Introduction to the science of ethics

Introduction To The Science Of Ethics

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INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS

BY

THEODORE DE LAGUNA

PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN BRYN MAWR COLLEGE

All rights reserved

COPYRIGHT, 1914,

By THE MACMILLAN COMPANY.

Set up and electrotyped. Published December, 1914.

NottoootJ ^resss

J. S. Cushing Co. — Berwick & Smith Co.

Norwood, Mass., U.S.A.

DEC I7J9I4

Preface

The title of this book is intended to be fairly descriptive of it. It treats of ethics as a science, which if not wholly independent of metaphysical considerations — and of no science can that be said — is sufficiently independent to permit of separate positive treatment. And under the broad license of an ' introduction ' it presents not only an outline of the science as we find it to-day, but some account of the past which has made it what it is.

Part I contains brief chapters upon the scope and methods of the science and upon one metaphysical topic (the freedom of the will) which cannot well be passed over in silence. But it is mainly given up to a discussion of the subjects of moral judgments and a survey of the various kinds of standards according to which, under the conditions of savage or of civilized life, moral judgments are made. It is thus intended to present a broad background of facts against which the explanatory theories, old and new, may be the better appreciated.

Part II is a review of the principal Greek and English ethical theories. In an introductory note I have given my reasons for including this review. It does not purport to be a history of ethics, even for the periods which it covers. By neglecting much that is important to the historian, I have gained space for a fuller and, I trust, more interesting and instructive treatment of the men and movements that are included. In connection with Part II a selection from the ethical classics should certainly be read; and this, however meager, should not fail to comprise Books I, II, and X of the Nicomachean Ethics.

Especially in the case of the Greek ethicists, I have not always found it possible to separate the moral theories entirely from their metaphysical basis ; indeed, to have done so would vi PREFACE

in some cases have amounted to a falsification. But I have at least relegated the metaphysics to a strictly subordinate place.

In Part III a positive treatment of moral problems is presented in connection with the elements of the general theory of values. So far as I know, this is the first attempt at an elementary presentation of any of the newer phases of the latter subject. Not that the theory of values as such is new. It is as old as ethics itself. But in recent years it has undergone a great development, and one of unusual interest — a development, however, which has remained buried in monographs and treatises that are wholly inaccessible to the undergraduate student as well as to the educated public generally.

It should be observed that Part III is intelligible — I would not say equally intelligible — without the previous reading of Part II, which may therefore be omitted if time requires or the instructor so prefers. Parts I and III will then serve as an < Elements of Ethics.' I hope, however, that this extreme course may not often be taken. It may, however, often be necessary to omit some passages of Part II ; and it is not so closely written but that omissions can easily be made. I would suggest that Chapter X and the account of the stimuli of the moral sense in Chapter XI, while dealing of matters of great importance in themselves, may be most easily spared by the beginner.

I should not know how to record the debts which I have incurred in writing this book; and I shall not attempt it. The great debts, of which I remain ever conscious, are, naturally enough, to my own teachers of ethics, Professor Howison of California and Professor McGilvary of Cornell and Wisconsin; but such debts are more easily felt than set forth. I should, however, mention that in the writing of Chapter XI I received several suggestions from Dr. Edna Shearer (a pupil of the late David Irons), whose unpublished dissertation on Hume's ethics was completed under my supervision.

Cambridge, England,

November 14, 1914.

CONTENTS PAKT I. THE FIELD OF ETHICS

OHAPTHB PAGE

I. Scope and Relations of the Science of Ethics . 3 L The Problems op Ethics, 3.

II. The Relations of Ethics, 8.

III. Ethics as a Theoretical Science and as the Philosophy of Practice, 11.

II. The Methods of Ethics 13

III. The Field of Moral Judgments .... 23 I. Character and Conduct, 23.

II. The Moral Agent, 26.

III. Extent of Moral Conduct, 29.

IV. Content op the Moral Act, 31. 1. The Prob-

lem, 31. 2. Status of Unforeseen Consequences, 33. 3. Motive vs. Intention, 39. Appendix : The Intention to Do Right, 42.

