In the world war

Contents

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CHAP.

Preface ^^

Preface

It is impossible in a small volume to write the history of the World War in even a partially exhaustive manner. Nor is that the object of the book.

Rather than to deal with generalities, its purpose is to describe separate events of which I had intimate knowledge, and indi\-iduals with whom I came into close contact and could, therefore, observe closeh^; in fact, to furnish a series of snapshots of the great drama.

By this means the following pages may possibly present a conception of the war as a whole, which ma}', nevertheless, differ in many respects from the hitherto recorded, and possibh' fault}', histor\' of the war.

Ever}' one regards people and events from his own point of \-iew; it is ine^-itable. In my book, I speak of men with whom I was ia close touch; of others who crossed my path without leaving any personal impression on me; and finaU}', of men with whom I was often in grave dispute. I endeavor to judge of them all in objective fashion, but I have to describe people and things as I saw them. Wherever the description appears to be at fault, the reason will not be due to a prematurely formed opinion, but rather, probably, to a prevailing lack of the capacity for judging.

Not ever3thing could be revealed. Much was not explained, although it could have been. Too short a period still separates us from those events to justih' the lifting of the veil from all that happened.

But what remains unspoken can in no way change the whole picture which I describe exactly as imprinted on my mind.

Count Ottokar Czerxix.

Chapter I

THE bursting of a thunder-storm is preceded by certain definite phenomena in the atmosphere. The electric currents separate, and the storm is the result of atmospheric tension which can no longer be repressed. Whether or no we become aware of these happenings through outward signs, whether the clouds appear to us more or less threatening, nothing can alter the fact that the electric tension is bound to make itself felt before the storm bursts.

For years the political barometer of the European Ministries of Foreign Affairs had stood at ' ' storm. ' ' It rose periodically, to fall again; it varied — naturally; but for years everything had pointed to the fact that the peace of the world was in danger.

The obvious beginnings of this European tension date back several years, to the time of Edward VII. On the on ehand, England's dread of the gigantic growth of Germany; on the other hand, Berlin's politics, which had become a terror to the dwellers by the Thames; the belief that the idea of acquiring the dominion of the world had taken root in Berlin. These fears, partly due merely to envy and jealousy, but partly due also man statesmen never had any intention of acquiring world-dominion. They wished to retain Germany's place in the sun, her rank among the first Powers of the world; it was undoubtedly her right, but the real and alleged continuous German provocation and the ever-growing fears of the Entente in consequence created just that fatal competition in armaments and that coalition policy which burst like a terrible thunder-storm into the war.

It was only on the basis of these European fears that the French plans of revenge developed into action. England would never have drawn the sword merely for the conquest of Alsace-Lorraine; but the French plan of revenge was admirably adapted to suit the policy inaugurated by King Edward, which was derived not from French, but from English motives.

Out of this dread of attack and defense arose that mad fever for armaments which was characteristic of pre-war times. The race to possess more soldiers and more guns than one's neighbor was carried to an absurd extreme. The armaments which the nations had to bear had become so cumbersome as to be unbearable, and for long it had been obvious to every one that the course entered upon could no longer be pursued, and that two possibilities alone remained — either a voluntary and general disarmament, or war.

A slight attempt at the first alternative was made in 191 2 through negotiations between Germany and England respecting naval disarmament, but never got beyond the first stage. England was no readier for peace, and no more disposed to make advances, than was Germany, but she was cleverer and succeeded in conveying to the world that she was the Power endangered by Germany's plans for expansion.

