The American navy : being an authentic history of the United States navy

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Contents

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Johp Barry 1 13

John Rodgers 2D9

Chapter I. Preliminary

The people of the United States are proverbially proud of their navy. Though comparatively of late origin, it has already made itself a name in histor3^ Its numbers, when contrasted with that of others, are and have been inconsiderable ; yet it has achieved victories that rival, in some respects, the proudest triumphs of England, Holland, and Venice.

For it is not by the magnitude of numbers, but by the magnitude of results that victories are to be tested. Waterloo was a greater battle than Austerlitz, though fewer were engaged in it. The capture of the Guerriere was, to America, almost as important as was the battle of Trafalgar to England. The defeat of the British squadron, on Lake Champlain, saved the State of New York. The triumph of Barclay, on Lake Erie, would have laid the West open to foreign invasion. Americans have cause, therefore, for pride in their navy. On every occasion, heretofore, it has proved equal to the crisis. Its operations, indeed, have been on an inconsiderable scale, but it will, we may confidently predict, prove as triumphant in a larger sphere, when the necessity shall demand

I HISTORY OF THE NAVY

it. The elements of a great navy exist in our people: all that is wanted to develop them is imminent peril.

The empire of the sea, indeed, can belong only to a maritime nation. Monarchs may build ships, and republics construct dock-yards, but unless seamen can be found, there will be no navy. For centuries it has been the ambition of France to obtain ascendency on the ocean. The most lavish sums have been expended on this favourite project, but success has never yet permanently crowned her efforts. This failure has not been because she is inferior to other nations in naval architecture, nor because her people are less brave, nor because gunnery is neglected in her ships of war; but because France has comparatively few seamen. She can build ships, but she cannot man them. From the fatal battle of La Hogue, in the reign of Louis the Fourteenth, down to the terrible disaster of Trafalgar, she has sustained an almost unbroken series of defeats at sea. Frigate after frigate, fleet after fleet have been torn from her by the prowess of England. Occasionally, a few French ships, manned by efiicient crews, have achieved victory; but these instances have been rare indeed. France can never become a great naval power, until her mercantile marine becomes more extensive.

That it is only great maritime powers which can obtain the empire of the sea is proved by all history. It was when Venice monopolized the traffic of the Mediterranean, that her galleys were the terror of the Saracen and the defence of Europe. It was when Spain and Portugal contended for the commerce of the Indies, that the flags of other nations sank before them on the deep. It was when the ships of Holland filled every sea, that the Dutch cannon were heard at London, that the navies of France and England fled to their harbours, that Von Tromp proudly scoured the Channel with a broom at his mast-head. The decay of Venice, Spain, and Holland was followed immediately by the decline of their naval supremacy. When England succeeded to the traffic of the world, she succeeded also to the supremacy of the ocean. From the hour when Drake, the first of her native navigators, penetrated the Pacific Ocean, she began to obtain that naval superiority, which, for nearly two centuries, she has enjoyed. Her hardy seamen, accustomed to battling with the deep, are always at hand to man her ships when war breaks out; and it is in vain that other European powers attempt to rival her, for though they can build a fleet, they cannot man it properly, and, sooner or later, their vessels become hers.

The necessity of veteran sailors in men-of-war can be made evident by contrasting soldiers with seamen in battle. The former are on firm land, and, if courageous and disciplined, have only to fear being overmatched. The latter are at the mercy of winds and waves, and may be called upon, perhaps in the very crisis of the conflict, to manoeuvre the ship, to reduce sail, or to cut away a mast. In such cases, the most expert crew can soonest return to the conflict, and, all things else being equal, is certain to win the victory. On land, the combatant has but to contend with his enemy : at sea, he has to battle with the elements as well as with his foe. It is evident, therefore, that seamanship is absolutely necessary to an efficient navy. A nation which is not maritime, and therefore without the material to man its ships, cannot become ascendant at sea. The brave men whom it forces on board its vessels by conscriptions are but so many victims to a mistaken policy, so many sacrifices to false ambition. It will be in vain for Germany to dream of a navy, for she must ever be agricultural, instead of maritime. Even Russia, after a century and a half of efibrt, has a navy but in name; for her mercantile marine is comparatively inconsiderable, and the crews of her armed ships are soldiers rather than seamen.

