Austria-Hungary and the war

Front matter

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Contents

chapter page

Foreword 14

I. Points of Human Interest — Austria- Hungary and the War - - - 17

Introduction

I recommend to the kind attention of the American public this book, written by the Austro-Hungarian consul in Cleveland, on certain vital phases of the struggle which is convulsing Europe, The reader will find in these chapters a comprehensive presentation of the political forces and historical developments which led to the initial clash of arms. This volume contains authentic information about the Near East, a region so little known in the United States ; it offers a graphic description of conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the two Austrian provinces coveted by Servia, and throws an illuminating light upon the real, the underlying, causes of the world-conflict. These causes I may be permitted to summarize in concise form.

It should be borne clearly in mind at the outset that for more than a century Austria-Hungary and Russia have been keen rivals in the Balkan Peninsula. Owing to its geographical position the Dual Monarchy is the predominant economic factor in Southeastern Europe, and in the course of her commercial expansion has sought, quite naturally, to secure a market for the output of her industries in Servia, Bulgaria and European Turkey. On the other hand Russia, swayed by sentimental and territorial considerations, has sought to exercise exclusive control over the newly constituted Slav countries of the Balkans. This claim to political mastery the Kussian government has based upon the racial affinity of all Slavic nations, upon the bond of kinship offered by the Greek church, common to all the Balkan states, and upon the fact that these states owe their existence to the many wars waged by the great Northern power upon the Turkish empire.

Back of the activities of Russian diplomacy in the Balkan Peninsula is her legitimate desire to secure the opening of the straits of Constantinople, closed to her by treaties, and thus to obtain a free outlet from the Black Sea for her commerce and her crops, and the unhampered passage of her fleet to the Mediterranean. In the pursuit of these objects the statecraft of St. Petersburg has sought to control the Balkan states and to prevent any of them, especially a vigorous and progressive Bulgaria, from occupying Constantinople, the key to the Dardanelles. In her endeavors to establish and maintain such a hegemony in Balkan affairs, Russia inevitably has menaced the vital commercial interests of Austria-Hungary.

The antagonism between Russia and Austria- Hungary found expression in perpetual diplomatic strife, aggravated by the underground activities of Russian consuls, reinforced by unofficial agents and priests. Austria-Hungary, in support of her interests in the disputed region, could employ no such extraneous forces as were placed within the grasp of Russia by the accident of her kinship to i, the Balkan states, but relied upon her commercial travellers and upon the importance of the economic interests common to the Dual Monarchy and the small states south of the Danube.

After the congress of Berlin in 1878, which was called to adjust the boundaries of Southeastern Europe following the Russo-Turkish war, the newly created kingdom' of Servia maintained, through King Milan, close relations with Austria-Hungary. Inasmuch as the Dual Monarchy had received from Europe a mandate for the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the restoration of order in those two Turkish provinces, King Milan, and subsequently his son, King Alexander, relinquished every pretension to expansion westward into Bosnia and Herzegovina, and concentrated their efforts upon an educational campaign in Macedonia, especially in the districts inhabited by a Bulgarian population.

This regime of harmony was interrupted violently in 1903, by the assassination of King Alexander and the election of King Peter Karageorgevitch, the scion of a banished house, to the Servian throne. No sooner had the Karageorgevitch been restored than it became apparent to- all the world that a new order had been established in Servia. An aggressive pro-Russian reigned at Belgrade. The beginning of the new rule was also the beginning of that rapid process of subordination to Russian dictation whereby Servia became a mere outpost of Russia, chosen to provoke and harass the neighboring

Dual Monarchy for the purposes of Eussian diplomacy.

The Servian nationalist agitation on the Austrian side of the border was carried on upon a large scale, by such organizations* as the Narodna Obrana, to which some of the highest officers of state, civil and military, openly belonged. The Narodna Obrana carried on its operations in Belgrade, under the full view of the authorities, promoting political discord beyond the Austrian frontier under the pretence of educational work ostensibly aimed at the cultural uplift of the Austrian Slavs.

