Germany her own judge : reply of a cosmopolitan Swiss to German propaganda

Preface

TO THE SECOND GERMAN EDITION

The present second edition can appear at a considerably reduced price, since it has undergone no vital alteration and the type of the earlier edition is therefore mostly available.

It is important for the majority of the Swiss living abroad that the opinion which they hold in overwhelming proportion on the subject of the responsibility for the world war should become known in a form accessible if possible to all classes at home. Even to-day a section of the German-Swiss press is treating the question of responsibility, which is so preeminently important in any peace negotiations, far too superficially; to this section it appears advantageous, for financial and professional reasons, to serve the German side. This unjust, and therefore damaging, procedure is awakening in foreign countries an intelligible disgust with ever3^hing that is German-Swiss, and from this not only the Swiss abroad, but also the Motherland may suffer. A strict control of the press on the part of the public is therefore desirable. The present cheaper edition is intended to play its part in making the control stricter.

In order to meet the accusation of prejudice, the second edition excludes every documentary proof which is not acknowledged as accurate by both vi Preface

sides, and therefore by the accused parties. Naturally all unsubstantiated attempts at exoneration to be found in war propaganda must be disregarded, for it is the duty of all impartial historical students to use only authentic material.

We emphatically defend our point of view about the responsibility for the war, because the comfortable but inaccurate subterfuge according to which ''all the States willed the war'* favours the rise of an universal anarchistic Babel after the war. And that is a result which would in the end benefit no class of society, but would harm the whole of humanity.

The Author

ABBREVIATIONS

N.Z.Z. = Neue Ziircher Zeitung B.N. = Easier Nachrichten

Contents

Introduction ix

I. The "Belgian State Papers" .... 3

II. German and English International Policy . 9

Introduction

To Neutrals: "Logic, not race sympathy!"

Herr Avenarius, the German, disapproves of reserve! Still, following the hint of Spitteler, I intended to keep silent till the end of the war and only to publish my notes after the conclusion of peace. I had a feeling that a neutral who has no intention of taking an active part in a struggle must remain dumb till the war is ended, from simple tact — from tact towards his neighbours as well as from respect for his own Government ! But the loud tone and the aberrations of writers in the German camp ("Stimmen im Sturm,'* etc.) force me to immediate speech.

So let Herr Avenarius listen!

First of all, to avoid mistakes, let me introduce myself to the reader.

I am a German -Swiss, or, more accurately, a cosmopolitan who has seen too much to back any race or people without reason. My earliest youth was spent in Russia. ^'A pro-Russian in disguise, I suppose/' Not at all. Although we Germans (from Germany and Switzerland) met with a hospitality in Russia which deserves our fullest gratitude, we mostly kept the strongest attachment to our Western homes. And this was nowhere more apparent

X Introduction

than in my own family, as we had a Swiss tutor for our early education instead of going to a Russian school. Our social intercourse at that time was confined to a small circle of German and Swiss residents. Then I went to school at Zurich. And nearly ten years' stay in Zurich made me completely Swiss. It was not till my return to Russia for some years' stay that I came in closer contact with the Russian character. Although I came to value much in it highly, I felt more at home in German surroundings in consequence of my education. I have very often taken Germany's part against Germans born and educated in Russia! My inadequate knowledge of the Russian language and my strong feeling for the West alienated my sympathies from Russia in no small degree. So I chose Germany for my permanent home as it was thoroughly sympathetic to me in many respects^ not least politically. The new German ''Kultur'' indeed, which I met in Berlin, did not wholly fulfill my expectations; for the old comfort, charming simplicity, and honesty were more and more being ousted by ostentation, cold shoddy glitter, and the last thing in materialism.^ Yet I still continued to defend Germany as often and as well as I could.

I used to say that elsewhere too the growth of the moral cancer was to be noticed, that the Empire, and especially the Southern States, should not be

^ Cf. inter alia Sudermann's poem "Was wir waren" {Berliner Tageblatt, August, 1914); also the opinions of Th. Oehler, director of German Missions (B.N. 21 supplement); and the Crown Prince {Deutschland in Waff en) , etc.

