Autology: an inductive system of mental science; whose centre is the will, and whose completion is the personality. A vindication of the manhood of man, the godhood of God, and the divine authorship of nature

Front matter

4 Xi

V,

& y

Contents

EXPLANATORY INTRODUCTION.

PAGE

I. — Preface 1

Chapter I

THE FIRST GREAT QUESTION OF MENTAL SCIENCE IS TWO- FOLD, VIZ., HOW CAN THE MIND BEGIN TO ACT — HOW CAN IT BEGIN TO KNOW?

Sect. I. — How do the Truth and Importance of this Proposition appear? 15

II. — How can the Mind begin to act? 18

III. — How can the Mind begin to know ? 21

IV. — What is the First Object and what is the True Key of all

Knowledge? 26

V. — The Vital and Dynamical Process of the Mind's Development

and Construction 29

Chapter II

THE SECOND GREAT QUESTION OF MENTAL SCIENCE IS, WHAT IS THE SUBSTANCE OR ESSENCE OF THE MIND?

Sect. I. — Can we know the Substance of Matter and of the Mind? . . 30 II. — Is the Substance of the Mind the same as the Substance of

Matter? 33

III. — Is the Substance of the Mind distinct from the Qualities of

the Mind? 36

IV. — The Difference between Qualities and Faculties of the Mind. 39 V. — The Difference between Qualities and Elements. ...... 40

VI. — Conclusion 42

viii

CONTENTS.

Chapter III. The Third Great Question Of Mental Science Is, What Is Choice?

Sect. I. — What is the Process and what are the Antecedents to

Choice? 43

II. — What is the Act itself of Choice? 52

Chapter IV

THE FOURTH GREAT QUESTION OF MENTAL SCIENCE IS, WHAT IS THE FACULTY OF CHOICE? : 56

Chapter V

THE FIFTH GREAT QUESTION OF MENTAL SCIENCE IS, WHAT IS THE POWER OF CHOICE?

Sect. I. — The Objective or Occasional Power of Choice 58

II. — The Subjective or Efficient Power of Choice, comprising

the True Elements of the Will 61

Chapter VI

THE SIXTH GREAT QUESTION OF MENTAL SCIENCE IS, WHAT IS THE VITAL AND DYNAMICAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE WILL?

Sect. I. — Essential Activity 66

II. — Essential Intelligence 70

III. — Essential Individuality 73

IV. — Essential Law 76

V. — Essential Liberty 78

VI. — Essential Will complete 80

Chapter VII. Will Questions

Sect. I. — The Eelation of the Self, the Will, and the Personality, to each other and to the essence of the mlnd, and the Difference between the Essence of the Mind and the Essence of Matter 82

II. — The Relation of the Will to Liberty 83

III. — The Relation of the Free Act of the Will, in choosing, to the Spontaneous and Necessary Acts of the other Faculties of the Mind 85 x CONTENTS.

Sect. IV. — Tnn Relation of Liberty to the Act of Choice 9.0

V. — The Relation of Choice to contrary Choice 92

VI. — The Relation of Liberty and Necessity to THE EFFICIENT

and the Occasional Power of Choice 93

VII. — The Difference between Selecting and Choosing 94

VIII. — Why does the Will choose one Thing rather than another? 95

IX. — Can THE Will BE CONTROLLED INEVITABLY) WITHOUT DESTROYING

its Liberty? 99

X. — Have Brutes a Will? 101

XI. — Will -Power 102

XII. — Conclusion 103

Chapter I. The Nature Of The Affections, And Their Relation To The Will

Sect. I. — The Affe< mons belong to the occasional Power of Choice. 105 II. —The Affections are the Empire of the Will 109

Chapter II. The Elemental Affections

Sect. I. — Mutual Relations of the Elemental Affections 114

II. — The Affections as Selfial and Selfish. — 1. Desirefdlness. 2. Trustfulness. 3. Hopefulness. 4. Cheerfulness. 5. As-

PIRINGNESS. G REVERENTIALNESS 115

III. — The Elemental Affections discriminated from each other. . 117

Chapter III. The Genesis Of The Determinate Affections. . 128

Order I. Individual Affections. II. Social Affections. III. Patriotic Affections. IV. Philanthropic Affections. V. ^Esthetic Affections. VI. Religious Affections 132

CONTENTS.

