Japan and world peace

Front matter

JAPAN

AND WORLD PEACE

K.AWAKA.MI

Preface

This little volume is an attempt to describe Japan's place in the League of Nations. I have tried to explain the aspirations and hopes, fears and misgivings, which Japan will entertain imder the new world regime, as under the old.

The foremost problem of Japan to-day is the population problem. An intelligent understanding of that question is essential to the appreciation of Japan's poKcies and activities.

Intertwined with the population question is the matter of Japan's iron and coal supply. With her increasing population sealed up in a small archipelago, Japan sees the only means of solving the problem of overpopulation in the promotion of her industry and the expansion of her foreign trade. In a word, Japan's foremost desire to-day is to become a great industrial and trading nation. But in order to reahze this desire Japan must have coal and iron, two essentials of modern industry. Unfortunately, Japan's small territory has little of either in store. She is compelled to seek them in territories not too far from her home land.

Here, in a nutshell, is the condition which furnishes the underlying motives as well as the impelling power to Japan's policies, internal and foreign.

X PREFACE

I have devoted a considerable space to Japan's relations with China, because those relations are most vital to the existence of the island nation. In speaking of the prevailing conditions in China, I have, in the past, endeavored to express myself with reserve. But I have reluctantly come to the conclusion that the time has come when the world should be informed of the true situation. There is no use in evading the fact that China is utterly incapable of managing her own affairs, and that the civilized nations of the world must come to an agreement with a view to establishing an international guardianship for China.

In concluding this preface, it is my duty as well as my great pleasure to acknowledge my deep obligation to Mr. D. S. Richardson, of Berkeley, California, who has read the manuscript with sympathetic interest.

K. K. ICawakami.

Chapter I JAPAN'S PART IN THE WAR PAGE

Why Japan entered the war — The alliance with England — The Grerman menace in the Far East — Bismarck's policy in Asia — The Kaiser's picture of the Yellow Peril — General von Bemhardi on Japan and China — German intrigue against Japan at the end of the Chino-Japanese war — Germany responsible for the Russo-Japanese war — The Japanese campaign against Kiau-chow — Its far-reaching significance — Military operations against Kiau-chow — How Germany treated the Japanese — How Japan treated the Germans — Bushido the real cause of Japan's kindness to the enemy — Japan's naval operations against Germany — Japanese submarine destroyers in the Pacific — Japan's assistance to Russia — ^Japanese merchant vesseb used by allies — ^Japan's financial contributions 1

Chapter II

The effect of German defeat upon Japanese politics — The new cabinet of Japan — Premier Hara, the "Commoner" of Japan — President Wilson on autocracy — Mr. Root on Japan — The diplomacy of autocracy — Dawn of modernism in Japan — The Oath of Five Articles — Advent of radical doctrines — Prince Ito and the Japanese constitution — The Mikado not an autocrat but a ceremonial head — The Mikado and the Cabinet — The Mikado reigns but does not govern — The extension of suffrage the first requisite of democratising Japan — Labor unions in Japan — Freedom of speech — Socialism in Japan — Japanese socialists against the Russian war — Japan's ability to ad-

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just herself to new conditions — Democracy retarded by Japan's constant struggle with aggressive Powers — ^The apprehension of Japanese advocates of liberalism 18

Chapter III

Baron Makino on the League of Nations — Japanese statesmen not in favor of raising the race issue — The race issue forced upon the envoys by popular clamor — Why the Japanese misimderstood Western sentiment — Mr. Wilson inspires the masses of Japan — Japan's population question — ^Japan's desire for expansion totally different from Germany's — Japan's real objective not free emigration — Japan not spokesman for all Asia — ^Why the Japanese are skeptical of the world league idea — ^Japan's disappointment at the Hague Court of Arbitration — ^The West maintains double standards of justice 45

Chapter IV

Why the masses of Japan clamor for the Pacific islands — Japan's overpopulation the real cause for that clamor — ^Japanese emigration — ^Japan has no real colony — Resources of the South Pacific islands — Potash deposits valuable to rice culture in Japan — ^The Marshall Islands — The Caroline Islands — ^The islands under the League of Nations 63

