The British revolution and the American democracy; an interpretation of British labour programmes

Front matter

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CHAPTER I The Relation to the Peace Settlement ... 3

The scant interest shown by the American people as a whole in the recent social movements of Europe. Yet the force of those movements will deeply influence the character of the peace settlement and the accomplishment of those political ends for which America entered the war. The fashion in which the social revolution is pushing the political and national issues into the background, and how the issue of a social system based on private property versus one based on communism is determining the alignment of forces in Europe. For what kind of democracy will the world be made safe?

CHAPTER II The Arrival of the Problem in America ... 36

The growth of radically socializing policies throughout the world is not due to socialist propaganda, or the influence of socialists, but to the war measures of governments often anti-socialist in opinion and intention. Thus the introduction of extremely radical policies into America is not the work of the Socialist Party, or the I. W. W., but results from the actual measures of the government for war purposes. These revolutionary measures, which could never have been introduced oy Socialist influence, have actually been put into eifect, and the question which will shortly present itself to the American public is "Which of these measures shall be undone?" and out of that question may arise, with the changes wrought by war conditions, a re-alignment of political forces, as in England. The British problems are already here.

Part II British Labour Programmes And The Forces Behind Them

CHAPTER I What Is the British Labour Party? .... 53

Historical outline of the Party; Its constituent elements. Its position in the ebb and flow of present party reorganization in England. The general question of political action by trade-union forces in England. The gradual disappearance of " absolute " socialism in Europe, and the substitution for cast iron dogmas a general socializing tendency in radical political programmes. Socialism and Democracy ; " Socialism versus the State." French syndicalism, British guild socialism, Bolshevism, and impossibilism in Labour politics. The English Parliamentary system and comparison with th« American Constitution.

CHAPTER II The Proposed Measures 92

The outstanding measures proposed by the sub-committee of the British Labour Party in their report on Reconstruction. The means to the end. Features iu a programme of the Lanshury-H erald group.

CHAPTER ni Is It Possible? 105

Most of the measures proposed are actually now in operation for the purposes of the war, and h£.ve given material results far in excess of anything which would have been thought possible in August, 1914. The feasibility of Collectivism, tested in material terms, has been demonstrated. What is now demanded is that that which can be done for purposes of war shall also be done for the purposes of peace. The political training and scientific spirit of the new Labour Party.

Chapter IV

The Ideal of a Real Democracy and "A New Social Order " 127

What is the feeling behind the declaration that the old order is done with, and that there will be no attempts to patch it up, and that an entirely " New Social Order " must replace it? Mainly that mere improvement of the material condition of the workers, leaving unchanged their moral status as a servile class, will not suffice. The reassertion of egalitarian ideas. The imponderabilia in the motive forces of Labour Politics. Why are some Socialists lukewarm towards or hostile to the war? The emergence of reactionary forces in war time. State Socialism not synonymous with Freedom: nor with Peace. Will a more socialized order necessarily make for a warless world? The relation of Socialism to internationalism^

CHAPTER V Military Conscription and the Institution of Private Property 159

The fashion in which the needs of war have prompted a reassertion of the absolute rights of the state over the person — his life and mind — is modifying age-long conceptions of private property. Confiscation, conscription of wealth and the Eighth Commandment. Not repudiation, but a progressive income tax. The virtual bankruptcy of some of the belligerent states and its effect on future legislation. Necessitas. . . .

CHAPTER VI The Spirit of Adventure in Social Change . .178

The end of the old fatalism which implies that we must " take the world as we find it," and that we cannot remake it. Some of the results that we may expect from the cheapening of life, th€ contempt of danger, the re-casting of moral standards, and the spirit of revolution which the war has produced. The " strenuous life " in times of peace, and its social and political implications.

