The battle of Harlem Heights, September 16, 1776; read before the New York historical society. February 5, 1878; with a preface and notes

Front matter

Glass JELi4J_

THE

BATTLE OF HARLEM HEIGHTS

Preface

This little monograph came in this wise. My grandfather, Rev. Abner Benedict, was a chaplain in the army at the battles of Long Island, Harlem Heights and White Plains. In the traditions of the family, and in biographical and historical literature, the battle of September 10, 1776, was known as the Battle of Harlem Heights. Absence from New York prevented my being present at the very interesting and appropriate celebration of the centennial anniversary of that battle. When the printed volume of the proceedings, with Mr. Jay's excellent oration, was put in my hands/ my surprise was expressed that the name Harlem Plains had been used instead of Harlem Heights. A remark was made in reply that the battle was fought on Harlem Plains, which surprised me still more. I immediately set about a search for the historical truth. The result of my inquiries is seen in the following paper, which was read before the New York Historical Society, as an attempt to ascertain the proper name and the actual place of the battle. This inquiry is quite immaterial except for the purpose of that historical accuracy which seems to me to be always important in questions of the early history of our revolutionary struggle.

Before my paper was completed, I was informed that Mr. Johnston was writing on the subject for the Long Island Historical Society, and supposing that he might have evidence which I had not seen, I invited him to give me an interview, which he kindly did, spending an evening with me at my house. I read to him the characteristic portions of my paper, as far as it was completed, and we conversed on the subject. His views differed from mine, as they did from the published accounts of all who had written before him. I derived not only pleasure, but profit, from the interview. After reading my paper iii the Society, Mr. John A. Stevens, who was at that time the Librarian of the Society, urged me to print it, and when I informed him that I could not at that time give it the necessary attention, he kindly offered to superintend the printing himself, which I declined, the manuscript not being in a condition for printing. I had also determined not to print before having an opportunity to see Mr. Johnston's volume. That volume proved to be a very valuable and interesting contribution to local revolutionaiy history. It did not, however, change my views. I then repeatedly invited Mr. Stevens to call on me and give me the benefit of his views. He always expressed his willingness to do so, but was prevented from coming. I then determined to wait till Mrs. Lamb's unique, excellent and popular history of the City of New York should be so far advanced as to embrace her account of the battle, knowing, as I did, that her views differed widely from mine. Soon after her account was published, I was informed that Mr. Stevens had in hand an article for the magazine of American History. I determined to wait for that also. The publication of that number of the magazine Avas unavoidably delayed till the 29th of May last, and by that time my paper was in large part printed.

That magazine article has rendered necessarj r a portion of this preface, and some notes which I have appended to my paper, which the reader is requested to look at. There are in the text a few r alterations and some new facts which I thought would more properly appear in the text than in foot notes.

I had then before me the carefully prepared accounts of Mr. Dawson, Mr. Lossing, Mr. Jay, Mr. Johnston, Mrs. Lamb and Mr. Stevens, besides my owm, no two of them agreeing, except Mrs. Lamb's and my own, which, to my surprise, proved to be coincident in many parts, both in substance and in language. That coincidence happened as" follows : Soon after the celebration, in a conversation with Mrs. Lamb, I expressed my views of the evidence as afterwards set forth in my paper, from which she expressed a prompt, positive and earnest dissent. I then dropped the subject with her, and went on with my inquiries.

Several months afterwards Mrs. Lamb sent her secretary to me with a message that she had not been present at the reading of my paper, and asking me to allow her to read it. I cheerfully handed it to the secretary. I did not hear from it again till sometime after my return from Europe, in the Autumn of 1879, when she informed me that the number of her history containing her account of the battle, was eleetrotyped and ready for the press. I did not read it till after it was delivered to the subscribers.

