An introduction to philosophy

Preface

This Introduction is a product of the classroom. It originated in a desire to outline an undergraduate year in Philosophy that would be both critical and constructive.

The History of Philosophy affords a natural introduction to the problems with which this discipline deals. It acquaints the student with the questions considered by those who have determined the course of reflective thought, and it reveals their attitudes and modes of approach. It also furnishes him with developed statements of philosophical problems, and discovers to him the advance made in their solution. In thus tracing the development of the Science of Sciences, the student grasps the significance of philosophical activity. This course is also preeminently fitted to develop the critical interest and aptness which are essential to the framing of worthy philosophical conceptions. But the results have led many to doubt the wisdom of limiting the undergraduate to the History of Philosophy. Most students whose only acquaintance with Philosophy has been made through a historical study of it, are merely critical. Many become philosophic sceptics ; and most of those who retain some philosophic faith are sadly confused.

On the other hand, if the history of reflective thought be ignored and the student be immediately introduced to a completed statement and solution of these problems, he fails to get what the history alone furnishes. This alternative course tends to a blind acceptance of the views held by the teacher; and the resultant dogmatism previ PREFACE

vents the development of the philosophic spirit and the attainment of a philosophic vision.

I sought a course which would be critically constructive, one in which the student would become acquainted with the great thinkers of the past and their thought, in which he would also be led to a solution of the main problems. A certain end influenced my choice of approach and presentation. It is agreed that the teacher of Philosophy is not to aim to give his students information concerning Philosophy and philosophers ; he should induce them to philosophize. He and they are not to read and think and talk about Philosophy ; the students are to be incited to think critically and constructively of themselves and the world of persons and things and history. Up to the measure of his ability the student is to become a philosopher; and, in endeavoring to secure this, we are to keep in mind the fact that a true Philosophy is not a mere theory of the universe, it is a personal relating of the Self to all that is.

These considerations led me several years since to outline the course herein presented. Lectures, classroom discussions, and the criticisms of friends have determined the filling in of the outline. At the urgency of persons who were acquainted with the results, it was offered for publication.

Frankly, I have a philosophical doctrine, and that doctrine determines the treatment given the questions and opinions which are considered. My point of view is that of Objective Idealism. Reality, in its epistemological relation, is conceived as being with meaning; In its ontologlcal relation, as active being; "active" being here used with the meaning assigned it on page 187. In a word. Reality is regarded as cognizable and immanently active. I also distinguish between a "totality" and "a true

PREFACE

Vll whole." A totality, being an aggregation, lacks the oneness which is essential to a unitary whole. In dealing with the categories, I have followed a pedagogical order ; but weighty reasons may be advanced in favor of presenting them in the logical order of their development.

I owe a great debt of gratitude to Dr. J. E. Creighton, of Cornell University. He gave time to the reading of my manuscript, and his suggestions and criticisms have been invaluable. I would also acknowledge aid rendered by Dr. A. H. Jones, of Brown University. But I alone am responsible for what is justly open to adverse criticism. The list of references which follows the text gives the names of a few among the many authors to whom I am under obligation. I owe much to authors from whose philosophic doctrines I feel compelled to dissent; naturally few of these appear in that list. But for my wife's encouragement, the publication of this work would not have been undertaken; but for her constant assistance, this Introduction could not have been brought to completion. She has looked up references, criticised statements, read proofs, and prepared the Index.

O. O. F.

Part I. General Introduction Chapter I. Introductory Page

§ I. Ourselves and the World I

§ 2. Experience and Philosophy 2

§ 3. Subject and Object 4

§ 4. Subjective and Objective 5

§ 5. The Problem in Philosophy 6

§ 6. Philosophic Material 8

Part II. Historical Introduction Chapter XL Prefatory

§ 7. Purpose of this Sketch 11

§ 8. General Divisions of Philosophy 12

DIVISION A. ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY

CHAPTER HI. GENERAL VIEW; PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY

§ 9. General View of Ancient Philosophy 14

§ II. Particular Doctrines 16

CHAPTER IV. THE SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY

§ 13. Socrates 22

§ 15. Aristotle 30

§ 16. Teleology in this Philosophy 37

ix

X TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER V. GR^CO-ROMAN AND NEO-PLATONIC PHILOSOPHIES

PAGE

§§ 17, 18. The Grseco-Roman Philosophy 39

§§ 19, 20. The Neo-Platonic Philosophy 43) 44

§ 21. Point of View and Doctrines at the Close of the Ancient Philosophy 45

DIVISION B. MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHY

CHAPTER VI. GENERAL VIEW; PATRISTIC AND SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHIES

§ 22. General View of Mediaeval Philosophy ..... 47

§§ 23-25. The Patristic Philosophy 48

§ 24. Period of Growth 49

§25. Period of Decline 51

§§ 26-28. The Scholastic Philosophy 51

§§ 26, 27. General View of this Philosophy . . . 5i> 53

§ 28. The Platonic Period 54

CHAPTER VII. SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY {Continued); TIME OF TRANSITION

§§ 29-32. The Scholastic Philosophy {Continued) .... 56 §§ 29, 30. The Aristotelian Period . . . . . • 56 §§ 31* 32' The Period of Separation 59> 60

§§ ZZf 34- The Transition 61

§ 35. Summary of Mediaeval Philosophy 62

DIVISION C. MODERN PHILOSOPHY

CHAPTER VIII. GENERAL VIEW OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY

§ 37. Schools in Modern Philosophy 69

CHAPTER IX. SUBSTANTIALISTS AND EARLY EMPIRICISTS

§§ 38* 39- The Substantialists 70

§§ 40, 41. The Early Empiricists 76, 77

TABLE OF CONTENTS xi

CHAPTER X. IDEALISTIC RATIONALISTS

PAGE

§ 42. Idealism Defined 81

CHAPTER XI. IDEALISTIC RATIONALISTS {Continued)

§ 45. Fichte 95

§ 46. Schelling 98

CHAPTER XII. REALISTIC RATIONALISTS AND LATER

EMPIRICISTS

§ 48. Realism Defined 109

§ 49. Realistic Rationalism : History and Doctrines . . .110

§ 50. General View of Empiricism . . . ... .113

§51. Doctrines of Later Empiricists , . . . • ^'S

CHAPTER XIII. PHILOSOPHY TO-DAY §52. Questions settled; Points of Difference 118

CHAPTER XIV. THE PROVINCE OF PHILOSOPHY

§ 54. The Plain Man and the Scientist 123

§ 55. Science and Philosophy 124

§ 56. Descriptive and Normative Sciences . . . . .126

Part III. Elements Of General Philosophy

CHAPTER XV. EXPERIENCE

§ 57. Standpoints of Psychology and Philosophy Distinguished . 128

§ 58. Dual Aspect of Experience 132

§ 59. Characteristics of Consciousness and Experience . . . 134

-tft;

xii TABLE OF CONTENTS

DIVISION A. COGNITION AND REALITY; EPISTEMOLOGY CHAPTER XVI. SCEPTICISM

PAGE

§61. Purpose of this Study 141

§ 62. Grounds of Doubt 141

§ 63. Scepticism Examined 144

§ 64. Conclusion . 149

CHAPTER XVII. SOLIPSISM

§ 65. The Doctrine Stated ' . 150

§66. Purpose of this Study 151

§ 67. Exposition of Solipsism ........ 152

§68. Examination of Solipsism 153

CHAPTER XVIII. APPEARANCE AND REALITY; PHENOMENALISM

§ 70. The Question Stated 157

§ 71. Doctrine Criticised: Appearance is a Seeming, back of which there is a Reality; we know Appearance, Reality remains unknown . . . . . . . . . • ^59

§ 72. Doctrine Criticised: Appearances are Illusory; we know Appearances, Reality cannot be known . . . .161

§ 73. Shall we discard the Concept Reality ? . . . . .166

CHAPTER XIX. APPEARANCE AND REALITY; PHENOMENALISM {Continued)

§ 75. Appearance is Reality Expressed . . . . . '171

§ 76. The Apparent and the Real . . . . . . -173

§77. Sources of Error in Perception; Conclusion . . . • 175

CHAPTER XX. REALITY

§78. Kinds of Reality 179

§ 79. Degrees of Reality . 180

§ 80. Reality as the Universal in Experience 181

TABLE OF CONTENTS xiii

§ 8i. The Nature of Reality i86

§ 82. Reality expressed only in the Subject-Object Relation . .188

CHAPTER XXI. IS THE COGNITIVE EXPERIENCE

RESOLUBLE ?

