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The realm of ends; or, Pluralism and theism; the Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of St. Andrews in the years 1907-10

James Ward · 1911 · Scanned text · Free in the US

151,570 words · about 10 h 37 min to read

Period artwork: Interior of the Bodleian Library, 1845
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About this book

Author
James Ward
Language
English
Published
1911
Length
151,570 words · about 10 h 37 min
Sections
5 reader sections
Text
Scanned text, read from page scans by OCR; may contain errors
Rights
Public domain in the United States

 

Contents (5)
  1. Front matter under 1 min
  2. Preface about 2 min
  3. Part I. : Pluralism about 5 min
  4. PART II. : THEISM. Lecture XL The Idea of Creation about 6 min
  5. V. 43° about 10 h 23 min

Continue:

Front matter

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Preface

THESE lectures are intended to serve as a sequel to the course delivered in the University of Aberdeen some ten years previously. If at that time I had foreseen that I should presently be favoured with the opportunity to lecture on the Realm of Ends or Pluralism and Theism I might well have entitled the earlier lectures the Realm of Nature or Naturalism and Agnosticism. There my endeavour was to establish the priority of the idealistic, or — as it seems clearer to say — the spiritualistic standpoint ; and here I have tried to ascertain what we can know, or reasonably believe, concerning the constitution of the world, interpreted throughout and strictly in terms of Mind.

At the outset, this world immediately confronts us not as one Mind, nor even as the manifestation of one, but as an objective whole in which we discern many minds in mutual interaction. It is from this pluralistic standpoint that our experience has in fact developed, and it is here that we acquire the ideas that eventually lead us beyond it. For pluralism, though empirically warranted, we find defective and unsatisfactory : but vi Preface

the theism to which it points is only an ideal — an ideal however that, as both theoretically and practically rational, may claim our faith though it transcend our knowledge. Such is a meagre outline of the present lectures. The summary contained in the last of them may take the place of further prefatory detail.

The two lectures on Hegel (Lectures VII and VIII) are, it must be confessed, largely a digression. It was my intention to treat of Kant's philosophy in like manner — in both cases in order to substantiate the contention that anyhow, avowedly or not, pluralism is the starting point of speculation. But on second thoughts I felt that perhaps I had already done too much.

In Lectures XIX, XX I have embodied portions of a paper, entitled Faith and Science, read before the Synthetic Society in 1902. This has already appeared in a volume of that Society's papers privately reprinted by the Rt Hon. A. J. Balfour in 1909.

The preparation and delivery of these lectures were frequently interrupted by an illness that began soon after my appointment and continued till its close. I desire to take this occasion to thank the Senatus of the University of St Andrews for their extreme patience and forbearance then and since ; and I cannot but rejoice that now at last these lectures, all defective though they be, are through this indulgence out of my hands.

Preface vii

I have still to express my obligations to generous friends : first, and especially, to Professor J. S. Mackenzie of Cardiff both for his long and careful criticisms and for the arduous work which he kindly undertook of reading through all the proofs ; again to Professor G. F. Stout of St Andrews for many valuable and astute comments ; and finally to my colleague, Professor W. R. Sorley, not only for his literary help but for his continuous encouragement throughout my labours.

JAMES WARD.

Trinity College, Cambridge.

September, 191 1.

Part I. : Pluralism

Lecture I. Introductory.

PAGES

The Realm of Nature and the Realm of Ends, the mechanical and the moral, as contrasted ' aspects ' of the one world. Naturalism holds

the former, Spiritualism the latter, to be fundamental . . . i — 3 Summary of the Spiritualistic position as argued in the writer's previous Gifford Lectures. The recognition of Experience as a duality in

unity tends to Spiritualistic Monism ...... 4 — 13

This, if sound, ought to furnish the interpretation of the reality underlying the phenomena that science formulates. Rise of the Historical

Method and the passing of 'Physical Realism' .... 13 — 18

The idea of the Good and the course of History 18 — 20

The problem of the One and the Many, and the question of method . 21 — 24

Lecture II. The One and the Many.

What sort of unity does the world imply? (1) Nature as objective not the One ...........

(2) Nor a Supreme Subject, taken alone ......

(3) Nor the unity of Subject and Object, as Absolute Self- consciousness. The One and Acosmism. The One of Mysticism

The World-Soul of Platonism useless as a mediating principle

Absolute Object, Absolute Subject, Absolute Self-consciousness, all alike

unreal because reached by abstraction . . . . . . 36 — 41

What sort of unity is possible without absolutely transcending the Many? The oscillations of theology and speculation between Pluralism and Singularism ........... 41 — 47

The start from Pluralism 48

Lecture III. Pluralism.

