Americanism, what it is

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AMERICANISM

Preface

This little book is intended to set forth as clearly as possible what is most original and distinctive in American political conceptions and most characteristic of the American spirit.

The field of thought here covered, no doubt, admits of differences of opinion regarding the value and importance of that which is distinctively American; but there can hardly be any controversy over what it is.

It requires only a brief employment of the method of exclusion to determine what it is not.

It cannot be maintained that Americanism, whatever it is, is a matter of race. Our country from the beginning has been populated by people of widely different ethnic origins. Some of their qualities are perpetuated with practically little effacement, others are obscured by the syncretism of races ; but there is no definable ethnic type that is exclusively entitled to be called American.

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Equally futile would be the attempt to define Americanism in terms of geography. There are, it is true, wide diversities of habits, manners, customs, and ideas among our people in the various States ; but there is nothing in all these variations that justifies a denial of Americanism to any of them.

And yet not every man who lives in the United States, or who has been born here, can be classed as an American, in the sense which we all, with more or less clearness, attach to that word. We feel that we are not misusing language when we say of a man who entertains certain ideas and sentiments that he is un-American.

We speak of "assimilating" the new elements that enter into our population, and we call it specifically "Americanization." What is it then that is involved in this transformation?

We have developed here in America a new estimate of human values, and this has led to a new understanding of life. It has become difficult for us to comprehend the course of events in Europe, and it is impossible for Europe to understand us. We have, especially of late, imported many iso-

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lated European ideas into our country, but they do not seem to fit into our system of things.

The reason is obvious. Our fundamental principles are different. They are even contradictory. We have long ago abandoned a great part of what Europe still holds sacred. If we had a dynasty of hereditary rulers ; if we had a State religion ; if we had formed a habit, and it had become hereditary, of giving ourselves up body and soul to the exigencies of the State ; if we were surrounded by powerful enemies ; then we might understand many things that happen in Europe which now seem to us unreasonable and almost insensate. We sometimes forget that our earliest traditions as a people,— and we do not regard ourselves as any longer young, — were an open, a heroic, and a bloody revolt against all that.

But our Americanism is not a mere negation. It is a positive, constructive force. It starts with the idea, that the human individual has an intrinsic value. It holds that he has an inherent right to bring to fruition all his native powers, and to enjoy the fruits of his efforts. His real value lies not in what he has, but in what he is and may

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become; and he may become anything his capacities and his achievements may enable him to be.

This whole conception of life is based upon the significance of the individual ; but the latest, if not the prevailing, fashion of thought is, to speak slightingly of the individual, — of his rights, of his capacities, and of his responsibilities. We are at present seeking progress, not through a development of the individual, but through what society as a whole can do for itself ; forgetting that society is a purely abstract idea, possessing no inherent power either of initiative or of achievement. Yet it has become almost a reproach to stand for the rights of the individual, who is the only motive power that society possesses.

The contemporary reaction against Americanism erroneously assumes that individualism is egoism. On the contrary, it is the only solid foundation for our duty to respect the other man's rights. And this is the essence of Americanism as revealed in the history of its origin.

David Jayne Hill.

Washington, D. C.

CHAPTER * PAGE

I. THE AMERICAN CONCEPTION OF THE

STATE .3

The Preeminence of the State. Alleged Immunities of the State. The Predatory Beginnings of the State. The Reason for the State's Irresponsibility. The American Protest Against Mere Power. A New Conception of the State. The Essential Limits of Sovereignty. The Distinctive American Doctrine,, An American Contribution to Political Theory. The Renunciation of Arbitrary Power. The Separation of Civil and Religious Interests. The Real Significance of the Constitution. Hostility to Constitutional Guarantees. Ill-Considered Proposals of Change. The Importance of the American Example. Essential Elements in the American Conception. Obstacles to World Organization. The American Conception and the Future.

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II. THE CRISIS IN AMERICAN CONSTITU- TIONALISM . . . ... .49

The Friends and the Enemies of Constitutionalism. The Means of Guaranteeing Equality. The Constitution as a Bar to Demagogism. Constitutional Changes. Unconstitutional Encroachments. Unconstitutional Legislation. The Renunciation of Arbitrary Power. Results of the Spirit of Domination. The Fruits of Government by Law. The Danger of Class Control. The Attacks Upon the Constitution. The Drift of Social Forces. The Needed Revival of Americanism. Principles versus Personalities. The Only Rock of Salvation. The Need of Organization.

