Some personal impressions

Contents

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Introduction vii

I. Monsieur Poincare 3

Introduction

BY VISCOUNT BRYCE

THIS book should need no introduction, for all who have tried to follow the course of events in the Danubian States and Balkan States during the last few years cannot but know the name and fame of Mr. Take Jonescu, one of the most active and gifted, as well as one of the most highly cultivated statesmen in Eastern Europe. However, at the request of its author, whose acquaintance I had the good fortune to make when travelling in Roumania fourteen years ago, I willingly write a few sentences of Preface to this English translation. The French original (for Mr. Jonescu writes French with singular facility, clearness, and grace) has already found many readers, and this version deserves to win for it a still larger circle here and in America.

Those of us who in France and the Englishspeaking countries have grown familiar with the names of the more prominent actors in the great and gloomy drama of the last ten or twelve years, must have often wished to know something of viii INTRODUCTION

the personalities that lay behind the names. What were their talents, their characters, their manners ? What were the ideas and motives which prompted either their avowed purposes or their secret aims ? In some cases these motives may long remain obscure, but in others the recorded words and acts are sufficient to enable those who were in close touch with them to form a just estimate and present to us true portraits, provided always that such observers bring discernment and impartiality to the task. The book is modestly entitled " Some Personal Impressions " ; and the descriptions it contains are for the most part vigorous sketches rather than portraits. Some, however, may be called vignettes, more or less finished drawings, each consisting of few lines, but those lines sharply and firmly drawn. Intermingled with this score of personal sketches there are also a few brief essays or articles which set before us particular scenes, little fragments of history in which the author bore a part, all relating to the persons who either figured in the war, or were concerned with the intrigues from which it sprang. Among these we find several German statesmen — Kiderlin Waechter, Prince Biilow, Prince Lichnowsky and a large number of Austrians, among whom Counts Berchtold, Aehrenthal, Goluchowsky, Czernin and Mensdorff, are the best known ; the late King

INTRODUCTION ix

Charles of Roumania, the German Emperor, Eleutherios Venizelos, and, lastly, the most ruthless and unscrupulous ruffian (with the possible exception of Trotsky) whom the war has brought to light, the Turkish Talaat Pasha.

These, with some minor personages, make an interesting gallery, for though most of them are dealt with very briefly — sometimes merely by telling an anecdote or reporting a single conversation — still in every case a distinct impression is conveyed. We feel that the man described is no longer a name but a creature of flesh and blood, with something by which we can recognise him and remember him for future use. National characteristics are lightly but brightly touched. Among the Germans, Kiderlin Waechter stands out as in Mr. Jonescu's judgment the ablest, and Biilow the cleverest. If the Austrian statesmen are, or were, what he paints them (and there seems no reason to doubt the general justice of his observations), the hideous failure of their diplomacy becomes comprehensible. A dynasty guided by such servants was fated to perish in the storm its folly had raised. Aehrenthal and Tisza were at least men of force and ability, but an ability which did not exclude bad principles and rash unwisdom. The rest were mostly ciphers ; while of Count Berchtold, the description given by Mr. Jonescu successfully conveys x INTRODUCTION

to the reader that there was nothing to describe, at least on the intellectual side. One may pity the people which was guided by such statesmen, for they were not its choice, but one cannot pity the dynasty which did choose them. It well deserved to perish, after three centuries of pernicious power.

Besides the illuminative glimpses of curious scenes, and the vivacious sketches of notable personages, which these pages contain, the reader will find in them some contributions to history of permanent interest. We are helped to apprehend the views, and comprehend what is now called the " mentality " with which the ruling caste in Germany entered the war. It has been often said of late that the men in whose hands great decisions lay were not great enough for the fateful issues they had to decide. Quantula sapientia regitur mundus seems even truer now than it did in the days of Oxenstierna. Among all the " Impressions " this book records, that is the one which stands out conspicuous.

Monsieur Poincare

MONSIEUR POINCARE

ON New Year's Eve, 1913, I arrived in Paris. I was on my way to London, where the Balkan Conference was then sitting. Negotiations between the Turks and the Balkan States had come to a deadlock, and I hoped to profit by this to the extent of coming to some pacific settlement of our territorial differences with Bulgaria. It was my intention to offer the support of Roumania to Bulgaria, which at that date meant the Balkan league, and if necessary to promise military assistance in order to force the Turk to give up Adrianople.