A remark was made to me after the reading of my paper, by one who had taken much interest in the centennial celebration, that my views would destroy the value of that celebration. No mistake could be greater. That celebration was in every respect a complete and admirable success, and for it we are indebted lo Mr. Stevens. He suggested the celebration, and he was the master-spirit of the theory and of the arrangements by which it was carried forward with so much success. The place of that commemorative display was well chosen and appropriate — elevated, far-overlooking and central. Had the battle been then going on, Mr. Jay might have seen the smoke of battle as it rose wherever it was, and have almost heard the vollies and the cannon, mingling with the well deserved plaudits of his hearers. On his either hand would be the two commanders, at their headquarters, directing the movements. The objective point of both was the same, Harlem Heights, Howe to attack and Washington to defend — neither having a thought of Harlem Plains. It could be no one but Washington who sent out, Knowlton, and Reed, and Leitch, and Putnam and Greene, onthe Heights, and no one but Howe who sent off the Fifth British Regiment of Foot to trot three miles, double quick, to support and rescue Leslie, three miles away, and it could be no one but him who sent forward the 8,000 or 10,000 fresh British regulars, who were just comingover the Bloomingdale hills when Washington ordered our jubilant troops to be called in.

That Mr. Stevens and Mr. Jay should be mistaken in their judgment on some facts of locality and some movements, is neither important nor singular. A hundred years of decay and of the changes wrought by modern improvements, have impaired the force of evidence, which was always scrappy, sketchy and scattered, and not so forcible before being collated and combined. Different minds would view it differently, some would give more weight to one thing and some to another, even if the whole testimony was before them, as it would not be. Much of it has been discovered since Mr. Jay's oration was delivered, and doubtless more will be discovered hereafter, during the quickened search of this centennial period. The whole subject is one of fair historical investigation, without feeling or prejudice or pride of opinion.

In referring to the evidence, I have inserted in the paper and in this preface, only verbatim extracts from each document and I have printed those extracts in italics, to give them a sharper outline and to make a more distinct and forcible, and at the same time more harmonious, presentation of the proofs. It should also be remarked that the references, Jay, 25, etc., are not to be understood as quoting Mr. Jay personally, but simply as a reference to the page of the Jay commemorative volume, the pages of that volume being numbered consecutively from the first to the last, including the appendix.

Mr. Stevens has gone awkwardly out of his way to throw discredit on the history of Mrs. Lamb, now nearly finished, and to say that I am justly chargeable with leading her into topographical and historical error, and to say this for no other probable reason than that I have been compelled to differ with him respectfully on a matter of revolutionary history which is somewhat dim with age, and on which all other writers on the subject have come to conclusions differing from his own and from each other.

He begins by suggesting that my view assumes that Washington "committed such a blunder as to have neglected to hold the southern extremity of the heights on which his army was encamped." The reverse is expressly stated in my account, and is true, that Washington held not only the southern extremity, but the whole of the Heights where his army was encamped. His strong pickets ran along the eastern brow of the Heights to the Point of Rocks, and along the northern brow of the Manhattanville hollow-way, to the North River. Immediately above them was the advanced guard of two brigades commanded bj' General Greene, and above them lay the brigades of which Colonel Silliman's command was a part — vide page 24. Washington held the whole of the Heights two months.

I shall not now review all the errors of Mr. Stevens. I leave them to be compared with the proofs mendoned in my paper. His petty fault-finding manner is evidence that he may have been influenced by " private griefs" as much as by the love of historical truth. I must, however, mention a few characteristic instances to show how carelessly he makes his attack.

Mrs. Lamb snys : Washington saw large bodies of the enemy upon Vie high grounds opposite. To this Mr. Stevens says :

There is no direct evidence to any appearance of large bodies anywhere. Let us see. Washington himself distinctly says : About the time of the post's departure with my letter, the enemy appeared in several large bodies upon the plains, about 2% miles from here. (Date, Headquarters, Morris' House.) I rode down to our advanced posts to put matters in a proper situation if they should attempt to come on, when I arrived there 1 heard a firing, which I was informed was between a party of our rangers, under the command of Colonel Knowlton, and an advanced party of the enemy. — Jay, 40. He says again, in another letter: On Holiday morning last, several parties of the enemy appeared on the high grounds opposite to our heights, and some skirmishing hael happened between our troops and those of the enemy. — Jay, 44. Mr. Stevens thinks the second of these statements of Washington is correct — the other not ! They are the same statement — referring to the plains on the high grounds opposite — that is, Bloomingdale Heights.