Chapter V JAPAN AND SIBERLA

Foreign Minister Viscount Motono on Siberia — Japan confers with France and England on the chaos in Siberia — France suggests intervention — Russian views in favor of allied intervention — Bolshevik-German intrigue in Siberia — The Japanese press and the elder statesmen objected to Siberian interven-

CONTENTS XIU tion — Ambassador Uchida on Bolshevism — American opposition to intervention — Appearance of Czecho-Slovaks in Siberia — President Wilson changes his attitude — His statement of August 3, 1918 — Japan concurs with America — The Japanese statement — The failure of the Wilson policy — Unnecessary sacrifices due to Mr. Wilson's delay — Japanese conduct in Siberia — Foreign Minister Uchida's declaration on Russia — Japan withdraws her troops from Siberia — The disputed question of the Siberian railway — The American agreement with the Kerensky administration — An international control of the Siberian railway — ^The Monroe Doctrine, American and Japanese 72

Chapter VI

The American proposal to annex Lower CaUfomia — ^The American agitation against Japanese enterprises in Mexico — How Japan faces it — A reflection upon American morals — The duty of the State Department to investigate the Mexican land project — Definition of the Monroe Doctrine — Governor Estaban on the annexation propaganda — General Aguirre on the foreign ownership of Mexican land — The Magdalene Bay Canard — How it was started — Senator Lodge's resolution — ^The Japanese in Mexico — The German propaganda in Mexico — ^Japan respects American policy in Mexico

Chapter VII

Danger to foreigners in China — ^The North China Daily News on the Chinese situation — A British view of China's internal warfare—The First and Second Revolutions— The Third Revolution — ^The Fourth Revolution — Dr. Sun Yatsen and General Li Yung-ting — The situation in Yun-nan — President Wilson's letter to China's new President — MiUtary despotism of the

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worst type — Military governors worse than feudal chiefs — Arbitrary seizure of railways by generals — Instances of political blackmail — ^Japan's move to end internal warfare in China 109

Chapter VIII

An interview with the leader of Southern Republicans — His views as to why China should not have helped the Entente Powers — A misrepresentation by a Chinese peace envoy — Yuan Shikai's imperial designs and his war policy — Japan checks Yuan's ambition — Japan and America advise China to declare war- Why China delayed the declaration of war — Factions fight over the war question — Southern republicans oppose the Cabinet's war policy — The war question plunges China into a civil war — General Chang restores the Manchu dynasty — The fall of General Chang — Southern Republicans still oppose the war policy of the Cabinet — The Cabinet declares war upon Germany — Liang Chi-chao's exposition of China's internal politics — China's motives in entering the war 125

Chapter IX

The attitude of the new Japanese cabinet towards China — Actions of the Chinese peace delegation — No secret treaties between Japan and China — Kirin forest and mine loan agreement — Premier Tuan's explanation of the same agreement — Manchurian railway agreement — The Japanese Government's statement on the same — Shan-tung railway agreement — The Chino- Japanese military agreement — The Chinese Government's statement on the same — ^These agreements not proper subjects of discussion at the Peace Congress — China's extraordinary performances at the Peace Congress — The Japanese Premier explains Japan's attitude towards China — Japan has no objection to publishing agreements with China — Why not also discuss at the Peace

CONTENT* XV

PAQE

Congress China's agreements with other nations? — China's real motives in opposing Japan — Discreditable tactics of the Chinese peace envoys 143

Chapter X

The Ishii-Lansing understanding — Self-preservation underlying motive of Japanese policy in China — Japan anxious to get iron and coal from China — Japan's precarious industrial structure — Japan's interest in the Han Yeh Ping Company — To solve her population problem Japan must become an industrial nation — The blimder of the "twenty-one demands" — The "group five" of those demands — The supply of arms to China — Foreign advisers to China — The Chino-Japanese treaties of May, 1915 — ^Transformation of Manchuria under Japanese management — Dr. Martin on exterritorial rights in China — The fall of the Ok\ima Cabinet due to its failures in China — The Terauchi Cabinet and China — ^The Hara Cabinet's policy in China 160