The United States possesses, perhaps, a greater capacity for naval ascendency than any power on the globe. Great Britain, in truth, is the only nation that can approach her in this respect. The causes in each case are the same. Both the United States and Great Britain have large mercantile marines, which form a nursery for seamen, and from which, in case of war, crews to man the national vessels can be readily transplanted. At the rate at which the tonnage of the United States is increasing, it will not be long before her mercantile marine will surpass that of her great rival ; and when that event occurs, she will have it in her power, at any moment, to become the arbiter of the seas. It will only be necessary to build the ships, when the contest will be decided at a blow. The war of 1812 proved, especially on the lakes, what a maritime people can do in an emergency. The fate of the two several campaigns depended on having the command of Erie and Champlain : the ships were constructed as if by magic ; and the seamen being ready made, as it were, the ascendency was gained, and the campaign decided in our favour. If a time should ever come when a great fleet will be necessary, it can be built and manned almost as rapidly, if the dock-yards are but filled.

The United States has, from its earliest infancy, had a mercantile marine; and hence the rapidity with which, in every war, a navy has been formed. In the primitive days of New England, a large traffic was carried on with Madeira, and subsequently with the West Indies ; and this maritime spirit continued down to the war of Independence, notwithstanding the mother country made continual efibrts to check it, by oppressive navigation laws. The result was that New England, and, to a certain extent, others of the colonies, possessed a body of skilful, bold, and energetic seamen, who, when war was proclaimed, changed their peaceful voyages for warlike ones, and were ready, "at a day's notice, to sail on a cruise against the enemy. In every age, consequently, since the settlement of the country, the colonies, and subsequently the United States, have been distinguished for naval efficiency. In the wars preceding the Revolution, more than one American seaman won his way, in the British navy, to the rank of admiral. When the war, of independence was declared, American privateers swarmed immediately on the ocean, attacking the English commerce, and paralyzing the efforts of the foe ; and to privateers soon succeeded national armed ships, which continued the career of profit and glory.

With the growth of the United States, the extension of its seaboard has been so great that, at the present time, it surpasses that of any other nation situated within the temperate zones. From the eastern cape of Maine, the curious navigator may follow one unbroken line of coast, for thousands of miles, to the mouth of the Rio Grande ; and then, crossing to the Pacific, he may sail along seabeat shores from the lower boundary of California to the upper extremity of Oregon. The wants of such a vast seaboard will nourish a continually increasing coasting-trade, which, in turn, will be an ever extending nursery for seamen. Nor is this all.' In consequence of the Isthmus of Panama interposing between the Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific Ocean, the bulk of the heavier trafiic between California and the Atlantic cities must always make the circuit of Cape Horn; and thus a school for skilful seamen will continue, as a necessity of the republic, so long as the republic itself exists. It used to be said, the best sailors of the United States came out of the Delaware, because the difficulties in navigating that river compelled those who sailed in it to become perfect in their art ; and this being true, the route around Cape Horn to our Pacific settlements will be the means of improving, in no small degree, the standard of American seamanship, high even as it is.

England is in the decline of advancing age; the United States in the first flush of youth. With a mercantile marine already approaching that of our mother country, though our vast resources are as yet only beginning to be developed, what will be our position, as a naval power, when we shall have attained to manhood, and when our ships will be counted by hundreds where they are now computed by tens ! If the wants of twenty millions of people can support a mercantile marine such as we now possess, what will not the wants of a hundred millions sustain ? Before the close of the present century, the number of seamen employed in American vessels will almost exceed belief: and the majority of these, in the event of a war, will be available for national armed vessels, since employment in a more peaceful character will be, to a great extent, impossible to obtain.