I recollect a very telling illustration of the German and British points of view, given to me by a prominent

I INTRODUCTORY REFLECTIONS 5

politician from a neutral state. This gentleman was crossing the Atlantic on an American steamer, and among the other travelers were a well-known German industrial magnate and an EngHshman. The German was a great talker and preferred addressing as large an audience as possible, expatiating on the ''uprising'' of Germany,^ on the irrepressible desire for expansion to be found in the German people, on the necessity of impregnating the world with German culture, and on the progress made in all these endeavors. He discoursed on the rising prosperity of German trade in different parts of the world; he enumerated the towns where the German flag was flying; he pointed out with emphasis how "Made in Germany" was the term that must and would conquer the world, and did not fail to assert that all these grand projects were built on solid foundations upheld by miHtary support. Such was the German. When my informant turned to the silent, quietly smiling Englishman and asked what he had to say to it, he simply answered, '* There is no need for me to say anything, for I know that the world belongs to us.'* Such was the Englishman. This merely illustrates a certain frame of mind. It is a snapshot, showing how the German and the English mentality was reflected in the brain of a neutral statesman; but it is symptomatic, because thousands have felt the same, and because this impression of the German spirit contributed so largely to the catastrophe. The Aehrenthal policy, contrary to what we were accustomed to on the Ballplatz, pursued ambitious plans for expansion with the greatest strength and energy, thereby adding to the suspicions of the world regarding us. For the belief gained credence that the Vienna policy was an offshoot of that of Berlin, and that the same Hne of action would be adopted in Vienna as in Berlin, and the general feeling of anxiety rose higher. Blacker and blacker grew the clouds; closer and closer the meshes of the net ; misfortune was on the way.

II

I was in Constantinople shortly before the outbreak of war, and while there had a lengthy discussion of the political situation with the Markgraf Pallavicini, our most efficient and far-seeing ambassador there. He looked upon the situation as being extremely grave. Aided by his experience of a decade of political observations, he was able to put his finger on the pulse of Europe, and his diagnosis was as follows: that if a rapid change in the entire course of events did not intervene, we were making straight for war. He explained to me that he considered the only possibility of evading a war with Russia lay in our definitely renouncing all claims to influence in the Balkans and leaving a field to Russia. Pallavicini was quite clear in his own mind that such a course would mean our resigning the status of a great Power; but apparently to him even so bitter a proceeding as that was preferable to the war which he saw was impending. Shortly afterward I repeated this conversation to the Archduke and heir, Franz Ferdinand, and saw that he was deeply impressed by the pessimistic views of Pallavicini, of whom, like every one else, he had a very high opinion. The Archduke promised to discuss the question as soon as possible with the Emperor. I never saw him again. That was the last conversation I had with him, and I do not know whether he ever carried out his intention of discussing the matter with the monarch.

The two Balkan wars were as a summer lightning before the coming European thunder-storm. It was obvious to any one acquainted with Balkan conditions i that the peace there had produced no definite result, and the Peace of Bukharest in 19 13, so enthusiastically acclaimed by Rumania, carried the germs of its death and its birth. Bulgaria was humiliated and reduced; Rumania and, above all, Serbia, enlarged out of all proportion, were arrogant to a degree that baffles description. Albania, as the apple of discord between Austria-Hungary and Italy, was a factor that gave no promise of relief, but only of fresh wars. In order to understand the excessive hatred prevailing between the separate nations, one must have lived in the Balkans. When this hatred came to an outburst in the World War the most terrible scenes were enacted, and as an example it was notorious that the Rumanians tore their Bulgarian prisoners to pieces with their teeth, and that the Bulgarians, on their part, tortured the Rumanian prisoners to death in the most shocking manner. The brutality of the Serbians in the war can best be described by our own troops. The Emperor Francis Joseph clearly foresaw that the peace after the second Balkan war was merely a respite to draw breath before a new war. Prior to my departure for Bukharest in 19 13 I was received in audience by the aged Emperor, who said to me: "The Peace of Bukharest is untenable, and we are faced by a new war. God grant that it may be confined to the Balkans." Serbia, which had been enlarged to double its size, was far from being satisfied; but, on the contrary, was more than ever ambitious of becoming a great Power.

Apparently the situation was still quiet. In fact, a few weeks before the catastrophe at Sarajevo the prevailing state of affairs showed almost an improvement in the relations between Vienna and Belgrade. But it was the calm before the storm. On June 28th the veil was rent asunder and from one moment to the next a catastrophe threatened the world. The stone had started rolling.