§ S^. What the Resolution of Cognitive Experience Signifies . .190

§ 84. Why Cognition is thus Analyzed 191

§85. Attempt to resolve Cognitive Experience Criticised . . . 192

§ 86. Is a State of Consciousness the Primary Object in Cognition ? 197

§ 87. The Kantian Limitation of Knowledge 203

§ 88. Summary 205

CHAPTER XXII. TRI-PHASAL CHARACTER OF COGNITIVE ACTIVITY

§ 90. Consciousness is Unitary 209

§ 91. Feeling and Will involved in Cognition , . . . .211

§ 92. Cognition characteristically a Thought Process , . .213

CHAPTER XXIII. A CONSTRUCTIVE STUDY OF COGNITION

§ 93. A Review

§ 94. The Universal in Experience and Cognition .

§ 95. Concepts, Objective Reality, and Cognition

§ 96. " Identity in Difference " and Cognition

§ 97. The Particulars of Experience organically Related

§ 98. Conclusions; Questions answered .

215 216

DIVISION B. THE CATEGORIES AND REALITY; ONTOLOGY

CHAPTER XXIV. GENERAL VIEW OF THE CATEGORIES

§ loi. The Categories and Reality 238

§ 102. Characteristics of the Categories » . . . . . 241

XIV

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER XXV. RELATIONS IN GENERAL

§ 104. Characteristics of Relation

§ 105. Thought is mediated by Relation .

§ 106. Relation and Reality ....

§ 107. As to Externality or Internality of Relations

§ 108. Objects modified by Relation

§ 109. The Ground of Relation

§ no. Conclusions

PAGE

243 244

245 246

249 252 252

CHAPTER XXVI. PERMANENCE AND CHANGE

§ III. Introductory

§ 113. Is Permanence Actual ?

§ 114. Change, Permanence, and Reality .... § 115. Conclusions

254 254

255 256

CHAPTER XXVII. INDIVIDUALITY

§ 116. An Individual Object ....

§ 117. Individuality as determined by the Subject

§ 118. Individuality as determined by the Object

259 260 261 262

CHAPTER XXVIII. SUBSTANTIALITY

§ 120. Origin of this Category . . . .

§ 122. Substance and Substrate

§ 123. Substance and the Primary Qualities

§ 124. Substance and the Totality of Qualities.

§125. Substantiality and Reality

263 265 271

273 274

275 277

CHAPTER XXIX. QUALITY

§ 127. Quality and Object

§128. Chararacteristics of Quality

§ 129. Quality and Reality

278 279 281 282

TABLE OF CONTENTS xv

CHAPTER XXX. QUANTITY

PAGE

§ 132. Characteristics of Number 284

§ 133. Characteristics of Measure .......' 285

§ 134. Real and Ideational Number 286

§ 135. Quantity and Reality 288

CHAPTER XXXI. SPACE

§ 137. Characteristics of Perceptual Space Experience . . . 291

§ 138. What Perceptual Space Is 292

§ 140. Conceptual Space 294

§ 141. Is Space infinitely Divisible and infinitely Extended ? . . 296

§ 142. Space and Reality 297

§ 143. Non-spatial, or Trans-spatial, Reality ..... 298

CHAPTER XXXII. TIME

§ 145. Characteristics of Perceptual Time ..... 301

§ 147. Is Time infinitely Divisible and Extended ? . . . . 305

§ 148. Time and Reality 306

§ 149. The Non-temporal or Trans-temporal 307

CHAPTER XXXIII. ACTIVITY, REST, AND MOTION

§ 152. Transeunt Activity 312

CHAPTER XXXIV. CAUSALITY

§ 156. Origin of the Idea of Cause 318

§ 157. Conceptions of Cause . . 321

XVI

TABLE OF CONTENTS

§ 159. • Is Phenomenal Cause Adequate?

§ 160. The Na!ve Metaphysical Conception of Cause

§ 161. Is the Naive Metaphysical Conception Adequate ?

§ 162. The Complete Ground ......

326 330 332 333 335

CHAPTER XXXV. FINALITY

§ 164. Finality in Individual Experience 338

§ 165. Finality in Historical Sources ...... 339

§ 166. Finality in the Development of Science .... 340

§ 167. Finality in Ethical and ^sthetical Relations . . . 340

§ 168. Directivity 341

§ 169. Finality and Non-living Individua ..... 343

§170. Self-determination the Highest Form of Activity . . . 345

§ 171. Finality and Reality 346

CHAPTER XXXVI. INDIVIDUALITY AND PERSONALITY

§ 173. Individuality and Personality 350

CHAPTER XXXVII. SOCIALITY; SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

§ 1 74. The Solitary Self and the Social Self ....

