The problem of knowledge

Front matter

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Part I: The Pboblem Of Immediate Knowledge

A. THE PROBLEM OF ACQUAINTANCE (EPISTEMOLOGY

PROPER)

1. A Critique of Dualism

Chapter II. Dualism and Avowed Agnosticism Chapter III. Dualism and Attempted Metaphysics Chapter IV. Dualism and Attempted Metaphysics

eluded) ....

2. A Critique of Idealism

Chapter V. Mystical and Logical Idealism Chapter VI. Psychological Idealism .

Chapter VII. The Older Absolute Idealism Chapter VIII. The Newer Absolute Idealism

r Chapter IX. The Disintegration of Idealism A Critique of the New Bealism ....

Chapter X. Antecedents of the New Realism Chapter XI. The Neo-Realistic Doctrine of Secondary Qualities ' .

Chapter XII. The Neo-Realistic Doctrine of Consciousness Chapter XIII. The Neo-Realistic Doctrine of Relations, Universals, and Values

11 11 13 36

232 259

4. Constructive Statement 310

Chapter XIV. Critical Monism in Epistemology . . 310 B. PROBLEMS OF THE WAYS AND MEANS OF KNOWING (MORPHOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE, AND GENETIC

LOGIC) 336

Chapter XV. The Morphology of Knowledge . . .336 Chapter XVI. The Genesis of the Apriori . . . .351

Part Ii: The Pboblem Of Mediate Knowledge . 367

A. THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH (LOGICAL THEORY) . 367

Chapter XVIL A Critique of Intellectualism . . .369

Chapter XVIII. A Critique of Anti-Intellectualism . .401

Chapter XIX. Critical Monism in Logical Theory . . 438

B. THE PROBLEM OF PROOF (METHODOLOGY) . . 459

Chapter XX. The Problem of Scientific Method . , 459

ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction (1) :

a. Philosophy in general (1).

Its definition (1).

Its relation to the special sciences (1). Problems of values and of reality (3). 6. The Problem of Knowledge (6).

Typical attitudes toward the problem (7) :

Woodbridge (7), J. Watson (8), Ladd (8).

Subdivisions of the problem (10).

PART I: THE PBOBLEM OF IMMEDIATE KNOWLEDGE (11). Division A. THE PROBLEM OF ACQUAINTANCE (EPISTE- MOLOGY PROPER (11).

Introductory definitions (13).

Subdivision I. A Critique of Absolute Epistemological Dualism (Epistemological Dualism and Critical Realism). An absolute duality of the experienced and the independently real (14). Agnosticism logically involved (14). a. The agnosticism avowed (14).

Locke (a forerunner) (14), Kant (17), Schulze (24), Hamilton (25), Spencer (27), cf. Bradley and Hodgson (30), Riehl (31), Dilthey (33). h. Attempted metaphysics ; agnosticism not fully acknowledged (36).

(1) Jacobi (37), Reinhold (37), Fries (38), Neo-

Friesianism (41), Herbart (42), Lotze (44), Ladd (50), Pringle-Pattison (51), Strong (52), Love joy (56).

(2) Schelling (57), Schopenhauer (58), Hartmann

(60), Volkelt (63), Cornelius {m), Kuelpe (68), B. Russell's earlier view (70) .

Subdivision II. A Critique of Idealistic Absolute Epistemological Monism (Epistemological Monism and Dogmatic Idealism). The view that (physical) reality is nothing beyond idea, offered as a solution of the problem of knowledge (72) . Preliminary distinctions (73).

1. The Integration of Idealism. Development of idealistic thought from simpler to more composite forms (74) .

xil ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

A. Mystical Idealism. The interpretation of physical reality

as mere idea, suggested by the mystical experience (75). The Upanishad philosophers (75), Albertus Magnus (79), Eckhart et al. (79), Mrs. Eddy (79).

B. Logical Idealism. The interpretation of reality as the

logical idea (the abstract absolute idea, the absolutely satisfactory predicate, or definition), suggested by the dialectic (81).

Plato (81).

C. Mystical-Logical Idealism. A dyadic compound of ele-

mental forms of idealism, the mystical and the logical (89).

Plotinus (89).

D. Psychological Idealism. The interpretation of the phys-

ical object as mere content of consciousness, under the influence of the psychological point of view (92).

