednesday, or next month. I may verify contributory values. I may find out what my umbrella is good for. (b) The cognitive function has developed the convenient method of expression of ideas of one individual to another by means of speech. It is conceivable that I might demonstrate the use of my umbrella to a soaked friend by gestures, but words greatly facilitate the process. In this way, contributory values are made independent not only of any special moment in the life of an individual, but also of any particular individual. This is in marked contrast with immediate values: the communication of my likes and dislikes to my neighbor is a matter of some difficulty, and sympathetic feeling always lacks something of the flavor of the original experience.

§ 4. With some care, the terms " objective " and " subjective " may be used to signify the distinction between immediate and contributory values. The independence which has just been recognized as characteristic of contributory values makes " objective " an appropriate designation for them. If such values pass as coin among the members of a community, they must cling to the object rather than to the persons who employ them. This is not to say, however, that they would be values at all apart from the relation of the objects to individuals who value them, but they may be called " objective " in deference to the fact that they do not depend for their existence upon any particular member of a community.

§ 5. The term " subjective," in contrast, is applicable to at least some immediate values, in view of the fact that they cannot exist apart from the conscious activity of some particular individual.

§ 6. The second task which I set for myself at the beginning of the chapter was that of indicating certain classes of values over whose position there is some dispute. The current differences of opinion are nearly all due to one fact, namely, that it is possible to use the cognitive function of conscious activity to express in thought and language facts of immediate value.

As we have seen, it is necessary that there be a cognitive minimum in order to be conscious of an immediate value. This element, however, at first at a minimum, may grow to the very limit of cognitive development and attain expression in the judgment. If apples are of immediate value, I may think of them as such, and I may make the judgment, " I like apples." Some writers now argue thus : " I like apples " is a judgment. Judgments are capable of verification. But immediate values do not demand verification. Therefore judgments of immediate values are immediately true. It is further argued that truth, not only of value-judgments but also all truth, is of immediate value, because, it is claimed, in judgment there is always an element of approval or disapproval on the part of the judging individual. Clearly, therefore, truth is a value whose assignment is in dispute, if, indeed, it be a value at all.

Again, in the judgment " I admire the vase," there is expressed a fact of immediate value. Suppose that, in my admiration, I pronounce it beautiful. Is the beauty a quality of the vase, or only my feeling toward it? If the beauty is in the vase, there must be some standard of beauty outside my consciousness, and the immediate value of appreciation of the beautiful will not be subjective, but objective. The place of aesthetic values, therefore, is in dispute.

Again, in judging an action to be good, am I expressing only my feeling toward it, or is my feeling governed by the presence of an objective standard of moral value which I instinctively recognize? Is it true that there is nothing good or bad, but thinking makes it so? Or is there a moral standard, quite independent of my sentiments, which is valid for all time? The place of moral values, therefore, is in dispute.

§ 7. To discuss these disputed points will be a part of what follows. At this point, however, it is suitable to distinguish carefully between a fact of immediate value, and the expression of that same fact in a judgment about immediate value. My feeling toward the vase is quite a distinct and separate thing from the judgment

" The vase is beautiful." The one does not necessitate the other. I might like the vase, and never put my liking into words; or I might say, " The vase, no doubt, is beautiful, but I feel no liking for it." Judgments of immediate values, therefore, do not derive immediacy from the immediate values which they state. The psychological basis outlined earlier in the chapter must be preserved. Judgments, even judgments of immediate value, since they fall within the field of cognition, must be classed with contributory values, if they are values at all. And strange as it may appear, the judgment that a vase is immediately beautiful will be found to be of contributory value. 1

Discussion of the possible existence of objective moral and aesthetic standards may be postponed to a later chapter. But discussion of the status of truth may not be postponed, because, if truth should be found to be immediate and antecedent to judgment, the distinction between immediate and contributory values would be of slight consequence. There would then be too little separation between certain values with reference to the cognitive function

1 Cf. page 58.

and certain other values with reference to the feeling-function of conscious activity to make the distinction worth while. My next task, therefore, is that of discussing the place of truth in a classification of values.

The substance of this chapter may be summarized as follows:

§ i. It is generally agreed that there are two groups of values which are distinct and separate and which may be named immediate and contributory values.

The distinction is a logical one: contributory values are means to ends; immediate values are given as good.

§ 2. The psychological basis of contributory values is the cognitive aspect of conscious activity; that of immediate values is the feeling-aspect, often joined with the will-aspect.

§ 3. It is not implied that any aspect of consciousness functions without the presence of the other aspects.

§ 4. " Objective " applied to contributory values means that they do not depend for their existence upon a particular individual. " Subjective " applied to immediate values means that they do depend for their existence upon some particular individual.

§ 5. It is generally agreed that contributory values are objective in this sense; and that some immediate values are subjective.

§ 6. Whether there are objective immediate values, in the realms of truth, beauty, and morality, is a disputed question.

§ 7. Confusion between the classes of contributory and immediate values has been due largely to the fact that it is possible to make judgments as to immediate values.

Chapter II

A CHIEF distinction between immediate and contributory values is that the latter admit of verification, while the former do not. If a friend tells me that a certain brand of soap is good for taking off dirt, I can very quickly find out for myself whether what he says is true or not. I can discover whether soap is contributory to the end of cleansing. But if my friend tells me that he likes a perfume, I cannot verify the immediate value of his liking. He simply likes it, and it is valuable to him without any ado. Whether I find it agreeable, or what his other friends think about it, makes no difference; for him, it is of immediate value.

Certain writers, however, tell us that the verification of the soap as contributory to cleansing is not merely a matter of using it and watching its effect upon the skin. They say that the process of trial and observation is of secondary importance beside recognition of the truth that soap cleanses. And this recognition, they say, has nothing to do with verification, but is based on a powerful compulsion of the feeling-side of consciousness to assent to it as true. Truth, they say, is thus an immediate value.