Chapter IV. The Orders Of Determinate Affections

Order I. — Individual Affections ►• •' • 136

Class 1. Self-sustentative Affections 138

2. Self-defensive Affections 142

3. Self-acquisitive Affections 150

4. Self-annunciative Affections. . . . . 160

II. — Social Affections 166

Class 1. Marital Affections 168

2. Kindred Affections 172

3. Annual Affections 175

III. — Patriotic Affections 177

Class 1. Eaceal Affections 180

2. Local Affections.' 181

3. Cultal Affections . 185

4. National Affections 186

IV. — The Philanthropic Affections 188

Class 1. Humane Affections 190

Manifestations. — Pity for the Suffering, the Sick, and the Afflicted ; Help for the Needy ; Kindness to the Undeserving- ; Forbearance for the Erring: Charity for all.

2. Utile Affections 195

Manifestations. — Home Conveniences; Social Proprieties; Public Spirit.

V. ./EsTHETICAL AFFECTIONS 208

Class 1. Playful Imitativeness 210

Manifestations. — Animal and Mental Development; ADimal and Mental Education; Animal and Mental Recreation.

2. Ideal Creativeness 214

Manifestations. — Ideal Theorizingness, Philosophizing, Building up Systems 'of Religion, Philosophy, Science, Government, Morals, and a Phdosophy comprehending all; Ideal Inventiveness, as of Instruments, Machinery, Engines, Steamboats, Railroads, Telegraphs, Factories, Forges; Ideal Reproductiveness, Reproducing History and Nature in the rr . Drama, Poetry, Song, Painting, and Sculpture; Ideal Kn-

hanciveness, Enhancing, Magnifying Character, or Forms of Nature, or a Capability of being Moved by the Sublime; Ideal Perfectiveness, Periectiug and Beautifying Nature according to the Ideals of the Mind, either in Architecture, Painting, Sculpture, Music, Poetry, or the Drama.

3. Depreciative Sportiveness 223

Manifestations. — Wittiness ; Ludicrousness ; Satiricalness.

VI. — Religious Affections 227

Class 1. Spiritual Wants 234

2. Faith in God 237

3. Hope of Immortality 240

4. Anticipation of Heaven • • 241

5. Divine Assimilativeness. . . . 243

6. Devotedness to the Divine 245 xii CONTEXTS.

Chapter V. Heart Questions

Sect. I. —The Heart the Seat of Moral Chabactbb

II. — I. What is Depravity? II. What is Insanity* III. Whm ifl Dementia? IV. What is Demonia< ix Possession? V. Cai bi -

OF THE ABOVE STATES. VI. CASTING 01 1 D EVILS -~>i

III. — Is MAN RESPONSIBLE FOB Ills DEPRAVITY? &C 260

IV. — The Heaut the Seat of Salvation 268

V. — IIeakt-Power 264

Part III. The Intellect. Division I

HOW CAN THE MIND BEGIN TO KNOW?

Chapter I. What Are The Faculties Of Knowing?

A. What is the Consi roi sness? 2G9

B. What is the Reason? 27U

C. What is the Sense? 276

D. What is the Conscience? 278

Chapter II. What Is Knowing?

Sect. I. — What is Knowing in general? 279

II. — All Knowing is divided into Absolute and Relative Knowing. 283

III. — What is Knowing as distinguished by the States and the'

Modes prominent in the Act of Knowing? 288

A. Conscious Knowing £90

B. Rational Knowing 291

C. Sense Knowing 202

D. Intuitive Knowing 295

E. Instinctive Knowing 29G

E. Dream Knowing 3U1

IV. — With what Kind of Knowing, and with what Faculty of the

Intellect, can the Mind begin to know? 804

CONTENTS.

DIVISION II.

ABSOLUTE KNOWING, OR THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF IDEAS AND THE SENSE.

CHAPTER I.

THE CONSCIOUSNESS GIVES ORIGINAL FACTS, AND BEGINS KNOWLEDGE.

Sect. I. — Certain Foundation Facts, showing that the Mind itself, with its Being, Faculties, and Action, affords the Material out of which Ideas are formed 315

II. — How the Consciousness finds and gives the Original and On-

tological Facts out of which the Reason forms Ideas. . 322 III. — The Difference between the Human Mind, Brute Being, and

Inanimate Nature respectively 346

A. Facts Peculiar to the Human Mind *. . . 346

B. Brute Being 353

C. Inanimate Nature 3G1

CHAPTER II.

THE REASON FORMS IDEAS FROM THE FACTS OF CON- SCIOUSNESS.

Sect. I. — What is an Idea? ...... 364

II. — The Difference of the Relation of the Reason to the Consciousness in forming Ideas, from its Relation to it in cognizing external Facts 368

III. — The Reason does its Work of transforming Facts into Ideas. 370

IV. — Absolute Personality distinguished from Human and Im-

siORTAL Personality, and also from Brute Being and Inanimate Nature ■ 403

Chapter IV. The Sense

Sect. I. — The Nature and the Faculties of the Sense, and its Relation to the Body 429

II. — What is Body, and why is the Soul embodied? ....... 432

XIV

CONTENTS.