At that time I was Ambassador to Rumania. I was therefore only able from a distance to watch developments in Vienna and Berlin. Subsequently, however, I discussed events in those critical days with numerous leading personalities, and from all that I heard have been able to form a definite and clear view of the proceedings. I have no doubt whatever that Berchtold, even in his dreams, had never thought of a world war of such dimensions as it assumed ; that he, above all, was persuaded that England would remain neutral ; and the German Ambassador, Tschirsky, confirmed him in the conviction that a war against France and Russia would inevitably end in victory. I believe that the state of mind in which Count Berchtold addressed the ultimatum to Serbia was such that he said to himself, either — and this is the most favorable view — Serbia will accept the ultimatum, which would mean a great diplomatic success; or she will refuse it, and then, thanks to Germany's help, the victorious war against Russia and France will effect the birth of a new and vastly stronger monarchy. It cannot for a moment be denied that this argument contained a series of errors ; but it must be stated that, according to my convictions. Count Berchtold did not intend to incite war by the ultimatum, but hoped to the very last to gain the victory by the pen, and that in the German promises he saw a guarantee against a war in which the participators and the chances of victory were equally erroneously estimated.

Berchtold could not have entertained any doubt that a Serbian war would bring a Russian one in its train. At any rate, the reports sent by my brother, who was a business man in Petersburg, left him in no doubt on the matter.

Serbia's acceptance of the ultimatum was only partial, and the Serbian war broke out. Russia armed and joined in. But at this moment extremely important events took place.

On July 30th, at midday, Tschirsky spoke in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and communicated to Berchtold the contents of a telegram received from Lichnowsky. This important telegram contained the following: He (Lichnowsky) had just returned from seeing Grey, who was very grave, but perfectly collected, though pointing out that the situation was becoming more and more complicated. Sassonoff had intimated that after the declaration of war he was no longer in a position to negotiate direct with Austria-Hungary, and requested England to resume proceedings, the temporary cessation of hostilities to be taken for granted. Grey proposed a negotiation between four, as it appeared possible to him (Grey) that Austria-Hungary, after occupying Belgrade, would state her terms.

To this Grey added a private comment, calling Lichnowsky's attention to the fact that a war between Russia and Austria-Hungary would facilitate England's neutrality, but that the conditions would inevitably change in the event of Germany and France being involved. Public opinion in England, which after the assassination was very favorable to Austria, was now beginning to fluctuate, as it was difficult to understand Austria's obstinacy.

Lichnowsky also added that Grey had told the Italian Ambassador that he thought Austria would receive every satisfaction on accepting negotiation. In any case the Serbians would be punished. Even without a war Austria would receive a guaranty for the future.

Such were the contents of the communication sent from London by Tschirsky, to which Bethmann added that he urgently requested the Vienna Cabinet to lo' IN THE WORLD WAR

accept the negotiation. On receiving this information, Berchtold conveyed the news to the Emperor. His position was this : that Russia was already at war with the Monarchy on the evening of the same day on which the order for general mobilization was to be submitted to the Emperor, and it appeared doubtful to him whether a postponement of their own mobilization would be possible in view of the Russian attack. He had also to take into consideration the different parties prevailing in Russia, and no guaranty was obtainable that those who were in favor of negotiation would gain the day. Any postponement of mobilization might in this case lead to incalculable military consequences. Obviously hostilities had begun without the knowledge and against the wishes of the Tsar; if they were also to be carried on against his wish, then Austria-Hungary would be too late.

I have never discussed this phase with Berchtold, but the material placed at my disposal leaves no doubt that he felt bound to inquire into this side of the question and then leave the decision to the Emperor Francis Joseph.