§175. The Social Self is the Real Self

§ 176. Social Reciprocity and the Development of the Individual

§ 177. Conclusions from our Study of Sociality

§ 178. Conclusions from our Study of the Categories

355 356

359 360 361

Part IV. Human Freedom And The Existence Of God

CHAPTER XXXVIII. HUMAN FREEDOM

§ 179. The Problem 363

§ 181. Theories Stated 367

TABLE OF CONTENTS xvli

PAGE

§183. Phases of Consciousness immediately related to Volition . 370

§ 184. Conditions of Psychical Freedom 373

§ 185. Character . 375

CHAPTER XXXIX. HUMAN FREEDOM (^Continued)

§ 186. Indeterminism Criticised ....... 379

§ 187. In Favor of Determinism 380

§ 188. Determinism Criticised 384

§ 189. Self-determinism 387

§ 190. Perfect Freedom . . 391

CHAPTER XL. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

§ 192. The Religious Consciousness ...... 394

§ 193. The Religious Consciousness Evaluated .... 399

§ 194. Conclusion 404

Index 413

Part I General Introduction Chapter I

§ I. Ourselves and the World. — We find ourselves in a world where there are things and other persons, and where events occur. We have dealings with these persons and things, and we have part in some events and take interest in others. Life is very real. We are real, and the outer world and all that is in it are real. This fact of the reality of ourselves and all that is about us has been impressed upon us by the experiences we have had in our intercourse with persons and our handling of things. We have found that, if we would succeed in our undertakings, we must recognize the reality of that with which we have to do, and we must adapt ourselves to its way of behaving; and we are certain that, if we should ignore the reality of the world and its happenings and the way things and persons behave, we would invite trouble, if not disaster.

Through the experiences which have impressed us with the reality of ourselves and the world, we have come to personal and practical acquaintance with ourselves and with what is other than self. We have learned something of the meaning for us of events and things and persons, something of their meaning for life. Our knowledge is not complete, neither is it always exact. Experience discovers to us the incompleteness and inexactness of our knowledge and enables us to enlarge and correct it. We recognize that the man of careful thought^'and extended practical acquaintance with the world and its affairs is the man whose opinion is of most value ; it is most likely to be correct. This is illustrated in the value which we assign to the judgment of the lawyer or the physician of wide reading and large practice, assuming that he is also a man who judges his experiences critically. In a word, reflection upon what has come to us in our commerce with the world of nature and persons and happenings, i.e. a thoughtful reasoned consideration of our experiences, tends to accurate knowledge. |' In this day of general education, the knowledge of most persons is to no small degree systematized. It is because their knowledge of numbers is to some extent systematized, that the merchant and the farmer are able to calculate the value of goods and produce. The knowledge of the scientist, like that of all others, comes through his experiences ; but it differs in some particulars from the knowledge of those who have not pursued critical studies. It comes more largely from reflection upon experiences ; and it is more extended, more exact, and better systematized.

Summary: Our intercourse with persons and things gives us experience. Experience impresses us with the reality of the world and ourselves and life, and furnishes us with the content of our consciousness — our feelings and our knowledge. Through it we develop skill in thinking and doing ; and our more exact knowledge comes of the reasoned consideration of our experiences.