Chapter XI

China's singular proposals at the Peace Congress — Her admisoion of liabilities — China's annual deficit — Financial difficulty main reason for her entrance into the war — Official corruption worse under the new regime — Examples of corruption — China's foreign indebtedness — Japan's share in the same — Japan's economic loans to China — Japan con5pelled by China to make financial advances — Japan's present financial policy in China defined by the Foreign Office — Wanted: An international supervision of China's finances — President Wilson advises American bankers to withdraw from China — Mr. Wilson reverses that advice — America's new financial policy in China 180

Chapter I Japan's Part In The War

Why Japan entered the war — The alliance with England — The German menace in the Far East — Bismarck's policy in Asia — The Kaiser's picture of the Yellow Peril — General von Bemhardi on Japan and China — German intrigue against Japan at the end of the Chino- Japanese war — Germany responsible for the Russo-Japanese war — The Japanese campaign against Kiau-chow — Its far-reaching significance — Military operations against Kiau-chow — How Germany treated the Japanese — How Japan treated the Germans — Bushido the real cause of Japan's kindness to the enemy — Japan's naval operations against Germany — Japanese submarine destroyers in the Pacific — Japan's assistance to Russia — Japanese merchant vessels used by allies — Japan's financial contributions.

Japan made a modest contribution towards the winning of the war, and asks little or nothing at the Peace Congress.

True, Japan proposed that the covenant of the League of Nations should contain a provision forestalling racial discrimination in future international dealings. But this proposal was made for the sake of principle rather than for Japan's own sake. For she believed it to be in perfect accord with the humanitarian ideals to which allied statesmen had pledged themselves during the war.

True also it is that Japan at first desired to retain the Marshall and Caroline Islands in her possession, provided, of course, other Powers were to hold the German colonies they had seized. But as soon as the mandatory system was suggested by President Wilson, Japan cheerfully consented to place them under the control of the League of Nations.

As for Kiau-chow, the former German territory in China, Japan, as early as May, 1915, irrevocably pledged herself to restore it to China.

Before entering into the discussion of what Japan expected from the Peace Congress and what her position under the new world regime will be, let us see what Japan did for the war.

The reason for Japan's entrance into the war is two-fold. First, she was bound by her alliance with England to declare war upon Germany. And, secondly, she had long regarded Germany as a dangerous factor in the Far East, and had looked upon the German possessions in China as a perpetual menace to the peace of the Orient and to her own safety.

Upon the details of the Anglo- Japanese Alliance we need not enter. We will only say that it was obviously England's right to call upon Japan for aid, while it was Japan's duty to respond to England's call. Read the Anglo- Japanese Treaty of Alliance carefully, and you will notice that wherever either high contracting party is attacked by a third Power the other high contracting party is required to come to its assistance in the regions of the Far East. The treaty does not say "aggressive action in the Far East," but "aggressive action wherever arising." The state of affairs described in the treaty had certainly come into existence by the time England asked for Japan's aid, and Japan could not shirk the responsibilities put upon her shoulders by the treaty.

On August 3, that is, the day before England declared war. Sir Conyngham Greene, the British Ambassador to Japan, hurried back to Tokyo from his summer villa and immediately requested an interview with Baron Kato, the Foreign Minister. At this conference the British Ambassador informed Baron Kato that his Government was compelled to open hostilities against Germany and desired to ascertain whether Japan would aid England in the event of British interests in the Far East being jeopardized by German activities. Baron Kato answered that the question before him was so serious that he could not answer it on his own account.

On the evening of the same day, Coimt Okuma convened a meeting of all the Cabinet members. Bearing the resolution of this meeting. Baron Kato, on August 4, called upon the British Ambassador and told the latter that Japan would not evade the responsibilities which she had assumed in entering into alliance with England.

At this time Japan did not expect to be called upon to declare war at once. But on August 7 the British Ambassador asked for an interview with

Baron Kato and told the Foreign Minister that the situation had developed in such a manner as would oblige Japan's immediate entrance upon the war. On the evening of that day Premier Okuma requested the "elder statesmen" and his colleagues to assemble at his mansion. The conference lasted until 2 o'clock the next morning. Before it adjourned Japan's policy had been definitely formulated.

Even without the obligations of an alliance with England, Japan would have welcomed an opportunity to oust Germany from the Far East. To appreciate the intense feeling entertained by the Japanese against Germany, one must know something of German policy in the Orient during the two decades before the war.