IY. Responsibility and Freedom 50

I. Responsibility, 50.

II. The Relation between Freedom and Responsibility, 51.

III. Further Arguments for Indeterminism, 56.

IV. Further Arguments for Determinism, 58.

V. Physical and Quasi-physical Determinism, 63. V. General Survey of Moral Standards ... 66 I a. The Standards of Duty, 67. 1. Instinctive and Customarg Standards, 67. 2. Personal Authority, 73. 3. The Authority of Law, 77.

viii CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAG1

I b. The Standards of Benevolence, 80. 1. Ideality of Benevolence and Virtue, 80. 2. Benevolence in General, 82. 3. The Objects of Benevolence, 83. (1) Benevolence to Individuals, 83. (2) Devotion to an Institution, 85. (3) Devotion to a Cause, 86. (4) Devotion to a Representative, 87.

II. The Standards of Virtue, 88. 1. The Kinds of Virtue, 88. (1) Courage, 89. (2) Temperance, 91. (3) Wisdom, 93. 2. Virtue without Effort, 96. 3. The Imitation of the Ideal, 97.

PART II. THE CLASSICAL SCHOOLS Introductory Note 101

VI. The Beginnings of Ethics 105

I. The Sophists, 105.

II. Socrates, 112. 1. Fundamental Assumptions, 113. 2. Theory of Virtue, 115.

VII. Hedonism 123

I. Aristippus, 124.

II. Other Hedonists, 126.

Vin. Energism 131

I. General Features of Ancient Energism, 131.

II. Plato, 133. 1. The Virtues in General, 135.

2. Wisdom, 138. 3. Pleasure, 142.

III. Aristotle, 144. 1. Metaphysical Basis, 145.

2. Happiness, 147. 3. Virtue, 149. 4. The Supremacy of Pure Beason, 153.

IV. Concluding Comments, 154.

IX. Rigorism 158

I. The Cynics, 158.

II. The Stoics, 163. 1. The Background, 163.

2. The Belation of Morality to Instinct, 164.

3. The Stoic Paradoxes, 167. 4- The Virtuous Life, 169.

CONTENTS ix

CHAPTEB PAGK

X. The Beginnings of Modern Ethics .... 175 I. The Point of Departure, 175.

II. Hobbes, 177. 1. Fundamental Principles, 177. 2. The State of Nature, 182. 3. The Conditions of Peace, 185. 4- The Function of the State, 187.

III. CUDWORTH, 189.

IV. Cumberland, 190.

XI. The Classical Schools op the Eighteenth Century 198

I. Preliminary Kemarks, 198.

II. Intuitionalism, 200. 1. The Mathematical Analogy, 200. 2. Obligation — Beward and Punishment, 203. 3. The Universality of Moral Laws, 206.

III. Sentimentalism, 207. 1. Empirical Standpoint,

207. 2. The Analogy of Beauty, 208. 3. Obligation, 215. 4. The Stimuli, 217.

IV. Utilitarianism, 223. 1. The Utilitarian Pro-

gram, 223. 2. Obligation, 226. 3. Approbation and Disapprobation, 230.

V. Concluding Remarks, 232.

XII. The Nineteenth Century and German Influence 235 I. The New Utilitarianism, 235.

II. Kant, 238.

III. Fichte, 242.

IV. Hegel, 243.

V. The English Controversies, 245.

XILL The Hedonistic Controversy 247

I. The Kinds op Hedonism, 247.

II. The Selfish Theory, 252.

III. The Theory of Original Selfishness, 259.

IV. The Hedonistic Theory of Values in Gen-

eral, 261.

V. Ethtcal Hedonism, 271.

f CONTENTS

Part III. The Evolutionary Theory Of Moral Values Chapter Page

XIV. The Significance of Morality for Society . 281 I. Introduction, 281.

II. Morality and Social Welfare, 282.

III. Social Intercourse, 286.

IV. The Relation of Morality to Social In-

tercourse, 292.

XV. Character, Sentiment, and Value . . . 296 I. Morality and Individual Welfare, 296. II. Character, 298.

III. The Sentiments, 304.

IV. Valuation, 311.

V. The Value of a Sum of Things, 315.

VI. Virtue and Happiness, 318. 1. Indirect Value of Morality, 318. 2. Direct Value of Morality, 320.

XVI. The Social Character of Sentiments, and the

Objectivity of Values . . . 324 I. Introduction, 324.