The logical fallacies involved (93).

a. Undisguised psychological idealism :

Clifford (100), Pearson (102), Marshall (103).

(3) Lipps (106); Vaihinger (107), Poincar^

(108). 6. Disguised psychological idealism. (Pure empiricism ; immediate empiricism ; the philosophy of pure experience) (109).

Mach (110), Avenarius (111), Petzoldt (112), Wundt (112), Fullerton (114), Hodgson (115), James (116), Dewey (117), Mead (118), A. W. Moore (119), Bawden (119).

E. Mystical-Psychological Idealism. A dyadic compound

of elemental forms of idealism, the mystical and the psychological (120).

Bergson (120).

F. Logical-Psychological Idealism. A dyadic compound of

elemental forms of idealism, the logical and the psychological. Reality as the concrete absolute idea, the concrete uaiversal, the logical within the psychological (126).

The monistic (singularistic) form : Absolute Idealism

(128). a. The pre-Bradleian constructive movement; the thesis (130). (1) Intellectualistic absolute idealism. The absolute idea determined by rational criticism (130).

ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS xui

Hegel (130), Stirling and Wallace (131), J. Caird (134), Green et al. (134), E. Caird (137), J. Watson (138). (2) Voluntaristic absolute idealism. The absolute idea determined by purpose (141).

Royce (141). /S. The Bradleian criticism ; XhQ antithesis {\^Q).

Bradley (146). 7. The post-Bradleian reconstruction ; the synthesis (154).

(1) Intellectualistic absolute idealism (154).

Bosanquet (154).

(2) Voluntaristic absolute idealism (159).

Taylor (159).

(3) Mystical absolute idealism, or

G. Mystical-Logical-Psychological Idealism. The triadic compound of the elemental forms of idealism (161). Hocking (161). 2. The Disintegration of Idealism. Tendencies from the more integrated forms of idealism back to the more elemental forms (181).

A. Toward Personal (Pluralistic) and Psychological Ideal-

(1) Monistic Theistic (Psychological) Idealism (182).

Paulsen (182).

(2) Semi-Pluralistic Theistic Idealism. Lotzian ideal-

(3) Pluralistic Theistic (Psychological) Idealism (184). Leibniz (184), Ward (185), Rashdall (187), Schiller (188), Renouvier (188).

(4) Pluralistic Semi-Theistic (Logical-Psychological)

Idealism. Howison (189).

(5) Pluralistic Atheistic (Logical-Psychological) Ideal-

ism. McTaggart (190).

B. Toward Abstract and Logical Idealism (192).

(1) Psychological-positivistic abstract idealism (192). Fullerton's earlier view (192).

(2) Critical-positivistic (intellectualistic) abstract

idealism (193).

Transition to this view. Lange (193), Liebmann

(195).

Typical representatives. The Marburg School :

H. Cohen, Natorp, Cassirer (195).

(3) Critical-transcendental (voluntaristic) abstract

idealism (198).

Windelband (198), Rickert (200), Munsterberg (201), Miincb (201).

XIV ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

(4) Logical-transcendental abstract idealism (201). Husserl (202), Meinong (203).

A and B. Partial combination of Personal and Abstract

Idealism. Bakewell (206).

C. Toward Mystical Idealism (208).

Spiritual or Keligious Idealism. Theoretical idealism retained for its supposed spiritual and especially religious value (208) .

Eucken (208), Boyce Gibson (209).

Subdivision III. A Critique of Healistic Absolute Epistemological Monism (Epistemological Monism and Dogmatic Realism). The attempt to maintain the independent reality of the total object of experience or thought (211).

a. Naive realism (212).

b. The Scottish realism (213).

c. Movements leading to the new realism (217).

(1) Disguised psychological idealism, as transitional to

physical realism (219).

Hodgson (221), James (222), Bush (224), Dewey (224), Boodin (227), Fullerton (229).

(2) Disguised logical idealism, as leading to logical

realism (230).

2. The New Realism (232).

a. The neo-realistic doctrine of secondary qualities (232).

Woodbridge (233), Alexander (234), G. E. Moore (236), McGilvary (238), Nunn (240), B. Russell (242), Hobhouse (244), Wolf (246) , Fullerton (247), Boodin (247), Marvin (248), Spaulding (249), Perry (250), Pitkin (251), Holt (251), Montague (254).

b. The neo-realistic doctrine of consciousness (259).

