Britain's case against Germany; an examination of the historical background of the German action in 1914

Contents

Preface . . . .

I. The Summer of 1914 .

II. German Political Theories .

Preface

DESPITE the difficulty of maintaining an attitude of aloofness and impartiality during a great war, I have honestly tried in this little book to see the facts plainly, and never to tamper with them. My main purpose is to show that the great issue for which we are now fighting is no new thing, and has not emerged suddenly out of diplomatic difficulties in the Balkans. It is the result of a poison which has been working in the European system for more than two centuries, and the chief source of that poison is Prussia. Accordingly, I have tried to show ( i ) that the action of Germany in 1914 is due to a theory of international politics which has taken possession of the minds of the German people since the middle of the nineteenth century; (2) that this theory is the outcome of the traditional policy of the Prussian state during the last two hundred and fifty years; (3) that it had to fight against a far nobler and more inspiring ideal, the ideal of the Germany of Goethe, of Stein and of Dahlmann, and only the dazzling success of the Prussian policy as pursued by Bismarck made possible its victory; (4) that the German Empire of to-day is so organised as to ensure the dominion of the Prussian military monarchy and of Prussian ideas and methods over the rest of Germany; and viii PREFACE

(5) that the policy of this Empire during the last quarter of a century has been the natural sequel of earlier Prussian action, and has found its inevitable culmination in the monstrous war of 19 14.

But over against the Prussianised German State, with its poisonous belief in brute force, I have tried to show that there has been growing up in the rest of the civilised world a far nobler and saner view of the way in which international relations should be conducted. This view, increasing steadily in strength, has expressed itself in the development of the Concert of Europe, in the establishment of treaties for the protection of small states, in the growth of international arbitration, and in the whole remarkable movement which culminated in the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907. Germany has been throughout the most determined opponent of this whole movement; Britain has been throughout its strongest and most strenuous supporter.

In the British Empire, indeed, and in all that it increasingly stands for, we may reasonably claim to see the absolute antithesis of the German ideal, its belief in self-goverment, in freedom, in variety over against the German belief in military monarchy, rigid discipline and uniformity ; its belief in peace over against the German praise of war; its belief that Freedom and Justice, and not mere physical Power, are the supreme ends and justification of the state. Perhaps this sharp conflict of ideals may provide part of the explanation for the

PREFACE ix

extraordinary hatred which Germans express for everything British.

It is not for Power that we are fighting ; it is not even for national existence, though that would be imperilled by a German victory. It is a conflict of national ideals, a struggle for all the deepest and highest things for which the best Englishmen have laboured in the past : for freedom, for the rights of small nationalities, for international honour, for the possibility of peaceful and friendly relationships between equal and mutually respecting states.

I cannot understand how, on such an issue, any Briton of military age can hesitate for a moment to offer himself for the combat. In a struggle where all that we hold dear is at stake, we should need no urging to throw all our strength into the scale. If we lose, then all is lost. If we win, but the victory is won by our allies alone or mainly, and we have not taken at least an equal part in the strife, the honour of Britain will be tarnished.

The index has been compiled by Miss J. M. Potter, M.A. I have to thank Professor Tout for reading the proofs, but the book has been produced so rapidly that it is possible some errors may have escaped even him.

R. M.

Manchester,

November, 19 14.

Chapter I

^ I ^HE colossal war of 19 14 has already meant -■- the killing or maiming of hundreds of thousands of the best manhood in the most highly civilised communities of the world, and it is only beginning. It has brought unspeakable miseries, murder, torture, outrage, robbery, starvation, despair, to millions of innocent old men, women, and children in the areas of fighting. It has so desolated some of the most prosperous and smiling regions of the world that it will take years, perhaps generations, to restore them to a condition as happy as they enjoyed in the early summer of 19 14. It has ruthlessly destroyed many of the most ancient and venerated monuments of civilisation, sanctuaries of the human spirit, which had stood undisturbed through all the storms of centuries. It has caused the destruction of innumerable valuable things slowly created by human labour, the sinking of ships, the burning of homes, the ruin of factories and mines. It has dislocated the commerce and industry of the world, and f inflicted upon labouring men everywhere, even in the non-combatant countries, a huge volume of unnecessary hardship. It has imposed upon all the states engaged in it, and upon many which are not engaged, an intolerable burden of debt incurred for entirely unproductive expenditure, and this crushing load will for generations make the lot of poor folk harder, and render more difficult and more slow the task of improving their conditions of life. In short, this war has already set back, perhaps for generations, the progress of European civilisation. And, whatever the ultimate results of the struggle may be, it must leave behind it a poison of mutual hatred between nations which will go on rankling, it may be for generations, and make it almost impossible to establish those relations of mutual respect and confidence between nations upon which alone a reasonable and stable European system can arise.