II. The Excitation of Sympathy, 325.

III. Admiration and Contempt. Pride and

Shame, 329.

IV. The Education of the Sentiments, 330. V. The Objectivity of Values, 335.

VI. The Function of the Elite, 340.

VII. Absolute Values, 347.

VIII. Historical Continuity, 350.

IX. Individual Differences, 354.

X. Values Peculiar to Minor Social Groups, 358.

XVII. The Significance of Darwinism .... 360 I. Evolution in General, 360.

II. Darwinism, 363.

CONTENTS xi

CHAPTER PAOK

III. Application of Darwinism to Ethics, 367.

IV. Congenital Basis of Morality, 372.

V. The Analogy of Language, 376.

XVIII. The Evolution of Moral Standards . . . 379 I. Conditions of Moral Evolution, 379.

II. The Problem, 381.

III. The Modification of Standards of Value,

IV. Conventionality in Moral Standards, 388. V. Doubt and Eeflection, 391.

VI. The Eise of Discontent, 394.

VII. Duty and Benevolence in Evolution, 398. VIII. The Progress of Benevolence, 401. LX. The Relation of Virtue to Duty and Benevolence, 404.

Conclusion 407

Index 413

GENERAL REFERENCES

ELEMENTARY WORKS .

Mackenzie, J. S., Manual of Ethics.

Muirhead, J. H., Elements of Ethics.

Seth, J., A Study of Ethical Principles.

Thilly, E., Introduction to Ethics.

Eite, W., An Introductory Study of Morals.

Mezes, S. E., Ethics, Descriptive and Explanatory.

Bowne, B. P., The Principles of Ethics.

Perry, R. B., The Moral Economy.

Dewey and Tufts, Ethics.

Palmer, G. H., The Field of Ethics, and The Nature of

Goodness.

Paulsen, F., System of Ethics.

Royce, J., The Philosophy of Loyalty.

Rashdall, H., Ethics.

Sorley, W. R., The Moral Life.

Moore, G. E., Ethics.

TREATISES :

Wundt, W., Ethics.

Stephen, L., Science of Ethics.

Janet, P., The Theory of Morals.

Ladd, G., The Philosophy of Conduct.

Taylor, A. E., The Problem of Conduct.

Rashdall, H., The Theory of Good and Evil.

Hobhouse, L. T., Morals in Evolution.

Westermarck, E., The Origin and Development of the

Moral Ideas.

Read, C, Natural and Social Morals.

Wallace, W., Lectures and Essays on Natural Theology

and Ethics.

Chapter I Scope And Relations Of The Science Of Ethics

I. The Problems of Ethics

Double Origin of the Science. — The science of ethics has grown principally out of the attempts to solve two sets of problems, which at first sight may not appear to be closely connected with each other. On the one hand it has been asked : What is happiness ? What would be the highest or most complete happiness? What can a man do toward securing happiness for himself or for others ? On the other hand the inquiry has been raised : What is the meaning of ' right ' and ' wrong,' l good ' and ' bad,' as applied to men's conduct and character? How do we make these distinctions and what validity do they possess? But however different their starting-points, the two inquiries are apt to run together very speedily. The study of the conditions of happiness usually reveals the fact that virtue, or good character — the sort of character that shows itself in right conduct — is by far the most important condition. Some moralists have even identified virtue and happiness. And the study of moral distinctions has either led to the conclusion that their meaning is somehow bound up with the happy or unhappy consequences of conduct ; or, at least, the study has involved some consideration of reward and punishment, and thus the problem of the relation between virtue and happiness has come into view.

Preliminary Definition. — Ethics thus constitutes a unified body of doctrine, which may be defined as the science of morality, or the science of moral distinctions. 1 Such a definition will not apply perfectly to every system that has passed under the name of ' ethics ' ; but that is not to be expected. One can never give a logically perfect definition of an historical growth. One cannot, for example, define socialism or Christianity in such a way as to include all who have ever been regarded as socialists or as Christians, without making the terms so broad that scarcely any one would be excluded. Now it is one of the best approved maxims of science, that one should be content with the degree of exactness which the given subject-matter admits of. To strain beyond this is to make oneself liable to serious error. The definitions which we give here must be taken simply as preliminary indications, which may give the student a fair idea of what to expect, and may help him to thread his way through the discussions that are to follow.