Sect. III. — The Union of Soul and Body « 438

IV. — The Relation of the Sense to Knowing 453

A. The Relation of the Body to Mental Manifestation 458

B. What is perceived by Means of the Sense ? 454

C. May there be more than tive Senses? 456

DIVISION III.

RELATIVE KNOWING.

Chapter I. The Nature Of Relative Knowing

Sect. I. — The Discrimination of Relative Knowing 457

II. — The Relation of the Operation of the Reason, in Relative

Knowing, to the Affections. . . . 458

III. — What are the Comparative Certainty and Reliableness of

Relative Knowing and Absolute Knowing? 450

IV. — What is the Difference between Adsolute Knowing and

knowing the Absolute? 460

V. — Kant's Analytical and Synthetical Judgments, or Knowing. . 470

Chapter II. Soul Language And Soul Implements

Or the Dictionary and Instruments of the Reason used in Relative Knowing 474

Chapter III

THE OPERATIONS OF THE REASON IN RELATIVE KNOWING. ART. I. — THE REASON ACQUIRES EXTERNAL FACTS.

Sect. I. — The Reason Believes .' 478

A. What is Faith, and what is the Difference between Believing and

Knowing? 478

B. What is the Difference between Relative Knowing and Believing? 479

II. — The Reason Perceives 483

A. What is Perception ? 483

B. What are the Grounds and Conditions of Perception? 486

CONTENTS. xv

Sect. III. — The Reason Cognizes 492

A. What are the Knowings of the Reason under, and by means of,

the Categories and the Senses? 492

B. How is this Act of Cognition verified? 494

C. Further Verification of the Act of Cognition 49S

D. All Causes are Phenomenal in their Effects, as Substances are

in their Qualities, and hence are perceptible 501

E. Man, as Effect, is Phenomenal of God the Absolute. 506

F. The Conclusion 514

IV. — The Reason Conceives 517

V. — The Reason Remembers. 521

A. What is Remembering? 521

B. The Relation of Remembering to Cognizing 522

C. How does the Reason remember? 524

D. How are Conceptions of External Things retained in the Mind? . 536

E. The Mutual Relation of Believing, Cognizing, and Remembering. 550

ART. II. — THE REASON COMBINES EXTERNAL FACTS.

Sect. I. — The Reason Abstracts, Generalizes, and Classifies 554

II. — The Reason Ratiocinates. 556

III. — The Reason Rhetorizes 561

IV. — The Reason Theorizes 563

V. — The Reason Invents 565

VI. — The Reason Imagines 507

A. Imagining distinguished from other Operations of the Reason. . 567

B. The Reason Embodies 570

C. The Reason Idealizes 572

D. The Reason Imagines Ideal Reproductions of the Real 573

E. The Reason Enhances ■

' F. The Reason Beautifies or Perfects

G. The Reason Depreciates

H. Genius and Art 581

VII. — The Reason Theologizes; or the Reason Affirms God and

Immortality 5S8

A. The Soul asserts itself and its God 588

B. Immortality 591

VIII. — The Reason Legislates 594

IX. — Conclusion 594

A. The Route from Man to God is not through Nature, but through

the Human Soul 594

B. The Soul claims to know God by its Intellectual Power, and not

simply to infer his Existence from its Ethical Nature 595 xvi CONTENTS.

DIVISION IV.

INTELLECT QUESTIONS.

Chap. I. — What is the Standard of Truth? 597 II. — Can the Trustworthiness of the Faculties of the Mind be

PROVED BY THE TESTIMONY OF THOSE FACULTIES THEMSELVES? GOO

III. — What is the Limit of Human Knowledge? 601

IV. — Intellect Power 603

Chapter I. Nature And Functions Of The Conscience

Sect. I. — An Ethical Judgment is the Highest Function of a Rational

Soul G05

II. — Is there a Conscience? G07

III. — What Faculties must be in Ouder that a Conscience may be? 610

IV. — What is the Conscience? 613

V. — What is the Office of the Conscience? 618

VI. — What is the Rule of Duty which the Conscience must ever

and of Necessity receive and enjoin? 625

VII. — Are all. Men under Obligation to have the True Law of the Eight and the True Rule of Duty, so that if they

do Wrong they do it at their Peril? 627

VIII. — What is the Ground and Limit of Man's Responsibility? . . 628 IX. — Is the Man Just before God who obeys the Dictates of his

own Conscience? 630

Chapter II. Questions Of Conscience

Sect. I. — What is Man, in View of his Original Faculties, under Obligation to be and to do? 632