Colonel Silliman (date, Harlem Heights, Sept. 17th) says: Yesterday, at 7 o'clock in themorning, we were alarmed with the sight of a considereible number of the enemy on the pterins between us, about a mile distant. — Jay, 57. This fixes the time, 7 A.M. Colonel Reed says : Just after I had seeded my letter an account came that the enemy was advancing in three large columns. —Jay, 47-49.

Colonel Humphrey says : Next morning several parties of the i in my appeeired upon theplains in our front. General Washington rode quickly for the outposts for the purpose of preparing for an attack if the enemy should come on. — Life of Putnam,

140. The enemy did not come on till a little before 12 o'clock, several hours later. — Jay, 57.

Notwithstanding attempts which have been made to throw discredit on father Weems's story of the cherry tree and the hatchet, I think that with the testimony of these three officers, every one of them on the spot, and of the highest credibility, Mrs. Lamb had a right to consider Washington's character for veracity good.

Again, Mrs. Lamb says: Before daylight Washington was in the saddle. His first important act was to send Knowlton with a picked company of '120 nn n to learn tin position of and take the enemy's advanced guard. Mr. Stevens says: For this also there is no authority. Let us see.

A letter from an officer in the army to his friend, published at the time in the Connecticut Gazette, says: On Monday morning the General ordered us to go and take the enemy's advanced guard; accordingly, we set out just before day and found where Hay were. — Jay, GO.

This officer is well understood to have been Captain Oliver Brown, Knowlton's senior captain, who was appointed by Washington to the command of the rangei's on Knowlton's death. — Jay, 60. He was there in the battle, an officer of the 120 picked men. It was he who said My poor Colonel (Knowlton) was shot just by my side. I took bold of him and asked him if he wasbadly wounded, be told me he was, and as his life ebbed away he said : " I do notvalue my life if we do but get the day;" and it was he who ordered two of his men to carry the dying hero to the rear. It could be nobody but Captain Brown. — Jay, GO. He was a brave, patriotic and good man, recorded as distinguished attlie battle of Harlem Heights, White Plains, Princeton, Trenton, Brandywine, Gerrnantoiru and Monmouth. Better believe him, Mr. Stevens, as Mrs. Lamb does, and as I do. See his Epitaph in the Appendix, Note 4.

Mr. S. says, that the statement of Mrs. Lamb that this battle was evidently a part of the British plan to drive the Americans from the island has no basis in contemporaneous history.

Let us see.

General George Clinton says: It is witliout doubt, they had out on the occasion between 4000 and 5000 of their choicest troops, and expected to have drove us off the island. They an

greatly mortified at their disappointment. — Jay, 54.

A letter from headquarters to a gentleman in Annapolis, dated Sept. 17th says : We expect every hour that the general engagement will come on. — Jay, 02.

In general orders of the lGth, General Washington says: General Nixon's and Colonel Sargeant's elivison, Colonel Weedon's and Major Price's regiments, are to retire to their quarters to refresh th< mselves, but to hold themsleves in readiness to turn out at a minute's 'warning. General McDougall to establish proper guards against his brigade upon the heights from Morris' House to General McDougaU's camp, to furnish proper guards to prevent et surprise, not less than twenty men from each regiment. General Putnam commands upon the right flank to-night. General Spencer, from McDougaU's brigade, up to Morris House. Should the enemy attempt to force the pass to-night, General Putnam is to apply to General Spencer for a reinforcement. — Jay, 65. Baurmeister, 24th Sept., says: The English Light Infantry advanced too quickly on the retreat of the enemy. — Jay, 82.

