The Liberal Republican movement

Preface

This study was prepared in 19 15 as a doctoral dissertation in the Graduate School of Cornell University. The aim has been to contribute something to the history of political parties and of party government by tracing the development of a movement that came at a time of readjustment in both party issues and party organization. The investigation of a nation-wide movement, the sources of which are to be found in the local party organizations, involves many complexities and frequent opportunities for error. The years 1 873-1 876, in particular, have presented a tangle of party interests from which it has been most difficult to ravel the Liberal thread. Much assistance has been derived from monographs on the political history of the individual states during the Reconstruction era, and in this connection special mention should be made of the studies prepared under the master guidance of Professor W. A. Dunning, of Columbia University.

The writer has endeavored very consciously and, he trusts, very concientiously to avoid the besetting sin of monograph writers, that of exaggerating the importance of their problems. He has nevertheless been convinced, as a result of his investigation, that the Liberal Republican Movement was something more than a mere " spasm of political enthusiasm of the negative character' ' which " passed away as quickly as it came," as a writer on political parties has characterized it. 1

Grateful acknowledgments are made to the Cornell University Library, to the Harvard University Library, to the Library of Congress, to the State Historical Society of

1 S. D. Fess, History of Political Theory and Party Organization in the United States, 253.

vii

Vlll PREFACE

Wisconsin, to the Minnesota Historical Society, to the State Historical Society of Missouri at Columbia, to the Missouri Historical Society at St. Louis, to the Iowa State Library at Des Moines, to the New York State Library at Albany, to the New York Public Library, and to the Boston Public Library.

The investigation has been carried on under the direction of Professor Charles H. Hull, of Cornell University, who has been throughout a patient, understanding, and undictatorial counselor. My indebtedness to him is too great to be expressed adequately in any formal acknowledgement. Professor Julian P. Bretz, of Cornell University, has rendered most generous and effective service in the critical reading of the manuscript. Both the manuscript and the proof have profited greatly by the careful readings of my wife.

E. D. R.

Illinois Wesleyan University,

Bloomington, Illinois.

December, 1918.

Contents

Chapter Page

I. Origin of the Liberal Faction in the Union Republican Party.

Introduction I

Chapter I Origin Of The Liberal Faction In The Union Republican Party

The Civil War, which tried so severely all of the institutions of the American Nation, created an anomalous situation in the party system. The Republicans had arisen and come into power as a distinctly sectional party. The Democratic organization, held together almost to the last by its politicians, had been forced asunder by the sectional conflict. The northern Democrats then divided among themselves. One portion supported the administration for the time being, and the rest maintained a moderate or extreme opposition. During the war the administration Unionists and the opposition Democrats completely filled the political field; the all-dominating issue of the preservation of the Union left no room for the activities of third parties.

Reconstruction inevitably brought readjustment in party organizations and issues. The chief problems of the Democracy, discredited by their connection with the war, were to regain the country's confidence and to secure positive, forward-looking issues. The Republicans, despite their seeming security, had the grave tasks of becoming a genuinely national party and of amalgamating the diverse elements that during the war had rallied under the party's banner. The composition of the Union party, 1 at first a

1 See Dunning, "The Second Birth of the Republican Party," American Historical Review, XVI, 56 ff.; Greene, "Some Aspects of Politics in the Middle West, " Proceedings of the Wisconsin Historical Society for iqi j, 60 ff.; Julian, Political Recollections, 330.

source of power, was now becoming a cause of instability. While national integrity was at stake differences over other issues had been suppressed, but with the cessation of war old-time constitutional views reasserted themselves. The inevitable result was a disintegration of the party. There was a pronounced difference of opinion between the extreme or "radical" nationalists and the moderates or "conservatives" as to the conditions and method of restoration of the seceded states. Although Johnson's "National Union" movement of 1866 failed in its immediate aims, it forced the two factions of the Union Republican party into a struggle which was renewed with increasing bitterness in the impeachment contest and culminated in 1872 in open rupture. 2 For the time being, the Republicans were united in support of the war amendments; but it was becoming evident that all attempts to continue extreme restrictive and punitive policies would meet with an active opposition within their ranks. Furthermore the Republicans were suffering from the demoralizing effects of an impotent opposition. Their party had not been kept on its mettle. Internal dissension was one of the consequences and by 1869 several of the state organizations were weakened by bitter factional contests. 3

The political situation in the Reconstruction era was further complicated by economic and social problems. Governmental abuses, long tolerated or condoned, were now being challenged and thus were coming within the cognizance of political parties. A reform influence was developing that threatened Republican unity almost as seriously as did contentious constitutional lawyers in Congress or factious politicians in the state organizations.