Introduction xi

measured by the standard of Berlin ; I would praise German order in contrast to the Apache licence of Paris, to the unrest in the French vineyards, and so forth. I lived nearly ten years in Germany with the firm intention of remaining there; at most I should have exchanged the capital for Munich and the Starnbergersee, as those districts are more congenial to a German-Swiss. What bound me to Germany was the conservative spirit, which establishes order for the present and brings security for the future by its system of entails and family trusts — and these are growing more and more common even among the middle classes. This feeling of security is weaker in democracies from the fear of vague and extravagant desires on the part of an often improvident proletariat. I noted, too, that the general tone of the people grows more refined under a monarchy — which agreeably impresses a foreigner.

The war broke out. The German method of opening the war, the violation of Belgian neutrality, and even more the white robes which German propaganda assumed, disgusted me utterly. My unusual position made me too impartial to believe the legend of foreign attack (cf. chs. ix and x). I left Germany, which I had held so high in my estimation, in disgust, in spite of friendly relations and many other pleasant recollections.^

I went to my own country. The impression which

* I read lately, in a correspondence from the United States, a passage which pictured the experiences I had had myself (B.N. 445): "Those classes which before the war had the greatest feeling for German culture mostly declare themselves against Germany."

xii Introduction

I got there was a depressing one. It was as if the German war wave had advanced the frontier of the Empire from the Rhine to the St. Gothard. I will not attempt to hold up a true mirror to Switzerland, for her to see the picture which she then presented to a newly returned Swiss of cosmopolitan sympathies like myself. I will only call to remembrance that an exaggerated, almost blind, belief in ''German truth" reigned among the German-Swiss, and among the Latins an overloud declaration for right and freedom. Even though (as I believe) the war had been staged and opened by certain Prussian circles in order finally to establish German predominance, noisy partisanship by small States would have been useless to the group of Powers attacked and actually dangerous for the small States themselves. For the issue of the war appeared likely at the beginning to be preeminently in favour of the attacking side. As the neutrals had failed to intervene on the lines of the Anglo-American pacifism when Austria sent her ultimatum to Serbia, any later pronouncement was futile.

Many Swiss fall to-day into the opposite error; they hold that true neutrality precludes all free judgment. That is obviously wrong; it is precisely the neutral who can deliver an impartial verdict — a verdict based solely on logic and free from all race sympathy. The longer the war lasts, the less can we suspend judgment. There are, indeed, many who hold the opinion that the division of our people into two camps to some extent insures our neutrality. That would be a sign of intellectual

Introduction xiii

poverty; our neutrality should spring from a reasonable will and not from internal division. This division is no help to our political unity! The only real neutral is the man who can deliver an impartial judgment in spite of his national sympathies, and who — even though this judgment must recognize right to be disconcertingly stronger on the one side — shows his weapons equally to both groups and behaves as tactfully to one side as to the other.

Chapter I The "belgian State Papers"

The world war was originally represented on the German side as a purely defensive war. German propaganda, however, gradually shifted its ground from "a hostile attack" to a war '' forced upon us." And now it is attempting to justify this preventive war, for which purpose it relies extensively on the so-called "Belgian State Papers." As these documents will also play a prominent part in my argument, I think it relevant to begin with a short commentary on them.

The "Belgian State Papers" are a collection of letters from Belgian diplomatists, which the German Foreign Office selected for publication from among the correspondence discovered in Brussels. The object, as Herr von Bethmann says, is "to show the world that even neutral statesmen in Berlin, Paris, and London saw preeminent danger in the policy of the Entente." The documents prove, indeed, that up to the German declaration of war the Belgians were no friends of the policy of the Entente, which confirms Herr von Bethmann's earlier confession that "a wrong had been done to Belgium by Germany." But they further prove to us, as I will show in detail in the fifth chapter, that

Edward the Seventh's preventive policy, which met with a very varied reception in neutral countries, was shipwrecked on the obstructively democratic mentality of the English people; and that therefore there is no excuse whatever for the German preventive war. Hence the publication of the " Belgian State Papers '* is the greatest blunder of the whole German propaganda.

