Paley's moral and political philosophy

Front matter

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PALEY'S MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

Chap. I. Definition and use of the science 17

n. Law of honor 18

III. Law of the land 18

IV. LawofGod 19

V. The moral sense 21

Culture of the moral faculties 34

VI. Human happiness 36

Vn. Virtue 44

BOOK n.

MORAL OBLIGATIONS.

Chap. I. The question, Why is a man obliged 1 considered. ... 50

II. The meaning of the word < Obligation' 51

III. The question, Why am I obliged to keep my word. ... 52

IV. The will of God 53

V. The Divine benevolence 54

VL Utility 56

VII. The necessity of general rules 58

Vin. On general consequences 60

IX. Ofright 61

X. The division of rights 62

XI. The geneial rights of man 65

CONTENTS.

PART I. OF RELATIVE DUTIES WHICH ARE DETERMINATE. Page

Chap. I. On property 69

n. The use of the institution of property ib.

ni. The history of property 71

IV. In what the right of property is founded 72

V. Promises 74

VI. Contracts. 82

Vn. Contracts of sale ib.

VIII. Contracts of hazard 84

IX. Contracts of loans of property inconsumable 85

X. Contracts of money-lending 86

XI. Contracts of labor — service 88

XII. Contracts of labor — commissions 91

XIII. Contracts of labor — partnership 92

XIV. Contracts of labor— offices 93

XV. Lies 94

XVI. Oaths 97

XVn. Oaths in evidence, 103

[Oaths of allegiance — Oath against bribery in the election of members of parUament — Oath against simony Oaths to observe local statutes— and, Subscriptions to articles of religion, axe omitted.]

xvm. v^^ius 104

Part II. Of Relative Duties Which Are Indeterminate

Chap. I. Charity 109

11. On treatment of dependants ib.

m. Slavery 110

IV. Professional assistance * Ill

V. Pecuniary bounty 112

VI. Resentment 117

VII. Anger 118

VIII. Revenge 119

IX. Duelling 121

CONTENTS. 7

Pigo

Chap. X. Litigation 122

XI. Gratitude 124

XII. Slander 125

Part III. Relative Duties Which Result From The Constitution Of The Sexes

Chap. I. Use of marriage institutions 127

n. Polygamy 129

III. Divorce 130

IV. Marriage 134

V. Duty of parents 136

VI. Rights of parents 142

VII. Duty of children 143

Book IV. Duties To Ourselves

Chap. I. Rights of self-defence 146

II. Drunkenness 147

in. Suicide 150

Book V. Duties Towards God

Chap. I. Division of these duties 154

n. Duty and efficacy of prayer, as seen by the light of

nature ib.

III. Duty and efficacy of prayer, as represented in Scripture 157

IV. Private prayer, family prayer, and public worship 159

V. Forms of prayer in public worship 162

VI. Use of sabbatical institutions 166

VII. Scripture account of sabbatical institutions 168

Vin. By what acts of commission or omission the sabbath is

violated 177

IX. Of reverencing the Deity 179

Book VI. Elements Of Political Knowledge

Chap. I. Origin of civil government 184

II. How subjection to civil government is obtained 186

8 CONTENTS

Page

Chap. III. Duty of submission to civil government 189

IV. Duty of civil obedience, as stated in the Christian

Scriptures 197

V. Civil liberty 201

VI. Different forms of government 203

Vn. First principles of political constitutions 211

VIII. Organization of the legislative power 220

IX. Organization of the executive power 223

X. Powers and restrictions of the legislature 230

XL Municipal law 243

XII. Organization of the judicial power. 248

XIII. Administration of justice 256

XIV. Crimes and punishments. . . .• 265

XV. Rehgious establishments and toleration 276

XVI. War and military establishments 377

THE

AUTHOR'S PREFACE.

Is the treatises that I have met with on the subject of morals, I appear to myself to have remarked the following imperfections ; — either that the principle was erroneous, or that it was indistinctly explained, or that the rules deduced from it were not sufficiently adapted to real life and to actual situations. The writings of Grotius, and the larger work of PuffendorfF, are of too forensic a cast, too much mixed up with the civil law and with the jurisprudence of Germany, to answer precisely the design of a system of ethics, — the direction of private consciences in the general conduct of human life. Perhaps, indeed, they are not to be regarded as institutes of moraUty calculated to instruct an individual in his duty, so much as a species of law books and law authorities, suited to the practice of those courts of justice, whose decisions are regulated by general principles of natural equity, in conjunction with the maxims of the Roman code ; of which kind, I understand, there are many on the continent. To which may be added, concerning both these authors, that they are more occupied in describing the rights and usages of independent commmiities, than is necessary in a work which professes not to adjust the correspondence of nations, but to delineate the offices of domestic life. The profusion also of classical quotations, with which many of their pages abound, seems to me a fault from which it will not be easy to excuse them. If these extracts be intended as decorations of style, the composition is overloaded with ornaments of one kind. To any thing more than ornament they can make no claim. To propose them as serious arguments, gravely to attempt to establish or fortify a moral duty by the testimony of a Greek or Roman poet, is to trifle with the attention of the reader, or rather to take it off from all just principles of reasoning in morals.