2 Johnston-Woodburn, American Political History, II, 585; De Witt, Impeachment of Andrew Johnson, 516 ff.; White, Trumbull, 286, 312-326; Salter, Grimes, 357-362; Schurz, Reminiscences, III, 292.

3 See, for instance, Julian, 302 f.; McClure, Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania, II, 203-217; Stebbins, Political History of New York, 412 f.; Dilla, Politics of Michigan, 99; Morehouse, Fell, 96-97.

In the late sixties there began, in the East and Middle West, the more or less definite activity of a group of reformers, composed largely of editors and scholars, who during the past decade had been for the greater part faithful supporters of the Republican party, but who from this time down to 1900, with some changes in personnel, endeavored to oppose abuses and secure reforms by concerted independent political action. In ability, in sincerity of purpose, and, all too often, in impracticability of method these men have a unique place in American history. But, although they were keenly alive to political and economic evils and honestly desirious of bringing about reformations, some of them at times seemed to be mere destructive critics. 4 Certain of their number, too, as their activity in the Liberal movement was to show, were speculative theorists, following unworkable theories, rather than efficient, pragmatical reformers. They remind us of Colonel Roosevelt's " people of means' ' who "will get together in a large hall, will vociferously demand 'reform,' as if it were some concrete substance which could be handed out to them in slices, and will then disband with a feeling of most serene self-satisfaction, and the belief that they have done their entire duty as citizens and members of the community." 5 Nor was their manner of appeal calculated to attract a wide following. Choate's characterization of Godkin's editorials as making virtue repellent was a pertinent criticism of many of these would-be reformers. In the East the views of this group were best voiced by Godkin in the Nation, Bryant and Godwin in the Evening Post, Ottendorfer in the Staats Zeitung, Bowles in the Springfield Republican, Arthur George Sedgwick in the Atlantic Monthly (1872- 1873), and a number of writers, especially the Adams brothers, D. A. Wells, and Edward Atkinson, in the North

4 See, for example, Rhodes' comment on Godkin in Historical Essays, 276.

5 Roosevelt, American Ideals (Standard Library Edition), 79.

American Review. In the Middle West the spokesmen were Horace White in the Chicago Tribune , Murat Halstead in the Cincinnati Commerical, Fred Hassaurek in the Cincinnati Volksblatt, W. M. Grosvenor in the Missouri Democrat (until 1 871), and Schurz in the Westliche Post. The rise of independent journalism in the years following the war is a factor always to be taken into account in the political development of the period, although its influence on the great mass of the voters was but gradually extended. 6 Most of these men had a regard for the Republican, or Union Republican party, the organization that, in spite of all its falterings and blunderings, had preserved the Union; but they desired that the party should be progressive, that it should face the new issues and not merely rest upon its past achievements. If the old party should fail to meet the pressing needs of the day they were ready to leave it for any organization that might appear more worthy of support.

It was natural that one of the first of the new issues to be championed by this group was civil service reform, as some of their number had been persistent advocates of the merit system since the introduction of Jenckes' bill in 1865. 7

6 See Merriam, Bowles, II, 132-134. For the ideas of this group, in addition to the editorials in the journals mentioned above, see Schurz's Reminiscences and his Writings; Lowell's Letters; Norton's Letters; C. F. Adams' Autobiography; Bigelow's Retrospection; Brinkerhoff's Recollections; Koerner's Memoirs; Austen's Letters and Diaries of Moses Coit Tyler; Ogden, Godkin; Godwin, Bryant; Merriam, Bowles; Cary, Curtis; White, Trumbull; Lloyd, Lloyd; Adams, C. F. Adams; Rhodes' essays on Godkin and Cox in Historical Essays; writings of Godwin, Godkin, Lloyd, Wells; publications of the American Free Trade League. Charles Francis Adams, Jr., in a speech during the campaign of 1872, said: ''Meanwhile, for a long time past, and especially during the present campaign, I have acted in close sympathy with the class whose feelings now find vigorous expression through the columns of the N. Y. Evening Post and the Nation, — a class insignificant in numbers only, and one not safely to be disregarded." Springfield Weekly Republican, Oct. 4, 1872.