Ambiguity of Terms. — If the attempt is made to amplify the definition of ethics by explaining the terms ' moral ' and ' morality/ a curious difficulty arises. Almost all the familiar expressions that might be used for such an explanation are found to be fatally ambiguous. For instance, let us consider the adjectives ' good ' and ' bad.' These are used to denote, not simply moral qualities, but any sort of worth or unworth whatsoever. Dogs and horses, houses and lands, groceries, pictures, scientific theories — anything that is capable of attracting human interest — may be good or bad. Men themselves may be thus described in more senses than one. " Antonio is a good man," may be a testimony to his virtue or an acknowledgment of his mer-

1 The term ' ethics ' is derived from the Greek -nOiicd (moral), from Ijdos (character), which Aristotle rightly surmised to be connected with e0os (custom) . This connection seemed to him to be important, because he believed that the process of character-forming is essentially one of habituation. The term ' moral ' is similarly derived from moralia (the Latin technical equivalent for ydiKd), formed by analogy from mos (custom, manners). Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, II, 1 ; cf. Wundt, Ethics, vol. I, pp. 24-26.

THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS 5

cantile standing. Only the context can determine. So also with the other pair of adjectives, ' right ' and ' wrong/ Anything that conforms, or fails to conform, to a standard of sufficiency or correctness is right or wrong accordingly. Conformity to moral standards is only one sort of Tightness. To denote it plainly it must be set down as ' morally right.' Similarly of ' merit/ ' responsibility/ ' obligation.' They may be as wide or as narrow as you please. ' Ought/ like ' right ' and ' wrong/ refers to conformity to a given standard. Everything ought to be right. ' Virtue ' itself, though usually restricted to moral goodness, is sometimes applied to the valuable properties of inanimate substances. It must not be supposed that this ambiguity is due to any peculiar poverty of the English language. Other languages show a similar condition. Our language has, indeed, two important common terms that are regularly used in an ethical significance, — ' conscience ' and ' duty.' But one hears too of an ' aesthetic conscience.' And the word ■ duties ' is often used to denote merely what a man is employed to perform — a sense far too narrow for ethical purposes. Consequently, if the student does not already know pretty well what ' morality ' means, no definition that we can give is likely to be of much use to him. The only ready device that could be used to cure his ignorance would be a list of typical actions and traits of character to which moral predicates are applied.

Two Kinds of Moral Valuation. — The fact that our language, like many others, has two common pairs of terms by which to denote moral distinctions is significant. It points to two markedly different attitudes toward the moral problems of daily life, from which important differences in ethical theory have arisen. ' Good ' and ■ bad ' are names for positive and negative values, which are attributed both to conduct and to character. Various grades of ' better ' and ' worse ' are recognized, with the zero-point of the

1 indifferent ' somewhere between. ' Right ' and c wrong ' also express a kind of valuation; but they are directly applicable only to conduct, and only indirectly to the author of the conduct. ' Right ' denotes agreement with a certain standard, and hence it is not properly susceptible of degrees. Furthermore, there is no zero-point : an act is either right or not right, and if not right it is wrong. There may be degrees of wrongness, but only in the sense of amount of departure from the standard of Tightness.

Examples. — There is perhaps no way in which the student can better be introduced to the study of ethics than by setting before him examples of these two types of moral valuation — the personal and the impersonal, as we may call them. The examples which we shall use for this purpose would have been so familiar to the reader of a generation or two ago, that the barest reference would have been sufficient. One may wish that this were the case to-day. The first, illustrating the personal type of valuation, consists of the concluding words of a speech of a rude shepherd, whose younger brother — whom he has promised his aged father to protect — has been convicted of a serious theft and condemned to slavery :

" Now therefore when I come to thy servant my father, and the lad is not with us ; seeing that his life is bound up with the lad's life ; it will come to pass, when he seeth that the lad is not with us, that he will die : and thy servants will bring down the gray hairs of thy servant our father with sorrow to Sheol. For thy servant became surety for the lad unto my father, saying, If I bring him not unto thee, then shall I bear the blame to my father for ever. Now therefore, let thy servant, I pray thee, abide instead of the lad a bondman to my lord ; and let the lad go up with his brethren. For how shall I go up to my father, if the lad is not with me? lest I see the evil that shall come on my father." 1

THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS 7

The second example exhibits a contrast to the first, which is all the more striking because it too involves the fulfillment of a promise ; not, however, to a man, but to a tribal God. A chieftain, going out to battle, has vowed that if he returns victorious he will offer up as a burnt sacrifice whatever first comes out of his house to meet him ; and his daughter, an only child, is the first to appear :

" And it came to pass, when he saw her, that he rent his clothes, and said, Alas, my daughter ! thou hast brought me very low, and thou art one of them that trouble me ; for I have opened my mouth unto Jehovah, and I cannot go back. And she said unto him, My father, thou hast opened thy mouth unto Jehovah ; do unto me that which hath proceeded out of thy mouth, forasmuch as Jehovah hath taken vengeance for thee on thine enemies, even on the children of Ammon." *

These examples might be paralleled without end ; but we shall limit ourselves to a third example, in which the personal and impersonal types of moral valuation are seen in conflict. A religious teacher and certain of his followers are walking through the grainfields on the sabbath day; and the latter have plucked some of the ears, thus technically breaking an ancient and venerated law, and arousing the criticism of punctilious lovers of the law :

" And he said unto them, Did ye never read what David did, when he had need, and was hungry, he, and they that were with him? How he entered into the house of God when Abiathar was high priest, and ate the show-bread, which it is not lawful to eat save for the priests, and gave also to them that were with him? "

And the whole issue is immediately summed up in the sentence that has passed into a proverb : " The sabbath was made for man, and not man for the sabbath." 2

1 Judges xi. 35-36. 2 Mark ii. 23 ff.

II. The Relations of Ethics

With Politics. — Ethics stands in very close relations with several other sciences. In the first place, it is intimately connected with political theory. (1) When ethics is regarded as primarily the theory of happiness, the investigator soon discovers that political conditions have much to do in determining the happiness or unhappiness of whole peoples. To distinguish between the two sciences, ethics may be regarded as treating of the conditions of happiness so far as these are under the control of the individual ; while to politics is left the problem of determining how the general happiness may be determined by wise government. Sometimes, indeed, the two sciences are regarded as essentially one. Politics may be treated as a department of ethics ; or ethics may be treated (as by Aristotle) as an introduction to politics. (2) When ethics is viewed as treating primarily of the moral distinctions, the connection with politics is equally close. For one of the most important functions of the state is the establishment of justice within its borders, that is to say, the enforcement of certain moral standards. And when it appears that the state is not adequately fulfilling this function, but that its laws are at various points in conflict with the ideal standards of justice, an ethical question arises, whether the duty of the individual citizen is not to obey the laws of the land, imperfect as they may be, while, if possible, laboring for their amendment. Besides, in the dealings of states with each other, many questions as to rights and duties arise, which a comprehensive treatment of moral distinctions cannot wholly ignore.

With Esthetics and Economics. — In the second place, ethics is related to aesthetics and economics. These also treat of values ; the one of beauty and such allied values as the sublime, the tragic, and the comic ; the other of exchangevalues. Some thinkers have pushed the connection between

THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS 9

ethics and aesthetics so close, that moral goodness has been regarded as a mere species of beauty, correlative with the beauty of sounds and shapes and colors. Certain it is that moral goodness often strikes us as beautiful or sublime, and that vicious suggestions may be a serious blemish upon an otherwise beautiful work of art. However, many ethicists have regarded moral goodness as so widely different from all other values, that the analogy with beauty has been lightly esteemed or altogether denied. It may be added that some writers, to whom the conception of conformity to a fixed type has seemed all-important, have found a relationship between ethics and formal logic. For formal logic, too, deals with fixed standards. The canons of correct reasoning must be observed, or the demonstration is fallacious; and there is no middle ground between validity and invalidity. Here also the analogy has sometimes been pushed to extremes, and morality has been regarded as a species of truth. The connection of ethics with economics is seemingly not so close as with aesthetics, though many similar phenomena are to be observed in the two fields. Just, for example, as the increased scarcity of a needed article brings about a rise in its price, so the estimation in which a virtue is popularly held is affected by its rarity. Among a licentious people the chaste man is a saint. Among the deceitful Greeks the hero Achilles was admired for nothing more than for his absolute lack of guile.