Then came the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a defensive measure undertaken by the Austro-Hungarian government in 1908, to meet the demand of the Young Turks, then in power at Constantinople, for the restoration to an Ottoman administration of the provinces which theaCongress of Berlin had entrusted to Austria thirty years earlier as the only practicable means of restoring order in them. Kussia, despite repeated secret understandings by which the foreign office at St. Petersburg had recognized the Austrian position in Bosnia and Herzegovina, now took passionate umbrage at the act which merely regularized the status of territories already within the boundaries of the Dual Monarchy. The press of St. Petersburg bitterly protested against the annexation, which it endeavored to present in the light of a deadly blow at the interests of the Slavic race.

The attitude of Kussia was reflected in a redoubling of the anti-Austrian agitation in Servia. At this point the Servian propaganda in Bosnia and Herzegovina dropped the educational mask and became openly political and provocative. Apostles from Belgrade began to traverse the Austrian provinces, preaching the gospel of sedition and violence. So menacing a tone did the Servian people adopt toward Austria-Hungary that the Dual Monarchy found a partial mobilization, at a high cost, imperatively necessary in view of the turmoil on the Servian side of the boundary. At this juncture of events there was grave peril of an actual outbreak of hostilities, which calamity was happily averted for the time being by the vigorous stand taken by Germany in championship of the vital interests of her ally.

Confronted by a united Germanic support of the accomplished fact, Russia yielded her recognition of the annexation and Servia pledged herself to discontinue her provocative tactics against public order in Austria-Hungary. Both Russia and Servia were destined to repudiate their solemn undertakings at the first opportunity that offered. The next blow aimed at the Dual Monarchy by Russia in her persistent attempts to exclude Austrian commercial influence from the Balkans came five years after the international crisis of 1909. It took the form of a Balkan League, contrived in St. Petersburg, and comprising Servia, Bulgaria, Greece and Montenegro.

This confederation was designed, ostensibly, to expel the Turk from Europe. The dominance of

Russia over the workings of the new grouping of Balkan powers was assured by a secret clause in the treaty, whereby the minor signatories bound themselves not to undertake a war against Turkey without Russia's consent, and which also conferred upon Russia the right of final decision in the distribution of territory that might be conquered by the allies. Moreover, the government at St. Petersburg obtained from the allies a pledge that they should make common cause to the limits of their resources in case of an attack by another power. This clause in the agreement was aimed at Austria-Hungary. It contained the complete explanation of the zealous efforts which Russia had made to bring the discordant Balkan elements together. That this alliance should hurl itself against Turkey in 1912, before the time was ripe for Russia's contemplated action against Austira-Hungary, and that it should destroy itself by its own violence in the second Balkan war, were events which had not been contemplated by Russian diplomacy.

However, Russia found a way to profit even from the unexpected course which events had taken. By encouraging Servian pretensions at the end of the first Balkan war, the Russians succeeded in strengthening Servia, their outpost against Austria- Hungary, at the expense of Bulgaria, which thus was deprived of the fruits of its splended victories over Turkey.

Austria-Hungary had once more come perilously near a clash with Servia in the first Balkan war,

. when the neighboring Slav kingdom, disregarding the warning of the powers, advanced to the Adriatic. Austria-Hungary met the situation by bringing about the creation of an independent Albania as a barrier to the establishment of a hostile maritime neighbor on the Adriatic.

