America after the war

Front matter

AMERICA

AFTER THEW\R

ByAn

Contents

CHAPTER

I America and the War

II Belgium and Luxemburg . . 22

Chapter I America And The Wae

When the national authorities acted, and America became a belligerent in one of the most stupendous wars in history, the duty of Americans to their country was clear : they were bound to sustain the successful prosecution of the war by every legitimate means in their power. Nevertheless, without impropriety they may continue to differ concerning the ends and the ultimate effects of the war on the future of the nation and on civilization in general. The right to freedom of opinion does not, however, abrogate the duty of an American not to embarrass his Government by useless discussion. No further debate, for example, concerning the propriety of a war is admissible in any orderly state after war is once duly declared. The laws which underlie national existence do not permit individual or domestic opposition to the national authority in time of war ; but the liberty postulated of a republic does permit a reasonable discussion, in the abstract, of the future national problems affected by the war.

All modern wars between nations are in the last analysis founded on national interest and national honor, which are almost identical terms. Other causes may be assigned by political parties, and in popular governments other causes are often necessarily assigned when the citizenship is indifferent to the national honor or oblivious of the urgency of the paramount national interest. The United States had an ample casus belli on which to found a declaration of war against Germany. The conduct of Germany prior to 1917 had violated the principal laws of war {jura belli), to the great injury of the American nation. The wonder is that American politicians and even the national authorities so long absolutely ignored or tolerated what was generally apparent. But underneath all the causes avowed for America's entering the war lay that mainspring of national action — the national safety and the national interest. Prior to 1914 it had long been foreseen by thoughtful men that America would sooner or later be obliged to enter into a war with Germany. The present time was certainly an opportune time for America to begin hostilities that were inevitable. Long anterior to the present war Germany was known to regard with invidious eyes this hemisphere, its institutions, its pretensions, and its peculiar and phenomenal development. It should be confessed that America in the past has not been most favorably regarded by European governments. Between the political thought of Europe and the political thought of America lies a great abyss far deeper than the separating seas. Only time can satisfactorily bridge this chasm.

Between Germany and America in particular there has long been a latent misunderstanding. Since 1870, given an opportune moment, American interests would have been unhesitatingly assailed by Germany with all the force and power it could command. For this reason, if for no other, it was the interest of the American Government to meet the inevitable issue with Germany at least as soon as it did, and it is its duty to wage the war with all the power and force it can command.

Some of the provocative causes ably stated by President Wilson in his address to Congress, April 2, 1917, and assigned as reasons for the entrance of America into a foreign war, have not become of less moment now that America is at war. Their indirect purpose was the conviction of those Americans who think little concerning the laws which control the struggles for human and national existence. That America was justified in her declaration of war for many reasons not stated by the President the world in the end will concede. Her imperiled national interests alone afforded ample justification for such a declaration. But in pragmatic England and in practical America political and national movements are singularly promoted by sentimental considerations, sometimes pertinent, at others irrelevant, but always skilfully manipulated by those more discerning public men who have closer at heart the national interests and well-being, and who themselves need no other incentive besides the national interests for even such an extreme action as public war.

For the honor of humanity it is sad to have to admit that sentiment of itself is never a valid reason of state for extreme national measures. In the minds of statesmen of any country sentiment is not the real reason for war, though it is often made use of by public men in order to influence some desired public action. Patriotism is not a sentiment. It is to belittle the nobility of mankind to affirm that the love of God, of family, of country, of liberty, and of justice is a sentiment. This natural affection is a priori and inborn ; it is dictated by the sense of self-preservation; it is an elementary principle of being. For country, family, and liberty men will fight until the end of time. In well-constructed human beings sentiment plays a minor part. At so grave a time as this Americans need no such artificial stimulus as sentiment to induce them to support their Government in an international issue involving the safety of their country, their families, and their liberty. As is the case with most abstractions, sentiment would not at any time be a safe criterion for public measures. It is as often ill founded as well founded, and consequently it is never a prudent or a deliberate reason for the great finality of a nation. It is the national interest and honor alone which in the end control the external actions of a state. In any discussion of the problems involved in this war, therefore, sentiment should be allowed to play only a minor part. Alliances between nations are not determined by considerations of sentiment. Common interests and advantages for the time being afford the sufficient inducement for either defensive or offensive alliances of nations.