The Powers had no notion what to do. It was felt that there was little chance of mere collective notes having any success, and as for a naval demonstration, which alone could have saved the face of Kiamil's government, the Powers were too jealous and distrustful of each other to act together in this way. On the other hand it was certain that the armed resistance of Turkey was shattered and that to force her hand would really be doing her a kindness. If only it had been done then, Turkey would have escaped Enver and her present misfortunes.

It is useless to repeat what I have so often said that the idea of a war with Bulgaria, and possibly with all the Balkan States — our traditional friends — was utterly repugnant to me. It was even possible that such a war might bring about the expected European conflagration, in which we should find ourselves on the side of Austria-Hungary, a prospect that was altogether odious to me, for in it I saw the grave of our future and of our national ideal.

I hoped the Bulgars would appreciate the situation and would hasten to accept my suggestions. If only they had done so, peace with Turkey would have been signed in the first week of January, 1913, the second Balkan war would probably not have taken place, and the European war would have been averted for an indefinite number of years.

Although my hopes of arriving at an understanding with Bulgaria were high, I took the possibility of failure into consideration and realised that I might want the friendly support of the Great Powers. This was why, before leaving Bucharest, I intimated to Monsieur Poincare, then Prime Minister of France, that I was about to visit him.

II

M. Poincare received me on the 1st of January, 1913, at half- past eight in the morning, an hour that in Paris is certainly an absurd time for an appointment, but I had to go to London in the afternoon, and on account of its being New

MONSIEUR POINCARE 5

Year's Day, Monsieur Poincare was due at the Elysee at ten o'clock for the official ceremonies.

I asked Monsieur Poincare for the support of France in our difficulties with Bulgaria. He made the warmest declarations of friendship for Roumania ; promised me his own personal co-operation, but said, " My action is naturally limited by the fact that relations with our ally are most cordial while, owing to your military convention with Austria and Germany, you will be in the enemy's camp if war breaks out. You know well," and he could not have spoken with greater sincerity, " that we do not want war, and are doing everything to avoid it. But if our adversaries force us to go to war the fact that your 300,000 rifles are on their side cannot be a matter of indifference to us."

As the Treaty between Roumania and the Triple Alliance was supposed to be kept secret I had to pretend that I knew nothing about the obligation he was alluding to.

The French Prime Minister, who knew the situation precisely, then asked me if I could assure him that in the event of war — a war that France would never provoke — he could hope that France and her allies would not find the Roumanian army against them.

Personally I had not believed for many years that the Roumanians and Magyars would ever fight side by side, but on the 1st of January, 1913, it was impossible for me to make any valid promise in Roumania's name.

I could only tell Monsieur Poincare that I could not give him an answer, but that if I were in his place I should grant Roumania as much help as was compatible with my alliances and my obligations, and leave it to the future to show whether I had acted wisely or not.

Ill

The events of 1913 confirmed my beliefs. With great clearness I saw that the idea of shedding Roumanian blood to glorify Magyarism was such an absurdity that no one on earth could give effect to it.

On the 9th of September, 1913, I paid Monsieur Poincare another visit. He was then President of the Republic. He congratulated me on the success of Roumania, and I took occasion to say, "On New Year's Day you asked me a question which I could not then answer ; I will give you your answer to-day. If war does break out — and I devoutly hope humanity may be spared such a calamity — you will not find the Roumanian army in your enemies' camp."

" Have you cancelled the treaty of alliance ? " he asked.

" I know nothing about any treaty. All I know is that the Roumanian army will not be in your enemies' camp. I am quite certain about it, and if I did not know that we are both believers in peace and are doing all we can to preserve it, I should say that events will prove me right. Let us hope that they may never have occasion to do so."

MONSIEUR POINCARE 7

" But are you sure to remain long in power? " he asked.

" Far from it, I shall be out of office in two months, but that doesn't matter. What I am telling you is true, irrespective of what ministers compose the government. After what has happened this summer no one will be able to make Roumanians fight against their will or against the dictates of national honour and interest."

.

II

TWENTY years ago Prince Lichnowsky was Secretary to the German Legation in Bucharest.

I knew him in those days as an intelligent young man, gay, witty and a real grand seigneur. Though a German Diplomat he was Polish by origin and had all the adaptability, vivacity and brilliance of his race. We got on admirably.

I did not see him again until early in January, 1913, when I went to London to try and come to an understanding with Monsieur Daneff over Bulgar-Roumanian difficulties.