At the congress of Bucharest, however, Servia, with Russian backing, advanced territorial claims i which threatened the equilibrium of the Balkans. So menacing to its legitimate interests did the government at Vienna regard this new Russo-Servian aggression, that the ministry of foreign affairs made inquiries at Rome and in Berlin in an attempt to obtain assurances of co-operation in the event that the current developments should force upon the Dual Monarchy the task of restoring the balance of power so necessary to the complete tranquillization of Southeastern Europe. This inquiry, which was presented to the attention of the world recently by Signor Giolitti, former premier of Italy, as an indication of aggressive designs against Servia by Austria-Hungary, was in fact a purely precautionary measure. It was undertaken in an effort to induce a revision of the treaty o*f Bucharest — an instrument regarded at Vienna as an oppressive device which, by perpetuating the resentment of the Bulgarian people, the strongest unit in the Balkan Peninsula, introduced the constant danger of a future conflict. Austria-Hungary realized so thoroughly the significance of the latest move by Russia on the international chess-board, that it was only by the pacific influences exerted from the highest quarters in the empire that a clash was averted at this juncture. The treaty of Bucharest, accordingly, was permitted to stand in its original form, thanks to the desire of Austria-Hungary to avert a violation of the peace of Europe even at the cost of a palpable menace to her own security.

From this moment Servia, assured of the protection of Russia, which had been put to the test during two wars, abandoned every reserve and openly plunged into a campaign of defiant provocation against the neighboring Austro-Hungarian empire. The agitation within the boundaries of the Slav kingdom for the erection of a greater Servia upon the ruins of a disintegrated Austria, assumed a violence which' gave pause to even the most optimistic minds at Vienna. The Servian press, people and government united in a demonstration of malignant hostility which fell but a degree short of a declaration of war. Public opinion in the Dual Monarchy was so profoundly disturbed by the tumult beyond the border that the government was subjected to a storm of criticism for its continued attitude of forbearance.

At the same time there were other disquieting manifestations of the activities of the Russian propaganda ; activities beyond the sphere of the Servian agitation — in Eastern Galicia, among the Poles and the Ruthenians, in addition to the normal missionary work which Russia had been carrying on among all the Slavic peoples in the Dual Monarchy.

Secret Russian agents, in many instances in the guise of priests of the Orthodox Russian church, developed an ominous zeal in their mission of propagating disaffection among the subjects of the Austrian crown and preparing the way for the great "deliverer" from the North.

And the sinister climax to all this subterranean contriving came with the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand by a "patriotic" Serb youth at Serajevo, the capital of Bosnia, on June 28th.

/ That crowning act in the series of provocations confronted Austria-Hungary with the choice of accepting without protest the beginnings of disintegration, or drawing the sword in defence of its imperilled sovereignty. War was the only choice

J possible. It is not a war waged by a government for its own aggrandizement. It is a struggle for life, undertaken by a people whose temper has been long and sorely tried by the malicious machinations of neighbors to whom the continuance of peace was only an opportunity for interminable conspiracies against the tranquillity and the dignity of the Dual Empire.

KONSTANTIN THEODOR DUMBA,

Ambassador of Austria-Hungary.

Washington, Dec. 20th, 1914.

Foreword

Perhaps it will not be found necessary for me to state that I am not a neutral.

My official position would be a bar to this qualification. But although I lack in the technical requirements of a neutral, I trust that my American readers will say after they have read my book that I am not lacking in impartiality.

I have endeavored to erase all personal bias and ask for my readers indulgence if my presentation of our case does not come up fully to the expectations which they may entertain on this account.

I admit I sometimes felt discouraged, when I heard leading representatives of the press, personal friends of mine, say : "There is no use, the American people have made up their mind. They believe this is the Kaiser's war. They think that this war will not end until militarism both in your country and Germany will be crushed," etc.

I have deemed it my duty from the first moment after I had returned from Europe in September to present our side to the public in a calm, dignified manner. This duty, moreover, as will be found natural, is also a duty imposed by my office.

In some instances I have succeeded, but in many others not. Articles writen to magazines setting forth our side were returned with polite excuses. The editors regretted that they were unable to pub-

FOREWORD 15

lish them, because, while appreciating the privilege of perusing them, the subject of the article did not fall within the scope of the magazine, or words to that effect. That is why I was prompted to write this book.

f We would like to convince the American public that this war was not of our making. It was forced upon us. Outward appearances may perhaps seem in contradiction to our view, but appearances are seldom conclusive.