Chapter II. Rise Op The Mercantile Marine

The colonization of the United States Jiad scarcely commenced' before commercial adventures began to be undertaken by the inhabitants. TJie Dutch, at that time the best navigators in the world, were the first to build a decked vessel within the limits of the present republic, which they did at their settlement. New Amsterdam, now New York, in 1614. The Plymouth colonists soon imitated this example. In 1633, a small ship was constructed at Boston, supposed to be the first built within the boundaries of New England. Meantime, a spirited trade grew up between the colonies and mother country. The fishing on the Banks of Newfoundland also assisted to develop the nautical enterprise of the inhabitants. Already, in 1615, the English had one hundred and seventy vessels engaged in this business, while France, Portugal, and Spain had, altogether; three hundred : and the Massachusetts colonists, as soon as the first difficulties of the settlement were over, began to enter into competition for this lucrative pursuit. As early as 1639, we find laws passed to encourage the fisheries.

Within twenty years after the landing of the pilgrims, quite a number of ships trading to Europe belonged to the settlers, while there was a still larger fleet of sloops owned by the colonists and employed in the coasting trade. As every vessel of any size carried a few light guns, to defend it from the Indians or to repel pirates, the navigation had most of the characteristics of an armed trade. In 1636, John Gallop, in his sloop, recaptured a pinnace belonging to Mr. Oldham, which had been taken by the Narragansett Indians; and this was, it is believed, the first naval combat ever fought by an American vessel. On more than one occasion, however, armaments were fitted out against the French, who then occupied Acadie, or Nova Scotia, as it is now called.

Meantime, a thriving commerce had grown up in New England with the southern colonies, with Madeira, and with the West Indies. The maritime character of the people increased daily; and with it, occasions for nautical prowess. In 1645, a ship, armed with lourteen guns, was built at Cambridge, Massachusetts, and being despatched to the Canary islands, fell in with a Barbary rover, when an action ensued that lasted all day, till the rudder of the corsair being injured, the New-England vessel escaped. In 1650, the Dutch having made some encroachments in Long Island Sound, the colony of Connecticut employed a cruizer, mounting ten guns and carrying forty men, to defend the coasts and keep open the communication between the mainland and the opposite shore. In 1665, Connecticut maintained a small vessel off Watch Hill, to prevent the Narragansetts from crossing to attack the Montauks. These were the first advances towards a regular navy. All this while, the colonies were increasing with astonishing rapidity in numbers, wealth, and enterprise.

In 1664, by the capture of New Amsterdam, the entire coast from Nova Scotia to Florida became open to their traffic ; and navigation as well as ship-building received accordingly a fresh impetus. At this time, it is computed there were one hundred thousand inhabitants of European extraction in the various settlements. The New-England colonies still continued to monopolize most of the commerce. Up to this period, Boston alone had constructed more than seven hundred vessels, of which thirty were over one hundred tons. Even at that early day, the master shipwrights of Massachusetts were thirty in number. The French, meantime, were occupying the lakes. In 1678, De la Salle launched a vessel of ten tons on Ontario, and in the year following, one of sixty tons on Erie.

The whale fishery, another element of maritime power, was established at Nantucket about 1690. It was, at first, carried on in open boats, in the vicinity of that island; subsequently, decked vessels, which pursued the fish into higher latitudes, came into use; and finally, ships of the largest size were employed, the voyages extending to Brazil on the one side, and Greenlafid on the other. A hardy race of seamen was thus nourished, which, at a later day, won from Burke one of the most eloquent eulogiums in the language.

In 1690, the Massachusetts authorities, annoyed by the French privateers from Acadie, despatched a force of seven hundred men, in eight small vessels, to extirpate the nuisance. The expedition was commanded by Sir William Phipps, and was entirely successful. Stimulated by victory, the same authorities fitted out, in the autumn of the same year, a squadron against Quebec, consisting of about forty vessels, carrying two thousand men. Sir William Phipps was again intrusted with the command. The expedition, however, failed. In this same year, the Falkland, a fourth-rate, was launched in the Piscataqua, and is believed to have been the first vessel of her size constructed in America. During the war with France, which raged at this time, numerous small cruisers had been built in the colonies ; but no action of importance appears to have occurred at sea.