Pluralism as a recoil from Absolutism now in the ascendant. Its standpoint and main features to be here described ..... 49 — 50

The standpoint is throughout the historical, and the behaviour of individuals bent on self- conservation and betterment its leading idea. Leibniz's Monadology still the type 50—54

-3° x Contents

PAGES

The pluralistic outlook illustrated from Economics, Bionomics and

Physionomics 54 — 59

Can the so-called inanimate world be regarded in this fashion? Stationary states, persistent types and inertia. ' Elective affinities.' ' No two indiscernible individuals.' The principle of Continuity. Uniformity

and statistics. The pluralisms conclusion ..... 59 — 67

Purposive Activity and Orderliness ....... 67 — 69

Lecture IV. The Contingency in the World.

Chaos a myth, yet orderliness and regularity the result of conduct, not its

Natura naturans and Natura naturata ....... 72 — 75

Causal Efficiency and Causal Connexion ; Chance and Contingency ;

Subjective Selection. ' Heterogony of Ends ' .... 75 — 80 Illustrations of contingency in the useful arts and in Nature. Fixity of

Type and Variety of Conditions. The Grotesque in Nature . . 80 — 87

* Worth ' and the natural ' Right to live ' 87—89

Contingency of Species ; the gulf between Man and Brute ; Contingency

Contingency in the so-called physical world ...... 94 — 96

Lecture V. Evolution as Epigenesis and Equilibration.

Pluralism implies epigenesis or new formation not literal evolution or

Epigenesis entails new properties which its component factors did not

, previously possess — hence it has been called ' creative synthesis ' . 101 — 105

The prime source of this synthesis lies for the pluralist in the activity of experients. Organization the result of experience. The idea

of ' potentiality ' throws no light on the process .... 105 — 108

In the practical world this synthesis yields new values that are not only

conserved but increased ........ 109

Interdependence of higher and lower : mechanization and direction .- 109 — 112

Tendency to progression. Final Harmony ..... 112 — 116

Lecture VI. The Pluralistic Goal.

In what sense is Society a unity? Two contrasted answers considered 117 — 120 The transition from Man as animal to Man as social. ' Objective

Mind' and Rational Persons. Meaning of 'Objectivity' . . 120 — 124 Mutual implication of Objectivity and Self-consciousness. Kant's

Subjective and Objective, Deductions of the Categories criticized 124 — 129

Society a living reality, though a complex and 'over-individual' one . 129 — 130 The advance towards a higher unity. No • law of diminishing return '

here. No ' solidarity ' of Evil 130 — 134

The Humanitarian Ideal and the Lord's Prayer 134 — 137

Contents xi

Lecture VII. The Pluralism of Hegel.

PAGES

Hegel at the historical standpoint : here he recognises both the contingency and the routine in Nature ...... 138 — 145

But Nature to become Spirit : the Higher the key to the Lower . 145 — 147

World-history, as Mind working out the knowledge of itself, begins with ' the unconscious.' Heterogony of Ends. The World-Spirit and its instruments compared to an architect using natural forces.

But where is this World- Architect to be found ? .... 147 — 152

It turns out that the completed plan is the architect .... 152 — 156

Individuals not means but ends. The World-Spirit the living organization which they gradually evolve . . . . . . 156 — 158

Lecture VIII. The Hegelian Unity.

Is it a unity differentiated into a plurality or a plurality organized into

a unity? Hegel's doctrine of the Trinity appealed to in answer . 159 — 160

The Kingdom of the Father is pure thought : the differences here are

posited only as ideal : ' the Notion has yet to objectify itself ' . 160 — 164

In the Kingdom of the Son we come upon difference, the Objective as fact. But how are the two Others, the Son and the World, related, and how is the transition effected? Der Abf all der Idee ! The first in thought the later in existence 164 — 170

Hegel's doctrine of development. The potential and the actual differ only in form. But what is first, it seems, is "the impulse that puts forth into existence " ........ 170 — 174

So, in the Kingdom of the Spirit we find unity to be the result of development. When, however, Hegel tells us that this result is the beginning, he does not say what he means . . . 174 — 180

Lecture IX. The Limits of Pluralism.