Formally we may have made the first step, when our note was sent to Servia ; but in its substance this step was merely the outcome of a great many others made before by our adversary, until our patience finally gave way. Any other country with selfrespect would have acted as we did. This we know to be true.

I venture the prediction that this war will be of short duration. Both sides will soon see the uselessness of continuing the struggle when the forces are about even and neither side can totally destroy the other. J Relieve, however, that the gain will be tcith our side. A slight gain, perhaps, but still a gain. I base this belief on the fact becoming more evident as the war is progressing that the people of Austria-Hungary and Germany are linked in a much firmer union than the people of our present allied enemies.

We believe that "Niebelungentreue" prompted Germany to gird on her sword for us. Niebelungentreue is an equivalent to German loyalty. This i.Q FOREWORD

loyalty both our peoples will mutually keep unto the end. We will stand and fall together.

While we fight, since fight we must, it is our ambition to uphold all principles of international law and of human, Christian civilization. Just as our State Minister of Home Affairs in Hungary, Dr. John von Sandor, wrote to Count Albert Apponyi, president of the committee for the support of wounded and prisoners of war: "Our society at large has a duty to accomplish which should go even beyond international treaties and agreements. It is necessary to protect those against the rigors of bad weather and other hardships who have raised their arms against us as honest enemies, following the call of their home countries. Society's sympathy displayed in behalf of prisoners of war was and is never opposed to true patriotism."

I have no desire to impose my or our views concerning this war on the American public. Americans do not yield to force. They may yield to argument, if argument is convincing. I used genuine efforts to make it as convincing as humanly possible and I shall have genuine pleasure to hear that it made at least some Americans yield.

E. L.

Cleveland, November 15, 1914.

I.— POINTS OF HUMAN INTEREST AND THE WAR IN AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

To-day, that is on November 15th when I write these lines, discussions over questions, as for instance which country started war preparations first, which country prompted the war, have much more purely academic value than they had three months ago, when the war broke out ; and yet the necessity of a satisfactory solution of these questions, whether of purely academic interest or otherwise, becomes daily more apparent. Their solution will, indeed, become a paramount issue, after the last man able to hold his rifle will have paid his toll to his country on the battle-field. It will be demanded by everybody when the routine of peace negotiations will be resumed. People and governments of the various countries involved in this war and of other interested and sympathetic bystanders will demand that clearness should be brought into these questions.

To judge a case before all evidence is in shows a prejudiced mind. To make Germany responsible for this world imbroglio, because one or possibly a few of her theoreticians have asserted that militarism is everything, demonstrates a deplorable bias. It is just as deplorable as would be, for instance, demonstrated by German sympathizers, were these latter to assert that Great Britain is responsible because of the attitude and utterances of some of her war writers on militarism. And England also has had her "Bernhardis." If Homer Lea and his "Day of the Saxon" dedicated to the late Field Marshal Lord Roberts is less known to-day to the English speaking world, it is because the British advertisers on both sides of the Atlantic have for obvious reasons drawn more attention to Bernhardi than to Homer Lea. Dr. von Mach, in his excellent book on "What Germany Wants," has commented on this war-study, and excerpts from it are reprinted in Appendix B of his book. These clearly indicate that Homer Lea's war spirit yields in nothing to General von Bernhardi's.

Neither of the war -books, however, is an evidence for or against the country which produces the writer. It is hardly believable that they would be accepted even as circumstantial evidence in any court of public opinion of the civilized world. They are in no way, either directly or indirectly, connected with the war, nor could they have prompted it. These books are not even of symptomatic interest with reference to the war, as they, at the very best, represent the ideas of a small minority in each respective country only.

Not theoretical evidence will be required when the final wind-up comes, but facts; simple, plain facts, the relative importance of which everybody grasps.