Chapter III. To The Tear 1750

At the beginning of the eighteenth century, the American settlements had attained a population of two hundred and sixty-two thousand; and the mercantile enterprise of the people kept pace fully with their increasing numbers. In 1701, the Newfoundland fisheries alone employed one hundred and twenty-one vessels, two thousand seven hundred men, and nearly eight thousand tons. The shipping generally had so much increased, that the mother country was supplied largely with transports, while no small part of the traffic between America and England was carried on in colonial vessels. Meantime, the coasting-trade was monopolized by American craft. The navigation laws, passed in 1651, forbade this, indeed; but these laws had always been practically a dead letter in America.

The war with France, which had been closed by the treaty of Ryswick, having broken out afresh, the colonies became again involved in hostilities. In 1706, Spain, being in ' alliance with France, made an attack on Charleston, which was repulsed by the citizens, who, with Lieutenant Colonel Khett at their head, armed the ships in port, for that purpose. In 1707, an expedition was fitted out by the New England colonists against Port Royal; but it proved unsuccessful. Another, on a larger scale, but equally unfortunate, was planned in 1709 : in this instance, a want of co-operation on the part of the English caused the failure. A third, and successful one, was undertaken in 1710, when the crown and provinces conjointly acting, a fleet of thirty-six sail and six regiments were despatched, on which the place submitted. Another enterprise, in the following year, was projected against the French settlements on the St. Lawrence; but though fifteen men-of-war, forty transports, and six storevessels were engaged in it, besides seven thousand troops, the affair proved abortive.

The peace of Utrecht, in 1713, put an end to the war. From this period, the maritime power of the colonies increased with accelerated rapidity. The naval power of France and England, during the contest, had been so nearly balanced, that the risk of foreign voyages had been great, and comparatively few enterprises of this character had been undertaken; but now the adventurous spirit of New England found ample exercise in ventures of this description. Meantime, the privateers, which had been employed extensively throughout the conflict, were abandoned. A few small armed vessels were, however, retained for the protection of the coasts, and for the suppression of piracies, which, about this period, became quite frequent in the American waters, and were not finally exterminated till the middle of the century.

In 1731, Massachusetts owned thirty-eight thousand tons of shipping, of which one-half were employed in the European trade. The next State, in maritime wealth, was Pennsylvania, which owned six thousand tons. The cities of New York and Philadelphia, even at that day, had become' rivals for the commerce of the country. In 1737, the entrances into the former port were two hundred and eleven, the clearances two hundred and twenty; while the entrances

OP THE UNITED STATES. 11

into the latter were two hundred and eleven, the clearances two hundred and fifteen. Newport, now comparatively without commerce, had, at that period, a hundred sail of shipping, and was the fourth seaport, in point of importance, in the colonies — Boston being the first. It was about this time that American vessels first became engaged in the slavetrade, in which, for a long period, Bristol and other Rhode Island towns largely participated.

In 1739, England declared war against Spain. It being the policy of the mother country to attack the colonies of her enemy, America became the seat of many of her preparations and levies. The expedition against Carthagena was largely supplied with men and means from this country. So also was the enterprise against Cuba, in 1741. Three years later, when hostilities broke out with France, the colonies became even more extensively engaged in assisting Great Britain. In 1745, an expedition was fitted out by the New England States against Louisburg, a port that commanded the entrance to the St. Lawrence, and on the fortification of which the French had spent vast sums. The fleet consisted of twelve armed vessels, hired and equipped by the colonies, besides transports. The land force numbered about four thousand men. The first was commanded by Captain Tyng, of Massachusetts, the last by Colonel Pepperel, of Maine. The expedition was joined at Causeau by Commodore Warren, of the royal navy, who brought with him part of the West India squadron. On the 30th of April, Louisburg was invested by land, it having been blockaded for some time previously by the combined British and American fleets. The siege lasted forty-seven days, when the place submitted.