Since the ascent of Prussia to the hegemony and direction of Germany, English public men have been with reason profoundly disturbed. They have seen with disquietude the long commercial supremacy of England challenged with effect by Germany ; they have seen the colonial policy of England and the integrity of its widely extended empire frequently menaced by unmistakable overtures. Indeed, for the last fifty years thinking men in England and elsewhere have foreseen that a struggle between the English and the German empires was inevitable. Men in both nations have long been shouting, "Delenda est Carthago!" to the increasing discomfiture of the rest of the world. Both Germany and England have in their own way silently prepared for the struggle, indirectly by alliances and international conversations, and directly by increased armaments either on the land or on the sea. It would have been far better for the Entente Allies if England had not confined her preliminary preparations so largely to the seas. Her allies have been forced to bear the brunt of her oversight. Indeed, it would have been far less costly to the British Empire itself had England's preparations on land kept better step with the pace of the German Empire. Mr. Lloyd George has lately admitted that England somewhat neglected the obvious duty to arm on land, and that the neglect would not occur again. England 's excuse for neglect is no mystery. She used her national resources the better to extend for the time being her challenged commercial supremacy.

In so far as America was concerned, England's increased armament was never disquieting. All the other external actions of England were not, however, so reassuring to America. Anterior to the War of 1914 many English statesmen endeavored to come to an understanding with Germany. In such a possible understanding lurked the greatest peril to this country. As existing national alliances and ententes are very temporary, it is thought by some public men, even in England's own empire, that this country has not yet escaped all ultimate danger of such an association. Regardless of that now remote possibility, the interest of America in the present conflict unquestionably lies with England and her allies. To aid France Cardinal Richelieu did not hesitate to promote Protestantism. He was a statesman of the first order. Any minatory combinations of the great powers which the future may unfold are too remote to furnish ground for any hesitancy on the part of America to cooperate heartily with England and her allies throughout the present war. Nevertheless, the American aims in the final issues of the war are not and cannot be identical with the ends of England. In Asia their separate interests have of late widely diverged. It is reasonably clear that the pronounced aims of Mr. Lloyd George are not even now the aims of most of the other leading public men of England. It is therefore safe to predict that the program of Mr. Lloyd George will not be prominent in the final adjustments of the pending war by the powers.

As to the respective merits of the two leading belligerents, England and Germany, in the War of 1914, America has not hesitated to form an opinion. England is a free and great country. Her public men are far more astute in the business of government than the German public men or any other public men. Even the English colonial empire, the duration of which is much involved in this war, has, since the independence of America, been admirably administered in the main, and the high commercial principles applied in colonial administration have produced good results. If we except the loss of liberty and independence of some of the subject populations of England, there has been little to condemn in the English colonial system. In all her colonies England has had since 1783 more regard for justice and human rights than has ever been displayed by any other colonial system. It is this fact which has made the dependent status tolerable in the English colonies and dependencies, and in several instances even desirable for them. It is the general opinion in America that the colonial system of England has for a century been more nearly perfect than any other colonial system known to history. There is not, however, a general consensus in America that the English colonial system either in India or Egypt is abstractly justifiable. But taking the English colonial system as it is, this country, as a whole, has not viewed with favor the desires of Germany to disrupt or partition it.

It is not extreme to affirm that the ambition of Germany to enter the ranks of the great colonial powers has been contemplated with disfavor not only in

America, but by the entire non-Germanic world. America in the main distrusts, with or without sound reason, all colonial systems whatever, but particularly the German. Of those existing it undoubtedly favors the British. American sympathies with the colonial system of England have in the pending conflict been much promoted by the conviction that since 1914 the Germans have deliberately violated the laws of war, laboriously built up since the time of Grotius. The early attempt of England to starve by a new system of blockade the civilian population of Germany did not meet with prompt condemnation in America because of the coarse German methods of warfare and the instinctive conviction of Americans that Germany was as hostile to America as to England. It was foreseen from the outset that the War of 1914, beyond all other modern wars, was bound to be a war a outrance, and that American interests were likely to be gravely imperiled by the leading belligerents. The President and the present Government were evidently from the beginning deeply concerned, and they acted with caution and uniform discretion. As the sequel showed, their concern was well founded.