7 Fish, Civil Service and the Patronage, 209-212.

Tariff reduction was another of their projects. To further this cause, the American Free Trade League was established in 1869, with Bryant, Godkin, Schurz, J. D. Cox, George Hoadly, Horace White, David A. Wells, and Edward Atkinson as leading members. 8 In the basic reconstruction measures they had generally supported the party, but, as anyone who understood the character of such men should have known, they would inevitably oppose the continuance of illiberal policies for partisan or other unworthy ends.

In the campaign of 1868 the Republicans relied most effectively upon their control of the South and the continuing popular distrust of their opponents. But while from a superficial reading of the election returns the Republican strength seemed overwhelming, a more careful analysis of the figures revealed serious weaknesses. The Democratic candidates had carried three northern states, including New York, they had been defeated by small majorities in three others, and with a " solid South/' of which there were already serious portents, they would have won the election. 9 To be sure, most of the dangers that confronted the party were still latent. Wise, tactful leadership might prevent serious divisions ; but it would have required no great gift of political prophecy to foresee the results of false moves by the Republican chiefs.

The Liberal Republican movement, coming in the midst of this period of party readjustment, combined something of all these complex, divisive forces in the Union Republican party. It marked the first deliberate attempt to meet the new political problems. The present study, while dealing to some extent with all phases of the movement, is concerned especially with its influence upon the reorganization of national parties.

8 Lloyd, Lloyd, I, 24. Garrison started a " Revenue Reform League" in Boston in 1869. Garrison, Garrison, IV, 262.

9 Cf. Dunning, Reconstruction, 134; Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress, 11,408.

As the foregoing suggestions indicate, President Grant, at the beginning of his first term, was confronted with many delicate problems which, both as politician and statesman, he must solve in order to keep his party intact and to retain the country's confidence. For the General the situation was one of peculiar opportunity. Had Grant but possessed the statesmanly capacity to formulate sound policies and the political skill to discipline recalcitrant factions he might well have become the real leader of his party and of the nation. He had not been chosen by reason of any party connections. The Republican managers had turned to him not as a Republican, but as the sole candidate whose success was reasonably assured. 10 The rank and file, adoring the great hero of the war, looked forward to his achievements "with an almost superstitious hope." 11 The reformers also cherished high expectations concerning him. Lowell, in a letter to his friend, Leslie Stephen, shortly after the election, well expressed the prevailing cheerful view: "If you write about American politics remember that Grant has always chosen able lieutenants. My own opinion is (I give it to you for what it is worth) , that the extreme Republicans will be wofully disappointed in Grant. At any rate, if he should throw away his opportunity to be an independent President, he is not the man I take him to be. No man ever had a better chance to be a great magistrate than he." 12 And, in fact, if few presidents have had such great difficulties to face, few have enjoyed, at the outset, so general and enthusiastic a support. 13

But it was very soon apparent that the General was

10 Rhodes, United States, VI, 159; White, 332.

11 Hoar, Autobiography, I, 246; Schurz, III, 285-303.

12 Lowell to Stephen, Thanksgiving Day, 1868, Lowell, Letters, II, 7. See also editorials in the Nation, May 28, June 20, Oct. 29, 1868; Godwin, Bryant, II, 274, 276; Norton to Curtis, Jan. 29, 1869 Norton, Letters, 1,319.

13 Cf. Rhodes, VI, 236.

peculiarly ill-adapted for a role which would have tried the skill of the most experienced and tactful political leader. He was at this time as ridiculously ignorant of party politics as he was of the duties of his high office. Haying had the refusal, apparently, of both party nominations, he had consented to lead the Republicans only after stipulating that he should receive a renomination. 14 He had, however, no conception of his responsibilities and obligations as party leader. He looked upon the presidency as a just reward for his services to the country, and incidentally to the Republican party. A soldier first and last, he brought his military ideas into the White House, regarding the relations of civil officials as he had those of officers in the army. 15 In his appointments, too, he felt entirely free to pay personal debts of friendship, regardless of party claims, to say nothing of the interests of the public service. 16 With no more trepidation over his responsibilities in managing the party than in managing the government, upon which he entered "without fear," he began by ignoring acknowledged party leaders. Urgent requests from a prominent Republican editor for inside information on proposed policies were completely ignored. 17 The identity of the members of his cabinet, whom he considered as a personal " staff, " was not divulged beforehand, even to his bosom friends. 18 An influential Pennsylvania politician, who ventured to present the claims of his state to a portfolio, was given to understand that the President would select a cabinet entirely in conformity with his own wishes. 19 His unusual method of choosing advisers 20 produced a cabinet which,