Doubtless the reader is favourably impressed by the German side at first, owing to the very careful selection of the letters and also to the fact that certain passages, which favour Germany, are emphasized by heavy type. But the more closely he examines the documents, the more he is convinced that the publication of the ''State Papers" completely misses its mark. In the first place, students of the most recent European history will find gaps, incriminating Germany, in the selection and sequence of the letters. Secondly, it will make an unfavourable impression on any impartial neutral that the collection includes such a disproportionate number of letters from the Belgian representative in Berlin, Baron Greindl, whose sympathies were Pan-German. These are in sharp contrast with the utterances of the other representatives (which are naturally not in heavy type). Baron Greindl, who chose as his favourite paper the Pan-German Kreuzzeitungy who untiringly forwarded to his Government with approval the weekly reports of the well-known Pan-German Professor Schiemann, produces an absolutely repellent effect by his exaggerated German racial sympathy. He writes, for instance: —

The Belgian State Papers 5

Behind the agreements, concluded or contemplated, there is always in evidence the hatred of Germany, which is kept alive in Paris by the perpetual memory of the humiliation of 1870, in London by jealousy of the development of Germany's trade, industry, and navy, and in St. Petersburg by nothing but prejudice and the boundless Slav pride which feels injured by the contrast between German civilization and Muscovite barbarism. (No. 26.)

What unworthy language for a diplomat! The words might come straight from the lips of the Pan-German professor Schiemann. A true neutral thirsts for documentary proof and nothing else; provocative outbursts rouse his disgust! But Herr von Greindl feeds us up with unproved assertions, and these are emphasized in the German collection by heavy type, although they contradict statements of his Belgian colleagues. As an instance I may cite his remarks on the French idea of revanche: —

When has the peace of Europe been threatened, except by the French idea of revanche 7 (No. 39.)

A real and lasting rapprochement between Berlin and Paris would presuppose the elimination of the idea of revanche; but there is no Frenchman, even among the most sensible and peace-loving, who does not cherish the hope of revanche in his heart of hearts. (No. 36.)

So writes Herr von Greindl from Berlin. But the contrary views of the Ambassador in Paris, Herr A. Leghait, — the man on the spot, — are not in heavy type : —

If France after long years of slumbering peace is thinking of sharpening her sword again, we must not assuijie that file is urged to do so by lust of conquest; (No. 11.) "'

Her readiness for defence is under consideration and c6'!niparisons are being made with the powerful organization of her Eastern neighbour (Germany). (No. 1 1.)

It is certain that French poHcy is conducted with the idea of peace. (No. 51.)

Herr von Greindl makes great play, too, — unfortunately also without documentary proof, — with the ostensible objects of the policy of the Entente: —

I do not question Sir Edward Grey*s sincerity; but it is nevertheless true that, with or without written or verbal commitments, every one in England or France regards the Entente Cordiale as a defensive and offensive alliance against Germany. This corresponds exactly to the character which the late King of England wanted to give it. The Entente Cordiale was not founded on the positive basis of defence of common interests, but on the negative basis of hatred of the German Empire! (No. 85.)

Yet this is answered in modest ordinary type by the remarks of his Belgian colleagues from London and Paris : —

France, who sincerely desires the preservation of peace and the improvement of her relations with Germany, will have to make great diplomatic efforts to prove in Berlin that the Entente Cordiale need not alarm Germany and was not concluded to prevent German expansion. (Leghait, Paris, No. 24.)

Certain Jingo organs of the London press declare that Great Britain will have to support the French Cabinet, if the Imperial German Government shows signs of exercising pressure. It hardly appears as if this would be in conformity with the attitude of so peace-loving a Government as that of Mr. Asquith. (Lalaing, London, the Morocco Question, No. 69.)