The fundamental principle of German policy in the Orient was voiced by Prince Bismarck when he told Prince von Bulow: "In Russia there is a serious amount of unrest and agitation for territorial expansion which may easily result in an explosion. It would be best for the peace of the world if the explosion took place in Asia, and not in Europe. We must be careful not to stand in the way, otherwise we may have to bear the brunt of it."

In these few words the Iron Chancellor set forth Germany's fundamental policy in the Far East. The conversation took place towards the end of the "eighties" and in the "nineties" this policy began to show itself in German activities in Eastern Asia.

There is not the shadow of a doubt that the principle laid down by Bismarck has been closely followed by his successors and the Kaiser. It explains the raison d'etre of that historic picture of the "Yellow Peril" painted by the versatile German Emperor. It furnishes a key to the general attitude of Germany towards Japan. It shows why Germany seemed always anxious to divert Russia's attention towards the Far East. Even in the anti-Japanese propaganda in America the Kaiser's hand was clearly seen. On the authority of Dr. A. N. Davis, for years physician to the Kaiser, we now know that the malicious rumor that the Japanese are so dishonest as to necessitate the employment of Chinese cashiers by Japanese banks, was also started by the Kaiser or his intriguing entourages.

It would be scandalous to presume that the Kaiser was foohsh enough to believe that the Japanese, rallying under their sun flag all the fighting forces of Asia, would march across the continent and trample under foot any territory of Europe. Only a perverted mind could conceive such a case. In no other Hght than that of the fimdamental principle upon which Germany's Far Eastern policy is established can we account for the Kaiser's picture of the Yellow Peril.

While, on the one hand, conspiring to divert Russian ambition to the far East, German diplomacy was at work to prevent the establishment of harmonious relations between China and Japan. Says General Friedrich von Bernhardi: "The political rivalry between the two nations of the yellow race must be kept alive. If they are antagonistic, they will both probably look for help against each other in their relations with Europe, and thus enable the European Powers to retain their possessions in Asia." This frank utterance, coupled with the confession of Prince von Bulow, leaves no room to doubt that Germany's Far Eastern policy was based upon the theory that Asia must remain the "happy hunting ground'* of European nations.

It was at the end of the Chino-Japanese war that the Kaiser's mailed fist was for the first time lifted against the Japanese. In the middle of April, 1895, Japan, after brilliant victories, concluded a peace treaty with China. On the day the treaty was signed at Shimonoseki between Prince Ito and Li- Hung-Chang, all Japan was celebrating the glorious termination of the war.

Suddenly out of the blue came the report that Germany had approached Russia and France with a view to force the retrocession of the Liao-tung peninsula which China had just ceded to Japan. The report was soon confirmed, and the whole country was stricken with grief and aflame with wrath. Never was Japan's honor so ruthlessly outraged.

On^the morning of April 23rd the German, French, and Russian ministers at Tokyo deigned to present themselves, one after the other, at the Foreign Department, each bringing with him a note admonishing Japan for affronting the Powers by taking the

Liao-tung peninsula. The German "advice** was of the most peremptory nature, and the masterful, overbearing manner in which it was handed to the Foreign Department by the Kaiser's envoy is still a topic of occasional conversation among the Japanese. The German Minister brought two copies of the advice, one in German, the other in the Japanese language transcribed in Roman letters.

The note was very brief and bluntly stated that the Japanese occupation of the Liao-tung peninsula was a menace to the Chinese capital and would jeopardize the peace of the Far East. " Therefore," it concluded, "the German Government advises the Japanese Government to abandon the idea of occupying the territory."

The original note even contained such a threatening phrase as this — "Japan is weak, Germany is strong; the outcome of an armed conflict between the two countries is obvious."

Japan was, forsooth, too weak not to heed the "advice." She gave up the Liao-tung peninsula with what grace and dignity she could. And behold ! only a few years later, Russia, encouraged and instigated by Germany, appropriated the whole territory of Manchuria, while Germany herself seized the terri-^ tory of Kiau-chow. With Manchuria and Korea. - dominated by the Czar, Japan had no alternative to preparing to fight Russia. Japan's titanic struggle ,^ / with Russia in 1904-5 was the inevitable aftermath \ of the German intrigue in and after 1895. Japan holds the Kaiser as much responsible as the Czar for the Manchurian war in which she sacrificed unnumbered Hves and untold treasure.