In this war, about four hundred privateers and letters-ofmarque were engaged on the part of the colonies. Already the maritime power of the American settlements had become imposing. , ^

Chapter IV. To The War Of Independence

By the middle of the eighteenth century, two years after the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, the population of the American colonies, excluding Indians, had risen to a million. The mercantile marine continued to advance proportionably. Communications between the colonies were principally carried on by water, the result of the population being chiefly on the seaboard ; for, even so late as the war of Independence, but few settlers had crossed the Alleghanies. It is computed that, in 1750, the tonnage of the colonies equalled that of England, considered in reference to the population. The clearances at the different American ports were, in that year, over a thousand, and the entrances not much less. Massachusetts alone owned one vessel, of one description or another, for every hundred inhabitants.

It was in 1750 that the live-oak, the most valuable shiptimber furnished by America, was first brought into use. Hitherto the white-oak had been principally employed in the construction of vessels. About this period, also, it became the custom with many American parents to enter their sons as midshipmen in the royal navy. Several of these young officers subsequently rose to the highest rank in the service. It is generally credited that his mother's affection alone prevented Washington from entering the British navy. It would be curious to speculate on what would have been the result of the Revolution, if that great man had been lost to his country in the' struggle for independence.

In 1756, England declared war once more against France.

The conflict that ensued was waged principally on land, and gave but little opportunity for the colonial seamen to earn renown. The navy of France had, by this time, however, sunk into comparative weakness, so that the commercial ventures of the Americans continued to be prosecuted with little risk. The only enterprise at sea, of any importance, was an attack, in 1757, on Louisburg, that place having returned into the possession of the French at the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. About eleven thousand troops, royal and provincial, besides a large fleet of transports and a respectable armed squadron, were engaged in this expedition. It failed, however, in consequence of the superiority of the French in men-of-war.

Numerous brilliant exploits on the part of colonial privateers are recorded of this war. One of the most remarkable was the action between the Thurloe fourteen. Captain Mantle, and the Les Deux Amis ten, Captain Felix. The Thurloe had a crew of eighty-four men ; the Les Deux Amis a crew of ninety-four. The French privateer, at first, endeavoured to fly, but discovering this to be impossible, he ran his enemy athwart hawse, intending to board him. The American vessel, conscious of a superiority of metal, and suspecting the crew of the foe to outnumber his own, resisted this attempt. The struggle continued for two hours, and was of the most heroic character. At last, however, the Deux Amis struck, but not until eighty of her men were either killed or wounded. The Thurloe's loss, in all, was thirty-seven. The combat was one of the most bloody recorded of that or any other war, as having occurred at sea.

From the peace of 1763 to the commencement of hostilities between the colonies and mother country, there is nothing of importance to record, connected with the maritime progress of America. The colonies, notwithstanding the increasing difficulties with England, continued to grow in population; and with the growth of numbers, the mercantile marine necessarily kept pace. This is not the place to discuss the origin or trace the course of that great controversy, which, after raging for nearly twenty years, finally placed America and Great Britain in a hostile attitude to each other, and ended in the separation of the colonies from the mother country. It is sufficient to say that the attempts to enforce the navigation laws, the stamp act, the duty on tea, and other measures repugnant to that proud spirit of freedom which characterized the colonists, assisted, in turn, to produce the alienation.

The first overt act of resistance was the burning of the royal tender Gaspee, by a party of Americans, in Providence Bay. A packet, plying between New York and Providence, had been chased by the Gaspee, for refusing to heave to and be examined; and, during the chase, the packet had led the tender on a shoal, where the latter grounded. In the following night, a party of patriots, in eight launches, left Providence, carried the tender by assault, and burned her to the water's edge. The British government offered a reward of a thousand pounds for the leader in this enteriDrise, but in vain. The first blood shed in the struggle between the colonies and mother country was poured out, not at Lexington, but on the decks of the Gaspee.

Chapter V. Organization Of A Regular Navy

When the war of independence began, in 1775, there existed no naval force whatever in any of the colonies. The Continental Congress, moreover, was so busily engaged in providing for an army, that the equipment of a navy, at first, received no attention. The maritime habits of the people, however, especially in the New-England States, turned individual enterprise towards the ocean ; and if proper commissions could have been procured, the sea would soon have swarmed with privateers. But the orders to capture were confined, in the beginning, to vessels bringing stores and supplies to the royal forces in America. In November of this year, however, Massachusetts, in her capacity as a sovereign commonwealth, established courts of admiralty, and enacted laws to encourage nautical enterprise. Washington, as commander-in-chief of the American army, had already granted commissions to vessels to cruise in the vicinity of Boston and intercept British store-ships ; and, under this authorization, numerous prizes had been made. On several occasions, however, captured vessels had been discharged, as not coming within the class allowed to be taken.