Grey's position is not free from difficulties; on the one hand he would naturally like to conserve his relations with Germany, which have improved recently, while on the other

The Belgian State Papers 7

hand he would not like to give the impression of not siff>- porting France. {Ibid,, No. 74.)

Thus an attentive reader finds a large number of the crudest contradictions in the '^ Belgian State Papers," as might be expected in the publication of personal opinions ^ even from the pens of active diplomats. Only such statements, therefore, have a historical value, which describe events, or which are, at any rate, to some extent supported by proofs.

On the whole, on the strength of many of these '* State Papers,*' the reader gets the firm conviction that the Belgians, even in London and Paris, had little sympathy with the policy of the Entente. This is intelligible. The former grouping of the Powers, which separated France and Germany into two camps, renewed the danger of invasion for Belgium with each European conflict. Therefore the Belgians favoured a rapprochement between France and Germany, which would have removed all danger for Belgium. The growing preponderance of Germany was regarded with calm resignation as inevitable : —

In a few years a balance of power between France and her neighbour (Germany) will be no longer possible. Germany need only have patience, need only continuously increase her economic and financial strength in peace, need only await the effect of her superior birth-rate, in order to dominate all Central Europe without contradiction and without a struggle. (Beyens, No. 118.)

Every attempt of the Franco-Russian alliance to preserve the European balance of power — whether by increasing their own armies or by the accession of the British Fleet (the Entente policy) — was, as is intelligible, condemned by Belgium, as she imagined that her painful position between the hammer and the anvil was thereby protracted. The possibility of seeing their country entangled in a foreign war naturally disturbed the Belgians more than the fear of a German hegemony.

Hence the heavy- type extracts in the "State Papers. '*

But France, Russia, and England had other views about the balance of power in Europe and about the preservation of the status quo ante on the Continent and on the sea.

Chapter II

I. The Origins of German Colonial Policy The origin of the hankering after colonial power dates from the concluding years of Emperor William the First's reign. The desire of the commercial circles of Bremen and Hamburg for colonies of their own found a willing ear in the son of the Crown Prince, the present Emperor. Troubles with natives and difficulties raised by foreign nations afforded this desire certain justification. At that time, however, it encountered opposition from the bulk of the German people, as far-seeing circles feared future complications and dangers. Indeed, there was a great danger that appetite might grow with success and that the next generation might blossom out from colonial desires to desire for world-power. To satisfy such wishes, Germany would inevitably have to cross the path of other States. For in consequence of the late awakening of her colonial policy (England began in 1602, Germany in 1883), the youthful Germany found the world more or less divided up, with the exception of a few districts (containing points of vital strategic importance) under Moslem rule. And on two of these points England had already laid her hand, namely, Gibraltar and the Suez Canal (the purchase of the shares took place in 1875), in order to secure her direct sea route to India.

2. Naval Rivalry

The Emperor William II realized that a larger fleet was requisite for the entry of Germany into the ranks of the World Powers. Unfortunately he went too far in his efforts in this direction, for he aimed at outstripping the English fleet. With this object Germany refused every programme of proportionate armaments which England proposed. (Proportion of 10 to 16; also, the so-called ^' Naval Holiday.*' Cf. German pacifist literature.)

But as soon as any fleet is greater than the British one, the danger of encirclement would exist permanently and in its sharpest form for the island empire, whose fleet is the equivalent of the land army of a Continental State. While it is exceedingly difficult effectively to encircle a Continental State on account of its many neighbours, England is at the mercy of any State with a more powerful fleet. So the State which aims at outstripping the English fleet is pursuing against England nothing else than a policy of encirclement, and from the modern German point of view would give England the moral right to set the world ablaze.