On the following day, July 31st, therefore, Tschirsky, at the Ballplatz, communicated the contents of a telegram from King George to Prince Henry of Prussia. It ran as follows :

Thanks for telegram. So pleased to hear of William's efforts to concert with Nicky to maintain peace. Indeed, I am earnestly desirous that such an irreparable disaster as a European war should be averted. My government is doing its utmost, suggesting to Russia and France to suspend further military preparations if Austria will consent to be satisfied with occupation of Belgrade and the neighboring Serbian territory as a hostage for satisfactory settlement of her demands, other countries meanwhile suspending their war preparations. Trust William will use his great influence to induce Austria to accept his proposal, thus proving that Germany and England are working together to prevent what would be an inter-

INTRODUCTORY REFLECTIONS ii

national catastrophe. Pray assure William I am doing and shall continue to do all that lies in my power to preserve peace of Europe.

George.

Both the telegrams cited were received in Vienna on July 3 ist, subject to certain military precautions, a proceeding that did not satisfy London.

In London, as in Berlin, an effort was made to confine the conflict to Serbia. Berchtold did the same. In Russia there was a strong party working hard to enforce war at any price. The Russian invasion was a fact, and in Vienna it was thought unwise to stop mobilization at the last moment for fear of being too late with defense. Some ambassadors did not keep to the instructions from their governments; they communicated messages correctly enough, but if their personal opinion differed they made no secret of it, and it certainly weighed in the balance.

This added to the insecurity and confusion. Berchtold vacillated, torn hither and thither by different influences. It was a question of hours merely; but they passed by and were not made use of, and disaster was the result.

Russia had created strained conditions which brought on the World War.

Some months after the outbreak of war I had a long conversation on all these questions with the Hungarian Prime Minister, Count Stephen Tisza. He was decidedly opposed to the severe ultimatum, as he foresaw a war and did not wish for it. It is one of the most widely spread errors to stigmatize Tisza to-day as one of the instigators of the war. He was opposed to it, not from a general pacifist tendency, but because, in his opinion, an efficiently pursued policy of alliance would in a few years considerably strengthen the powers of the Monarchy. He particularly returned to the subject of Bulgaria, which then was still neutral and whose support he had hoped to gain before we went to war. I also obtained from Tisza several details concerning the activities of the German government as displayed by the German Ambassador immediately preceding the war. I purposely made a distinction between the German government and German diplomacy, as I am under the impression that Herr von Tschirsky had taken various steps without being instructed so to do, and when I previously have alluded to the fact that not all the ambassadors made use of the language enjoined by their governments, I was alluding specially to Herr von Tschirsky, whose whole temperament and feelings led him to interfere in our affairs with a certain vehemence and not always in the most tactful way, thus rousing the Monarchy out of its lethargy.

There is no doubt whatever that all Herr von Tschirsky 's private speeches at this time were attuned to the tone of *'Now or Never," and it is certain that the German Ambassador declared his opinion to be ''that at the present moment Germany was prepared to support our point of view with all her moral and military power, but whether this would prove to be the case in future if we accepted the Serbian rebuff appears to me doubtful." I believe that Tschirsky in particular was firmly persuaded that in the very near future Germany would have to go through a war against France and Russia, and he considered that the year 19 14 would be more favorable than a later date. For this reason, because first of all he did not believe in the fighting capacity of either Russia or France, and secondly because — and this is a very important point — he was convinced that he could bring the Monarchy into this war ; while it appeared doubtful to him that the aged and peace-loving Emperor Francis Joseph would draw the sword for Germany on any other occasion where the action would center less round him, he wished to make use of the Serbian episode so as to be sure of Austria- Hungary in the deciding struggle. That, however, was his policy, and not Bethmann's.

This, I repeat, is the impression produced on me by lengthy conversations with Count Tisza — impressions which have been confirmed from other sources. I am persuaded, however, that Tschirsky, in behaving as he did, widely overstretched his prescribed sphere of activity. Iswolsky was not the only one of his kind. I conclude this to be so, since Tschirsky, as intimated in a former despatch, was never in a position to make an official declaration urging for war, but appears only to have spoken after the manner of diplomatic representatives when anxious to adapt the policy of their government to their own point of view. Undoubtedly Tschirsky transmitted his instructions correctly and loyally, nor did he keep back or secrete anything. An ambassador attains more or less according to the energy expended by him in carrying out the instructions of his government; and the private opinion of the ambassador is, under certain circumstances, not easy to distinguish from his official one. At all events, the latter will be influenced by the former, and Tschirsky's private opinion aimed at a more vigorous policy.