Prince Lichnowsky had come back into the Diplomatic Service after a very long absence. He had only done so at the reiterated request of the Kaiser, who believed him to be the only man capable of succeeding Baron Marschall in London, Baron Marschall at that time having the reputation of being the ablest diplomat in the German service. I may as well say here that in spite of his ability Marschall had not been much of a success in England. He had lived too long in Constantinople to make a good Ambassador at

St. James's.

Prince Lichnowsky took his task seriously. He spared himself no trouble to win people's confidence, and in a short time had accomplished marvels in this direction. He was extremely frank, and his clear picturesque way of talking impressed people. It was he who, in speaking to me of the two little bits of Bulgar territory that jutted out into our Dobrudja, which Daneff was at the time offering me as a complete satisfaction for our claims, contemptuously described them as " the two dugs of the bitch."

I will not now describe rny interviews with Lichnowsky in 1913. I must admit, however, he was more than friendly and kind, and did me real services. He went so far even without waiting for the sanction of his Government as to make a proposal favourable to us at the Balkan Conference then sitting in London. I shall have something to say about all this another time.

I must, however, mention two points relating to that moment. One day Lichnowsky assured me that the relations between England and Germany were excellent. The next day Sir E. Grey said to me, " If Prince Lichnowsky makes the proposal you speak of I shall receive it most favourably, as I do everything that comes from the German Ambassador. We are on excellent terms."

This was really remarkable when one thinks of the then recent Agadir crisis. I came to the conclusion that there was no danger of European war, and on the 7th of January, 1913, I wrote to King Charles that I was positive the great war would not break out yet awhile.

At that same time Lichnowsky said to me, " We will do what we can for you, but our means are limited. You should really apply to Vienna, as Austria can do a good deal at Sofia if she wishes to. I am sure there is something brewing between Austria and Bulgaria. I don't know exactly what it is, but something is going on."

In the spring of 1914 I was again in London for six days. Prince Lichnowsky gave a luncheon in my honour. All the Embassy staff were there, including the notorious Kiihlman, then Councillor of the Embassy, now Minister at the Hague, who at that time was unfortunately corresponding with the Kaiser over the head of Lichnowsky and was giving false information to Berlin as to the state of affairs in England.

I asked Lichnowsky how matters stood between England and Germany, and if he was as pleased with things as he had been in January, 1913. He replied that he had succeeded in his efforts, and that Germany and Great Britain were on the best of terms.

" I told the Kaiser," he said, " that nothing could be easier for us than to keep up good relations with England — because England genuinely cares for peace. But in order to do this we should never attack or annoy France, because in that case England would back her to the last man and the last shilling, and, as it is not to our interest to irritate France, you see that our relations with England will remain of the best."

My impressions accorded with those of the German Ambassador. I felt that England would not tolerate an attack on France, but putting that aside it was certain that in London the desire was to be on good terms with Germany. In that one saw the guarantee of peace.

On July the 12th, 1914, I again arrived in London. I saw Lichnowsky and discussed the Albanian question with him, which had by then become disquieting, and also the silence of Austria as to what line she was going to take over the Serajevo drama. Lichnowsky felt that Austria had something up her sleeve. His Austrian colleague Count Mensdorff was uncommunicative. Lichnowsky had been in Berlin since the Serajevo assassination, and he was not pleased with what he had seen in the Wilhelmstrasse. " They are giving Austria a free hand," he said, " without thinking where it may lead us. I warned them, but I am not happy about it, and am beginning to regret that I did not stay in Berlin." Lichnowsky did not conceal the fact that Tchirsky, the German Ambassador at Vienna, was encouraging the bellicose tendency of Austria.

Lichnowsky's apprehensions were well grounded. The German Chancellor, Bethman Hollweg, had never been well up in questions of foreign politics — far from it. As for Von Jagow, I knew that at the time he was in Rome he had told one of his colleagues that in the Balkan incidents he saw the proof of the approaching disintegration of Austria-Hungary, and that it was a disturbing problem. With a fixed idea like that in his head it would be easy to make mistakes.

On Wednesday, July the 22nd, I dined with

Baroness Deichman, sister of Sir Maurice de Bunsen, British Ambassador in Vienna. The house was one of the social centres of London and lent itself most favourably to an Anglo- German understanding. I knew that I was to meet Lichnowsky, who had expressed a wish to talk to me that very day.

After dinner I went with Lichnowsky into a sitting-room in which there hung a fine portrait of Sir Maurice de Bunsen, painted, if I am not mistaken, by the great English artist, Herkomer.