3. The Balance of Power in Europe The consequence of this special position of England is that she cannot permit the marked predominance of any country on the Continent. The more powerful a Continental Power is, the more greedily does it look at England's possessions in the world; but little England cannot by herself deal with too strong a Continental Power. ^ It must therefore be England's aim to maintain the balance of power in Europe as equal as possible, but to retain so free a hand in her Continental alliances that she can offer her friendship to either group of Powers according to circumstances. ^

In any case England must actively associate herself with the weaker side as soon as an ambitious group becomes aggressive.

This "police supervision" of Europe by England is especially beneficial to the small Continental States. For it is obvious that a predominant large State only considers the interests of a small State, if the latter finds a backing in the balance of power which provides the best possible guarantee for the status quo ante.

On the other hand, an attempt by England to abuse her position as a World Power as regards the Continent in times of peace would bring upon her an Anglophobe coalition, which might easily be her destruction.

^ How necessary it is for England to support the weaker military group on the Continent was neatly put in a popular form by a German acquaintance of mine. We were discussing at the beginning of the war the probable enormous French and Russian war indemnities (one hundred milliard marks), and the Berliner said: "We will build a fleet with the money, and then England had better arm herself!"

2 Cf. Sir Edward Grey's words at the time of the German-English rapprochement : "Old friends do not exclude new friendships."

^ 4. The Hegemony of the World

England, the greatest European sea Power, would only become a danger to the world if she were to unite with the strongest Continental Power. There is no possible doubt now that Germany, the mightiest State on land, had been working for this, for Herr von Bethmann opposed the English principle of a balance of power ^' which kept Europe nervous'' in order, as he confesses in his speech of the 2d of December, 1 9 14, to force England into a British-German agreement.

He hoped to achieve this object by the military predominance of Germany : —

. . . England was comparatively the least entangled. An attempt at an understanding could most easily be made with her, which would have absolutely guaranteed the peace of the world ... I never hoped to break down this old English principle [of the balance of power] by persuasion. But I thought it possible that the growing power of Germany and the increasing risk of war might force England to realize that this ancient principle was untenable and impracticable and that a peaceful compact with Germany was preferable.^

The Chancellor's paper, the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, commented on this (B.N. 172): —

Supposing a firm and loyal understanding were to be established between Germany and England, the danger of a European war would be removed so far as human foresight can reach. France would not dare to provoke a war, and other European dangers of war would be nipped in the

1 The later speeches of the German Chancellor also clearly revealed this effort to achieve predominant power on the part of German policy.

bud by the weight of an Anglo-German agreement. As is well known, England did not assent to these proposals.

It is obvious that this over-powerful Anglo-German hegemony would have meant danger for all other States. When, therefore, these intentions on Germany's part were revealed for the first time by England in this war, the Chancellor hastened to calm the fears of the most powerful neutral, America, by the following statement to one of her press representatives : —

... I reminded the English Ambassador of my long-continued efforts to bring about an understanding between England and Germany, efforts which, as I suggested to him, would have made a general European war impossible and fully guaranteed the peace of Europe. Such an understanding would have formed the basis on which we should have approached the United States as a third partner. But England did not accept these views, and by entering the war destroyed for ever the hope of their fulfilment.

England certainly did not refuse Germany's enticing offer from sheer love of justice. The far-seeing Briton saw clearly that even the greatest naval Power would be bound to sink into vassalage to her all-powerful Continental friend, as soon as the latter had achieved assured predominance on the Continent.

The Chancellor failed to enforce this definite agreement with England; on the contrary, his policy of ''the growing power of Germany and the increasing risk of war" spurred on the fatal competition of armaments in Europe.