And all this — for what ?

According to the present belief of nearly every Englishman, Frenchman, Belgian and Russian, of most Italians and Americans, of some Germans and many Austrians, in short, of the greater part of the human race capable of forming a judgment upon such a subject, the responsibility for all this fruitless waste of human blood and tears rests primarily upon the rulers of Germany and (in a less degree) those of Austria; and secondarily upon the intellectual leaders of the German public, the journalists, the politicians, the professors — ^perhaps especially the professors — who created the public opinion which enabled their government to act as it has acted. That belief has been reached unwillingly, and there are many who have resisted it, incredulously, till the logic of facts convinced them; because they have found it difficult to believe that any government of a civilised state could so act, and still more difficult to believe that the leaders of a great nation, which has led the world in philosophy, in music, and in many branches of learning, could have allowed its very soul to be so poisoned as to support such a course of action, and to gloze over the crimes by which it has been accompanied.

The conviction which most of the world now holds in regard to the guilt of Germany in this war may be summarised in a few sentences, which, taken together, form a very grave indictment.

(i) The original cause out of which this war sprang, the Austro-Serbian question, not only could have been settled if all the great powers had desired its settlement, but was in a fair way of being settled, when Germany, though not directly concerned, intervened with an act which made a general conflagration inevitable. Germany therefore is responsible for the war.

(2) Germany had meant to fight a war of pure aggression, if not on the Austro-Serbian issue, then , on some other; she meant to fight this war either • this year or next, and all her policy was leading up to it. She had prepared for it beforehand in the most elaborate detail, under cover of a pre- / tended desire for peace. She meant to fight, and either to cripple or to ruin, all the powers now opposed to her; and although she would have pre-

A ferred to deal with them separately, and hoped to do so, she had made her arrangements for dealing with them in conjunction.

(3) From the beginning of the war she has, on her side, so conducted the struggle as to show that, under her present rulers, she is a state without honour, a state which regards her most solemnly assumed obligations as of no avail when they stand in the way of her immediate convenience; a state therefore with which it is impossible to have any treaty relations until her system and principles of government are radically changed. She has also conducted the war with a deliberate and calculated brutality to which

y modern warfare presents no parallel, which violates many solemn international rules formally ratified by Germany herself, and which makes of no avail the progress that has been made in the humanising of war.

This is an indictment so grave that it ought to be fully substantiated. We shall therefore begin by resuming, as briefly as possible, the evidence for these three assertions, even though, in doing so, we may have to cover some well-trodden ground. That done, we shall next be able to enquire how far the ideas that make this kind of action possible are prevalent among the ruling classes, and among the mass of the people, in the German nation; how far these ideas are rooted in German history; how they have shown themselves in recent German policy; and what are the rival ideas, the rival conceptions of national honour, of progress and of " culture " with which they are now engaged in deadly strife.

i. — Germany deliberately precipitated the War.

When the heir to the Austrian throne was assassinated by a Serbian on June 23, it was natural that Austria should be indignant against the Serbians, and ready to jump to the conclusion that they had encouraged the crime. It would have been right and proper that Austria should require Serbia not only to disown the crime but to do her best to track and punish those who had a hand in it; and if Serbia had failed to do this nobody would have thought it unreasonable that Austria should punish her.

The Austrian government did not adopt this course. During a month they held an enquiry into the crime behind closed doors. They gave no indication to any of the powers except Germany, not even to their ally, Italy,^ as to the course of action they proposed to adopt. They waited until a moment when many of the ambassadors were away on holiday, as they would not have been if it had been known that a crisis was approaching, so as to make it difficult for the diplomatists to interfere. Then, on July 22,, they suddenly delivered

' British Blue Book, Nos. i, 161. I quote throughout from the popular edition, " Great Britain and the European Crisis."

an ultimatum to Serbia^ of such a kind that Sir Edward Grey, who at this stage had much sympathy with Austria, said that he " had never before seen one state address to another independent state a document of such a formidable character " and that at least one of its demands was " hardly consistent with the maintenance of Serbia's independent sovereignty." ^ These monstrous demands, which throughout implied that the Serbian government was responsible for the murder, were not accompanied by any proofs.* And Serbia was required to accept them all within forty-eight hours on pain of war. The diplomatists of all the powers except Germany urged upon Austria that more time ought to be allowed,* if the danger of European war was to be avoided. Austria declined to give more time, and moreover made it clear that she would not discuss the Serbian question with anybody. In spite of this, England, France and Russia did their best to persuade Serbia to yield as far as possible ^ — a difficult thing for Russia

^British Blue Book, No. 4.