(1) The English School (259).

Influence of Hodgson (259). Hobhouse (260), Mc- Dougall (260), Moore (261), Russell (262), Alexander (262), Stout (264), Wolf (266).

(2) The American School (266).

Influence of James (266). Bush (267), Fullerton

(268).

Woodbridge's introspective view (269).

Views of Woodworth (270) and Dunlap (271),

criticised by Angell (272).

The behaviorist view (272). Influence of Dewey

Frost (275), Singer and Woodbridge (276).

Criticism by Miller (277).

ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS XV

Views of McGilvary (277), Boodin (279), Marvin (280), Holt (280), Spaulding (282), Pitkin (282), Perry (283), Holt (later statement) (286), Montague (287). (3) Comparison and general Criticism of views (289). C. The neo-realistic doctrine of relations (293).

Nunn (293), Alexander (294), Stout (294), Russell (294), Montague (295), Holt (296), Marvin (296), Spaulding (297), Pitkin (298), Perry (300).

d. The neo-realistic doctrine of universals (302).

Relation to Platonism (302). Views of several neo-realists (302).

e. The neo-realistic doctrine of values (306).

Moore (306), Russell (306), McGilvary (307), Alexander (307), Montague (307), Perry (308).

General statement and criticism of the new realism (309). Subdivision IV. Constructive Statement : Critical Realistic Epistemological Monism (Epistemological Monism and Critical Realism : Critical Monism in Epistemology). Normally, the experienced object and the real object numerically identical, the real object existing, with some of its qualities and relations, when not experienced (310).

Prior immediate knowledge the only explanation of mediate knowledge (311). Activistic view of sensation (312). Activistic explanation of the nature of consciousness (314). Activistic conception of causality (316) . Approaches to this point of view (316). Argument for activism from freedom (317). The subject-matter of psychology (318). Explanation of hallucination, etc. (320). Primary and secondary qualities and relations (322). Partial knowledge of the thing-in-itself (326). Tertiary qualities and relations (327). Values (328). Anticipation of further problems (330). Contrast between our doctrine and the Kantian (331). Solution of the problem of the externality or internality of relations (332). Reflections on the status of epistemology in general (333).

Divisions B and C. SPECIAL PROBLEMS OE THE WAYS AND MEANS OF KNOWING (MORPHOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE, AND GENETIC LOGIC) (336).

Division B. The Fundamental Mode of Cognition (Morphology of Knowledge) (336).

Subdivision I. A Critique of Absolute Morphological Dualism. Perception and conception as two irreducibly different modes of cognition (336).

Subdivision II. A Critique of Conceptualistic Absolute Morphological Monism. Pure conception the only ultimate mode of cognition. Platonism (336).

XVI ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

Subdivision III. A Critique of Perceptualistic Absolute Morphological Monism. Pure perception the only ultimate mode of cognition. Bergson (337).

Subdivision IV. Constructive Statement.

Critical Perceptualistic Morphological Monism {Critical Monism in the Morphology of Knowledge). Perception the one typical and fundamental mode of cognition (337). Criticism of approximations to this view (338). Kant (338), Royce (339), James (340). Processes not ultimately perceptual, non-cognitive (341). Cognitive processes ultimately perceptual (342). Perception in a complex (343). Introspection (344). The new (perceptual) intuitionism (346). Division C. The Genesis of the " Apriori " Element in Cognition (Genetic Logic) (351).

Subdivision I. A Critique of Absolute Genetic Dualism. Absolute rationalism with reference to cognitive forms and absolute empiricism with reference to cognitive contents. Kant (351). Subdivision II. A Critique of Rationalistic Absolute Genetic Monism. Absolute rationalism in the account of the contents as well . as the forms of cognitive experience (352).

Approximations to this view in Descartes and Leibniz (352). Fichte (353), Hegel (353), Green (353), H. Cohen et al. (353). Subdivision III. A Critique of Empirical Absolute Genetic Monism. Absolute passive empiricism in the account of the forms as well as the contents of cognitive experience (353) . Hume (353), Jas. and J. S. Mill (354), Spencer (354). Subdivision IV. Constructive Statement : Critical Empirical Genetic Monism (Critical Monism in Genetic Logic). An activistic empirical account of the genesis of the forms as well as the contents of cognitive experience (355).