Of our own writers in this branch of philosophy, I find none that I think perfectly free from the three objections which I have stated. There is likewise a fourth property observable almost in all of them, namely, that they divide too much the law of Nature from the precepts of Revelation ; some authors industriously declining the mention of Scripture authorities, as belonging to a different province, and others reserving them for a separate volume ; which appears to me much the same defect as if a commentator on the laws of England should content himself with stating on each head the common law of the land, without taking any notice of acts of parliament ; or should choose to give his readers the common law in one book, and the statute law in another. ' When the obligations of morality are taught,' says a pious and celebrated writer, ' let the sanctions of Christianity never be forgotten : by which it will be shown that they give strength and lustre to each other : religion will appear to be the voice of reason, and morality will be the will of God.'*

The manner also in which modem writers have treated of subjects of morality is, in my judgment, liable to much exception. It has become of late a fashion to deliver moral institutes in strings or series of detached propositions, without subjoining a continued argument or regular dissertation to any of them. This sententious apophthegmatising style, by crowding propositions and paragraphs too fast on the mind, and by carrying the eye of the reader from subject to subject in too quick a succession, gains not a sufficient hold on the attention, to leave either the memory furnished or the understanding satisfied. However useful a syllabus of topics or a series of propositions may be in the hands of a lecturer, or as a guide to a student, who is supposed to consult other books, or to institute on each subject researches of his own, the method is by no means convenient for ordinary readers ; because few readers are such thinkers as to want only a hint to set their thoughts at work on ; or such as will pause and tarry at every proposition, till they have traced out its dependency, proof, relation, and consequences, before they permit themselves to step on to another. A respectable writer of this class* has comprised his doctrine of slavery in the three following propositions : —

' No one is born a slave ; because every one is born with all his original rights.'

' No one can become a slave ; because no one, from being a person, can, in the language of the Roman law, become a thing, or a subject of property.'

' The supposed property of the master in the slave, therefore, is mattei of usurpation, not of right.'

It may be possible to deduce from these few adages, such a theory of the primitive rights of human nature, as will evince the illegality of

* Preface to 'The Preceptor,' by Dr. Johnson.

t Dr. Ferguson, author of 'Institutes of Moral PLilosophy,' 1767.

slavery ; but surely an author requires too much of his reader, when he expects him to make these deductions for himself; or to supply, perhaps, from some remote chapter of the same treatise, the several proofs and explanations which are necessary to rendei the meaning and truth of these assertions intelligible.

There is a fault, the opposite of this, which some moralists who have adopted a different, and I think a better plan of composition, have not always been careful to avoid ; namely, the dwelling on verbal and elementary distinctions, with a labour and prolixity proportioned much more to the subtlety of the question, than to its value and importance in the prosecution of the subject. A writer on the law of nature,* whose explications in every part of philosophy, though always diffuse, are often very successful, has employed three long sections in endeavouring to prove that " permissions are not laws." The discussion of this controversy, however essential it might be to dialectic precision, was certainly not necessary to the progress of a work designed to describe the duties and obligations of civil life. The reader becomes impatient when he is detained by disquisitions which have no other object than the settling of terms and phrases ; and, what is worse, they for whose use such books are chiefly intended, will not be persuaded to read them at all.

I am led to propose these strictures, not by any propensity to depreciate the labours of my predecessors, much less to invite a comparison between the merits of their performances and my own ; but solely by the consideration, that when a writer offers a book to the public, on a subject on which the public are already in possession of many others, he is bound by a kind of literary justice to inform his readers, distinctly and specifically, what it is he professes to supply, and what he expects to improve. The imperfections above enumerated are those which I have endeavoured to avoid or remedy. Of the execution the reader must judge ; but this was the design.