Lichnowsky was in Court dress ; he was to see the King that evening. I do not know what the occasion was. He told me he had not yet succeeded in finding out the text of the demands Austria was making of Serbia, but that he had learnt enough to know that they would be very very harsh. He knew that amongst other things Austria had asked for the suppression of a nationalist society in Serbia, and that alone seemed to him to be going pretty far. He earnestly begged me to suggest to the Roumanian Government that they should use any influence they had at Belgrade to get the Austrian note, no matter what it was, accepted by Serbia. " I promise you," he said, " that in the carrying of it out, the Serbs can whittle it down or evade the conditions, and we can see to it that nothing is said. I take that on myself. We must get round this crisis somehow. For instance, the order to suppress a patriotic society need not really mean anything. In a few months they could resurrect it under another name."

I promised him to do what I could. That very night I telegraphed what the German Ambassador had communicated to me to Monsieur Bratiano, the then President of the Roumanian Council.

II

On Friday, July the 24th, the Austrian Ultimatum was published. In reading the Times I said to my wife, " This means European war ; we must get back to Roumania."

I went to see Lichnowsky in the morning. He was at the Foreign Office. I went to his house later and found him very much upset. Obviously the Austrian note had exceeded his expectations. He was, however, firmly convinced that there was no danger of war. He was sure that some way of preserving peace would be found. He told me with an ironic smile that he had been instructed to advocate to the English Cabinet the " localisation " of the question at issue between Serbia and Austria. He did not express his opinion of this folly, but it was evident that he thought it ridiculous. He was so certain of peace that he asked me if I were going direct to Aix-les-Bains from Brighton or whether I should return to London for one night. When I answered that it would depend on the political situation he said good-bye, being certain that I should go straight on to Aix from Brighton. He was so assured in bearing that I telegraphed to Paris and Aix to announce my arrival.

At Brighton in the afternoon of Saturday and again on Sunday I received communications from London that shewed me that Lichnowsky was deceiving himself and that Tchirsky, the German Ambassador at Vienna, was pushing Austria on to take up an overbearing attitude. I telegraphed to my friend Mishu, Roumanian Minister in London, asking him to book places for me in the Ostend Express for Tuesday morning the 28th of July, and I informed my brother at Aix-les-Bains that I had given up my journey thither.

I returned to London on Monday morning the 27th July. From the station where my friend Mishu met me I went straight to Prince Lichnowsky and told him of my agitation and of my decision to go back to Roumania. He told me I was wrong, that there was no possibility of war, not a hundred to one chance of it ; that in my place he would stay on in London because it would be so tiresome to go from London to Aix-les-Bains via Bucharest. Insisting on the danger of war, I said, " It is all the more serious — because we must not delude ourselves as to the attitude of England. In spite of the pacifism of its Government, England will certainly come in."

Lichnowsky, forgetting what he had said to me in the spring, said, " Of that I am not so sure as you are." " You are wrong," I said. " I know the English. No-one in the world will be able to prevent them mixing themselves up in a war provoked with so much injustice. If you believe the contrary you are profoundly mistaken."

He went on repeating that it might be possible, but that he was not so sure of England's coming in as I was. That is the one weakness that I found in Lichnowsky's judgment at that time. Of course like a great many other people he had been blinded by the Irish question.

I followed Lichnowsky's advice. I gave up my tickets for Tuesday the 28th, but being more distrustful than the German Ambassador I took places on the express for the following day, Wednesday the 29th. It turned out to be the last through train.

On the morning of Tuesday the 28th, when I saw Lichnowsky, he was a changed man. He had begun to lose confidence. He only saw a seven to three chance of peace, and although he assured me of his hope that humanity would be spared such a nameless folly, he said, " Go back to Roumania. There are none too many good brains about; don't deprive your country of yours. I hope you will soon come back, but I understand your going."

I saw him for the last time in the afternoon of Tuesday the 28th. He was pale — a man undone. He told me the peace of the world hung by a thread. I have seldom seen anyone so overcome.

I had a profound conviction that this man was sincere, that he had genuinely worked for peace, that he had served his country with all his strength, and that for all the calamities unchained by the black executioner of Budapesth and the criminals of Berlin he deserves no blame.

I hope Prince Lichnowsky, for whose confidence and friendship I am grateful, will forgive me for witnessing to history in such detail. The day will come when the German people — once more sober — will remember that their true servants are those who did their best to save their country from the torrent of universal hate unloosed against it by this war — a war naked of all excuse.