Americans are not a thoughtless people, and they are now beginning to think of the future, after the present war shall end. That the past alliances between nations have not been of long duration history demonstrates to them. At present America finds herself engaged on the side of four or five powers of the first rank; some of them have long been friendly to America, others not uniformly so. The alliance, or, if preferred, the present coordination, of America with the Entente powers, is entirely fortuitous; it is pursuant to no treaty, or even international conversation. It is dictated, as all other international arrangements and alliances have, in fact, been dictated, solely by the best interests for the time being and the supposed safety of the allied countries. All such alliances are at best but temporary. In the past England and France have more often been enemies than allies. In the more general conflicts of the world America and England have heretofore been uniformly enemies. France and Russia have in turn been enemies and allies. Prussia and England have been both allies and enemies. France and Prussia have been allied against England, while Austria, France, and Russia have been allies against England and Prussia combined. The past combinations, indeed, have been very curious and inconsistent. In each instance the supposed interest of the allies alone governed. The course of history never stops. What has been will be again. 1

i The inconsistent alliances between European countries are enumerated by a recent French writer as follows :

The alliances of Burgundy and England against France, then of Burgundy and France against England; of France, Venice, and Turkey against Austria and Spain ; of France, Saxony, and the Palatinate against Austria; of France, Sweden, and the Netherlands against Spain and Austria; of France and Prussia against Austria and England, then of Austria, France, Sweden, and Russia against Prussia and England ; of France, Spain, and the United States against England ; of all the nations of Europe against France; of France, England, and Piedmont against Russia; of France and Italy against Austria; the moral or immoral entente of Prussia, England, and France against Austria; alliance of Prussia and the North German States, morally aided by England, against France; of France and Russia against Germany, Austria, and Italy, with England in the background; of Japan and England against Russia; in order to bring about the present combination, in which fabricators of empty phrases see the supreme struggle between "civilization" and "barbarism/' but in which well-informed minds see only a new and intense form of a conflict of interests dividing Europe and the world. [Translated from "Hier, Aujourd'hui, Demain," p. 155, Bourassa.]

That the policy of America in the present war should be formulated by its statesmen, and not by its politicians, is evident. Statesmen govern a country with an eye to the future good of the nation. Politicians are mere opportunists. The difference between them is marked. Taking into consideration the brevity of all international alliances, the imperative duty of American statesmen is to make sure that in the course of a temporary alliance with European powers the best interests of the American nation are not imperiled. There are with the allies of America outstanding problems of grave importance. Any error in regard to them will inflict untold miseries upon posterity. Most international alliances, while necessary, are full of ultimate dangers. For this reason European alliances have not been heretofore favored in America. That they have now become necessary and must long continue is generally admitted, although it is a departure from an ancient tradition. Unintentionally, America has against her will at last been forced to enter a new and difficult foreign arena. The great question is, Will it adequately prepare for the new responsibilities which the entrance entails! If it does not, the future of America will be unnecessarily jeoparded, and the natural course of American history will be much influenced.

To the world in general the "United States' ' par excellence is known as 1 ' America.' ' In the course of these papers America has therefore been accepted as the more familiar title of the United States. Only in some instances, where greater particularity was essential to clarity, has the official designation been employed.

CHAPTER n

To enforce Belgian neutrality is not the primary reason why America engaged in the war against Germany, nor is the violation of the spirit of American democracy the real reason. The great injuries suffered by the Belgians in the present war have been deplored by Americans, who have done much to alleviate the plight of Belgium. Throughout their entire national existence Americans have evinced a marked sense of public justice; they have showed themselves to be in the main a just and kindly people. But as America was not a party to the neutraliza- 22 tion of Belgium, it is doubtful whether an infraction of Belgian neutrality by any of the parties to the Neutrality Treaty of November 15, 1831, could by the law of nations be vindicated by America. This was obviously the conclusion at first reached at Washington. Americans could and did protest against the violation ; but officially America had no standing to protest or to vindicate a treaty of neutralization to which America was not a party.

It is unfortunate that the state of political parties and the conditions of her parliamentary government did not permit England to act with more efficiency in the first days of the War of 1914. That the safety of Belgium was in the first instance adequately protected by any of the guarantors of her neutrality is not clear. The preliminary pourparlers in 1914 between England and Germany, when examined carefully, leave the impression that the English ministers did not insist firmly enough on the right of Belgium to immunity from invasion in the event of war. Up to July 31, 1914, Sir Edward Grey said to the French representative, "The preservation of the neutrality of Belgium might be, I would not say a decisive, but an important factor in determining our attitude.' ' (British White Book of 1914, No. 119.) Would Sir Edward not have been justified in making his declaration stronger?

Belgium, in the eyes of America, presents one of the most melancholy as well as one of the most heroic spectacles in modern history. Her sad plight has excited their profound sympathy. That Belgium will emerge intact and resume her national existence, Americans hope and expect. What the ultimate destiny of Belgium may be in the centuries to come is another matter which no statesman of Europe would venture to predict. But one thing may be affirmed: Belgium in the future is not going to repeat her present experience if it can be helped.