CHAPTER I A Society of Free Men or the Servile State? . 189

The greater the degree of socialization, the more dependent does the individual become upon the community. Unless this increased power of the community is used with restraint and wisdom, the new order may be wrecked by the crushing of the individual personality on which in the long run society depends. A social order which comes into being as the result of war measures is likely to be strongly marked by coercive tendencies. If it is not to be ui truth the Servile State, the indulgence of present tendencies must be checked by a clear recognition of their danger. Do we love oppression and coercion for their own sake? What present methods might mean, if employed by a Labour government.

CHAPTER II The Herd and Its Hatred of Freedom .... 236

The deep-seated hatred of those who have the insufferable impudence to disagree with us is one of the strongest and most constant motives in history, often ruthlessly over-riding economic and other considerations, yet seldom taken into account. The motive has strong biological justification, but like other instincts of self-preservation may destroy us if yielded to indiscriminately without foresight of consequences. How the social machinery of modern society tends to develop this herd feeling. Two essays for war time: "The Problem of Northcliffe"; and " De Hasretico Comburiendo, or ' Now is not the time.' "

CHAPTER III Why Freedom Matters 263

Our age long failures to grasp the real justification of freedom: Society's need. The self-same debate in Athens two thousand five hundred years ago. The oppressions from which the mass have suffered have always been imposed by themselves. The idea that a tiny minority, by means of physical force, can impose tyranny upon the mass, is obviously an illusion. Tha. tyranny must be imposed by capturing the mind of the mass. The quality of any Society depends upon the ideas of the individuals who compose it, and those ideas upon Freedom and independence of judgment. The Political Heretic as the Saviour of Society.

APPENDICES

Text of the Report of the British Labour Party

ON Reconstruction 297

Text OF " Lansbury-Herald " Proposal . . .315

Part I The Concern Of America The British Revolution

AND

THE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

Chapter I The Relation To The Peace Settlement

The scant interest shown by the American people as a whole in the recent social movements of Europe. Yet the force of those movements will deeply influence the character of the peace settlement and the accomplishment of those political ends for which America entered the war. The fashion in which the social revolution is pushing the political and national issues into the Background, and how the issue of a social system based on private property versus one based on communism is determining the alignment of forces in Europe. For what kind of democracy will the world be made safe ?

How much space have the great American daily papers devoted to the Report on Reconstruction adopted by the British Labour Party? Has even one at this moment of writing, six months after its publication, reproduced it in full, or analyzed it with any care? Has it been noticed at all in the American Press outside of special radical weekly publications? However that may be, it is pretty certain that not one hundredth part of the space has been devoted to it that has been devoted to such world shaking questions as the retention of Dr. Muck as the conductor of the Boston Symphony Orchestra, or Mr.

Creel's remarks concerning certain Congressmen. Yet in the minds of very many who have followed most closely the social and political developments of recent years in Europe, this document may very well prove to be what it professes to be, the charter of an entirely new social order; the proclamation of a revolution. By " revolution " be it noted, is not meant machine guns at street corners, nor anything resembling a military movement against the government.^ The word is used in the sense in which we speak of the industrial revolution — the coming of " the New Social Order " as the Labour Party Committee themselves term It. It is not likely to come by violence, but it will be none the less revolutionary — a " turn over " — for all that. For it will affect

1 As long ago, however, as the summer of 1917 the London Times, through the articles of its " special commissioner," began to speak of "the ferment of Revolution." Its commissioner (September 25) wrote:

" There exists at the present moment a revolutionary movement in this country which has gathered considerable momentum; it has long passed the stage of mere talk, and has realized itself in formidable action. There has been no attack on the Throne, no rioting in the streets, no destruction of visible property; but changes have been already brought about which are thwarting the efforts of Government to conduct the war with efficiency, and if these changes go further they will bring the country into confusion."

The paper comments editorially:

" The facts set out in these articles are no news to the Government or to the official heads of trade unionism, but their cue has always been to turn a blind eye, and, when that is impossible, to minimize the extent of the mischief and soothe the public with ' optimistic ' assurances, which the public are always ready to swallow. That policy is natural, and up to a point defensible; but when the result is a continued and rapid increase of the evil on lines that promise no decline but certain development into a national danger, then it is time to adopt a different policy.