Count Berchtold

Ill

COUNT BERCHTOLD

I HAVE only had two political conversations with Count Berchtold during my life, but they were enough to enable me to take the measure of the man. After each of them I wondered to myself how it was possible that such a person could be Minister of Foreign Affairs to a Great Power. The phenomenon was explained to me by a Viennese journalist. " In our country it is necessary for a Count to succeed a Count." I state this for what it is worth, but I have never succeeded in finding a better reason.

Count Berchtold is a fine-looking man, if one admires that type of person. Gentlemanly, extremely gentlemanly, with good manners — and that is all there is to him. I should have nothing to add if I wanted to paint his portrait.

I was motoring in Northern Italy when Count Berchtold went to Sinaia in September, 1912, to pay a visit to King Charles. A telegram from Sinaia caught me at Venice. In it a friend informed me that it was considered advisable that I should stop at Vienna on my way home and see Count Berchtold. I understood this to mean that King Charles thought a change in the

Austrian Government imminent and that he wished me to be in personal touch with the new director of Austrian policy. I acquainted Count Berchtold with my wish to visit him, and he came in from the country to Vienna in order to receive me.

We chatted for an hour. He tried to explain to me his notorious circular on the decentralisation of the Ottoman Empire — the circular that precipitated the outbreak of the Balkan War. I could make nothing of it. He complained that his intentions had been misunderstood everywhere. He laid himself out to reveal them to me, but again I did not understand him any the better. Was the business too intricate, or was I too limited ? I don't really know.

Speaking to him of the ticklish condition of Balkan Affairs, I said, " If you can keep the peace for another couple of months the situation will be saved. Mountain wars are not undertaken after November." " Why should the peace be kept for two months only ? I am sure that peace is in no way threatened in the Balkans. You can be certain of that," he replied confidently. Did he want to mystify me or did he not know the real situation ?

In the course of conversation I spoke of the folly of competitive naval armaments and asked why Austria too should be travelling down the same road. " Why," I asked, " do you want a big fleet ? You have no Colonies ; you never will have any Colonies, and your oversea trade will never be of much importance. What good

COUNT BERCHTOLD 25

is a fleet to you ? If you are seeking security against Italy you are committing a fundamental error. You will never be able to fight Italy on the sea, not only because she will always be your superior, but also because, in the event of such a conflict, she would be the ally of France and England, and your Dreadnoughts would never even put to sea. If, on the other hand, you expect to be on Italy's side she will not need your fleet. She would prefer to increase her own. Besides," I added, " I don't understand what Germany is up to either," and thereupon I repeated to him what I had said to Kiderlen-Waechter in Berlin some ten months previously.

In reply Count Berchtold explained to me what I had already suspected, — that the increase of the Austrian Navy had been demanded by Germany, and that the day was coming when the Austro-German Fleets would have a real superiority over the English Fleet. He recognised that England could always build more ships than the two Teutonic Empires, but he was sure that she would soon be short of crews. " With their system of voluntary enlistment the supply of recruits will soon fail, whereas we with our compulsory service can always get as many men as we want. Then we could attack and destroy England."

I listened with amazement to this Minister of a Great Power. He did not seem to realise that the day England found she could not get enough volunteers for her Navy, that day she would introduce compulsory service, but that she never could allow herself to be outclassed by Germany at sea.

II

The second time I saw Count Berchtold was on the 11th or 12th of September, 1913. I am not quite sure of the day. I rather think, however, it was the 11th. He began by making most ample apologies both on his own account and on that of Count Tisza for an incident that had recently occurred at Deva, when the small Roumanian flags on my wife's motor had been torn off by Hungarian police. We then spoke of the great political crisis we had just been through. He told me he had been much criticised and had been accused of not having protected the rights and position of Austria-Hungary. I replied — in accordance with my genuine conviction — that even if it were really true that the designs on Salonika attributed to Austria were but a calumny, Austria had lost nothing through the Balkan crisis, that even her caprices had been satisfied, and that therefore she had absolutely no cause for grievance. I added that he could, if he would, establish good relations with Serbia, more especially as for at least fifteen or twenty years to come the Serbians would be more than busy with their newly acquired territory. I assured him that this was the genuine belief of Monsieur Pasitch, and that if Austria would but show herself a little less hostile everything would once more go smoothly.

COUNT BERCHTOLD 27

We talked, too, of Albania, which he looked upon as his own creation, and seemed surprised that I knew the Albanians and Albanian affairs as well as I did. I must own that on this subject he was very well informed, but all the same he seemed to me completely deluded. For example, he told me that at that moment law and order in Albania was better assured than in any other country in Europe !