5. Chancellor J Crown Prince ^ and People We should be wronging Herr von Bethmann if we ascribed to him alone and to his epoch the origin of the German lust for predominance and the responsibility for it. Prince Biilow, who claims for himself the honour of being the founder of German world-policy, proclaimed in a sitting of the Herrenhaus as early as 1904: *'The King at the head of Prussia, Prussia at the head of Germany, Germany at the head of the world ! " ^

Herr von Bethmann *s actions are, indeed, worse than such words as those. It is true that the Anglo- Russian proposals as to the extension of international law, arbitration, and the limitation of armaments came to nothing owing to Germany's opposition even in Herr von Billow's time (as can be shown from German pacifist literature) ; still, the universal competition in armament did not reach fever heat till Herr von Bethmann's regime. It was Herr von Bethmann who tried to secure German predominance for generations to come by means of a world catastrophe. The starting of the world conflagration and the fiction of a foreign attack (for

^ This phrase of Billow's forms a significant background for German policy from 1904 to 1907, which was trying to checkmate the English fleet by means of an overwhelming Continental coalition. (Burzev's Revelations.)

It is comprehensible that such words influenced the present Crown Prince — at that time twenty-two years old. A well-known Swiss paper comments very justly: ^^ At home this had a very good reception, but abroad, e.g., by attentive listeners such as Edward VII, it might well be maintained that Germany, the mischiefmaker, was aiming at the domination of the world."

proofs, see chs. ix and x) are such momentous actions that they can only be explained by the presupposition of a vast increase of power after the war, great enough to crush the idea of revenge.

While the last two Chancellors show us the clear determination to place Germany *'at the head of the world,'* there is a third character who also gives us an insight into German aims — the Crown Prince William! He is, of course, not yet a responsible director, but is all the more dangerous as a propagandist. How does he write in his famous book '^ Germany in Arms '7 Among other gems we read :

The German Empire above all other nations of our old earth has the sacred duty of keeping its army and fleet at the highest point of readiness. It is only so, supported by our good sword, that we can attain to the place in the sun which is our right, but which is not willingly conceded to us.

The much-read Pan-German propagandist Dr. Paul Liman comments justly on this in his well-known book "The Crown Prince": —

We find here the realization that a people must not rest content with the goods which the past created for it, unless it means to surrender itself, that Germany, too, is entitled to claim the right of free movement, but that she will attain to the place which is her due only by making sure of her power to take it by force.

The comment is absolutely to the point: the Crown Prince's words are, indeed, fundamentally aggressive; it is not a question of protecting existing possessions, but of acquiring new possessions. "The thirst for increased power and greatness in certain circles in Germany before the outbreak of i6 Germany Her Own Judge

war and the envy of England's world possessions are depicted for us in an interesting way by Liman among other authors : ^ —

And when the Crown Prince saw the fatal effects of perpetual famine in India, when he noted the fierce hatred which lay so near the surface, did he not get the impression that even the edifice of English power, in spite of its apparent stability, might yet one day collapse? . . .

For the Crown Prince knows that we stand at a turning-point of history. We all have the feeling that the dawn of a new world is beginning to appear, and that the content of the history of the coming decades, in which the Crown Prince will be our leader, must be different from the past. A universal monarchy like that of the early Middle Ages will certainly never arise again, and if, nevertheless, we were to talk nowadays of a world-domination in the narrower sense, we should have to point to England, whose flag rules the seas, whose colonies form a mightier empire than the Caesars ever united beneath theii* sway. . . .

The German people is thirsting for a new period of action, for the possibility of winning new rights over new territories. It is not "saturated," as the Philistines say, quoting a phrase of Bismarck's which was coined for the moment, for a limited European purpose. Germany does not want a policy of peace, but of power. The traditions of the heroic age are not so utterly extinct, the ancient pride is not so utterly dead, that we should be content to retire to the dower house. . . .

We need more egoism and more determination such as springs from a sure self-consciousness. The lotus flower does not float on the dark pond in our country, nor will the

^ From the overwhelming mass of material I pick out Liman's work, because a personal friend of his drew my attention, whilst I was still living in Berlin, to his successful book. This book, which has, I may add, a semi-official character, because it defends the Crown Prince himself and his militarist-imperialist tendencies, appeared in a large edition some months b^ore the outbreak of war, and is therefore served up "piping hot."