§ 2. Experience and Philosophy. — We have seen that we come to assurance of the reality of the world and to knowledge of it, through experience. The question we have now to consider is, What does Philosophy, as distinguished from other forms of thought, find in experience ? To this we can only give a general answer at this point. This book, as a whole, is little more than the beginning of an answer to this question. An illustration will help us to recognize what is peculiar to Philosophy in its view of experience. You hear a confused noise, you look in the direction of the sound and see a runaway horse bearing down upon you, you are filled with fear and flee to shelter. Let us see what Psychology, a science closely allied to Philosophy, will do with this. Speaking in very general terms, we may say that the Psychologist will note the auditory sensation and the localization of the source of the sound, then the visual sensation and the localization of the object, then the instinctive fear and the motor reaction in running to shelter. He would distinguish much more, but this will answer our purpose. For him, this experience is a process, or rather a series of processes. Philosophy, on the other hand, notes three characteristics of this experience which are of special moment for reflective thought. First, you are certain of the reality of what you heard and saw and fled from, and of yourself as seeing, fearing, and fleeing. Philosophy deals with this fact of reality ; and what it has to say concerning it will appear in our further study. The second characteristic of this experience is that you interpreted what you heard and saw, that you discovered meaning in it for yourself. What you were conscious of was not merely some sounds and an extended patch of color moving toward you ; but that a runaway horse was bearing down upon you. The perception of meaning was an element of the seeing and hearing. Philosophy deals with this fact of knowing. What it has to say about it will appear farther on. Just here we wish to emphasize another characteristic of this experience. This characteristic is that the experience as a whole, and in every stage of it, has two contrasted aspects. You hear the sound and refer it to something apart from you ; you see something and refer what you see, and your fear, to what is not you ; and you run to some place which is shelter for you. In these experiences, the hearing, the seeing, the fearing, and the idea of shelter have each of them two references ; one of them to you, the other to something which is not you. These two references are two aspects of one experience. Every experience has these contrasted references, or aspects. Later we shall have more to say about this. What we wish to do here is to call attention to this characteristic of experience as a cardinal fact for Philosophy. Philosophy has not always taken account of this fact, nevertheless it has affected all philosophic thought, except possibly the earliest.

Summary : An experience is a selected whole of consciousness ; it may be regarded as a process in consciousness, or as content of consciousness. An experience has two aspects ; it is a unitary consciousness with duality of reference, a reference to the self and a reference to something to which the self is giving attention. Philosophy is the reasoned consideration of experience, as experience.

§ 3. Subject and Object. — An experience reduced to its simplest form may be stated in one of three ways : " I know something, I do something, or I feel somehow." It is evident that in each of these there is a self who experiences and something in respect of which he has the experience. This agrees with what was said about the two aspects of experience. The self who experiences is the Subject; that in relation with which the subject has the experience is the Object. Our experiences come of our giving attention to objects. In the first two forms, — " I know something," and " I do something," — the object appears as something which is other than the subject; it is trans-subjective — i.e. beyond the subject. In the other form, " I feel somehow," the subject directs his thought toward himself as feeling; that is, he makes himself the object. We do this whenever we give attention to ourselves, as when we say, " I know myself," or " I feel disturbed." There are other experiences which appear to be like these last named, though they really differ from them. Examples are at hand in experiences that may be stated thus : " I know what he thinks of it," and " I can picture the river-bank." In the first of these just given, the subject has an idea, or a thought, for his object; in the second, his object is a mental image.

One may also have experiences that would be expressed in these words : " I am glad," and " I saw a beautiful house." The " gladness " has its existence in you ; you are the subject of the " gladness." The " beauty " is of the " house " ; the " house " is the subject of the " beauty." The subject is that to which the state or quality pertains.

Summary : The subject is the self who experiences ; or that to which a state or quality pertains. The object is that in relation with which the subject has an experience, or that toward which the subject directs his thought. The subject may make himself, an idea, or a mental image, his object.

§ 4. Subjective and Objective. — Our personal experiences belong peculiarly to ourselves. You cannot have my headache. You determine to write a letter ; that experience, as a purpose, is yours. Another may have a similar experience, but he cannot have yours. These experiences are in a sense " private property." Looked at thus, experiences are Subjective ; they are in the subject and of the subject. In contrast with this " private property " in experience, we have " public property " for experience. The world of nature, the events of history, literary remains, and current happenings, are objects for all of us just as they are for each of us. Some of us may get more from them than others, but they are there for all of us. What is " public property " for experience is said to be Objective. You picture the face of an absent friend by visual memory ; or you recall a symphony which you have heard, by auditory memory. These mental images are subjective in so far as they are in you and of you ; but, inasmuch as you direct your thought to them, they are at the same time objective. What is in experience is subjective; what is for experience, is objective.