Approximation to this view by James (355). Three defensible theories of the apriori which would make possible a critical realistic epistemological monism : (a) Inheritance of some active psychical characters empirically acquired by ancestors (359). (6) Rapid individual acquirement from experience on the basis of a special mutation (359). (c) A combination of (a) and (6) (359). Criticism of extreme aposteriorism (363). Summary (364).

PART II. THE PBOBLEM OF MEDIATE KNOWLEDGE (367).

Division A. The Problem of Truth. (Logical Theory, or Philosophical

Logic) (367). Introductory (369).

Subdivision I. A Critique of Absolute Logical Dualism. Two irre-

ducibly different criteria and definitions of truth, the one intel-

lectualistic, the other anti-intellectualistic, e.g. practical (Kant)

ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS XVU

Subdivision II. A Critique of Intellectualistic Absolute Logical Monism. The criterion and definition of truth purely intellectualistic (identity with reality) (371),

A. Absolute Intellectualism in combination with Epistemological

Dualism (371). Locke (371), Leibniz (371), Lotze (372), Lovejoy (372), Boyce Gibson (373).

B. Absolute Intellectualism in combination with Idealistic Episte-

mological Monism (374), Hegel (374), J. Watson (375), Bradley (375), Bosanquet (381), Joachim (383), Koyce (384).

C. Absolute Intellectualism in combination with Realistic Episte-

mological Monism (391). Aristotle (391), Aquinas (391), McGilvary (392), Perry (393), Montague (393), Holt (394), Marvin (394), Boodin (395), B. Russell (396). " The Law of Significant Assertion " (398). Subdivision III. A Critique of Anti-Intellectualistic Logical Monism. The criterion of truth not discoverable and truth not definable intellectualistically, but only in an anti-intellectualistic way (401). a. Anti-conceptualism. Truth to be learned by reverting to pure intuition, without concepts (401).

Bergson (401). Cf. James (406). /3. Current Pragmatism (407).

Essential pragmatism. Practical value of some sort the criterion of truth (407) .

1. Approximations to essential pragmatism (409).

A. Semi-pragmatism. Movements in the direction of

pragmatism, which yet fall short of the pragmatic criterion of truth (410). Peirce (410), Baldwin (411), Boodin (412), Royce (413), Hocking (413).

B. Quasi-pragmatism. Practical values the measure of

what, for practical purposes, and even in science, we are justified in taking as truth ; but this not necessarily real truth (414). Mach (414), Poincar^ (414), Vaihinger (415), Bergson (415). Appreciation, criticism and explanation (416).

2. Developments beyond essential pragmatism (417).

A. Pseudo-pragmatism. All practical value of ideas or

judgments an indication or proof of their truth (417) . James (418), Schiller (419), the Chicago School (420).

B. Hyper-pragmatism. Practical value (usefulness) or

the process of working (verification) the essential nature of the truth (422), James (422), Schiller (423), Dewey (423), A. W. Moore (423), Bawden (423), Boodin (423), The conversion of J. E. Russell (423).

Criticism and explanation (426).

xviii ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

Further problems for the essential pragmatist (431) : The avoidance of ultra-utilitarianism (431), and ultra-individualism (433). The interpretation of consistency and the theoretical interest (435). Subdivision IV. Constructive statement : Critical Pragmatic Logical Monism {Critical Monism in Logical Theory). The proximate genus in the definition of truth derived from intellectualism, and the differentia of the species from pragmatism (438). The defect of presentation and need of representation (439). The criterion of truth found in practical identity ( functional equivalence) of predicate w^ith subject, of idea with reality, or with further experience of reality (440) . Definition of truth according to representational pragmatism (443). The ideal element in truth (446) . The essentially human character of truth as defined (446) . Further definition of the ideal (448). The permanence of truth (449). The need of transcending mere representational pragmatism (450). Definition of truth according to revised (intuitional or scientific) representational pragmatism (452). Further tests of representational pragmatism (455). Division B. The Problem of Proof (Methodology) (459). a. The problem of certainty (459). 6. The problem of proof as the problem of the production of logical

certainty, the problem of scientific method (461). Subdivision I. A Critique of Absolute Methodological Dualism. Deduction and induction as tyfo irreducibly different scientific methods of proof (461). ' Subdivision 11. A Critique of Rationalistic Absolute Methodological Monism. Deduction the only scientific method of proof (462). a. Pre-Kantian rationalism. Views of Descartes, Spinoza, and

Leibniz (462). h. Rationalism of the " logisticians. " Views of Dedekind,

Cantor, Frege, Russell, Couturat, Royce, et al. (462). c. The rationalistic dialectic. Views of Hegel and McTaggart (470).