III. TAKING SOUNDINGS • . . . .85

The Revolt Against Fixed Principles. The Essential Permanence of Law. The Substitution of Experiment for Experience. Reason versus Emotion. No Denial of Opposition to the Constitution. Rights as the Gift of Society. The True Nature of Public Authority. The Nature of New Legislation Demanded. The Pragmatic Character of These Demands. The Mask of Philan-

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thropy. The Constitution Not a Class Guarantee. The Value of Constitutional Guarantees. The Spirit of Revolt Against Fundamental Law. A Perilous Situation.

IV. THE TESTS OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 125

The Test of Democracy as a Theory. The Real Problem of Government. Responsibility in a True Democracy. Democracy versus Imperialism. The Irresponsibility of Majority Absolutism. Just Government Essentially Self-limiting. The Conflict Between Democracy and Imperialism. The Strength of Imperialism. Weak Points in Democracy. Is Democracy an Impediment to Duty? Our Own Relation to Imperialism. The British Example. The Democratic Ideal. The Test of Our Own Democracy. The Triumph of Democracy.

The Real Basis of International Law. Do Inherent National Rights Exist? The Possibility of World Organization. The Impediments to World Organization. The Present Basis of National Security. The

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Necessity of National Strength. An American Platform of Principles. Opposition to American Principles. The League to Enforce Peace. The Incompatibility of Imperialism and Democracy. The Relation of Peace to Justice. The Relation of Peace to Force. The Traditional American Attitude. The Fear of Militarism.

VI. THE DUTY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE . 195

Some Irrelevant Propositions. The Real Question Stated. Our Primary National Obligation. The Fruits of the New Politics. The Dominance of Economic Thinking. The Influence of Pacifism. The Effects of Political Pacifism. The Loss* of National Prestige. An Unrecognized Source of Danger. Our First Line of Defense. Our Special American Interests. The Need of a Clear Foreign Policy. The Present International Problem. The Attitude of Our Young Men. The Necessity of National Ideals. The Nation's Duty to the Future.

VII. NEW PERILS FOR AMERICANISM . . 233

The International Situation. The World Conflict for Trade. The Possible Expan-

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sion of Empire. The Alternative of World Rivalry. Our Advantage of Position. The Advantage of Our Democracy. Our Policy Marked Out for Us. The Economic Contest. The Conditions of the Struggle. The Militarization of Industry. The Obstacles to European Recuperation. The Question of Future Markets. Our Own Economic Situation. The Meaning of Militarizing Industry. The Possibilities of American Initiative. The Danger of Economic Menace. The Industrial Situation to be Faced. The Opportunity of America.

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THE AMERICAN CONCEPTION OF THE STATE

I

THE AMERICAN CONCEPTION OF THE STATE

If, as the theory of Imperialism implies, the State were in reality a superior entity, apart from the individuals who compose it, and this entity were capable of foresight, supervision, and protective care, it would not be altogether unreasonable for men to submit themselves to it without reserve. As a matter of fact, however, there is no such superior entity. The truth is that in civilized communities men live under a system of relatively fixed legalized relations which we call the State; but that which gives us a sense of its reality is not the State itself, which is nowhere visible, but the Government, or body of men, which claims to act in its name.

THE PREEMINENCE OF THE STATE

We are all, no doubt, very much imposed upon by the alleged claims and authority of the State, which in the abstract are so evident that we do not think of denying them. The noblest of human virtues, we are assured, is devotion to the State. It stands for order and justice among men. Without it there would be no security for life or property. No people is deserving of respect that is not ready to make sacrifices for the State; for it is the State that redeems the individual from a merely animal existence, and transports him from the realm of mere sensual indulgence to the domain of farreaching historic action. At their best, individuals are only like the leaves of a tree. They serve their purpose for a season, and then fall into decay. The State, like the tree itself, lives on. Through summer sunshine and wintry storms its roots penetrate to greater depths and its branches rise to greater heights, — a symbol of unceasing growth, of continuity of purpose, and of uninterrupted achievement. Happy should be the leaves it has lifted to the heavens, to fall and perish at its feet, if they may thereby supply it with new nourishment and sustain its larger life!

There is, at first thought, something very plausible about this line of reasoning. The State, when rightly conceived, is, undoubtedly, more important than the individual; and it would seem conclusive that, if one or the other is to be sacrificed, it should not be the State. Not only the magnitude of the interests guarded by it, but its intrinsic character as the organ of justice, would seem to place its claims above all else. But can it be contended that even this high prerogative, through which the State becomes the custodian of our most sacred rights and liberties, exempts the persons who represent it from the observance of the principles of justice for which it is said to exist?