With the Theory of Values. — Ethics, aesthetics, and economics may all be regarded as subordinate to a general science of values. Only in recent years has such a separate science been organized under the name of ' axiology/ or the ' theory of values.' But from the earliest times discussions of this nature have formed a part of the foundations of ethics. " What is good? " was one of the first questions to be asked when scientific attention began to turn to the problems of human life. The specifically ethical question, " What is happiness ? " — that is to say : What is the sort of experience which is good in itself, and not simply as a necessary condition for some other experience ? — only gradually distinguished itself from this more general inquiry.

With Sociology. — Since the origin (in the nineteenth century) of a distinct science of social institutions, called ■ sociology/ its contact with ethics has been unbroken. 1 Moral sentiments are recognized as one of the great forces by which the customs and forms of organization of societies are shaped. Contrariwise, the customs and organizations are almost universally believed to be an essential factor in the maintenance and development of moral sentiments. Religious, political, commercial institutions all have their influence upon the moral life; none more than that oldest of institutions, which under various transformations has come down to us from the very beginnings of civilization, and has its roots in the instinctive traits of our prehuman ancestors, — the family. Consequently the study of social institutions, while it cannot for the purposes of ethics take the place of the study of the moral consciousness itself, is capable of illustrating it most admirably, and of casting light upon many of its most obscure problems.

With Psychology. — In common with all the other mental sciences, ethics is dependent upon the general science of mind, psychology. But the precise nature of this dependency is one of the most hotly debated questions of the present day. At one extreme are those who regard ethics as a branch of psychology, and particularly of social psychology. At the other extreme are those who declare that psychology is utterly incompetent to decide a single ethical question. The controversy is complicated by the fact that there exist two distinct types of psychological theory, the structural and the

1 It should be observed that the sense in which this word is used still fluctuates widely. As we use it here it does not include social psychology, the importance of which for ethics is doubtless even greater.

THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS 11

functional; and the relation of ethics to each of these is matter for controversy. Meanwhile all are agreed that the ethicist must make constant use of psychological data and methods ; and this is, after all, the most important point for us to note. When, as is often the case, the study of ethics is begun without a previous grounding in the elements of psychology, some attempt must be made to remedy the deficiency as occasion arises.

The ' is ' versus the ' ought to be.' — There is one phase of this controversy which we cannot pass over without notice. Psychology, it is said, treats simply of what is, and has no concern with what ought to be, and hence the distinctions between good and bad, right and wrong, do not fall within its province ; while ethics is precisely the science of what ought to be, regardless of what is. Such a statement is open to criticism. For a peculiar form of ethical theory is suggested which in our day has few defenders. All admit, to be sure, that the mere fact that a condition of affairs exists, or that an act is commonly performed, does not prove it to be right. But that the standards of right and wrong are absolutely independent of circumstances of every sort — that under all possible conditions, in all ages and climes and in all stages of social development, the same laws of righteousness hold sway — is not so clear ; and, if true, it is not to be lightly taken for granted. So weighty a doctrine ought not to be hidden away under cover of a verbal antithesis.

III. Ethics as a Theoretical Science and as the Philosophy of Practice

Theoretical and Practical Sciences. — Sciences are sometimes classified as theoretical sciences and practical sciences (or arts). A theoretical science is the system of existing knowledge of a given subject-matter. The mathematical sciences, physics, chemistry, biology, and economics, are examples of such sciences. A practical science is a systematic body of knowledge bearing upon the accomplishment of a given end. The sciences of medicine and pedagogy are obviously of this kind.

Ethics belongs on both sides of the classification. It is a theoretical science having as its subject-matter the moral distinctions. But it is also a practical science, having as its object the assurance of happiness.

Philosophy and the Special Sciences. — There is another familiar division of the sciences, into philosophy and the special sciences. The difference is here one of comprehensiveness and generality. Here again ethics belongs on both sides. As the science of morality it is a special science, comprised, along with economics and aesthetics, under the general theory of values. But as a practical science it is not simply one among others. It is the art of life, having as its object the establishment of a universal policy. In this aspect, therefore, it is philosophical.

In this introductory study, we shall consider ethics primarily as a special theoretical science, paying only secondary attention to its significance as the philosophy of practice.