General Sir Henry Clinton says: The ungm-e enable impetuosity of the light.troops drew us into Uds scrape. — Jay, 81. The light infantry who were the van of our army pressed too gallantly upon the rebels. — Jay, 80.

The complaint is clearly that they were premature — they attacked too soon.

It has been said that there is no evidence that at any time on the Kith, "a single Britisher succeeded in crossing or attempted to cross the Manhattan ville Hollow -way." Let us see:

I suppose that Silliman's entrenchments across the Island were where they are placed by Mrs. Lamb, beginning about 153d street, near the bank of the Harlem River, and ending quite on the bank of the Hudson River, because there were no other entrenchments across the island to the river, and because Silliman says they took in three little redoubts which were there before, and are shown on the map. It is, however, for the present purpose quite immaterial whether they were there, or lower down, where two months later, Sauthier's map shows was another line of entrenchments beginning about half the distance from the Harlem River to the Hudson, and ending on the Hudson, apparently a stronger work than Silliman's.

Now, Colonel Silliman says: About half a mile below us in the woods, we had two brigade s lying as an advanced guard. The enemy in a large body advanced in the woods a little before 12 o'clock and began a heavy fire on those brigades. — Jay, 57. General Greene commanded those brigades.

General Greene says in his letter to the Governor of Rhode Island— his State: "On tin 16th wt had a skirmish at Harlem Heights. A party of about a thousand came and attacked our advanced post, and Putnam and Reed took part in that right. — Jay, 55. In another letter General Greene says: " The enemy next day at Harlem Heights, flushed with the success of the day before, approached and attacked our lines where I had the honor to con, maud," Jay, 66. " General Putnam and the Adjutant-General were in the action, and behaved nobly." — Jay, 67.

I have carefully studied the various accounts of this battle, and now, after all that has been said, I am compelled to say that I have not seen any evidence that after the eight rounds apiece of the skirmish between Leslie and Knowlton in the early morning, there was a shot fired below the American pickets along the brow of the Manhattanville Hollow-way, so clearly and truly represented on Mr. Johnston's map " Field of the Harlem Heights affair," at page 259 of his volume.

The opinions of the writers, that all the fighting was below those pickets and so within the British picket lines, are very clearly given, but they all fail to state the evidence on which they formed those opinions, which opinions seem quite inadmissible. Mr. Stevens seems to suppose that where the facts are inconsistent with his theory, so much the worse for the facts, and that what he so often calls "The fair inference," " The natural inference," "The presumptive evidence" of his theory must prevail over the written statements of officers of high character who were on the spot.

Of all the extraordinary statements of Mr. Stevens, the most extraordinary is this, that th<r, is n<>t a shadow of authority for Mrs. Lamb's statement that Knowlton was discovered at sunrise and attacked by 400 of the British Infantry near Vandewaters Heights.

In addition to the proofs quoted on pages 28 to 30, I invite attention to the testimony of Hall's Civil War in America, which distinctly and significantly furnishes the missing link which connects the parts of this story, stating where Knowlton's camp was, the place from which the Rangers " set out " before daylight, and the place 2% miles distant where they were discovered and attacked by Leslie a little later in the morning. Hall says: On the sixteenth in the morning, a body of the enemy (the Rangers) turned out of their lines on Morris Heights, and appeared * * near the. edge of a wood in front of our left flank, on which two companies of Light Infantry (Leslie) were sent to dislodge them.

Now it is quite immaterial what route Knowlton took when he ''set out," or when he " came in " for re-inforcements. I must however insist that it is probable, as stated in my paper, page 27, that he went out by the low unobstructed shore of the river, out of sight and of hearing of both armies, and that he "came in" through the woods that covered the heights along the shore, pursued by Leslie, also in the woods.