Uh. No. 5.

' The document purporting to give the Austrian dossier which appears in the German White Book (p. 28) is merely a general statement, unsupported by evidence, and is seemingly only an extract from a German newspaper. It ought not to be forgotten that in 1909 Austria projected a declaration of War against Serbia, and that in the celebrated Friedjung trial it was shown that the allegations on which this declaration was to be based were founded on documents forged in the Austrian legation at Belgrade. See "The Southern Slav Question," by Scotus Viator.

* British Blue Book, Nos. 18, 13, 25 ; Russian Orange Book, Nos. 6, 12, 14.

' British Blue Book, Nos. 12, 15, 25.

to do. Before the time fixed by the ultimatum Serbia sent an extremely humble and conciliatory reply/ in which she gave way upon every point but two, and offered to submit these to arbitration. No independent state has perhaps ever submitted itself to greater humiliation before another. The Serbian reply gave to Austria all, and more than all, that she could reasonably expect.^ Nevertheless Austria declined to accept it. She would not even agree to take the Serbian note as a basis of discussion.* She declared war, and began to bombard Belgrade.

It is quite obvious that Austria did not want peaceful satisfaction from Serbia. She wanted war. It was the opinion of most of the diplomatists concerned, perhaps of all, that the note to Serbia had been intentionally drafted in such a way as to ensure its rejection.* Why did Austria take this line, and run the risk of a European conflagration ? Obviously because the murder presented a good excuse for crushing Serbia once for all, and Serbia (as we shall see^) had long been an obstacle in the way of the Austro-German scheme for obtaining control over the Balkan peninsula. Once before, in pursuance of this great scheme, Austria had taken the risk of war, when she committed the high-handed act of annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908. That was the

'British Blue Book, No. 39-

'^ Sir Edward Grey's opinion, lb. No. 46.

« British Blue Book, No. 61.

' See below, Chap. V.

occasion on which Germany declared that " she stood beside her ally in shining armour." The bluff had succeeded on that occasion. It seems clear that Germany had persuaded Austria that it would succeed on this occasion also, and that none of the opposing powers was in a position to fight. Certainly Austria had been convinced that Russia,, the power chiefly concerned, would not fight.^ In 1908 the two Germanic powers had played a two-handed game. It is impossible to resist the conclusion that they were doing the same thing now. True, the German officials insisted that they did not know the contents of the Austrian ultimatum.^ That may have been literally true, because it was a useful thing to be able to say, especially as the other ally in the Triple Alliance, Italy, had been kept in the dark. But it should be noted (i) that the German Kaiser and Chancellor had an opportunity of discussion with the Austrian statesmen between the murder and the ultimatum, when they attended the funeral of the Archduke, and it is incredible that the opportunity was not used to discuss their future course of action; (2) that the German ambassador at Vienna (one of the few diplomatists not off duty at the crisis) did know the contents of the note beforehand;^ (3) that if the German government did not know what the ultimatum contained, it was a monstrous thing to pledge German support

^ British Blue Book, Nos. 32, 33. ' lb. No. 18. » lb. No. 161.

beforehand to Austria in carrying it out ; ^ and (4) that it is incredible that Austria should never have consulted her closest ally and sole supporter in regard to an act that was likely to bring on a European war. The full truth will be known one day; but in the meanwhile no reasonable student of the documents can avoid the conclusion that Austria was encouraged by Germany, probably in the belief that a bold bluff would succeed, into a monstrously high-handed act which was likely to cause a general war, and into committing that act in such a way as to make the avoidance of war extremely difficult.

So ended the first stage of the crisis: the war between Austria and Serbia had been precipitated. The diplomatists now devoted themselves to the almost hopeless task of preventing it from spreading, and in particular of reaching some sort of agreement between Austria and Russia, the traditional protector of Serbia. It is needless to follow the course of the fevered negotiations which were crowded into the days between July 24 and August 2, when the die was cast. But certain broad facts come out very clearly. England was desperately anxious for peace, and Sir Edward Grey and the British ambassadors at the various courts took the lead in urging every conceivable argument, and trying every device that could be thought of. France, the ally of Russia, and Italy, the ally

^ " We therefore permitted Austria a completely free hand in her action towards Serbia, but have not participated in her preparations. Austria chose the method of presenting . . . a note." German White Book, p. 5.

of Germany and Austria, were equally zealous, and the representatives of these three powers worked hand in hand in the most intimate way throughout the crisis. Russia also was eager for peace, as she had already shown by urging Serbia to give way, and as she showed at every stage of the negotiations; but she was resolved that she would not again submit to such a humiliation, or be forced to such a desertion of a small power which looked to her as a protector, as she had had to endure in 1908; and even if her ministers had been willing, public feeling in Russia had been stirred to such a pitch that it would have been impossible for them to submit without raising a positive revolution.