With this historical background before us, we can fully understand why Japan welcomed an opportunity to drive Germany from the Far East.

The campaign against the German territory of Kiau-chow, extremely small in scale as it was, was no easy task for Japan. The impecunious nation was still suffering from the financial burden caused by the Russian war. The Okuma Cabinet had come to power upon the promise to reduce taxation which had been increased in consequence of that war. It had also declared its intention of curbing the influence of the military clique and of retrenching the expenditures of the army. All these promises had to be cast to the winds because of Japan's entrance into the war. The appropriation for the Kiau-chow expedition alone amounted to $30,000,000, not to speak of the cost of the extensive naval operations required of Japan.

The far-reaching significance of the Kiau-chow campaign will be the more clearly understood if we picture in our minds what would have happened, had -Japan decided to sit on the fence. Had she declined Ao declare war upon Germany, Russia would have had to keep large forces in Siberia; France would have been compelled to garrison Indo-China with several army corps, while Great Britain would have been forced to maintain in the Indian and Pacific

Oceans, for the protection of India, Australia, New Zealand and Canada, a fleet equal to that of Japan. Had German cruisers and gunboats, with the splendid harbor of Kiau-chow as their base of operations, marauded in the Pacific and Indian oceans, the transportation of Australian and Indian forces to the scenes of war would have been well-nigh impossible,'"* '^

while British trade in those waters would have been ^ ^,

completely paralyzed. With Japan's attitude uncertain, even the United States might not have felt safe in casting her lot with France and England. Under such circumstances, the situation in Europe would have become extremely difficult for the entente Powers.

There is another important aspect of the Kiau-chow campaign which has escaped the serious consideration it deserves. Had Japan delayed her action against Kiau-chow, it was more than probable that the Germans would have raised a large army of Chinese in Shantung, captured the arsenal at Techow on the Tientsin-Nanking line, virtually seized the whole of that province, and thus compelled the Government at Peking to declare war upon the Entente Powers. In the state of disorganization in |i'

which China found herself at that time, it was ob- ^|

vious that such a German plan would have easily been put into practice. China would have had to accept the German yoke and been compelled to drive all British and French interests from the country. Only by Japan's prompt declaration of war upon Germany was such an eventuality prevented.

When Japan declared war upon Germany, Captain Meyer- Waldeck, the commander of Kiau-chow, had at his disposal a force of some 13,000 men, of whom 3,000 were German trained. The fortification was reputed to be one of the most formidable in the Orient. Within the harbor was a fleet of German and Austrian gunboats, though the cruisers had already left the port on a marauding cruise.

Against this stronghold Japan sent 30,000 men under the command of Lieutenant-General Kamio. This force was joined by 1,200 British, 800 Wales Borderers, and 800 Indian troops, under the command of General Bannardiston.

On August 25 the first division of the Japanese forces landed at Kiau-chow, and by September 18 the last contingent set foot on Chinese soil.

On August 25 the Japanese fleet, assisted by British warships, effected the blockade of the Bay of Kiau-chow. As the blockading fleet took position off Tsingtau, a typhoon swept the coast, and it was followed by a second and fiercer typhoon that scattered the ships.

On land the Japanese advance was made extremely difficult by rain and flood. During that summer that section of China was flooded as it had not been flooded in sixty years previously. Rivers rose until whole valleys were inundated, while villages of mud houses melted into these lakes. All Shantung was a mud slough after the waters fell, retarding the landing and progress of the Japanese and British forces.

Through sloughs of mud the Japanese reached the shores of Kiau-chow Bay, and farther inland seized a station of the German railway line leading up three hundred miles to the provincial capital of Tsinan-fu. This railway was seized for all its length, because the German garrison had been using it in receiving war materials, food suppHes, reservists from all parts of China, and the returning crew of the Austrian cruiser which had been disarmed in early August.

The general attack on the fortification began on October 22, and on November 7 the garrison surrendered to the beseiging forces.

Throughout this campaign the barbarous German treatment of the Japanese in Germany presented a marked contrast to the civilized manner in which the Japanese treated Germans.