" The central fact is that behind the meaningless and stupid term 'labour unrest' lies a conscious revolutionary movement which aims at the complete overthrow of the existing economic and social order, not in some uncertain future, but here and now."

our most fundamental conceptions, touching such things as the institution of private property, the real nature of democracy, the rights of the individual and the power of the community, — the character of human society in fact.

" The war of Nations," ^ writes Frederic Harrison, " is being entangled with, is merging into, the war of Class : about sovereignty, ranks, upper and lower Orders; but essentially, between those who hold Capital and those who Work with their hands. National wars, as we see, unite men in nations: class wars suppress the spirit of nationality, for they herald what Socialists promise as the grander form of Patriotism, the brotherhood of labourers. At the opening of the great European War Democracy was appealed to, and nobly it answered the call in the name of the Nation. But now, in this fourth year of war, we see all over Europe how democratic patriotism is expanding into the new Industrial Order which dreamers for two generations have Imagined as the Social Revolution."

That Social Revolution will determine the political issues. Yet its nature and underlying forces are left all but undiscussed and unrepresented in the American press.

There are several causes contributing to that neglect. We get in the American press long quotations every day from the daily papers of Britain as representing " British " opinion. But for reasons of an economic order the British Labour Party, and the groups composing it, although they represent

'^Fortnightly Revienv, Jan., 1918.

perhaps the majority of the British population, do not possess a single daily paper. It thus happens that day after day during serious crises, we get voluminous expressions of " British opinion " from which possibly the largest section of all is excluded;

Let us note the relation of this Social Revolution of which Mr. Harrison speaks, to the accomphshment of the specific objects for which America entered this war.

What are those objects?

The President has repeatedly, both explicitly and implicitly, emphasized this fact : The establishment of a new international order is not for America, as it is for the other belligerents, something over and above special national objects. It is in itself the major American purpose, since it is the condition sine qua non of the prevention of the particular abuses which caused her to enter the war; the condition of achieving any result whatsoever. Even though no League of Nations were established, France would secure the righting of the wrong of 1872 ; Italy would redeem her unredeemed fatherland, and so down the whole list of the European belligerents. But what would America get? Her belligerency on behalf of the freedom of future generations of Americans, the preservation of democracy in the world, is related in a more intimate way than in the case of her European associates to the ending of an international order based upon competitive militarism.

A new international order as the outcome of the war might take one of three possible forms :

(i) A close aUiance of the four chief allied [6]

governments: America, Britain, France and Italy, imposing a general settlement arranged privately among themselves, that settlement covering such questions as the kind of government which shall be recognized (that is, permitted) not only in Germany but in Russia, Poland, Ukrainia, Roumania, Bohemia, Serbia, etc. Such an Alliance would be an organ of coercion for securing the observance of the settlement, territorial and other, which it might make, using perhaps its military forces in such cases as Russia, but more frequently its power through control of food, shipping and raw material.

(2) A Sociahst International definitely aligned against the League of Governments just described. The International would stand for the Soviets, for complete industrial democracy in Russia or Germany, or anywhere else that such experiments might be tried.

(3) A Liberal League of Nations of the Wilson type, embracing not only the four chief AUied belligerents but the lesser states, the enemy states, and the neutrals as well. Its main activities would be, not repressive and coercive, aimed at compelling observance of an imposed status quo, but legislative. It would aim not so much at enforcing peace through the power of a few great governments, as at making constitutional provision for changes in the conditions which lead to war, creating for that purpose democratic machinery in the shape of an international legislature as truly representative as possible of the peoples. It would provide for change and development by constitutional means, removing the need for war as an instrument of change or growth. It would thus provide In the International field what every nation provides as a matter of course within its own borders. Its first task would be not so much that of policemen compelling observance of ancient international laws, as of democratic law-makers devising better rules. The questions Involved In these political alternatives cannot be answered without raising the fundamental issue of the Social Revolution. Let us note how the development of governmental policy with reference to a certain political decision Is now tending to raise that Issue.