What of the attitude of Austria? During the first few days she maintained her stiff-necked attitude, and refused to discuss the Serbian question in any form. She was evidently still hoping that the bluff would succeed. But after a few days she realised that the danger was serious, and that whatever the German officials might say, Russia would fight unless some settlement was reached. That conviction brought her to a more reasonable attitude. On July 3 1 Sir Edward Grey proposed that Austria should stop the advance of her troops in Serbia, that Russia on her side should take no military steps, and that the other powers should consider what satisfaction Serbia ought to give to Austria.^ To this Russia agreed at once;^ and

'British Blue Book, No. in. '^ Russian Orange Book, No. 67.

on the following day Austria also accepted the proposal, thus for the first time permitting the powers to discuss the questions between herself and Serbia/ On this basis, it seems safe to assume that a peaceful settlement would have been reached.^ The obstacle was no longer in the obstinacy of Austria. Where was it?

Throughout the negotiations the German government never tired of asserting that it was eagerly and assiduously working for peace, and using its influence with Austria in that direction. This is stated over and over again, but the only definite German step of which there is any proof was the forwarding of English suggestions to the Austrian government without comment. In the German White Book issued after the war began there is not a single document showing that Germany used any influence upon Austria in a peaceful direction; indeed, the only despatches between Berlin and Vienna contained in this book are an empty note about the Serbian ultimatum on July 24, and a telegram from the German ambassador at Vienna on July 28 saying that Sir Edward Grey's mediation " appears belated," " after the opening of hostilities by Serbia ! " It is difficult to believe that if Germany had really been using pressure upon Austria she would not have included some evidence to this effect in the official statement of her case. As for Germany's zeal for peace, the one clear

^ British Blue Book, Nos. 131, 135, 161. * Russian Orange Book, Nos. 69, 71, and definite fact is, that every proposal and suggestion made by Sir Edward Grey was rejected (with polite expressions) as "inadmissible"; Sir Edward Grey even begged the German government, if they objected to his suggestions, to suggest any way out that seemed suitable : " mediation,'' he said, " was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would ' press the button ' in the interests of peace." ^ Two days later Sir Edward Grey went so far as to say that if Germany would propose any reasonable scheme, and if Russia and France did not accept it, he would have nothing to do with Russia and France.^ To these appeals the German government, so zealous for peace, made no reply whatever: on the contrary, on the very evening on which Sir Edward Grey sent the first of these two messages, the German Chancellor was proposing to the British ambassador that England should remain neutral while Germany attacked France and violated Belgium.* Lastly, on the very day on which Austria agreed to let the powers discuss the Serbian question, the German government sent an ultimatum to Russia involving war within twelve hours.* Is it possible, in face of these facts, to deny that Germany first urged

^ British Blue Book, No. 84.

Uh. No. III.

* Russian Orange Book, No. 70. The despatch announcing the ultimatum immediately follows a telegram from the Russian ambassador congratulating Sir E. Grey upon the prospect of securing peace!

Austria into a line of action which made war likely, then placed every difficulty in the way of a peaceful solution while pretending to strive for peace, and finally, when peace seemed likely to be secured in spite of all difficulties, suddenly precipitated war by its own act?

The German defence of the ultimatum to Russia, as given in the German White Paper, is that Russia was threatening Germany by mobilising.^ There is some obscurity about the actual dates and facts concerning the mobilisation.^ But it seems to be clear that Germany herself had been actually mobilising in secret for some days before she sent her ultimatum demanding that Russia should demobilise.^ In any case, it is well known that Russian mobilisation is a much slower thing than German, taking weeks instead of days ; and under these circumstances a power which was zealous for peace might reasonably be expected to risk a delay of a day or two at a moment when peace seemed to be in sight. And there is another significant fact. It was primarily against Austria that Russia was mobilising : the armies opposite the Austrian frontier had begun to assemble two days before the armies opposite the German frontier. Yet Austria sent no ultimatum; Austria was ready to discuss

^ German White Paper, pp. 13-15.

^ Russia seems to have issued 'orders for the mobilisations of the regions near Austria on 29 July, the day on which Austria attacked Serbia (British Blue Book, No. 78). The general Russian mobilisation was ordered on 31 July, after the general Austrian mobilisation.