§ 5. The Problem in Philosophy. — The purpose of any particular line of study determines the point of view, the choice of material, and the method. The geographer and the geologist both study the earth ; but they have different ends in view and, as a consequence, they differ in their selection of material. We have seen that Psychology and Philosophy differ in their study of consciousness ; this difference arises from the difference in the tasks they set for themselves. The important question for us at this point in our study is. What is the task which is undertaken by Philosophy ? All exact knowledge is attained by critical and systematic study of what comes to us in our experiences ; and we have concluded that Philosophy studies experience, as experience. Our present question, then, is, What does Philosophy seek in its study of experience t

We say that the world as a whole is real and that the persons and things which are in it are real ; but what is it to be real .? Shall we say that what we can measure and weigh and what we can see and touch is real, and that what we cannot see and touch is not real } Is reality always " lumpish," or is there reality which does not occupy space ? If ideas are as real as houses and trees, have we two kinds of reality, one that fills space and another that does not ? If so, what is the relative value for us of that which fills space and that which does not ? Which is most important for us, that we accumulate the things which can be measured and weighed or that we develop our minds and have right purposes ? Or we may ask. Is the world which we know the real world, or is it only a shadow or sign of the real world ? These questions are not prompted by idle curiosity ; they are asked because we wish to know just what we are and what those actualities are with which we are dealing day by day. It is important also that we attain to positive and correct answers to these inquiries. In fact, we have, each of us, already answered them, in part at least. We have certain notions respecting things and man, certain ideas as to their make-up and what they are for. Are these notions valid } Do they accord with reality ^ This is not a mere debate about words. Our belief as to what we are and as to what the world of things and other persons is, affects our thoughts and feelings and purposes. It determines the value we give to things. If to be real is to fill space, and if what does not fill space is not real, we will naturally put highest value on what is material ; and our ability to think will be valued only because it is a means for acquiring things. Our conception of what man is and of what he is for will certainly influence our thinking and our doing ; it will determine our attitude toward the questions of the day. We have questionings and fears, longings and hopes. These doubts, aspirations, and assurances have their origin and their support in our notions of the world and ourselves, in our conception of what is essential to the reality of man and things. We repeat that most.

If not all, of us have arrived at some kind of an answer to these questions ; but our conclusions are of doubtful worth, because they are not the result of critical and systematic study. Philosophy seeks a positive and valid answer to these inquiries. Philosophers wish to know the nature of the reality in us and in things and the true significance of life for us. In short, Philosophy seeks to give an exact and systematic account of the essential nature of all that is.

§ 6. Philosophic Material. — We have concluded that Philosophy is the reasoned consideration of experience. From this it naturally follows that all particulars of experience are material for Philosophy. Each of us has such material in his own consciousness — in his feelings and instincts, in his thought of himself and the universe, in all that he has felt and purposed. But we are not confined to our private experiences ; we may know the experience of others. Men are constantly giving expression to their experience. We hear it in conversation, we find it in their writings, it is embodied in their art. Literature, art, and religious ceremonies and beliefs are expressions of the conception of the universe and man and life had by authors, artists, and worshipers ; and they are therewith expressions of what these men themselves were. In fact, all the activities of men are expressions of experience ; and the products of these activities record the thoughts and longings and hopes of men ; and so far as they do this they are material for Philosophy. Sometimes men are subject to illusions, and many of their conceptions are doubtless incorrect, and the best are incomplete ; but these illusions and misconceptions are experience facts and are, therefore, philosophic material. Erroneous views and gross superstitions are oftentimes significant material for the philosopher. The tested and assured findings of scientific investigation are of great value. So, too, are the views which have been held by men who have studied the world and man most critically and who have greatly affected the thought of their time. Of still greater value are the reasonings and teachings of those who have influenced thought long after their own age. All this material comes of commerce with the world of persons, things, and events, and of thought respecting the world and reflection upon It and ourselves. We conclude, then, that the universe, what It contains, and all Ideas respecting the universe, its events, and ourselves are material for Philosophy.

But, inasmuch as Philosophy would give an exact account of experience, the philosopher may not assign like value to all the Items In this vast store of material. To be exact, we must be critical ; and, while all the material has some value, the particulars are of unequal worth. The peach tree bearing fruit yields fuller information as to what a peach tree Is than the young tree just appearing aboveground. The thoughts and purposes of primitive man, as evidenced by the way he lived and what he did, are of value for the study of man ; but the activities of civilized man present a completer and, therefore, a more valuable embodiment of human experience. What Is Important for the understanding of one age, and therefore important for a true understanding of man, may be of little importance if we are studying man in another age. It Is also possible that what at first may seem to be of great value, will be found to be relatively valueless ; and that what Is apparently trivial may prove to have great significance. We must be careful In our evaluation of material.