Concerning the principle of morals, it would be premature to speak ; but concerning the manner of unfolding and explaining that principle, I have somewhat which I wish to be remarked. An experience of nine years in the office of a public tutor in one of the imiversities, and in that department of education to which these chapters relate, afforded me frequent occasions to observe, that in discoursing to young minds on topics of moraUty, it required much more pains to make them perceive the difficulty than to understand the solution : that, unless the subject was so drawn up to a point as to exhibit the full force of an objection, or the exact place of a doubt, before any explanation was entered on, — in other • Dr. Rutherforth, author of " Institutes of Natural Law."

words, unless some curiosity was excited before it was attempted to be satisfied, the labour of the teacher was lost. When information was not desired, it was seldom, I found, retained. I have made this observation my guide in the following work : that is, on each occasion I have endeavoured, before I suffered myself to proceed in the disquisition, to put the reader in complete possession of the question ; and to do it in the way that I thought most likely to stir up his own doubts and solicitude about it.

In pursuing the principle of morals through the detail of cases to which it is applicable, I have had in view to accommodate both the choice of the subjects and the manner of handling them, to the situations which arise in the life of an inhabitant of this country in these times. This is the thing that I think to be principally wanting in former treatises ; and perhaps the chief advantage which will be found in mine. I have examined no doubts, I have discussed no obscurities, I have encountered no errors, I have adverted to no controversies, but what I have seen actually to exist. If some of the questions treated of appear to a more instructed reader minute or puerile, I desire such reader to be assured that I have found them occasions of difficulty to young minds ; and what I have observed in young minds, I should expect to meet with in all who approach these subjects for the first time. On each article of human duty, I have combined with the conclusions of reason the declarations of Scripture, when they are to be had, as of co-ordinate authority, and as both terminating in the same sanctions.

In the manner of the work, I have endeavoured so to attemper the opposite plans above animadverted on, as that the reader may not accuse me either of too much haste, or too much delay. I have bestowed on each subject enough of dissertation to give a body and substance to the chapter in which it is treated of, as well as coherence and perspicuity : on the other hand, I have seldom, I hope, exercised the patience of the reader by the length and prolixity of my essays, or disappointed their patience at last by the tenuity and unimportance of the conclusion.

There are two particulars in the foUovdng work, for which it may be thought necessary that I should offer some excuse ; the first of which is that I have scarcely ever referred to any other book ; or mentioned the name of the author whose thoughts, and sometimes, possibly, whose very expressions, I have adopted. My method of writing has constantly been this ; to extract what I could from my own stores and my own reflections in the first place ; to put down that, and afterward to consult on each subject such readings as fell in my way j which order, I am convinced, is the only one whereby any person can keep his thoughts

Preface

from sliding into other men's trains. The effect of such a plan on the production itself will be, that, whilst some partis in matter or manner may be new, others will be little else than a repetition of the old. I make no pretensions to perfect originality : I claim to be something more than a mere compiler. Much, no doubt, is borrowed ; but the fact is, that the notes for this work having been prepared for some years, and such things having been from time to time inserted in them as appeared to me worth preserving, and such insertions made commonly vrithout the name of the author from whom they were taken, I should, at this time, have found a difficulty in recovering those names with sufficient exactness to be able to render to every man his own.

Nor, to speak the truth, did it appear to me worth while to repeat the search merely for this purpose. When authorities are relied on, names must be produced : when a discovery has been made in science, it may be unjust to borrow the invention without acknowledging the author. But in an argumentative treatise, and on a subject which allows no place for discovery or invention, properly so called ; and in which all that can belong to a writer is his mode of reasoning, or his judgment of probabilities ; I should have thought it superfluous, had it been easier to me than it was, to have interrupted my text, or crowded my margin with references to every author whose sentiments I have made use of. There is, however, one work to which I owe so much, that it would be ungrateful not to confess the obligation : I mean the writings of the late Abraham Tucker, Esq., part of which were published by himself, and the remainder since his death, under the title of ' The Light of Nature, pursued by Edward Search, Esq.' I have found in this writer more original thinking and observation on the several subjects that he has taken in hand, than in any other, not to say, than in all others put together. His talent also for illustration is unrivalled. But his thoughts are diffused through a long, various, and irregular work. I shall account it no mean praise, if I have been sometimes able to dispose into method, to collect into heads and articles, or to exhibit in more compact and tangible masses, what, in that otherwise excellent performance, is spread over too much surface.