I believe, for instance, the pronounced efforts made by one or the other country shortly before the general conflagration to increase the annual contingent of their recruits, should be a strong circumstantial evidence against that country or those countries in such a Supreme Court of public

/ opinion. The appropriation by the Russian Duma for the increase of the annual contingent of recruits by 125,000 during three years, shortly before the war

/ began, is such a fact. France's measure to raise the peace-footing of her army to nearly 800,000 men, which is practically the peace establishment of the German army, although Germany's population is more than twenty millions more than France's, is another such fact. Germany's correla-

' tive measures would be another, but if Germany had to follow her neighbor's example this does not detract from the importance of these facts in a court called upon to decide which country made the first move.

I have no intention to argue here on the question who started this war. Developments in this wardrama have not yet reached the stage where anybody could have in an unbiased way collected all evidence referring to this point. All that any one of us can do who desires to perform his duty in an honest and conscientious way is to make contributions from his store of knowledge and information. Little by little the general store of material will accumulate and the world will have a clearer grasp of the situation. This desire should be generalized in preference to the manifestations of some people that no further information is necessary, because the question of responsibility concerning this war is already settled. They omit to add that "it is settled in their mind." A jury deciding a case before evidence was submitted is not liable to be upheld by the Court, if this fact would be proved against its members.

In this chapter I propose to comment on questions of more general human interest concerning this war, which are based on my observations during my recent vacation trip in Europe. I think it is noteworthy to draw the attention of my American readers to the fact that as a member of the Austro- Hungarian Foreign Service in the United States, I started on my leave as late as July the 18th. It is a general rule, which is in force probably in every civilized country that in warlike times, "leaves" of all members of a country's army and navy, and its foreign service are instantly suspended. Everybody has to return to his post of duty. Had my country planned to start a war against various European countries or even one, had it even thought that such a war was impending, it would most decidedly have instructed all its embassies and legations to countermand all leaves of the various foreign staff-members. Instead of which, however, two of my American colleagues, our Consul-General in New York, and our Consul in San Francisco, had left on their respective "leaves" about the time when I left. I am not conversant with other similar moves of my colleagues in other parts of the world, but the fact alone that the three heads of some of our most important Consular offices in the United States were

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allowed to leave, would indicate that our Government had no warlike intentions. It must be noted in this connection that Consulates, in the early beginnings of war especially, have to perform very important duties, such as calling in of their country's reservists and all persons liable to military service, care for transportation of these people to the seat of war in their country, etc. As another significant feature it must also be emphasized that the German Ambassador was likewise in Europe in July on his leave, which would hardly have been possible had his country planned to war with France and Russia and the whole world, as some people would like to make it out. I am also in a position to state that until the last days of July, when war was actually declared, no reservists or officers of our army had had been called in to join the ranks.

On the other hand, we have the evidence of Sam Blythe, of the Saturday Evening Post, whom the American public knows as a trusted, reliable informant, that as early as the 31st of July quite a number of British officers from the Pacific Coast, Vancouver, etc., were leaving from New York to England after they had been called in by the war office hurriedly. In order to leave from New York on an Atlantic steamer practically at the height of the season, they must have made their reservations some time previously. But even if they were all able to secure hurried reservations in the nick of time, it is safe to assume that they must have left the Pacific. Coast at least a week before they started from New York on the 31st of July. On the 23d or 24th of July, however, nobody on the Continent of Europe had any idea that England would be in war with Germany. Owing to my absence I cannot verify whether or not this was known in the United States.

We have similar news from other parts of the world confirming Mr. Blythe's above information. Thus the "Peking Gazette" of July 28th conveyed the information from Hankow that the crew of some British gunboats stationed there had received hurried orders to leave their station and to proceed to Hongkong and Weihaiwei, where they were to be used for the manning of some armored cruisers, and as reserves for some warships, whose crews were not yet on war footing. The gunboats in Hankow — so it was stated — were left in charge of private guards, after some parts of same had been dismounted, disabling these boats for practical use. We incidentally from the same source likewise know, that on July 30th the Imperial Chinese Telegraph Office in Tientsin gave out notice that the cables between Shanghai and Chefoo had been disabled and no further Berlin cables arrived from that day on. From far Eastern papers it would appear that England and Japan in the Far East were ready for action on ar around July 30th. The British fleet was concentrated in Weihaiwei on July 28th, the French fleet in East Asia in Haiphong on the 1st of August.