14 McClure, II, 216; Schurz' s Writings (Bancroft ed.), II, 415.

15 Schurz, III, 306; Garland, Grant, 391.

16 Garland, 393; Sherman, Recollections, I, 474; Schurz, III, 308-310; Hoar, 1,305.

17 Badeau, Grant in Peace, 156.

18 Wilson, Dana, 405; Blaine, II, 424.

20 For details, see Badeau, 161-166; White, 334-337.

when finally announced, proved to be equally anomalous. 21 Obscure friends without official experience or definite party standing were associated with men of marked ability and with some of pronounced reform sentiments. 22 But in no case, apparently, was the good of the party organization considered in the original selections, and in one instance, at least, the President gratuitously created ill-feeling in a friend whom he had sought to please. 23 Other important appointments were equally unfortunate for party harmony. The President's immediate assistants, as well as many other important officials, were drawn from army officers. At the beginning of the term they were his closest advisers 24 and constituted a sort of " Kitchen Cabinet." 25 The traditional rights of congressmen in respect to appointments were at times disregarded in a way that no executive with experience in political usages would have ventured. 26 The slighting manner in which Charles A. Dana's claims to the collectorship of the port of New York were ignored undoubtedly helped to create a most dangerous critic at a highly strategic point. 27

This policy of holding aloof from the councils of party managers did not long continue. The soldier President, most tenacious in carrying through his pet projects, soon felt the need of loyal supporters in Congress. Such adherents, in accordance with Grant's ideas of political fitness, should be rewarded for their devotion by the control of the federal patronage. The notorious congressional clique, of which Butler, Conkling, Cameron, Morton, and Chandler

21 Cf. Hinsdale, Hist, of President 1 s Cabinet, 207.

25 Hinsdale, 207.

26 See, for instance, Cullom, Recollections, 176.

27 Wilson, 406-409, 414-416. Wilson's opinion that Dana's opposition was disinterested and impersonal was not generally shared by contemporaries.

were the leading spirits, furnished the desired band of dependable administration men. 28

One of the first of the schemes upon which Grant had set his heart was the purchase of San Domingo, "the beginning of an Iliad of woes" 29 for the party. From this unhappy expansion project grew the administration's open and irreparable break with Sumner, marked on the side of the supercilious, egoistical Senator by bitterly exaggerated denunciations of the President and his advisers, and on that of the headstrong, vindictive Executive and of his defenders by the summary removal of Motley from the English mission and the displacement of Sumner as chairman of the committee on foreign affairs. 30 To secure the votes of carpetbag senators for the annexation treaty by the appointment of a southerner, Judge Hoar was also forced out of the cabinet. 31 Senator Schurz's opposition to annexation marked the beginning of the differences between the administration and the influential leader of western reform sentiment. 32 The President's obstinate and unreasonable course in this matter also caused much dissatisfaction among some of his close supporters. Morton was opposed to his chief's efforts to force the Senate's action on the treaty, foreseeing nothing but an ultimate defeat for the administration. 33 Henry Wilson warned Grant that Motley's removal would

28 Rhodes, VI, 388 f.; Foulke, Morton, II, 265; Sherman, I, 474; Conkling, Conkling, 326.

30 For detailed arguments on both sides of this controversy, see Pierce, Sumner , IV, 433 ff., and Badeau, chs. 23-24. An impartial summary is given by Rhodes, VI, 349-354, 362 f. For Sumner's view of the episode, see Sumner to Morrill, Sept. 8, 1870, Forum, XXIV, 406-408.

31 Cox, "How Judge Hoar Ceased to be Attorney-General," Atlantic Monthly, LXXVI, 162 ff.; Sumner to Bigelow, Aug. 7, 1870, Bigelow, Retrospection, IV, 402.

32 Schurz to Grosvenor, Mar. 31, 1870, Schurz's Writings, I, 484; Schurz, III, 307 f.

33 Foulke, II, 151 n. For Senator J. S. Morrill's opposition and the favor with which it was received, see Forum, XXIV, 405 f .

be likely to injure the party in Massachusetts. 34 Senator Cole, of California, a thick-and-thin organization man, wrote from the senate chamber, when the confirmation of Motley's successor was being held up, that the opposition was "in favor of Motley" and added naively, " Grant often forgets to act justly. He is not always a wise politician." 35 The Republican defeat in the New Hampshire state election in the spring of 187 1 was regarded as a direct protest against the administration's treatment of Sumner. 36

The San Domingo fiasco was, in a sense, the President's personal experiment, but in dealing with more pertinent issues upon which Republicans differed Grant was no more successful in promoting harmony. The passage of the tariff act of 1870, with the President's full approval, was a marked triumph for the protected interests. 37 This was an especially vital issue for the party at this time since the sentiment for tariff reform among Republicans was coming to be widespread. In the Middle West there was a most persistent opposition to the continuance of the war duties. 38 In this section administration papers, otherwise loyal, were avowed supporters of the free-trade movement, 39 and prom-

34 Wilson to Grant, July 5, 1870, Pierce, IV, 446. See also on the indignation of prominent Massachusetts Republicans at Motley's removal, Sumner to Morrill, Sept. 8, 1870, Forum, XXIV, 408.