In complete ignorance of impending events, I had arrived at Steiermark a few days before the ultimatum in order to establish my family there for the summer. While there I received a message from Berchtold to return to my post as quickly as possible. I obeyed at once, but before leaving had one more audience with the Emperor Francis Joseph at Ischl. I foimd the Emperor extremely depressed. He alluded quite briefly to the coming events, and merely asked me if, in case of a war, I could guarantee Rumania's neutraHty. I answered in the affirmative, so long as King Carol was alive; beyond that any guaranty was impossible.

Ill

Certain extremely important details relating to the time immediately preceding the outbreak of war can only be attributed to the influence of the group represented by Tschirsky. It is incomprehensible why we granted to our then allies, Italy and Rumania, facilities for playing the part of seceders by presenting them with an ultimatum before action was completed, instead of winning them over and involving them also.

I am no accurate judge of the events in Rome, but King Carol in Rumania had certainly tried everything to induce Serbia to yield. In all probability he would not have succeeded, as Serbia had no idea of renouncing her plans for a Greater Serbia; but presumably an anxious feeling would have arisen between Bukharest and Belgrade, which would strongly have influenced further Rumanian policy in our favor.

Bukharest has made enormous capital out of the diplomatic proceedings.

Before the first decisive Cabinet Council Baron Fasciotti, the Italian Ambassador, harangued all the members in this spirit, and declared that the situation in Rumania and Italy was similar, and in each case there was no reason for co-operation, as neither Rome not Bukharest had previously com^e to an understanding regarding the ultimatum. His efforts were crowned with success.

On August I, 1 9 14, I sent the following telegram to Berchtold :

The Prime Minister has just notified me the result of the Cabinet Council. After a warm appeal from the King to bring the treaty into force, the Cabinet Council, with one exception, declared that no party could undertake the responsibility of such action.

The Cabinet Council has resolved that as Rumania was neither notified nor consulted concerning the Austro-Hungarian action in Belgrade no casus feeder is exists. The Cabinet Council further resolved that military preparations for the safety of the frontier be undertaken, which would be an advantage for the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, as several hundred miles of its frontiers would thereby be covered.

The Prime Minister added that he had already given orders to strengthen all military posts, after which by degrees general mobilization would follow.

The government intends only to publish a short communique relating to the military measures taken for the safety of the country.

Secondly, it appears incomprehensible why the ultimatum was drawn up as it was. It was not so much a manifestation of Berchtold's wish for war as of other influences, above all that of Tschirsky. In 1870 Bismarck also desired war, but the Ems telegram was of quite a different character.

In the present case it appears incomprehensible why a note should have been selected which by its wording gave umbrage to many who hitherto were favorably disposed toward us.

Had we, before the ultimatum and after the assassination, secretly and confidentially furnished proofs to the great Powers who were not inimical to us, and especially to England, that trouble was impending over a political murder staged at Belgrade, we should have evoked a very different frame of mind in those governments. Instead, we flung the ultimatum at them and at the whole of Europe.

It was feared probably at the Ballplatz that any communication to the Powers would result in their intervention in the form of a new conference of ambassadors, and that stagnation would ensue. But in the year 1914 the case was very different from former days i6 IN THE WORLt) WAR

—before the ultimatum right was so undoubtedly OH our side.

At all events, the Tschirsky group dreaded such an insipid solution, and had insisted, therefore, on drastic action. In 1 8 70 Bismarck was the attacking party, and he succeeded in interchanging the parts. We also succeeded, but in an^opposite sense.

IV

Then came our greatest disaster — the German entry into Belgium.