After fairly definite declarations to the effect that there should be no military intervention In Russia for the purpose of Interfering with the Internal affairs of that country, we have intervened. The first justification was that the country was falling under the military domination of Germany. Russia's forces were aiding our enemy In war. But that enemy is now disarmed. We still intervene. On what ground? It has not so far been stated. But there are several perfectly arguable grounds. It Is undeniable that the Russian Revolutionary government has robbed miUIons of honest Frenchmen of their savings. That money was not lent to Czardom for the purposes of oppression. With it, Russia has built railroads and docks — and steals them. More, the economic penetration of Russia by Individual Germans may place it dangerously under German Influence. The possible creation of a new menace to western democracy may demand that that process of penetration shall stop. Certain groups — monarchist, Cadet — which recently were turning to Germany for aid, are now believed to favour our intervention. It will, therefore, be far better for the future of democracy — and Russian bonds — that the early steps of Russians in self-government and self-determination should be guided by their elder brothers; the practical means to that end being the partition of the country between the great Allied powers for a prolonged military occupation. Japan, who has been to the forefront In the policy of intervention, will of course shoulder her part of the White Man's Burden in its latest form, and in fitting the Slav race for democracy upon Western models.

That decision, if carried out, will of course necessarily mean that the future League of Nations will be of the Holy Alliance type. Just as the Congress of Peace which settled the last world war ended in a League of Nations (the phrase was current, by the way, at the Congress of Vienna) which decided to forbid experiments In political democracy as the enemy of public order (which In a sense they certainly were) so the new Peace Congress may forbid experiments In new forms of democracy, based, as we regard It, upon theft, and threatening the peace and security of that form of political organization which we have developed during the nineteenth century. The Holy Alliance which followed the Congress of Vienna was initiated by a sincere, religious enthusiast, for the declared purpose of maintaining world peace, which was presumed (rightly) to be incompatible with political democracy as we now know it. The Peace of Vienna was broken, less by the dynasts who were honestly in favour of a peace which should crystallize the order in which they were the ruling element, than by revolting American colonies, popular revolutions, and assertions of nationahty.

But we know that that interpretation of " making the world safe for democracy " will not be accepted by great masses of the folk in Western Europe.

In the pages that follow some attempt is made to show why so many among the European peoples have ceased to attach much value to mere political democracy — control of their political government and destiny — and, as already noted, are Insisting that democracy means the right to control their industrial life and government, to determine their workaday conditions by control of the economic basis of the community's life — the means of production, distribution, exchange. This involves the right of the state to take private property and capital for social ends, as absolutely as it now, for mstance, takes the life of the worker for its military purposes. Soviet Russia, in the application of this principle to practice, has asserted the right to exclude from its government all those who do not subscribe to its communistic principles. Just as England refuses to accord the vote to those who will not fight for the state (conscientious objectors to the conscription of life), so Russia refuses to give the vote to those who resist the conscription of their wealth.

That interpretation of democracy we are for the time being resisting, and this issue has on both sides overridden the original causes of conflict. Note to what degree. The Nationalist parties in Russia, those whose sentiment of Slav national soHdarity were such as to throw the protection of Russia over small Slav states endangered by the aggression of Germany, are the very parties who, in the border states, were the first to call in German aid to repel rival Russian parties who would upset the existing economic order. As between the Russian Bolshevik and the enemy German bourgeois, they chose the German bourgeois. The " Whites " of Ukrainia, like those of Finland, very readily allied themselves with Germans to fight Russians. The son of Leo T-olstoy begins an article in an American paper with these words: "I shall be glad for Russia when the Germans take Petrograd. It w'ill finish the Bolsheviki." Professor Miliukoff himself went to Kieff to come to an alliance with the Germans. The parties whom we are now supporting in Ukraine and in Finland are those which have been notable for their readiness to co-operate with the Germans In resistance to the Russian Bolsheviks. But the most striking illustration of all is of course the clause in the armistice conditions which demands that the German troops shall remain in the border states " until the internal conditions permit of their withdrawal." Their withdrawal now would be the signal for Bolshevik capture of power. As these lines are being written the American newspapers contain dispatches rejoicing at the defeat of Bolsheviks by