Subdivision III. A Critique of Empirical Absolute Methodological Monism. Induction the only scientific method of proof (472). a. Pre-Kantian empiricism. Bacon to Hume (472). h. Post-Kantian empiricism (473). Comte (473), J. S. Mill (474), Bergson (475).

Subdivision IV. Constructive Statement : Critical Empirical Methodological Monism. {Critical Monism in Methodology.) The one scientific method of proof both inductive and deductive (476). Views of Kant (476) and Poincar^ (477). Scientific procedure (487) ; definitions (488) ; assumptions (488) ; empirical data (490) ; fundamental principle (490) ; laws and inductive methods (490) ; theory (492) .

General Conclusion. Critical Monism (494).

CHAPTER I Introductory: Philosophy and its Principal Problems

Of all intellectual enterprises philosophy is perhaps the most difficult to define. A glance over the course of what is called the history of philosophy reveals not only a disappointing transitoriness of solutions and lack of unanimity among philosophers as to methods and presuppositions, but what is much more disconcerting, an almost total shift from time to time in the problems themselves. It will not do, however, to conclude at once that the grouping together of the problems generally called philosophical has been purely arbitrary.

The resort to etymology for purposes of definition is commonly of doubtful wisdom ; and yet in the present instance it puts into our hands a clew which may conduct us through the maze of historical transformations to our desired definition. The philosopher has been from the first, as his name proclaims him, a lover of wisdom; and philosophy has always been, in spite of those admirably modest utterances of Pythagoras and Socrates, not the love of wisdom simply, but the best wisdom of the lover of wisdom.

But one must not take too rigidly in this connection the distinction between wisdom and knowledge. In the beginning the term ''philosophy" seems to have been used to cover all such knowledge as was not either the common possession of the community or the immediate result of some special experience of the individual. It was applied to whatever there existed of those organized bodies of adequately verified knowledge, the special sciences, including mathematics. Nor is it very long since this broader use of the term was given up. Even within the memory of persons still living the physical sciences bore the name of ''natural philosophy," and apparatus

B 1 employed for experimental purposes could be referred to as ''philosophical instruments." One might almost say that originally philosophy held all the special sciences in solution, and that of late these sciences have been crystallizing out and taking on a relatively independent existence. The analogy is somewhat misleading, however; in both philosophy and the sciences there has been from the beginning a process of growth, of creative becoming.

The special sciences, which have been differentiating themselves out from the matrix of philosophy, are commonly classified as abstract, descriptive, and normative. Of these three groups the first and last are most readily understood in relation to the second, the descriptive sciences. These are constituted of generalizations as to the relations of quaHties and processes in experienced objects or groups of objects. Astronomy and chemistry, biology and anthropology, psychology and sociology, will serve to represent the class. The abstract sciences, such as arithmetic, geometry, and even mechanics, deal with isolated aspects of reality. Their laws are accurate, but essentially hypothetical; they state what would be verified in experience if the ideal conditions which they assume were ever actualized. The abstractness, however, is only relative ; all generalization, even such as occurs in the descriptive sciences, is more or less abstract, and the propositions of even the most abstract sciences are descriptive — with certain provisos — of reality. This is true even where, as in the case of the non-Euclidean geometries, the provisos are contrary to experience, thus making difficult the empirical verification of their conclusions.^ The normative sciences, finally, are made up of generalizations, selected from the results of the descriptive sciences and organized into a system of rules for the realizing of an end. The normative sciences which figure most largely in relation to philosophy are logic, aesthetics, and ethics, the laws of which are rules for the realization of truth (or at least of consistency, which is hypothetical truth) , beauty, and moral goodness, respectively. Thus, while the laws of descriptive sciences are categorical, and those of abstract sciences hypothetical, the laws of normative sciences are always either categorically or hypothetically im-

1 See Ch. XX infra.

INTRODUCTORY 3

perative. The ''applied sciences" may be regarded in general as complex and loosely organized normative sciences.