Upon the arrival of the Japanese ultimatum in Berlin every Japanese in Germany was clapped into prison. The Japanese Embassy at Berlin was not allowed to communicate with them, nor could they get the list of their names. Some of these Japanese were even robbed of their bank deposits by the Kaiser's Government. Of course, Japanese Government money, amounting to some $1,250,000, deposited in the Deutsche Bank was immediately confiscated.

Meanwhile, how did the "heathen" Japanese treat the " Christian" Germans? Says the charming American authoress. Miss Eliza Ruhamah Scidmore:

"Simultaneously with the declaratioji of war the Minister of Home Affairs, alarmed by the savage

X ways of war in Christian Europe, issued instructions concerning the protection of German subjects in Japan, securing the same protection of person, property, and honor as before, if they conducted themselves without prejudice to the interests of Japan and her aUies. The Minister of Education warned teachers not to make impudent remarks that might arouse the animosity of young students, and urged them to show every kindness and facility to German teachers and students who might be called to the colors. The Chief of Police in Tokyo reminded people that, although the two Governments * had entered into hostilities for good reasons,' the people of the two countries as individuals should not act against each other in any way, and that the citizens of Tokyo should be more magnanimous than ever to those Germans who chose to remain; that they should not hold public meetings to inspire am'mosity, but always to be worthy of a civilized country. . . .

"German Government money deposited in Japan was not touched, and the Deutche Bank in Yokohama continues unhindered in its management. No German property was injured, no German molested. No one's German governess, valet, or employee of any kind was interfered with or imprisoned. Germans naively wrote their names in the Hsts for tennis tournaments, unconscious of the fact that not a British woman or child would tread the same court with them."

This generous conduct of the Japanese towards the Germans may be somewhat puzzHng to Westerners. The superficial even brand it as "pro-German," \ forgetting that the Japanese were just as generous towards the Russians during the Manchurian war: "*" The Japanese explanation is totally different. Frorn time immemorial Bushido, the canon of knightly conduct, taught the Japanese to be kind to his enemy. If you have an opponent, says Bushido, beat him, use every effort to that end and spare yourself nothing, but once you have beaten him, then see to it that you make him your friend. Japan has beaten Germany in the Far East. Kiau-chow is in her hands, to be eventually turned over to China. Germany, as far as Japan is concerned, is now completely innocuous; therefore, the Japanese turns to the German and says in effect: "Sir, I admire your courage. I for one have no further use for enmity, let us be friends." Of this national precept the Mikado's exhortation to soldiers and sailors is a fine example. He says:

"The soldier and the sailor should esteem valor. Ever since the ancient times valor has in our country been held in high esteem, and without it Our subjects would be unworthy of their name. How then may the soldiers and the sailors, whose profession is to confront the enemy in battle, forget even for one instant to be valiant .^^ But there is true valor and false. To be incited by mere impetuosity to violent action cannot be called true valor. The soldier and the sailor should have sound discrimination of right and wrong, cultivate self-possession, and form their plans with deliberation. Never to despise an inferior enemy or fear a superior, but to do one's duty as soldier or sailor — this is true valor. Those who thus appreciate true valor should, in their daily intercourse, set gentleness first and aim to win the love and esteem of others. If you affect valor and act with violence, the world will in the end detest you and look upon you as wild beasts. Of this you should take heed."

To return to Japan's part in the war. Her greater, though more quiet, participation than her land operations against Kiau-chow was on sea. In the first year of the war, the Japanese navy took charge of the Eastern seas as well as the Pacific and Indian oceans. In this task Japan used a naval strength twice as large as the British Eastern and Australian Fleets prior to the war. When German cruisers were at large in the Pacific, Japanese men-of-war protected the coasts of Australia, New Zealand, and British Columbia, and kept safe the lanes of transportation from Hong-Kong to Vancouver, from Sydney and Singapore to Suez and Zanzibar. The great fieets of transports, which bore Australian and New Zealand troops to the various fronts of war, were usually convoyed by Japanese warships. It may also be safely said that without the co-operation of the Japanese fleet the hunting down of the Emden and the destruction of von Spec's ships off the Falkland Island at the hands of the British and Australian fleets would have been infinitely more diflScult. As japan's papt in the war 15