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troops commanded by German officers. We are allied with Germans against Russians. The original alignment of forces by nations — Germany versus Russia — has disappeared and has been replaced by an alignment based on class and party. To make the demonstration complete is the fact mentioned in one of the dispatches that the Soviet troops are largely officered by German ex-prisoners — privates made officers by the Russian Soviets. These Germans, leading Russians, are now fighting their own ex-officers leading Russians. We are In alliance with Russo-German bourgeois and imperialists against Russo-German republicans and Socialists.

The situation may be unavoidable, and wise politics. I am not discussing the merits of the thing, only calling attention to the facts, which we do not sufficiently face.

The suppression of Soviet government in Russia and establishment of order will not be a simple matter; obviously it will be extremely difficult. And we shall have to deal not only with Russia, but with conflicts in most of the small independencies which we have created — In Poland, Ukralnia, Jugo-Slavla. Already Poland Is at war with Ukralnia, and Jugoslavia In violent disagreement with Italy. And In addition to controlling these numerous small independencies there is the problem of controlling Socialist Germany.

The German problem has also entirely changed In character. It Is no longer a problem of suppressing autocratic militarism, but of dealing with an autocratic Socialism. Germany has omitted the phase of political democracy in her development, and jumped in a day from political autocracy to what may well prove to be a proletarian dictatorship of socialist principles. Germany may well so develop as to become the natural ally of Soviet Russia. We face a Russo-German Socialist alliance.

It may be part of the German evil which has cursed the world that the German people have shown three qualities in highly developed degree : discipline, pushed to the point of docility, in submission to the constituted order whatever it may happen to be (Hindenburg seemed to obey a German Soviet as readily as, a week previously, he had obeyed his mediaeval emperor) ; cohesion as a racial and national group, and capacity for organization.

We have thus a solid Germanic block soon to number a hundred million, influencing a Russian block as large, and thrust into the midst of smaller and often mutually antagonistic states. In fact, one result of the break-up of Russia and Austria may be to make Germany (plus German Austria) the most powerful racially-unified group on the Continent. More than one military critic has expressed the opinion that Germany will be relatively stronger after the war than she was before ! Such a Germany would be able to manipulate the mutual antagonisms of her lesser neighbours in order to secure for herself the aid of one against another. That game has been played endlessly in history.

What then is the political outlook?

Suppose we manage to repress Bolshevism in our states. It will be by means of increasing the central authority and the repressive character of our governments, making them military, " Prussian." That means bringing into power everywhere in the western states those parties that are Nationalistic in temper and outlook. We need not stop now to examine why parties that support militarist and repressive forms of government should also be Nationalist, Chauvinist. It suffices for the moment that it happens to be the case. Between Nationalism, Militarism and Chauvinism there is a close casual relationshif). Note where the fact lands us.

There seems a possibility that Germany may break into several states. As the result of what forces? Of the coming of Bolshevism to power in Berlin and other northern cities. But assume Bolshevism is suppressed. It will be by virtue of the coming to power of a strong National government, resting on the appeal of the National tradition. And then the German solidarity — and German menace — will remain. If we have to deal with Bolshevism by repression exercised through strongly centralized nationalistic governments we have not destroyed the specific danger it was the object of the war to dispose of.

A large number of lesser states endowed with military, Nationalistist and Chauvinist governments means the perpetuation of the old rivalries and antagonisms. What situation does that leave in Europe?