Now if truth be an immediate value, all those values which I designated as contributory are, in the last analysis, immediate, or, at least, based on immediate values. My whole thesis, on the other hand, assumes that there are the two classes of values, immediate and contributory, and that they are coordinate in rank. It becomes of first importance, therefore, to disprove the theory that truth is an immediate value.

A very subtle psychological argument has been advanced to prove this theory. The keenest piece of analysis in its support has been made by H. Rickert in his Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis. 1 It will be profitable to summarize and criticize Rickert's position.

Starting with the classic conception of truth as located in the judgment, 2 Rickert emphasizes the practical character of knowledge. He observes that there is no truth where there is only a succession of perceptions, and that the fully

1 Rickert, H., Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis, Tubingen und Leipzig, 2 AufL, 1904.

2 Op. tit., 84 ff.

developed logical judgment appears only when the individual takes an interest (Anteil) in the perceptions. He says that affirmation or negation is logically implied in all judgments which are held to contain knowledge in the sense of true knowledge. Thus, knowing is appreciating (Kennen ist Erkennen). But appreciation has to do only with values; therefore truth is a value. The value truth is coordinate with values derived from willing and feeling; that is, truth is an immediate value. The usual opposition made between perceptions and judgments, on the one hand, and feeling and willing, on the other, is false; the true opposition is between perceiving, on the one hand, and judgments of affirmation and negation together with feeling and willing, on the other. Affirmation and negation, since they are expressive of interest, are a kind of approval or disapproval, pleasure or displeasure. Knowing is a process determined through the feelings. But truth differs from the appreciation that comes with feelings other than affirmation or negation, in that the appreciation that comes with chance feelings (i.e., immediate values) is unstable, whereas the feeling that appreciates truth is timeless.

A necessity of judgment is here felt, different from the necessity of perceiving (causal necessity). Necessity of judgment is logical necessity, Sollen, in contradistinction to Mussen. Sollen precedes Sein in existential judgments, because Sein is only expressible by a judgment. Now if this doctrine is sound, it is obvious that any separation of two classes of values, one of which excludes the element of judgment, is vitiated. For Rickert makes the true judgment dependent upon a necessary feeling of appreciation; that is, he makes of it an immediate value. According to his theory, the truth of my judgment " The tree is green " is grounded in a transcendental Sollen which compels me to judge it as green, if I judge at all. There is an immediate feeling of affirmation, appreciation, recognition, which requires me to say " green " rather than blue or red. Every fact implies a judgment. 3 In the preceding chapter, 4 I made the distinction between facts of immediate value and judgment concerning the truth or falsity of these facts. According to Rickert, I must have fallen into that " Positivismus, der die ' Tatsache * und ihre Konst aliening fur das

4 Page 16.

einzige und letzte ansieht, was den Philosophen kummert" 5 It is necessary, therefore, at this point to criticize Rickert's position:

§ i. The doctrine that Sein depends upon a transcendental Sollen, is equivalent to saying that metaphysics is dependent upon epistemology, and many are the objections against such a position. 6 Here it may be remarked that Rickert, as all others who adopt that standpoint, does not live up to his doctrine. If it be true, as he states on p. 130, that existential facts imply a prior judgment, correct method would demand the proof of his theory on the basis of necessary judgments. Such a theory must not be constructed from any materials outside the sphere of judgments recognized (appreciated) as true. What apparently contradicts such a requirement is to be found on pp. 88-89. ^ n these pages, Rickert distinguishes between the quaestio facti of psychology and the quaestio juris of epistemology. He says that psychology is concerned with Sein, but he adds, " Sieht man die Feststellung solcher Tatsachen als Aufgabe der Psychologie an, so muss auch die

5 Rickert. op. cit., 130.

6 Cf. Marvin, W. T., The New Realism, 43-95.

Behandlung der Frage nach dem erkenntnistheoretischen Wesen des Urteils mit psychologischen Feststellungen beginnen, um dann zu sehen, welchen Dienst sie fur das Verstdndnis des logischen Urteilsbe griff es leisten konnen" This is to say, you must start with certain existential facts in order to obtain a basis for consideration of the judgment. Later, 7 he says that it is immaterial whether all judgments, psychologically speaking, contain either an affirmation or a negation, for the epistemological problem concerns only those which do imply one. His developed theory, however, claims that all knowledge (true knowledge — even existential facts) contains an affirmation or a negation. What of the facts taken from psychology which he used to erect his theory? He has assumed the knowledge of certain facts in order to prove a theory of the dependence of reality on knowledge. It is an error of method.

§ 2. The position of Rickert, in holding that existential facts imply judgments, is to the effect that there are immediate truths. We know existential truth with existence, and the latter cannot be regarded as independent of the for-

7 Rickert, op. cit., 96.

mer. Rickert is not alone in supposing that there are immediate truths. This theory is held by Russell 8 and by James, among moderns. In the case of James, however, perhaps it is more a question of terminology, as knowledge, in his use of the word, is not restricted to propositions.

Dewey (in a conversation with the writer) has brought a cogent argument in criticism of this doctrine of immediate truths. In the proposition " It is green," a whole background of experience is presupposed, the comparison of colors. If the judgment is to be verified, the use of spectrum analysis will be required. The truth of the simplest " atomic " proposition, therefore, is dependent upon a great number of " molecular " propositions. " It is green " may be a " snap judgment," associating a particular phenomenon with others that I have experienced, or it may involve the services of an expert physicist, as in a law court. In either case, truth is a matter of inference, and the process is no simple, compelling affirmation, but a harmonization with past experience by comparison.