It was not until October, 1775, or six months after the battle of Lexington, that Congress took steps for the organization of a navy. On the 13th of this month, a law was passed, ordering two small cruisers to be equipped, for the purpose of intercepting supplies for the British army. On the 29 th of the same month, a resolution was adopted, denying to private ships of war and merchant-vessels the right to wear pennants in presence of the continental ships. On the 30th, two more cruisers, and of a larger class, were authorized. Up to this period. Congress looked only for a redress of grievances, and did not contemplate a separation from the crown of Great Britain : hence the strictly defensive policy on which it acted. The burning of the town of Falmouth, by order of Admiral Graves, was necessary to produce a more decided line of conduct. This outrage, which led to the law of Massachusetts to which we have already alluded, caused the passage of a general prize-law by Congress. Under this act, the capture of British vessels in any way connected with the pending struggle was authorized. This law was followed, on the 13th of December, by another, providing for the construction of thirteen additional cruisers.

By the close of the year 1775, therefore, Congress had authorized the equipment of seventeen men-of-war, varying in force from ten to thirty guns. These ships, however, were much inferior to what vessels of the same rate would be now. Their armaments were light sixes, nines, or twelves, carronades not having yet been introduced.

A serious difficulty was found in procuring suitable officers. Competent seamen there were enough, but officers accustomed to the discipline of a navy were rare : indeed, except a few who had left the royal service before the war, none were to be had. A large number of Americans, it is true, were in the British navy, where they occupied all ranks, from that of a midshipman up to post-captain ; but there is only a single authenticated instance of such a person having thrown up his commission. Congress was accordingly compelled to select its officers principally from such masters and mates of merchant-vessels as were most conspicuous for seamanship, presumed courage, habits of enterprise, and the capacity for command.

Esek Hopkins, an officer highly recommended, was appointed commander-in-chief of the new navy, a rank intended to correspond at sea with that of Washington on land. A sufficient number of captains and lieutenants was commissioned at the some time. Among the latter was John Paul Jones — among the former, Nicholas Biddle — names soon destined to become especially conspicuous. The first ensign displayed by a regular American man-of-war was hoisted by Paul Jones, in December, 1775, on board the Alfred, of which he was first lieutenant, that ship then lying in the Delaware. It is believed, on traditional authority, that the device of this flag represented a pine-tree, with a rattlesnake at its root, about to strike, and the motto, " Don't tread on me." The present national ensign did not come into use until 1777, and is generally supposed to have originated, in part, from the arms of the Washington family, the commander-in-chief having employed a private flag, not dissimilar, to distinguish his head-quarters. Until the adoption of the stars and stripes, the privateers, and even regular cruisers, carried different devices, the former usually the arms of the State whose commission they bore.

The squadron, under Commodore Hopkins, sailed for the Delaware on the 17th of February, 1776, on a cruise against the British naval force then ravaging the coasts of Virginia. The little fleet consisted of eight vessels, of which the Alfred twenty-four was the largest. Not meeting with the expected enemy, the commodore sailed for the Bahamas, where he had been ordered to rendezvous. Here he determined to make a descent on New Providence, a large amount of military stores being known to be collected there. The forts were easily captured, but the British, having received intimation of the attack, had removed the principal part of the stores. The squadron now proceeded northward, capturing various small vessels on the way. On the 6 th of April, Hopkins fell in with the British ship Glasgow twenty; but, after an action of five hours, the royal vessel escaped. The failure of his squadron to capture the ship brought the commodore justly into disgrace. He was allowed, indeed, to remain in command for a short period longer ; but he did not go to sea again. In January, 1777, Congress finally dismissed him from the service. No naval commander-in-chief was subsequently appointed, though a committee of Congress recommended the measure in 1781.