It has taken four years of war fully to push home to our consciousness — if indeed it can be said to have done it yet — the almost self-evident truth that in the case of a war fought by a large alliance made up of all sorts and conditions of nations, success depends, not alone upon the possession of ample military force by each separte state (although that is absolutely necessary) but also upon the capacity to combine those forces to a common purpose, to employ them to a common end. If incompatibility of aim sphts the Alliance, or even prevents complete co-operation, the very power created to give us victory may be used to make it impossible.

Mere military preparedness could not improve the situation to our advantage. The defection of Russia from the Alliance and her political collapse, would not have been prevented by the fact of possessing more military power. That might have made the consequences worse. If, for instance, the stores of military material which were ready for shipment had actually reached Russia in 19 17, American troops might have been killed by American guns and shells. (It may well now be happening.) In the same way it will serve I'ittle purpose to resuscitate the military power of Russia, if her political development results in her becoming a future ally of Germany.

The forces behind the military disasters we have actually had to face as the result of the Russian collapse, and the dangers we may have to face as the result of pro-Prussian development of Russian policy, are moral, social, economic. Those forces will determine the policy which will direct the mihtary power. It is not alone the gun which mutters but the direction in which it shoots. And that is determined by policy.

It is of the utmost importance to get clearly in our minds the outstanding difference between ourselves and the enemy. During the war he managed to achieve unity of a kind by virtue of historical and geographical circumstances. His alliance was composed of a group of states geographically contiguous with one member of it so predominant in power — military, political and economic — as to be able to impose so long as the alliance lasted at least unity of policy and direction. Our alliance was made up of a much larger number of states, not grouped together, but scattered over the face of the world, separated by great differences of national character and interest, and not dominated by the preponderant power of one member able by simple virtue of that power, autocratically to impose a single policy and aim. And if we are to achieve a unification as effective as that of the enemy it must be by virtue of voluntary co-operation — a democratic internationalism. Such a process is much more difficult, and cumbrous than the autocratic method, and apt to be much less immediately efficient. But it is all that is left to us, and whatever its difficulty we must embark on it. It is our failure to do this in sufficient degree which in the past has given, and will in the future give, the enemy his one great chance of success.^

^Lord Robert Cecil, the British Under Secretary of State for Foreign AfEairs, in a public address said : " We have got to pool

Now the prevailing idea seems to be that unity will be maintained if we don't speak rudely of one another or recriminate over reverses. But unity is not achieved merely by good intention. No one of the Allies wanted to quarrel with Russia, and we were very scrupulous early in the war about not saying rude things concerning the Czar. But we see now that we should have had a better chance of understanding the Revolution, and of guiding its course, if we had reconciled ourselves to a few home truths about the Czarist regime. So with Italy. A little frank counsel about the conditions of the treaty of April, 19 1 5, might have very greatly accelerated the line taken three years later. No one wants to offend either Russia or Japan at this juncture. We have the best of feelings towards both. Yet a fatal disunity, resulting in a permanent Russo-German Alliance may come out of the best intentions; it may result equally from our action or our want of action in the matter of intervention. So with Anglo-American relations today. How many Americans realize that just as Russian SociaHsm was unwittingly

all our resources. ... In this and many other matters we are fighting under a certain disadvantage. Our enemies have been content to enslave themselves to the German general staff. That gives* them a certain unity of control, a certain perfection of machinery, which it is difficult for us to imitate. For, after all, the essential part of our struggle is that we are free nations, that we claim the right to decide, each for ourselves, what is necessary in the interests of the general cause. ... I do not myself wish it otherwise. I am satisfied that with all its inconveniences it gives us a spiritual strength which ultimately will secure victory for us over the enemy. But if we are to succeed despite our freedom we must be prepared to scrap national prejudice, national sentiment, and even I would say, national interests. That is essential if we really propose to make the best use of the strength we have." (Reported in New York Times, Sept. 3, 1918.)