It is an error to assume that Belgium is the cause of the war of 1914 or even the cause of England's belligerency. Belgium is only one incident of the great war, not its causa causans. Many people in this country have lost sight of the fact that this war is in its origin a war for supremacy in the Balkans, which incidentally set on fire the long-conflicting pretensions of Germany and England. To the people of the Orient the present war is one for the control of the European approaches to the far East. To the average American the war is one for the principle of democracy. But whatever the object of the war, Americans in or out of public life, with ample justification, have come to believe that the triumphant success of Germany in Europe would be disastrous to America. It is not compatible with the safety of America that there should be only one great power in Europe and that power unfriendly to America. The arrogations of such a power would soon extend to this hemisphere; they would menace its integrity, and possibly destroy for centuries the national policies and the proper development of America. This is a correct, if instinctive, conclusion for Americans.

That the status of Belgium was not the primary cause of the war, history demonstrates. Belgium never has been, according to the publicists' definition, a completely sovereign state. Belgium as a state was the product of the fears of

Europe. Torn away from Holland only in 1830, Belgium, by the concerted action of England and France, was erected into an independent, but neutralized, state by the convention of the five great powers convened in London in the year 1830. In the erection of a single state composed of the Flemish and the Walloon provinces, formerly a part of the United Netherlands, the racial diversities of the Flemings and the Walloons were not much considered. Consequently, the new state was from its inception left to wrestle with the always deplorable bilingual problems. The choice of a reigning house for the new kingdom was not even left to Belgium, but was dictated by the great powers. The choice of the English queen's uncle as the first sovereign was agreeable to England, and the arrangement for his speedy marriage to the daughter of Louis Philippe, then King of France, was most pleasing to France, as the future dynasty was not likely to be hostile to French susceptibilities.

It will thus be perceived that Belgium was allowed to enter the family of nations only provisionally and because the great powers deemed it the best solution of a very dangerous territorial problem. From the days of Caesar to those of Napoleon, the valley of the Meuse has been the pathway and the battle-field of all the armies of Europe. In 1830 neither France nor England was willing that either separately should have paramountcy in the territory since known as Belgium. In 1830 an English foothold in the Low Countries would have met the opposition of all the other great powers. At that time Prussia was not in a position to enforce its own views in regard to the territory now called Belgium. It very reluctantly consented to the proposals of England and France to sever it from Holland, as did Austria and Russia; but all the powers recognized that England's interest in the Belgian littoral was greatest. Indeed, her interest was vital. England has long feared that the littoral of the Low Countries might pass into powerful and unfriendly hands, and the supreme effort of her statesmen has been directed to frustrating this eventuality. That her apprehension is both legitimate and natural cannot be denied. Her bitter enemy, Napoleon the Great, discerned that "Antwerp was a pistol turned against the heart of England.' ' What he neglected to add was that Belgian territory is a highway which leads with equal directness to either Paris or Berlin.

The terrain of both Belgium and the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg is very unfortunately situated as regards three of the great powers of Europe. The present German invasion of these territories is by no means the first instance of a violation by the powers; it is computed by competent authority to be the one hundred and nineteenth invasion. For this reason Belgium has been called the "Cockpit of Europe." Every military scientist in Europe has long formulated possible plans for military movements on Belgian territory, as the military archives of all the great powers might disclose.

The international situation of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg and of Belgium is almost identical. If anything, Luxemburg was more effectually neutralized than Belgium. A public man is in no position to form a correct opinion upon the international status of Belgium and the obligations of the guarantors of its neutralization if he is not entirely familiar with the Luxemburg neutralization treaties of 1839 and 1867, their construction by the great powers, and the subsequent attitude of the signatories to such treaties. The international status of Belgium was fixed by Articles VII and XXV of the treaties of November 15, 1831, and by Articles I and II of the treaty of April 19, 1839. The neutralization of Luxemburg was finally effected by the treaty of London, signed May 11, 1867, on the part of Great Britain, France, Italy, Eussia, and Prussia. By Article II of that treaty the "high contracting parties engaged to respect the principle of neutrality stipulated by the present Article." By the prior treaty of 1839 the powers collectively guaranteed the peaceful possession of Luxemburg to the King of Holland in the fullest, most absolute, and most unqualified manner. The object of the Luxemburg treaty was to prevent the possibility of Luxemburg passing under the control of any of the great powers. The effect of the treaty of 1839 was to make Luxemburg inalienable. The English construction of her obligations under the treaty of 1839 concerning the practical neutralization of Luxemburg was not, however, fortunate for Belgium in 1914. On the threshold of the existing hostilities, as appears from that most important document, the "British White Book," published in England by authority in the first days of the present war, M. Cambon, the French ambassador, asked the English foreign minister, Sir Edward Grey, "what the British Government thinks of the violation of Luxemburg by the Germans." Sir Edward Grey referred him "to the views expressed in 1867 by Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon.' ' (White Book,