The Plurality of Worlds a problem both for pluralists and theologians.

To deny it seems futile ........ 181 — 184

Need for a Supreme Unity as Upper Limit. Appeal to the principle

of Continuity : A. R. Wallace's arguments 184 — 189

Is the Unity a Society or a Person? Either way it cannot be absolute;

but for the theist it transcends the series within which pluralism

remains. But even so, if immanent it cannot be absolute . . 189 — 195 The Lower Limit of Pluralism also unattainable from within. The

demands for a Primum movens connecting both limits . . 195 — 197

Voluntarism denies the necessity of this. But difficulties for pluralism

Xll

Contents

Lecture X. The Difficulties of Pluralism.

PAGES

Physical Catastrophes and the Dissipation of Energy .... 202 — 204

Psychophysical Difficulties. Birth, and death cannot be what they seem to be. Pluralism committed to some form of Pre-existence. The

problem of Heredity ......... 204 — 212

The problem of Death : here, for pluralism, metempsychosis in some form unavoidable. A higher Spiritual Order and the Conservation

of Values now seem essential ....... 212 — 215

Metaphysical Difficulties. The Problem of Interaction propounded by

Lotze met by his own doctrine of ' Sympathetic Rapport ' . .21 5 — 2 1 9

Teleological and cosmological arguments against pluralism : how far

PART II. : THEISM. Lecture XL The Idea of Creation

Metaphysics without assumptions criticized ..... 225 — 228

Practical and theoretical value of the Theistic Ideal, even though strict

proofs of its reality are wanting ....... 228 — 231

Mistaken views of Creation ........ 231 — 234

God at once transcendent and immanent : creation then implies more

than absolute thought or absolute self-consciousness . • . . 234 — 238

Analogy between Creative Intuition and the Originality of Genius . 238 — 240 But any adequate idea of God-and-the-World is beyond us ; yet this idea meets the defects of pluralism, and is the only idea of the

Absolute we can admit . . . . . . . . 240 — 242

Tendency of Theism towards Singularism. But if the world is real, it stands over against the reality of God. In making it, God limits

himself : apart from it we have no basis for our ideal of God at all 242 — 246

Lecture XII. The Cosmology of Theism.

Theism usually occasionalistic. Earlier and later forms of the doctrine.

Leibniz's objections not decisive .......

Anyhow the Realm of Ends does not imply a prior system of means.

On the pamphysical view such a system not necessary at all Monads as 'the real atoms of Nature.' Interaction as 'sympathetic

rapport.' Organism and Environment as implying a twofold

relation of monads 25

Comparative merits of Pampsychism and Occasionalism

247—25

251—254

4—2 59

259 — 262

X

V

Contents xiii

Nature as ' the preparation for Mind ' means only that self-conscious existence is attained to gradually from earlier stages of merely sentient life 262 — 265

Tracing this process backwards, we approach that lower limit which pluralism cannot explain. How does theism interpret it ? Theism is ready nowadays to accept evolution in the literal sense. But evolution as epigenesis raises formidable problems . . . 265 — 269

Lecture XIII. Freedom.

To combine Pluralism with Theism we must reconcile finite freedom

and divine foreknowledge. What do we mean by freedom ? . 270 — 273 Meanings of Cause. Law of Causality as a postulate . . . 273 — 277 Hence two senses of determination — the one including, the other excluding, the ideas of efficiency and guidance ; yet the thoroughgoing ' determinist ' identifies them 277 — 283

Analysis of Voluntary Action : Motives and Forces contrasted . . 283 — 286 A Man's volitions and his Nature. Determinism and Sensationalism.

Flux and conflict of motives without a Self, absurd . . . 286 — 291

Lecture XIV. Freedom and Foreknowledge.

The doctrine of Kant and Schopenhauer — noumenal liberty and empirical necessity. Operari sequitur esse applied to men and

But are human characters and chemical qualities thus on a par? Schopenhauer's 'noumenal freedom' a dogmatic blunder, and

Kant's 'nature-necessity' an inconsistency .... 295 — 300

Yet Kant's distinction of homo phenomenon and homo noumenon is important, the one an observed object, the other a subject per se. The phenonema of filled time produced by such subjects, which

are thus not a part of the time-order that they make . . 300 — 304

Relation of abstract time to experience. Necessitarianism fails through assuming that there is nothing but filled time ; how time is filled

it does not inquire ......... 304 — 307

But if the filling of time is eternally decreed, Necessitarianism is inevitable 308 — 312

Attempts to reconcile freedom and ' foreknowledge.' The Pluralistic

Lecture XV. The Problem of Evil and Pessimism.