But, as the special sciences multiply, what is to become of philosophy? As new sciences continue to detach themselves from the parent body of philosophy, the question is naturally raised as to whether it is not to be expected that as the sciences increase, philosophy must decrease, and even as to whether in fact philosophy is to be regarded as anything more than the rapidly disappearing remainder of prescientific thought? It would almost seem that, to quote the words of Windelband, ''philosophy is like King Lear, who divided all his goods among his children, and it must now befall him to be cast out as a beggar upon the street." ^

But another interpretation of the present situation is possible. May it not be that philosophy, as the characteristic wisdom of the lover of wisdom, has been finding out by a process of elimination, as the sciences develop, just what are its own proper and persistent problems? Is it not discovering that its peculiar task is not to be a science — not even a "science of the sciences," which would be simply another special science, however important — but that its main business is to arrive at a wise estimate of the world we live in, of ourselves and our ideas, and of the wise man's way of living? The philosopher still finds much — perhaps more than ever — to occupy his thought in questions concerning reality in its broader aspects, concerning life and its ideals, and concerning the relation between these two, reality and ideals.

It has been recently claimed by the Danish philosopher, Harald Hoeffding, that the persistent problems of philosophy are four : the problem of consciousness, the problem of knowledge, the problem of being, and the problem of values. ^ But these problems are not all mutually exclusive, and the really ultimate problems of philosophy may be reduced to a simpler classification. The problem of knowledge, in so far as it transcends psychology and logic, belongs to the problem of values ; it is concerned with estimating intellectual value. The problem of consciousness in turn, in so far as it transcends empirical

^Praeludien, 4th ed., 1911, Vol. I, p. 19.

« Hoeffding, The Problems of Philosophy, Eng. Tr., New York, 1905.

psychology, is reducible in part to the problem of being, and in part to the problem of knowledge ; it has to determine on the one hand what, in general, consciousness is, i.e. what place it has in the realm of being, and on the other hand what it is as awareness, i.e. as knowledge. Manifestly, then, Hoeffding's philosophical problems may be reduced to the problem of being and the problem of values, or, in other words, to metaphysics and criticism.

That all the problems left over from the sciences for " wisdom" or philosophy to deal with are problems of either metaphysics or criticism may be confirmed by an examination of the historic problems of philosophy. Corresponding to each of the normative sciences there is an elementary branch of critical philosophy. Thus philosophical logic discusses the nature of the ideal or value which the rules of logic as a normative science subserve ; its problem is that of the nature of truth. Similarly ethics as a branch of critical philosophy is concerned with the question. What is moral goodness ? And philosophical aesthetics with the problem. What is beauty? One might even go farther and speak of the problem of philosophical economics, or. What is wealth ? the problem of philosophical politics, or, What is good government? and so on throughout the entire list of philosophical counterparts to the normative sciences. They are all problems of value.

There are other problems of value, however, besides these relatively simple questions as to the nature of valid ideals. There are the problems as to the value of certain complex actualities, such as human knowledge, human religion, and human development in general. These problems give rise to those branches of critical philosophy known as epistemology, the philosophy of religion, and the philosophy of history. It is characteristic of these complex branches of critical philosophy, these philosophical critiques of phases of actuaHty, that on the one hand they make use of certain sciences, and on the other hand they are each intimately related to metaphysics. Thus epistemology, in so far as it is concerned with investigating what ''knowledge" is, must necessarily make use of psychology and logic ; and in so far as it is concerned with estimating the worth of our best ''knowledge," it must reach a positive

INTRODUCTORY 5

and favorable conclusion, if our metaphysics is not to be reduced to vain imagination. The philosophy of religion makes fundamental use of the history and psychology of religion in solving the fundamental problems of the nature of the religious value or ideal and the essence of religion. It also includes, besides this historico-psychological part, an ethical part, undertaking to estimate the moral value of religion, and an epistemological part, dealing with the value of religious experience for knowledge, and especially for knowledge of a religious Object. But if the epistemological philosophy of religion should result in establishing the validity of religious knowledge, a further development of the philosophy of religion would be called for, viz. a metaphysical discipline, undertaking to formulate our knowledge of the religious Object in systematic unity with the rest of our metaphysical knowledge. The philosophy of history also, while drawing upon a vast number of special sciences, both descriptive and normative, and especially upon descriptive historj^, may be either a branch of critical philosophy or a metaphysical discipline, or both. Not only is it concerned with a critique of progress, the norm of which is made up of the ideals established in the other branches of critical philosophy; it may include a metaphysical explanation of this progress as due to some theological or ontological principle, such as the will of God, or the evolution of the "Absolute Idea."