" British Blue Book, Nos. 105, 113.

y- and to make terms; Austria actually did not declare war against Russia until five days after Germany! Why, then, need Germany take action? There is only one imaginable reason. It was because she was afraid that peace was going to he assured, and she meant to have war.

ii. — The War had been long intended and prepared.

It is, in the nature of things, not easy to obtain documentary proof of Germany's far-reaching and detailed preparations for war, the evidences of which have accumulated since the war began, and have, in the mass, convinced most men that every detail of the German attack on Belgium and France had been arranged beforehand. It is, for example, remarkable that when German armies appeared before fortresses in Belgium and France they should find it possible to bring into action immediately big guns requiring concrete platforms which, according to artillery experts, require three weeks to settle; it cannot be proved, as yet, that these platforms had been secretly constructed beforehand by agents of the German government; but it is certainly an extraordinary coincidence that there should be platforms ready, at the right spots. It is suggestive to learn that orders from Germany for the chartering of coalships to sail to points in the Atlantic Ocean reached Cape Town a week before the murder of the Archduke : but it cannot be proved that these ships were destined to provide supply for commerce-raiders. We may well wonder why, long before there was any alarm of war, there was a sudden and inexplicable rush of orders from Germany to sell Canadian Pacific shares on the London Stock Exchange. It is not without significance that the army manoeuvres to be held last August in Central Germany were to be on so much larger a scale than ever before that many of the reserves were to be called out; the visitor to Germany, who was told of this in May and thought nothing of it then, cannot now fail to realise how convenient a cloak these unprecedented manoeuvres afforded for the accumulation of supplies and equipment in the direction of the French frontier. A hundred details of this sort, each perhaps capable of explanation by itself, have combined to produce a widespread moral certainty that all the arrangements for a war that was to be waged this summer had been completed in Germany long before the Archduke's murder.

But there is no need to rely upon scattered details of this sort. Evidence of a far more definite kind as to Germany's warlike intentions is abundant.

In the first place, there is the enormous and rapidly increasing German expenditure on armaments during the last few years. The expenditure on the navy has naturally attracted most attention in this country, where the strain of keeping abreast of it has been sharply felt. The beginning of the modern German navy really dates from the

Navy Bill of 1897. The conviction that the object of its creators was to challenge British sea-power first took root in 1900, when, in the middle of the South African War, Germany suddenly revised the scale of expenditure established in 1897, ^^^ practically doubled its navy. From that time onward England has found herself forced to build against Germany. She tried, from 1906 to 1908, the experiment of retarding the rate of construction, in the hope that Germany would follow suit : thie German reply was to raise their naval estimates by 33 per cent. She opened negotiations for a limitation of armaments on both sides, only to be told that this was impracticable. As late as 19 13, England suggested a " naval holiday," or suspension of new construction by mutual consent, but the reply was equally unfavourable. Germany increased her vote for the navy by i 1,000,000 per annum in 1912, and by half a million in 1913, and then we had to follow suit in proportion. When the war began Germany had a navy more powerful and more costly than England had found necessary ten years before, though the very existence of England depends upon command of the sea. The rapid construction of this vast force was not meant for show only: it was meant to be used. And alongside of the programme of naval construction had gone forward an elaborate fortification of Heligoland and of the highly defensible German North-sea coast, such as to provide an impenetrable fortress where the main fleet could rest in safety while submarines and other modern devices were employed to wear down the English numerical superiority. This quite practicable scheme of operations has been openly discussed and described for years past in German publications of many types. At the same time the Kiel Canal was being widened and deepened, to permit of the free passage of warships back and forward between the North Sea and the Baltic. Many people have prophesied that a war between England and Germany would come when the enlargement of the Canal was completed. It was completed in the early summer of 19 14.

Still more striking than the naval activities of Germany during these years have been the increases in her land army. In 191 1 an Army Act was passed by the Reichstag which provided for a very large increase to the peace- footing of the army, involving, of course, a proportionately larger increase of the number of trained reserves; the act also provided for a huge expenditure on guns, air-craft, motor-transport and other munitions of war. This enlargement of 191 1 was defended on the ground that it has always been a rule in Germany that the army on a peace-footing ought to be kept in a steady ratio to the population of 1 : 100, and that there had therefore been at intervals of a few years a long series of Army Acts providing for increases in the army proportionate to the growth of population. The explanation is perhaps not unreasonable, though the German army, before 191 1, was already the most formidable in Europe. But this explanation was quite insufficient to account for the passing of a second Army Act in 191 2, and a third in 19 13, each providing for more sensational increases than the last, and each devoting also huge sums of money for the increase of those mechanical means of destruction upon which, during this war, Germany has relied even more than upon the wonderful valour of her soldiers.