No. 148). Sir Edward's answer involves a historical retrospect. In 1867 France, prior to the final treaty of that year, was negotiating for the acquisition of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg. This expressely violated the treaty of 1839, on which Prussia relied. In Parliament Sir Robert Peel strongly protested against the purchase of Luxemburg by France, following closely the annexation of Savoy and Nice, "because the holding of Luxemburg is a matter of first importance for France, for defensive or offensive operations against Germany.' ' The question in substance in 1867, when France was in treaty for Luxemburg, really was, What obligations the collective guarantee of the integrity of the territory of Luxemburg entailed on the signatory powers, and whether, if one power disregarded or retired from the treaty, the others were obligated either individually or jointly to enforce by arms the obligations of the treaty? Prussia insisted on the binding nature of the obligation, as it was clearly her interest to do then. Count Bismarck was firm on this point. On June 14, 1867, according to Hansard (p. 1910, seq.), Mr. Labouchere, M. P., in the course of Parliamentary debate on the treaty of 1839 said:

. . . The guarantees entered into by this country for the independence of Belgium and of Turkey stood on very different ground from that given recently with respect to Luxemburg. Nobody could contend that the possession of Luxemburg, either by France or Germany, would menace or disturb our interests.

At the time when a war with America seemed likely, we might have felt grateful to the Emperor of the French for stepping forward with a guarantee affecting Montreal and the Canadian lakes; but would his own subjects have been pleased?

According to M. Moustier, the Foreign Minister of France, the "neutrality" of Luxemburg might not be inconsistent with the passage of troops through the Duchy. The noble Lord appeared to have admitted that a violation of the treaty would be constituted if an army marched through the territory, but a glance at the map would show that it was almost impossible that war could be waged between France and Germany without an army passing through the Luxemburg territory. If, therefore, we were to take Count Bismarck's view of our obligations, we should be bound to go to war. Nothing had done so much harm to the English name as a certain recklessness in undertaking obligations and a great discretion in fulfilling them. . . .

. . . Even supposing that England might be brought to raise armies and find treasure for a war to prevent a Dutch province from becoming German or French, was it likely that our colonies would incur the risks of war for such an object?

The nature of the obligation of the powers under the Luxemburg guarantee of 1839 was in 1869 a subject of deep concern both in England and on the Continent. Prussia was particularly apprehensive. Nevertheless, Lord Stanley, then English foreign secretary, informed Prussia: "No interest of ours was either directly or indirectly involved and we stood absolutely free and unfettered. The security of Belgium is an entirely different matter." (Hansard, Vol. CLXXXVL, p. 1253, seq.)

Now, Great Britain was a party to the neutralization of Luxemburg. Lord John Russell, not then in power, alone protested against any such narrow construction of the obligation of England under the treaty of 1839, and he bravely stated that the position of the English Government had created a very unpleasant feeling on the Continent.

(Hansard, Vol. CLXXXVIIL, p. 975.) The relation of Saguntum to the Carthaginians was singularly like Belgium's to Germany. The Roman contentions concerning Hannibal's violation of the treaty relative to Saguntum probably offer the nearest parallel to England's present contentions concerning the German invasion of Belgium in derogation of the Belgian treaty of 1831. In the negotiations for peace the Roman argument is not likely to be overlooked by those trained in the art of diplomacy.

The attitude of the powers to the Luxemburg treaties leaves the impression that the right of a signatory to contravene or to withdraw from its conventional guaranty is not clearly denied in public law. The alleged right of a signatory to violate the pact is a grave matter, and it certainly shocks the moral sense of private people when a party to a neutralization treaty withdraws and then violates it. But the nature and extent of the obligation of a guarantor of neutrality is, in international law, not so clearly laid down as it should be. The English position that there was no obligation of the parties to the Luxemburg treaty to enforce it by a resort to arms, unless their own interests were also violated, leaves a very unpleasant impression when applied to Belgium. That a treaty of neutralization was violated with impunity in the instance of Luxemburg must be conceded, and this is the unhappy lesson of Luxemburg. The uncertainty of the attitude of the great powers in regard to neutralization treaties long stared Belgium in the face, and consequently its apprehensions were first directed to one great power and then to another. The annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910, with the consent of the powers, after Japan had guaranteed the independence of Korea in 1904, was ominous for Belgium.