On the 1st of August Peking papers positively stated that Japan would go to war against Germany jointly with England.

I give these reports merely as some additional symptomatic evidence to clear up some phases of the ante-war situation. I am frank to state that they are open to further investigation. When peace will be established all this and much other evidence will be examined and verified or excluded, just as the finding may be. It is of course impossible for any human being to know all that has been going on in the various parts of the world within the last few months.

GERMAN EMPEROR LOVER OF PEACE.

My party, consisting of my wife, myself and Mr. Howard W. Baker, a friend of ours from Minneapolis, sailed on the "Imperator" from New York on the 18th of July. We arrived in Cuxhaven, Hamburg, on the 25th of July. By that time Austria-Hungary had sent her note to Servia and the enthusiasm of the masses in Hamburg was high. Thousands of people thronged to the Austro-Hungarian Consulate General displaying the sympathies which the German people in general felt for the people of Austria-Hungary. War between Austria- Hungary and Servia was in those first days still considered a vague possibility only. It was miles away from our own minds.

The same scenes of enthusiasm were repeated in Berlin, where we arrived the next day. Yet we would not give credence to the war rumors, although there was undoubtedly much electricity in the air. You could feel its prick when you rubbed shoulders with the crowds on Berlin's great Avenue Unter den Linden. On the following day we drove out to Potsdam. This was the day on which the German Emperor was expected back from his northern cruise. He was expected to arrive at three o'clock in the afternoon at the station close to the New Palace. Many American tourists had assembled there on the chaussee, leading up to the entrance of the new palace.

When we saw the Emperor and Empress driven past, followed by the Chancellor of the German Empire, the Chiefs of the General Staff, the Chiefs of the Navy and Army, I had the first premonition of the situation's earnest. So must have had the Emperor, as his expression looked careworn. I belong to the many who, with Professor Burgess, are convinced that the German Emperor always has been a man of peace. Carrying with him the doubtless pleasant impressions of his annual summer vacation cruise, which had to be abruptly broken off, he no doubt also realized at that moment the terrible burden and grief of the impending great catastrophe which rests so heavily upon his shoulders. I again ask my readers, would the German Emperor have gone on his leave, had he premeditated, nay, even foreseen developments? Considerations which hold good for mere mortals often also hold good for emperors and heads of a country, and this is certainly one of them.

This first chapter should bring out points of human interest rather than heavy war material, and this is why I comment here on my own first impressions of the war, just as they gradually developed.

The next two days saw us in Dresden. By that time war-fever had visibly risen. The first hostilities between our Monarchy and Servia had started, but Germany was still miles away from her personal wars. Everywhere symptoms increased in number that Russia would take advantage of the local difficulties existing between Austria-Hungary and Servia. Her secret agents must have undoubtedly received information to that effect, as their activities were noticeable on many points of the German- Russian frontier. In Dresden, for instance, a plot had been discovered three days prior to our arrival there to blow up the railway bridge. Because of this discovery, the hangar with the Zeppelin airship was closed the day following our arrival.

WAR ENTHUSIASM IN AUSTRIA.

After two days' stay we continued our way to Carlsbad. The route over Bodenbach had been already closed to general passenger traffic, but the Teschen line stood open. This was on the 31st of July. At one station in Bohemia the door of our compartment was all of a sudden thrown open and an excited young man rushed in. "Have you heard the latest news?" he shouted at us. "General mobilization will be ordered to-day. That means Germany, Italy, France, Russia, in war. What will England do?" We were unprepared for the answer. As I stated before, the idea of a general European complication was far away from our minds. We were all confident that hostilities would be limited to the area between Austria-Hungary and Servia. The terrible disaster of a general war came as an entirely unexpected shock.