The next circumstance for which some apology may be expected, is the joining of moral and political philosophy together, or the addition of a book of poUtics to a system of ethics. Against this objection, if it be made one, I might defend myself by the example of many approved writers, who have treated de officiis homines et civis, or, as some choose to express it, * of the rights and obligations of man, in his individual and social capacity,' in the same book. I might allege, also, that the part a member of the commonwealth shall take in political contentions, the

B vote he shall give, the counsels he shall approve, the support he shall afFord, or the opposition he shall make, to any system of public measures, — ^is as much a question of personal duty, as much concerns the conscience of the individual who deliberates, as the determination of any doubt which relates to the conduct of private life : that consequently political philosophy is, properly speaking, a continuation of moral philosophy, or rather indeed a part of it, supposing moral philosophy to have for its aim the information of the human conscience in every deliberation that is likely to come before it. I might avail myself of these excuses if I wanted them ; but the vindication oii which I rely is the following : — In stating the principle of morals, the reader will observe that I have employed some industry in explaining the theory, and showing the necessity of general rules ; without the full and constant consideration of which I am persuaded that no system of moral philosophy can be satisfactory or consistent. This foundation being laid, or rather this habit being formed, the discussion of political subjects, to which, more than to almost any other, general rules are applicable, became clear and easy. Whereas, had these topics been assigned to a distinct work, it would have been necessary to have repeated the same rudiments, to have established over again the same principles, as those which we had already exemplified, and rendered familiar to the reader, in the former parts of this. In a word, if there appear to any one too great a diversity, or too wide a distance, between the subjects treated of in the course of the present volume, let him be reminded, that the doctrine of general rules per vades and connects the whole.

It may not be improper, however, to admonish the reader, that, under the name of pohtics, he is not to look for those occasional controversies which the occurrences of the present day, or any temporary situation of pubUc affairs, may excite ; and most of which, if not beneath the dignity, it is beside the purpose of a philosophical institution to advert to. He will perceive that the several disquisitions are framed with a reference to the condition of this country, and of this government : but it seemed to me to belong to the design of a work like the following, not so much to discuss each altercated point with the particularity of a political pamphlet on the subject, as to deliver those universal principles, and to exhibit that mode and train of reasoning in politics, by the due application of which every man might be enabled to attain to just conclusions of his ovm. I am not ignorant of an objection that has been advanced against all abstract speculations concerning the origin, principle, or limitation of civil authority ; namely, that such speculations possess little or no influence on the conduct either of the state or of the subject, of the governors or the governed ; nor are attended with any useful consequences to either ; that in times of tranquillity they are not wanted, in times of confusion they are never heard. This representation, however, in my opinion, is not just. Times of tumult, it is true, are not the times to learn ; but the choice which men make of their side and party, in the most critical occasions of the commonwealth, may nevertheless depend on the lessons they have received, the books they have read, and the opinions they have imbibed, in seasons of leisure and quietness.

Some judicious persons, who were present at Geneva during the troubles which lately convulsed that city, thought they perceived, in the contentions there carrying on, the operation of that political theory, which the writings of Rousseau, and the unbounded esteem in which these writings are holden by his countrymen, had diffused among the people. Throughout the political disputes that have within these few years taken place in Great Britain, in her sister-kingdom, and in her foreign dependencies, it was impossible not to observe, in the language of party, in the resolutions of public meetings, in debate, in conversation, in the general strain of those fugitive and diurnal addresses to the public which such occasions call forth, the prevalency of those ideas of civil authority which are displayed in the works of Mr. Locke. The credit of that great name, the courage and liberality of his principles, the skill and clearness with which his arguments are proposed, no less than the weight of the arguments themselves, have given a reputation and currency to his opinions, of which I am persuaded, in any unsettled state of public aiFairs, the influence would be felt. As this is not a place for examining the truth or tendency of these doctrines, I would not be understood by what I have said to express any judgment concerning either. I mean only to remark, that such doctrines are not without effect ; and that it is of practical importance to have the principles from which the obligation of social union, and the extent of civil obedience, are derived, rightly explained and well xmderstood. Indeed, as far as I have observed, in poUtical, beyond all other subjects, where men are vnthout some fundamental and scientific principles to resort to, they are liable to have their understandings played on by cant phrases and unmeaning terms, of which every party in every country possesses a vocabulary. We appear astonished when we see the multitude led away by sounds ; but we should remember that, if sounds work miracles, it is always on ignorance. The influence of names is in exact proportion to the want of knowledge.

These are the observations with which I have judged it expedient to prepare the attention of my reader. Concerning the personal motives which engaged me in the following attempt, it is not necessary that I say much ; the nature of my academical situation, a great deal of leisure since my retirement from it, the recommendation of an honored and excellent friend, the authority of the venerable prelate* to whom these labours are inscribed, the not perceiving in vs^hat way I could employ my time or talents better, and my disapprobation in literary men of that fastidious indolence which sits still because it disdains to do little, were the considerations that directed my thoughts to this design. Nor have I repented of the undertaking. Whatever be the fate or reception of this work, it owes its author nothing ; in sickness and in health I have found in it that which can alone alleviate the one, or give enjoyment to the other,— occupation and engagement.