Had England remained neutral we should not have lost the war. In his book, Ursachen und Ausbruck des Krieges, page 172, Jagow tells howon August 4th, toward the close of the Reichstag session, the English Ambassador appeared there and again asked whether Germany would respect Belgium's neutrality. At that time German troops were already on Belgian soil. On hearing that, the Ambassador retired, but, returning in a few hours, demanded a declaration, to be handed in before midnight, that the further advance of the German troops into Belgium would cease, otherwise he was instructed to ask for his passport and England would then protect Belgium. Germany refused, and the consequence was a declaration of war by England.

That England on the same day sent word to Belgium that she would resist with her utmost strength any violation of her neutrality is fully in accordance with the steps taken at Berlin by the English Ambassador.

Two days before, on August 2d, the English Cabinet certainly gave France the assurance that, in addition to the protection of Belgian neutrality, she had demanded that there should be no naval action against France. The contradiction between both points of view is clearly visible. It appears to me, however, that the only explanation is that on August 4th England no longer adhered to her standpoint of August 2d, for the German acceptance of the English ultimatum on the evening of August 4th had wrested from England the moral possibility of making further claims. If England, on August 4th, had sought a pretext for war, she would have put forward, besides the Belgian demand, also that referring to the abstention from naval action. But she did not do so, and confined her ultimatum to the Belgian question, thereby tying her own hands in the event of Germany accepting the ultimatum. On the night of August 4th, between the hours of nine and midnight, the decision as to whether England would remain neutral or no lay with Germany.

Germany kept to her resolve to violate Belgian neutrality in spite of the certainty of the English declaration of war resulting therefrom. That was the first fateful victory of the militarists over the diplomats in this war. The former were naturally the motive power.

The German military plan was to overrun France and then make a furious onslaught on Russia. This plan was shattered on the Marne.

In more respects than one, German policy foimdered on the heritage left by Bismarck. Not only was the conquest of Alsace-Lorraine a lasting obstacle to friendly relations with France, perpetually forcing the latter into the arms of every anti-German coalition, but Bismarck's heritage became Germany's curse, because the Germans, though desirous of following in his footsteps, had no one sufficiently competent to lead them therein.

Bismarck created the German Empire out of Diippel, Koniggratz, and Sedan. His policy was one of ''blood and iron" — and for fifty years that policy of violence and violent means had been ingrained in the mind of every German school-boy as the gospel of diplomatic art — but Bismarck was not able to bequeath to the German people his genial efficiency, wisdom, and prudence in the use of his violent means. Bismarck carefully prepared the wars of 1866 and 1870, and struck when he held good cards in his hands. The Germany of William II had no desire for war, but one day plunged headlong into it, and during the first week had already created political situations which were beyond her power to cope with. Belgium and Luxemburg were treated on the Bismarckian principle of *' might before right," and the world rose against Germany. I say world, because England's power extended over the world.

At the beginning of the war England stood at "order arms." It would have been entirely true to her traditional poHcy to allow Germany to fight against France and Russia and mutually weaken one another, then at a given moment to intervene and enjoin peace. England was forced to join in by Germany threatening to establish herself in Belgium. How far the German invasion of Belgium can morally be extenuated owing to a French purpose to do likewise has still not been made clear — but this argument does not apply to Luxemburg, and the breach of right remains the same whether the country where it occurs be large or small.

The invasion of Belgium and Luxemburg was a stroke of the Bismarckian policy of violence, not carried out by politicians, but by generals, though they were devoid of Bismarck's power of calculating the devastating consequences.

Later on, during the course of the war, the German Supreme Command made repeated use of violent means, which were more detrimental than useful to us, though subsequently these means were morally justifiable and comprehensible; in fact, were directly forced on us, seeing that Germany was fighting for her existence, and her adversaries, who would not come to an understanding, left her no choice of means. The use of noxious gas, aerial attacks on open towns, and the Uboat war were means used in desperation against a merciless enemy, who left women and children to die of starvation and declared day by day that Germany must be annihilated.