ALLEGED IMMUNITIES OF THE STATE

To the unsophisticated man it is inexplicable that the State, claiming the right of command as the guardian of human rights, should not be governed by the ordinary precepts of morality. He cannot understand why it is that what would be condemned as a crime if done by an individual citizen, should be made the object of public rejoicing and national pride if performed by a government. "How," he asks, "can the State consistently require honesty in word and deed of me, and at the same time not only practice diplomatic equivocation but expect me to sacrifice my life in defending it? Why is it that the State punishes me with death if I kill my personal enemy, who has done me a real wrong; and yet may require me to join in killing innocent people, who have injured no one, and only pray to be let alone? Why should the State repress and punish robbery, pillage, and assassination within its own borders ; and, at the same time, compel its subjects or citizens to aid in the invasion and acquisition of territory that does not belong to it, and in despoiling the property and taking the lives of noncombatants by exploding shells and falling bombs? In brief, what is it that gives a government a right, without judge or jury, without proof of guilt or evidence of evil intention, at any time, for any reason, or finally for no reason at all except its own glory or aggrandizement, to enjoy a monopoly of doing with impunity that which all individual men are condemned and punished for attempting?

As a question of ethics, it is impossible to justify a distinction between private and public morality; but it is not primarily a question of ethics, it is a question of historic fact. The privilege of employing armed force for any purpose it sees fit is a traditionally recognized prerogative of every Sovereign State; not because the're is in every free and independent community of men an inherent right to treat with violence every other such community, but because the condition of human society offers no method of preventing a nation that wishes for any reason to make war upon another from doing so, except by a similar use of armed force against it. In short, the only restraint upon the conduct of a Sovereign State, outside of its own will, is armed force; and, in an abstract sense, one State has as good a right to exercise it as another. Everything, therefore, depends upon each State's own conception of its duty.

THE PREDATORY BEGINNINGS OF THE STATE

If we pause to inquire into the origin of the State, we see that, in its beginnings, it was not a moral institution, nor intended to be an organ of justice, but, on the contrary, a predatory enterprise, the result of domination from within by a ruling class deriving a benefit from the subjection of a servile class, or of domination from without by the invasion and conquest of territories and populations unable to resist the aggression of the stronger. At first, all the inhabitants of the conquered territory were destroyed, and its property taken over. Later, the women and children were retained as slaves. Still later, the whole population was spared, but reduced to the condition of a servile class, and compelled to pay tribute to the conqueror. Such is the history of every dynastic State of antiquity, and the same may be said of most of the Great Powers which exist today. It is only within very recent times, and chiefly because the common people have at last become able, by virtue of representative government, to withhold the payment of tribute from their rulers, that they have come to be recognized as constituents of the State, and allowed some voice in the government.

THE REASON FOR THE STATE'S IRRESPONSI- BILITY

The historic origin of the State enables us to understand its comparative irresponsibility. Based primarily on the possession of superior force, the absolute supremacy of the governing authority has been, as a matter of fact> unquestioned and unquestionable. The unlimited and arbitrary will of the ruler has, therefore, been compulsory; and it has been considered expedient to accord to it a prompt and uncomplaining obedience.

When, with the growth of intelligence, philosophers began to theorize about the nature of the State, they were confronted by the actual existence of absolute power. As authority did, in fact, emanate from the "sovereign," the abstract attribute of "sovereignty," and not the inherent rights of the individuals composing the population, was taken to represent the essence and controlling principle of the State; and "sovereignty," thus conceived, was defined as "supreme power." Wherever that was to be found, there was the substance of the State; and, being supreme, it was not only the source of law, but by hypothesis above the law, since it is from "sovereignty" that all law proceeds.

Thus was a temporary and abnormal state of fact emphasized and immortalized as a legal conception, the one prime fountainhead from which all other legal conceptions were to be deduced; for what in this conception is the law, if not a decree of "sovereign power"? And what rights has any individual under the law, except those that supreme power accords to him? The State, therefore, is everything. The "subject" — and the "citizen," too, under that conception — is nothing but a creature of the State.

Rightful authority and supreme power, though in reality so widely different, are in this theory completely identified. "Whoever," declares this doctrine, "possesses supreme power has rightful authority to command." If it is the sovereign's will to wage war, there is no court of appeal. Individual rights and private morality are entirely subordinate in this system.

THE AMERICAN PROTEST AGAINST MERE POWER

It is interesting to note that the first really radical protest against this conception of the State came from America, and it is a protest that may very properly be emphasized today ; not officially by our Government, which in recognition of the society of Sovereign States — if one may use that expression without derision — is obliged to respect certain international traditions, however erroneous and inconsistent they may be, but by ourselves as individual citizens, who, not being charged with that obligation, may freely think, and freely express our thoughts.