This problem simple for those who first assume God's existence as certain. But we have to dispose of the problem first ; and so must take the defensive 317 — 319 xiv Contents

PAGES Pessimism as excessive reaction against exuberant optimism . . 320 — 322 Schopenhauer and Hartmann's faulty psychology .... 322 — 330 Hartmann's Romantic Metaphysic includes a Theogony and a Cosmogony 330—333

His answer to the questions he set to Schopenhauer : his ' Evolutionary

Optimism ' and his Scheme of Redemption .... 333 — 338

Lecture XVI. The Problem of Evil and Optimism.

The doctrine that happiness is the end, common to optimists and pessimists alike, implicitly denied by 'the Hedonistic Paradox.'

The doctrine shown * to entangle itself in a vicious circle ' . . 339 — 349

Evolution and the Relativity of Evil . . . . . . . 349 — 351

But is the evolution we find in this world ideally the best? . . . 351 — 353

Omnipotence and so-called ' Metaphysical Evil ' .... 353 — 355

Alleged ' Superfluous Evil.' Is Experience in general worth what it

And what of evils not obviously due to imperfect experience? The

World's Conservative Factors ....... 357 — 360

Will Progress be followed by Decline ? ...... 360 — 361

Lecture XVII. Moral Evil and Moral Order.

Theological doctrines and philosophical theories that ignore evolution

leave Moral Evil an ' insoluble mystery ' 362 — 364

Innocence and Wrong-doing. The rise of Conscience . . . 364 — 368 This not a fall but an advance, and rids us of the doctrines of a Fall

and of Original Sin ......... 368 — 371

Without the possibility of Moral Evil an evolving world could not become moral at all ........ . 371 — 374

The Moral Evil in the world not such as to justify atheism . . . 374 — 377 But this evil, it is said, is not confined to human misdeeds : the so-called Divine Government is either immoral or it does not exist at

all. The objection discussed ....... 377 — 380

Evidence to replace the old belief in 'special interventions' . . 380 — 382

The tragedy of the world as a divine comedy ..... 382 — 384

Lecture XVIII. Theories of a Future Life.

For Man the present life inadequate, but the difficulty of conceiving

any other has grown with the advance of knowledge . . . 385 — 388

Metaphysical arguments do not meet it, for personal continuity is what

The ' question of Immortality ' depends on the 'meaning of the world' : apart from this we cannot decide it one way or other. Anyhow

some Continuity of Memory and of Environment is essential to it . 393 — 395

Contents xv

Memory implies both a subjective function and objective 'records': the organism not the sole repository of the latter. Analogy between germinal soul and disembodied spirit. Organism the result of subjective interaction, not vice versa ..... 395 — 401

Continuity of Environment secured in Transmigration, but to secure personal continuity it has to be assumed that latent memories are eventually revived, and that in 'the nascent state' the soul can select 401 — 405

Personal continuity secured by the Christian ' Transfiguration ' but without continuity of environment. Possible combination of the two views. Purgatory as an intermediate state. Conclusion . 405 — 408

Lecture XIX. Faith and Knowledge.

The moral argument, and the main one, for a future life is a matter of faith not of knowledge and is further dealt with only in this connexion here. A quotation from Kant introducing the whole topic.

Agnostic objections 409 — 413

' Primitive credulity ' as the source of knowledge .... 413 — 416

Faith and Logic : Faith and Reason 416—419

The Meaning of the World and what it implies 419 — 421

Necessity for Belief in God ........ 421 — 425

Belief in a Future Life. Counter-arguments ..... 425 — 428

The Moral Ideal and Faith 428 — 429

Lecture XX. The Realm of Ends.

The Course of our inquiry : — The Natural and the Ethical ; The Start from the Pluralistic Standpoint; The advance to the Theistic; The Problem of Evil; The two voices — Faith and Knowledge

The positive results seemingly attained : — I. As to Method

II. As to God .

III. As to the World

IV. As to Faith in the Unseen

Practical arguments : Nietzsche's natural ' Over-man ' and the Christian

'Spiritual man '..........

The Absolute End

Supplementary Notes.

The Meaning of Contingency .

Dr Howison on Creation .

The Relation of Body and Mind The Temporal and the Eternal The Divine Experience .

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