But while some philosophical disciplines are thus partly critical and partly metaphysical, it would seem that there are, over and above problems of criticism, no philosophical problems which are not problems of metaphysics, the theory of being, or reality. In undertaking to classify these problems of being, there is still a good deal to be said for the classic subdivisions, viz. ontology, or the philosophy of being in general, and the three parts dealing with particular forms of being, viz. psychology, which, as a branch of metaphysics, deals with the nature of the self (soul, mind, spirit) ; cosmology, which deals with the fundamental nature of the universe; and theologj^ undertaking to set forth the nature of the religious Object. More commonly nowadays, however, the problems of metaphysics are not grouped together in this manner, but stated separately, as, for example, the problem of mind and matter, the problem of contingency and order, the problem of mechanism and teleology, the problem of the One and the many, the problem of good and evil. We do not at this point undertake to say whether or not these metaphysical problems can be solved without any dependence upon the philosophy of values ; but it is quite evident that, with the partial exception of the last, they are not themselves problems of value, but problems of reality, and such, moreover, as are not capable of being adequately dealt with in any of the special sciences, whether descriptive, normative, or abstract.

In the present volume our concern is simply with the problem of knowledge. Before attacking the particular problems, critical and constructive, into which this general problem naturally falls apart, a few introductory remarks may be offered. Epistemology, let it be frankly admitted at the outset, may be construed either as a science or as a department of critical philosophy, or as an aggregate of both. As a descriptive science it would assume, as all such sciences do, the actuality of its subject-matter. Assuming, then, that there is such a thing as knowledge, and that it is sufficiently accessible and distinguishable to be recognized and described, the science of epistemology would simply undertake to state the observed nature of the various types of knowledge-process, and thus to arrive at an adequate empirical definition of knowledge. It would necessarily make use of much of the materials also employed by logic as a normative science, and might even itself be turned into the normative form, in which case its fundamental assumption would be the possibility of realizing knowledge as an ideal. As descriptive science its question is. What is knowledge? or, How do we know? As a normative science its question would be, What must we do (or experience) in order to know? But a further question may also be raised, viz.. Is what we have and call our knowledge really what we take it to be? Is our ''knowledge'' really knowledge? Is knowledge a human possibility? Now this question cannot be adequately treated by merely calling attention to the fact that he who asserts that no knowledge is possible has already tacitly assumed what he explicitly denies (viz. that some knowledge is possible, if only

INTRODUCTORY 7

the knowledge that knowledge is impossible) . There are many undogmatic agnostics who desire to be reassured that our best human knowledge-values are genuine and may be taken at their face value. What is called for is a branch of philosophical criticism, the critical evaluation of knowledge-claims.

This critical philosophy of knowledge is lightly esteemed by some recent writers. F. J. E. Woodbridge, for example, while making ample room for the theory of perception as an experimental science, asserts that the function of philosophical epistemology is moral and spiritual only ; it can broaden one's spiritual vision and thus modify character, but it can make no difference to our knowledge.^ But even if we grant that it is quite possible for one to know without knowing that he knows, we are not obliged by this admission to subscribe to the generalization that our knowledge can never be affected by either our knowing that we know or our doubting that we know. We must not anticipate here the outcome of the discussion upon which we are entering, but if there is ever such a thing as knowledge without the ability to prove what one knows, it would seem quite possible that one who originally did know may come to doubt his knowledge until it ceases to be knowledge. If epistemology can remove such doubts with reference to genuine knowledge, it is calculated to affect not only the degree of certainty, but ultimately even the content of our knowledge.

Woodbridge's denial of the knowledge-value of this philosophy of knowledge-values may be viewed as a rather violent reaction against the abuse of critical epistemology which has been characteristic of much recent philosophy. For a generation or two it has been the custom to saddle upon critical epistemology the task of bearing up a whole system of metaphysics. Epistemology may rightly enough pass judgment upon the question of the possibility of metaphysics, but to prescribe to metaphysics what must be its conclusions as to the nature of reality — this is another matter, and does not so manifestly lie within the province of a theory of knowledge. As typical instances of this too common tendency to exploit epistemology in the interests of a particular metaphysical doctrine, we may