When I say the first radical protest came 13 from America, I speak with precision. Long before Jean Jacques Rousseau wrote of the "Contrat Social/' or John Locke of a "Civil Compact/' a company of plain men, sailing over wintry seas to an unknown land with the purpose of escaping the too heavy hand of an absolute government, on November 11, 1620, as they were approaching the shores of what was afterward New England, drew up and signed in the cabin of their little ship a compact which expressed a new idea of human government. This was nearly thirty years before the famous "Agreement of the People" of 1647, in which the followers of Cromwell endeavored to establish for the security of their rights against the encroachments of arbitrary power a supreme law placed above the power of Parliament. The compact written in the Mayflower pledged the signers not only to frame for themselves "just and equal laws," but "to jjield to them all due submission and obedience." Here was the beginning of real self-government.

There was nothing original in the mere fact of a written compact, for written compacts had long before been extorted from kings and emperors by popular uprisings. The new leaven was the voluntary submission to self -imposed law, as a means of securing a permanent guarantee of individual rights.

No new State was at that time organized on this basis, for the Pilgrims continued to be loyal to the King of England ; but a new idea had entered the minds of men, the idea that all just government must be based on the recognition of individual rights and liberties, rights and liberties so sacred that even governments are bound to respect them; for it is only on account of them that governments have a right to exist.

A NEW CONCEPTION OF THE STATE

For the first time since Europe emerged from primitive savagery, an opportunity was offered for the free exercise of intelligence in considering the fundamental problems of government, without interference on the part of arbitrary power and dynastic interests; for the isolation from the Old World was, in effect, a return to a condition of nature, so far as government was concerned; while, at the same time, in mental development and political experience the colonists possessed the full maturity of the age in which they lived. The result was a new and distinctive conception of the State — a conception differing by the whole diameter of human experience from that which was then generally accepted in other parts of the world, not excepting England.

In what, then, did that new conception 16 consist? In migrating to the New World the men of the colonial period brought with them an exceptionally rich political inheritance, the highest and the noblest that, up to that time, had ever existed. They possessed the traditions of representative government and the idea of personal guarantees contained in Magna Charta, with its solemn pledge that "No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseized of his free hold, or his liberties, or his free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or otherwise destroyed, but by the lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land." All that had been long before wrung from the hand of royal power as the heritage of Englishmen. In time the later colonists brought with them, and shared as British subjects, the body of principles vindicated in the English Revolution of 1688, doctrines

for which Englishmen had struggled heroi- 3 17 cally before their supremacy was established by their triumph over the absolutism of the Stuart dynasty. With the writings of Rousseau and the French philosophers only a few were acquainted. With the sounder political philosophy of John Locke, which in its mode of reasoning was more congenial to the American understanding, a greater number were familiar. But in their own deepest convictions, high above the foothills of mere theory and argumentation, towered like a sun-lit mountain top the self-evident truth that a just government must be based on the inherent rights of the governed; and when that maxim was denied, not only by the King but also by the British Parliament, the moment for separation and the formation of a new government had arrived. To them it seemed preposterous that the State could be one thing and the individuals composing it another. Equally clear to them was the idea that individuals, in their organic relations as a body politic, not only constitute the State, but the whole of the State; for what, in the last analysis, is the State but the organic union of its citizens? Both royalty and parliamentary representation are merely institutions of the State — the King as the symbol of its unity, the Parliament as the organ of its deliberations — but neither of these is the source of its authority, which must be sought in the body politic itself, in the organic unity of a coherent people, associated together for the security of their individual rights.

THE ESSENTIAL LIMITS OF SOVEREIGNTY

What, then, in this conception of the State, is "sovereignty"— for the word and the idea were already firmly fixed in the legal traditions of the world? Only "Sov-

| t H ereign States" could have a standing in the society of nations. The new State about to be formed must, therefore, be in some sense "sovereign," if it was to be recognized as independent; but the idea of absolute sovereignty, the unlimited authority of "supreme power," that was precisely what they were opposing; that was what they could never accept, and consequently could not claim for themselves, for the simple reason that human nature is not absolute. Not any more than a king could a parliament, or even their own colonial assemblies in which they were represented, be allowed to possess arbitrary power; for there were individual rights which they meant to reserve — "inalienable" rights as they expressed it — which should not be surrendered to any earthly power. So far as the laws of nations were concerned, they, as much as any others, were an independent and a sovereign people; but the right of either men or nations to do whatever they pleased, to place themselves above the law, or to declare their mere will to be the law, seemed to them to have no warrant. Such a pretension was, in their eyes, mere usurpation.