35 Cole, Memoirs, 333.

36 Pierce to Sumner, Mar. 15, 1871, Sumner MSS.; N. Y. Herald, Mar. 15, 1871; Lyford, Rollins, 250.

37 Tarbell, Tariff in Our Times, 62. When in the fall of 1869 John Bigelow, then editor of the N. Y. Times, advised the President to recommend the removal of the war rates Grant replied: "Oh, we can't do anything of that kind. " Bigelow, IV, 317.

38 Rhodes, VI, 278. Schurz, in denying that the Missouri Liberal movement of 1870 was a plot of the revenue reformers, declared that if the issue had been squarely on the tariff the majority against protection would have been more than double that received by the Liberal candidates. Schurz' s Writings, II, 32 f.

39 Tarbell, 55; Nation, Mar. 3, 1870, p. 132; Cincinnati Semi-Weekly Gazette, Apr. 14, May 5, and passim 1871.

LIBERAL FACTION IN UNION REPUBLICAN PARTY II

inent Republican congressmen reflected the views of their constituents on this question. 40 Forty three of the Republican members elected in 1870 were classed as tariff reformers. Thirty five of this number were from the Middle West. 41 Even among the administration organs in the East there were protests against the injustice of the existing system. 42 Advocates of civil service reform in Congress could get no better satisfaction from the administration. Leaders of the growing anti-administration faction, like Schurz and Trumbull, gave their hearty support to this cause. 43 Schurz, upon assuming his senatorial duties in 1869, thought that the " utter absurdity of our system of appointment to office has this time so glaringly demonstrated itself that even the dullest patriots begin to open their eyes to the necessity of a reform." For himself, he confided to a friend, he had u taken a solemn vow to pitch in for it next winter to the best of my ability." 44 General Cox in the cabinet was an equally relentless foe of the prevailing system of appointments. 45 But his efforts to take the offices under his jurisdiction out of politics naturally aroused the bitterest hostility from party managers, like Cameron and Chandler, and when, in 1870, Grant failed to lend his support the

40 Rhodes, VI, 275-277; Tarbell, 67; Salter, 363, 364, 379, 383. Emery A. Storrs, of Chicago, a leading Republican "spellbinder" in the national campaigns of 1 868-1 884, was in 1870 a most pronounced advocate of free-trade. Adams, Storrs, 235 ff.

41 111., 8; Ohio, 7; Ind., 6; Iowa, 6; Mo., 3; Mich., 2; Minn., 1; Wis., 1; Kan., 1. The Free-Trader, quoted in N. Y. Tribune, Dec. 24, 1870. The list as given by the Free-Trader is reprinted in livening Journal Almanac, 1871, p. 43.

42 For such examples, see N. Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1871 ; Boston Commonwealth, Feb. 4, 1 87 1.

43 Bancroft- Dunning, Schurz' s Political Career, 317; White, 349, 376.

44 Schurz to Taussig, Apr. 18, 1869, Schurz' s Writings, I, 483.

45 For Cox's views, see his article, "Civil Service Reform" in North Am. Rev., Jan. 1871, pp. 81 ff.

Secretary resigned. 46 The President seemed mildly favorable to the reform measure enacted the following year and made some commendable efforts to secure its execution. But when the salutary innovation was assailed by the keenly interested machine politicians, he failed to give it the backing necessary to its permanent establishment. 47

Furthermore, most serious cause of dissension of all, the conservative Republicans' hope of a liberal southern policy was doomed to sad disappointment as the President came more and more under the influence of the radicals. 48 Nevertheless the champions of amnesty and complete restoration of home rule kept up the fight persistently, despite all administrative indifference or hostility. In the spring of 1870, when the radical managers sought to keep control of Georgia by a further interference in her internal affairs, a strong and successful opposition was made by the conservative senators, led by Trumbull 49 and Schurz. 50 In the session of 1870-71 the same group made a gallant stand against the Enforcement Act. And in the next session, when after the launching of the national Liberal movement even the radicals saw the expediency of concessions, they practically won their fight for general amnesty. 51

These policies, which created dissensions in official party circles, all tended to alienate the independent reform group

46 Opposition to fraudulent land claims also entered into Cox's trouble with the politicians. Ewing, Cox, 24 f. Cox claimed later that his resignation was due entirely to the failure of the President to sustain him in his efforts at civil service reform. See Cox to Sumner, Aug. 3, 1872, Sumner MSS. Forney wrote to Sumner (Oct. 20, 1870): "Cameron is here. ... He and Chandler have got Cox out of the Interior and got Delano in." Ibid.