* Rt. Rev. Edmund Law, D. D. Lord Bishop of Carlisle.

MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

BOOK L PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS.

Chap. I. Definition And Use Of The Science

Moral Philosophy, or Ethics, is the science which teaches men their duty, and the reasons for it.

Its use is, to guard against the errors that may arise, either from defects in the ordinary rules of life, or from ignorance in their application.

The ordinary rules of life are the Laws, \. of Honor; 2. of the Land ; 3. of God.

[Of these, the Laws of God, and the Laws of the Land, may be called essential rules of conduct. But the Laws of Honor cannot, with any propriety of language, receive that appellation. " The law of honor consists of a set of maxims, written or understood, by which persons of a certain class either agree to regulate, or are expected to regulate their conduct. It is evident that the obligation of the law of honor, as such, results exclusively from the agreement, tacit or expressed, of the parties concerned. It binds them, because they have agreed to be bound ; and for no other reason. He who does not choose to be ranked among the subjects of the law of honor, is under no obligation to obey its rules. These rules are precisely upon the same footing as the laws of free-

1 What is Moral Philosophy, or Ethics 1

2 What is the use of this science 1

3 What are the ordinary rules of life ?

4 May all these laws be called essential rules of conduct 1 6 Of what does the law of honor consists 1

6 Why is any one bound by the laws of honoT ?

7 Is any one obliged to obey its rules 1 masonry, or the regulations of a reading-room. He who does not choose to subscribe to the room, in the one case, or to promise conformity to masonic laws, in the other, is under no obligation to regard the rules of either." — Dymond's Essays on the Principles of Morality. Essay 1, Pt. 2, chap. 4.]

Chap. II. Law Of Honor

The Law of Honor is constructed by people of fashion, and is calculated for their use.

Hence it regulates duties only betwixt equals in society, and omitting such as relate to inferiors in life, passes no censure on acts hurtful to society, unless they interfere with the concerns carried on between such equals. And hence unfeeling conduct to domestics and dependants, and the nonpayment of debts to tradesmen, are no offences in the code of Honor.

Again, the Law of Honors being constructed by persons in the pursuit of pleasure, and for the mutual convenience of such, passes no censure on acts connected with that pursuit ; and is, in most instances, favorable to the licentious indulgence of the natural passions, and, disregarding the law of God, even ordains, as in the case of duelling, a kind of murder.

Chap. III. Law Of The Land

They, whom the Law of Honor does not affect, make the Law of the Land their rule of life ; and are content so long as they do or omit nothing for which some law can punish them.

But such a rule is defective, because the law itself is doubly so; for it omits many duties, and permits many crimes.

8 By whom is tho law of honor constituted 1

9 What duties does it regulate ]

10 What does it omit 1

11 Does it censure all acts that are hurtful to society 1 13 What kind of vices does it not consider as offences?

13 For whose Convenience is the code of honor 1

14 What follows from this fact 1

15 Do its followers always hold it subordinate to the will of God 1

16 With what are those content who make the law of the land theii >nly rule of Ufe 1

17 Is that rule defective 1 Why 1

Chap. IV. Law Of God. Is

I. It omits many duties, as not objects of compulsion. Foi as it never speaks but to command, and commands only where it can compel; voluntary duties, such as piety to God, bounty to the poor, &c. must necessarily be omitted, as beyond the reach of the law.

II. It permits, or rather does not punish, many vices, be cause they are incapable of positive description ; for instance, prodigality, disrespect to parents, &c. For either it must define accurately the crime to be punished, or it must leave to the discretion of the magistrate the application of a vague description to the individual case ; and thus lead the way to the tyrannical abuse of power. In all cases, where the uncertain nature of the act defies a previously fixed description, the law, in free states, chooses rather to leave men at liberty, than to invest the magistrates with a power so full of danger.

CHAP. IV. LAW OF GOD,

Whoever expects to find in the Scriptures a specific solution of every doubtful point of moral conduct, looks for more than he will meet with. Had it been otherwise, the volume would have been too bulky to be read, much less circulated ; and, in the language of St. John, the world itself would not have contained all the books necessary to be written. This will appear manifest from considering, that the laws of England alone, with its acts of parliament and decisions of the courts, occupy nearly one hundred folio volumes ; and yet in not one instance out of ten, when looking for a particulai case, can you find one exactly in point ; to say nothing of

18 "What duties does the law of the land omit ]