The true nature of the State, they considered, must be determined by its end. In this all the colonies at the moment of their struggle for independence were in perfect agreement. What they claimed for themselves they cheerfully accorded to all others, even to the least among them, and on a basis of equality. The State, they believed, existed to preserve their rights and liberties ; and the Constitution of Massachusetts, adopted in 1780 and never since superseded, in even more precise terms than the Declaration of Independence distinctly asserted in its first sentence : "The end of the existence, maintenance, and administration of government is to furnish the individuals who compose the body politic with the power of enjoying, in safety and tranquillity, their natural rights and the blessings of life." And in the Declaration of Rights which constitutes its first article, it is declared: "All men • . . have certain natural, essential, and inalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties: that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their happiness."

THE DISTINCTIVE AMERICAN DOCTRINE

The American colonies varied greatly in their relations to the British Crown, as well as in their religious ideas and their economic interests; but all united in a definite conception of the ends and purposes of the

State. It existed, they thought, for the protection of individual rights and liberties. All alike shared in the provisions of the Great Charter, which set definite limits to the royal authority; but the Great Charter permitted anything and everything to be done, if it was by the will of those who made the law — and these were far less than a majority of the people. The American colonists believed that there were things that should never be done, even by the "law of the land." There were, they thought, human rights, so individual, so necessary to be guarded, so impossible for a God-fearing man to surrender, that the Government had no right over them. Their contest was not merely with the King, but also with the British Parliament. They did not believe that its legislation, if contrary to certain fundamental principles of right, could possibly be law.

The Stamp Act of 1765 was, in itself, no great matter. It proposed to raise only 100,000 pounds sterling to be used for the maintenance of soldiers in America. In Parliament, Conway and Barre raised constitutional objections; but it was the elder Pitt who was the great protagonist of American opposition to the Act. When it was passed, his health was so broken that he could not hold a pen or walk without crutches. When in January, 1766, he was able to crawl into a carriage and be carried into the House of Commons, after referring to the subject as "of greater importance than ever engaged the attention of this House! that subject only excepted, when, near a century ago, it was the question whether you were to be bond or free," he declared: "It is my opinion that this Kingdom has no right to lay a tax upon the colonies." Then follows his argument, in which he states that "the distinction between legislation and taxation is necessary to liberty." Since only the Commons have power to vote taxes, and the Americans are not represented in Parliament, he argues, there exists no right to tax them; and yet, he affirms, the Americans, being "subjects" of Great Britain, although not taxable by the British House of Commons are subject to the legislation of the Commons, the Lords, and the Crown, which are equally legislative powers.

It is just here that the colonists, and certainly most Americans of today, while not challenging the validity of Lord Chatham's interpretation of the British Constitution, would dissent from the political theory that underlies it. While taxation was, in the War of Independence, the question at issue, the colonists would quite as stoutly have opposed an attempt by the King, the Lords, and the Commons to impose upon them legislation affecting their civil and religious liberties. The truth is, the American conception of the State was radically different from the British conception. It went far beyond Magna Charta. That provided that specially enumerated rights and liberties should never be taken away from an Englishman "but by the lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land," but the American idea was that there are certain rights and liberties which should never be subject to abridgment by law, and that encroachments upon these rights and liberties by a portion — even by a majority — of the people, or by any government they might establish, should be, through a superior and permanent law, declared illegal. For this there was necessary a voluntary renunciation of power in accordance with fixed principles of justice.

AN AMERICAN CONTRIBUTION TO POLITICAL THEORY

That is the original and distinctive contribution of the American mind to political theory. It holds that there should be nothing in government that is not governed by law. The absolutism of Parliament was as odious as the absolutism of the King. When the American colonists set about their constructive work, their problem was to destroy and prevent forever the recurrence of absolutism in every form, whether official or popular, whether of dominant individuals or of popular majorities. All alike, grasping for power, aiming to attain their ends by legislation, they should find themselves confronted by granite barriers which they could not pass.

This idea, wholly new and distinctive in its application to the people themselves, the

Americans embodied in their constitutions. Other nations had thrown off the yoke of tyrants, others had won their complete independence, others had made it impossible for a personal ruler to impose his arbitrary will; but never before had a people voluntarily subscribed to certain definite principles of right which they bound themselves to regard, and at the same time made it impossible for themselves to abolish without solemn deliberation and a fresh appeal to the whole people. Then, following the tradition of submitting to the judgment of their peers, in order to give security to the system of self-government thus devised, they instituted courts to maintain it by the decisions of neutral judges, with the duty of measuring the legislation they were required to apply by the restrictions of the fundamental law.