The point of Mr. Stevens as to the barracks, I presume would not have been made by him were it not that he makes 1 he basis of it a map which has no existence except in the garbled and "cooked" copy of a map substituted for and called the original Sauthier's map in the magazine article. What an idea to " cook " an old historical map into a made-dish and serve it as the original! The barracks built and burned by the Americans were the barracks near Fort Washington, burned by Colonel Lasher by the special order of General Heath. I invite attention to note 5 in the Appendix in which I make some remarks as to the maps and the barracks. At the time of the battle there were no barracks below Manhattanville— nor indeed anywhere else ; it was warm weather, September 16th, and the two armies had arrived on these fields only the night before, and it is not easy to see how Sauthier's map, not made till after November 16th, when barracks were necessary, could furnish evidence that the Americans were fighting within the British lines and had barracks there two months before.

June 22, 1880.

E C. BENEDICT.

THE

EVACUATION OF NEW YORK,

AND THE

BATTLE OF HAELEI HEIGHTS,

IN SEPTEMBER, 1776.

The Evacuation of the City of New York and the Battle of Harlem Heights, to which it led, are so nearly connected as to be one military event, and are so important as to deserve a more careful history than they have yet received. That battle was the first American victory of the Revolutionary War.

This Society, on the centennial anniversary of the day of the battle, celebrated so important an event in an appropriate manner under the mistaken name of the Battle of Harlem Plains. Assembled thousands, convened from this and other States, on the high grounds overlooking northward the battlefield and the camp grounds of the preceding night, listened to a patriotic and eloquent commemorative oration by Air. Jay, our late Minister to Austria, which was published by the Society. In recommending the Society to celebrate the event, the Executive Committee very justly says: The action, though of minor importance, teas one of the most brilliant exploits of the Revolutionary War. In a close conflict, the most celebrated of the British regiments, after an unsuccessful effort to break the American lines, icere repulsed and driven back in confusion by lite Continental troops. This success restored confidence to the patriot forces, demoralized by the retreat from Long Island and the subsequent landing at Kips Bay. — Jay, 86. There was no large and general plan of attack, and at the end of the day each army kept the positions which it had before the attack was made (Jay, 52-76) ; and in the number of casualties, the battle was indeed of minor importance, but in historical results the affair was as important as it was brilliant, and was so esteemed at the time.

It is the object of this paper to contribute some general views and some historical details which have hitherto escaped proper notice, and which serve to correct some statements, now shown by this further evidence to be erroneous. The chief of those errors are in regard to the proper historical name of the battle and the place where it was actually fought, both of which are important to the truth of history and to its commemorations. Before considering the evidence in detail, some general views, which seem to me to have much weight, will be presented.

THE MORAL EFFECT OF THE BATTLE

upon the two armies was very striking and very important.

The British were convinced that they had been in an unfortunate scrape. In a manuscript note by Sir Henry Clinton, in his copy of Stedman's History of the American War, he says: The ungovernable impetuosity of the light troops drew us into this scrape. — Jay, 81.

In the British order book of the next morning the Commander-in-Chief disapproves the conduct of the Light Company in pursuing the rebels 'without proper discretion and without support. — Jay, 77. Lieut, Harris, of the Fifth British Foot, a pari of the British reserve (Jay, 77), says: We were instantly trotted about three miles, without a halt to draw breath, to support a battalion of Light Infantry which had imprudently advanced so far icithout support as to be in danger of being cut off. This must have happened but for our haste. — Jay, 79. The Hessian General Donop says: General Leslie 7tad mads a great blunder in sending these bra ve fellows so far in adva nee in the woods icithout s uppori. — Jay, 82. General Howe found it necessary to recommend the corps u nder the command of General Leslie to be not only brave but more prudent. — Jay, 83. General George Clinton says of the enemy : They are greatly mortified at their disappointment, and have ever since been exceedingly modest and quiet, not having even patroling parties beyond their lines. I lay within a mile of them the night after the battle, ami never heard men work harder. I believe that they thought ice intended to pursue our advantage and attack them next morning. — Jay, 54-55. The brave Captain Gooch, writing to a Boston merchant, says : The great superiority of numbers, and every other advantage the enemy had, when considered, makes the victory glorious, and though but over a part of their army, yet the consequences of it are attended ivilh advantages very great, as they immediately quitted the heights all round us, and have not been troublesome since. — Jay, 60.