48 Rhodes, VI, 390; Woolley, "Grant's Southern Policy" in Studies in Southern History and Politics, 182 ff.

50 Bancroft-Dunning, 319; Cong. Globe, 41 Cong., 2 Sess., 2061 ff.

outside. Indeed, the militarist Executive was a sad disappointment to them from the outset. In the first place, his personal tastes and habits were most objectionable. His lack of social accomplishments, 52 his utter inability to speak in public, 53 his close associations with financiers of ill-repute, 54 and especially his dense ignorance of public affairs must have provoked the impatience, if not the open contempt, of men of their refinement and ability. 55 Policies did nothing to remove these unfavorable impressions. Instead of the independent progressive administration anticipated, they saw a strictly partisan conduct of affairs. The first acts showed how greatly they had been disappointed in their man, 56 and later developments could but deepen their disapproval. 57 George William Curtis, though the editor of a loyal administration journal, was so good an independent in spirit that he was forced to write in private correspondence in 1870: "I think the warmest friends of Grant feel that he has failed terribly as president — not from want of honesty or desire, but from want of tact and great ignorance. " 58 The presence of Hoar and Cox in the cabinet had been one of the few ties that held the independents to the administration. 59 Their early resignations,

62 Letters of Mrs. J. G. Blaine, I, 48, 90; Badeau, 171-174.

53 Badeau, 175 f.

54 (H. Adams) "The New York Gold Conspiracy" in Westminster Review, Oct., 1870, pp. 422 ff.

65 See, at a little later period, the statement of David A. Wells at the Union League Club in 1873, quoted in Austen, Tyler, 79. Professor Tyler's own observations on Grant in 1871 are much to the same effect. Ibid., 57-62.

56 Bigelow, IV, 263, 284 f.; Norton's Letters, I, 352; Nation, editorials, Mar. 11, 18, 1869.

57 For a most unfavorable review of Grant's first year, see H. B. Adams, "The Session" in North Am. Rev., July 1870, pp. 29 ff.

58 Curtis to Norton, June 26, 1870, Cary, Curtis, 213.

59 Lowell wrote to Stephen in March, 1870, after a visit to Washington: "He [Judge Hoar] and Mr. Cox struck me as the only really strong men in the Cabinet. " Lowell's Letters, II, 56 f.

virtual dismissals, showed the growing domination of the machine element and the lessening regard for reform sentiments.

The action on the tariff seemed an especial challenge to the reformers. The forcing out of David A. Wells, a conspicuous figure in the reform group, from the position of special revenue agent was resented as a victory for the protected interests in Congress. 60 As a result the attacks on the citadel of protection became more persistent than ever. In 1870 the Free Trade League waged a most aggressive campaign. Lecturers were kept in the field in the East and Middle West and a great mass of literature was distributed. 61 Other measures, much less academic but more effective, were taken against the enemy. In April at a meeting of revenue reformers in Washington plans were laid, it was reported, to defeat prominent protectionist representatives. 62 The Liberal Republican campaign in Missouri that fall 63 was in part a free- trade demonstration. Governor McClurg, the regular Republican candidate, was said to have been one of the objectionable high tariff men marked for defeat. 64 Grosvenor, of the Missouri Democrat, was an ardent free-trader (the author of the League's publication, ''Does Protection Protect?"), and he put forward this issue so prominently in the Liberal program 65 that the New York Tribune characterized the whole Missouri movement as a free-trade conspiracy. 66 The tariff reformers

60 Nation, July 7, 1870, p. 2. Atkinson wrote to Sumner (Dec. 1, 1870) of Cox's resignation: "I suppose Cox's retirement was forced . . . because he is a free-trader. " Sumner MSS.

61 Fifth Report of the American Free Trade League, printed in N. Y. Herald, May 31, 1871; Brinkerhoff, Recollections, 190-205; Lloyd, I, 25.