Colonel Lamb was at this time confined in a British prison ship. After his release he told Dr. Stiles that an officer came on board on Lords-day evening (15 September), damning the Yankees for runaway cowards, and storming that tfiere was no chance to fight and get Iwnor and rise. He was in the Monday action also, and came again on board in tfie evening, cursing and damning the war, saying he had found the Americans would fight, ■ and that it would be impossible to conquer them. — Jay, 69. Lewis Morris, Jr., writes to his father: The impression it made upon the minds of our people is a most signal victory to us, and the defeat a considerable mortification to them. — Jay, 56. Colonel Sillimansays: Our people drove the regulars back from post to post about a mile and a half, and then left them pretty well satisfied with tlieir dinner. Since which they have been very quiet. They have found now that when ice meet them on equal ground we are not a lot of people thai wdl run from them, but that they have now hud << pretty good drubbing. — Jay, 57. A British officer, in a letter from New York, dated September 23d, a week after the battle, says : I am pretty confident our General will not attack them in their advantageous situation with musquetry. He seems determined to mafce no improper sacrifices. We have a noble train of artillery. — Upcott Collection. SirWilliam Howe, says Colonel Humphrey, not choosing to put too much at risk in attacking us in front, on the 12th of October, moved to Frog's Neck.— Humphrey's Life of Putnam, 144. The British were humiliated. On the other hand, the Americans were overjoyed with their success. It was our first victory iu the war. Colonel Humphrey says: An advantage so trivial in itself, produced, in event, a most surprising and almost incredible effect upon the whole army. Among the troops not engaged, who, during the action, were thro/ring earth from the new trenches with an alacrity that indicated a determination to defend them, every visage was seen to lighten and to assume, instead of the gloom of despair, the glow of animation. — Humphrey, 142-3.

Major Fish wrote to Mr. McKesson, the Secretary of the Convention:

Our troops were in a most desponding condition before, hut now are in good spirits. — Jay, 59. Lewis Morris Jr. says: Our people consider it a most signal victory to us. — Jay, 56. George Clinton writes to the New York Convention: It has animated our troops, given them new spirits and erased every bad impression the retreat from Long Island, &e.,had left upon their minds, — they find they are able with inferior numbers to drive their enemy, and think of nothing now but conquest. — Jay, 52. Adjutant-General Reed says: I assure you it has given another face of tilings in our army. You, can hardly conceive the change it made in our army. It has given spirits to our men. The men have recovered their spirits, and feel a confidence which before they had quite lost. General Washington says: Our army seems to be greatly inspirited by it. — Jay, 45. This little advantage has i itspirited our troops prodigiously. — Jay, 43. All seem to concur in the opinion that it was the result of the true character of our troops as patriotic and brave officers and men. Never did troops go to the field with more cheerfulness and alacrity, says an officer of the Maryland Regulars. — Jay, 61. It also destroyed the prestige of the British soldiers. They find, says Washington, that it only requires resolution and good officers to make an enemy (that they stood in too much dread of) give way. — Jay, 43. General George Clinton says: They find they are able with inferior numbers to drive their enemy. — Jay, 52. Colonel Silliman says: They have found now that when we meet them on equal ground we are not a set of people that will run from them, but they have now had a pretty good drubbing. — Jay, 57. General Knox says: They (the Americans ) find that if they stick to these mighty men, tliey will run as fast as other people. — Jay, 51.

Captain Gooch says: I'm now rend)/ to give them the second part whenever they have an appetite, as I'm convinced whenever they stir from their ships we shall drub them. — Jay, 60. This self-reliance acquired in this battle went with our troops through the war, and it is here presented before examining the evidence, because it cannot fail to have an important influence in giving force to the evidence.