II. — What, as a Fact, is Man's Actual Condition and History? . 633

CONTENTS. xvii

Sect. III. — Has Man, in View of his Fallen Condition, a Right to claim that God shall provide Salvation? or can he do anything THAT WOULD LAY GOD UNDER OBLIGATION TO MAKE

such Provision? 634

IV. — Is Repentance the Work of the Conscience? 634

V. — Is Man under Obligation to Repent? 635

VI.. — Will Choosing to Repent, and Choosing to Change and Purify the Heart, actually produce Repentance, and actually Change and Purify the Heart ? 636

VII. — If Choosing to Repent and Purify the Heart does not give Repentance and Purification, what, then, is Man- under

Obligation to do? 636

VIII. — How, then, can the Heart be Changed and Purified? .... 637 IX. — Does the Law of Love bind God to Convert all Men, and Save them at all Costs, and with all Possible Expenditure of Grace? 638

X. — Will God ever cease to make Efforts to save the Souls of Men, even though he is not bound by the Law of Love to do so, and even though they fall again and again,

and fall ultimately into eternal death ? 63!)

XI. — Conscience Power 639

Part V. Personality. Chapter I

PERSONALITY AS A COMPLETE AUTOLOGY 641

CHAPTER II.

PERSONALITY AS THE FIRST FACT OF LIBERTY 646

Chapter IV. Personality Renders A Philosophy Possible

Sect. I. — Is a Philosophy Possible? 657

II. — Errors in Psychology which have prevented the Finding of

a True Ontology 662

III. — Errors as to the Nature of the Infinite and Absolute which

HAVE PREVENTED THE DISCOVERY OF A TRUE 0.NTOLOGY. . . . 669

CONTENTS.

Chapter V

PERSONALITY THE ONLY TRUE DYNAMICS AND THE ONLY TRUE ONTOLOGY OF THE UNIVERSE 678

Chapter VII. Personality Questions

Sect. I. — Miracles 635

II. — Prates * 690

III. — Providence 694

CRITICAL APPENDIX.

Chap. L — Man, God, Nature 698

II. — Principles and Rules of Criticism 700

HI. — xUthors 701

AUTOLOGY.

EXPLANATORY INTRODUCTION.

In the successive sections of this introduction will be found some general views in reference to the motives, matter, title, inscription, intention, questions, and method of this book. It is designed to place the reader at the stand-point of the author, in order that he may more clearly see the scope of the work, more readily comprehend its subordinate parts, and be in a better position to form a judgment as to the extent to which it has fulfilled its own plan, and, in the end, gained or failed of reaching its own ultimate object. •

I. Preface, a. The primary motive for writing this work was not to make a book, but to investigate mental science. A knowledge of the faculties and functions of the mind seemed a mental necessity and a moral duty. For who can ever know himself, his obligations or liabilities, without a knowledge of his own soul's faculties ? and what rational being can rightly rest in ignorance of himself? The labor thus self-imposed grew into a pleasure, and became its own reward.

b. The points of beginning from which the inquiries of this book set out in search of truth, were the work of Jonathan Edwards on the " Freedom of the Will," and that of Immanuel Kant, entitled the " Critique of the Pure Reason."

It scarcely need be said in this place that these two great works were not regarded as the poles of truth, but only as the poles of inquiry, by starting from which it has been sought to explore the equatorial regions of truth.

The works of Edwards and Kant are the cooled and hardened masses of lava thrown out from the volcanic depths of the human mind by the eruptions of its own metaphysical fires.. In these vast masses, strown roughly along the rugged steeps of study and inquiry, are found many precious stones and valuable metals, with much of baser matter, such as mere cinders, ashes, and debris.

c. In these two great works are treasured much sturdy thinking and much valuable truth ; but, alas, there may be discovered there also much feeble thinking and the germs of nearly all the errors that infect the world of mental science. The fact is appalling, for if such giants in intellect fail, who can succeed ? Where they fall, who shall have the presumption to rush into the "imminent and deadly breach"? Yet "hope springs eternal in the human breast.'' And it is eloquently said that "never to give up the hope of a philosophy is the last infirmity of noble minds," hence philosophy never wants a votary or a champion willing to undertake her cause.

d.* The thought and study which have wrought out and wrought themselves into this book, have been put forth in hearty earnestness and in good faith, and have maintained their hidden and silent way as an undercurrent of living interest through many years of laborious and exacting professional duties and cares. The work thus produced may not be deemed worthy of high estimation ; yet if they who read it remember that the whole progress in science has been gained by small items contributed by many individuals, and that what may seem of but small value in the possession may have cost much in the procurement, and if it be remembered, also, that what may be very little to receive may be very much to be without, then it may turn out at the last that " he who gives a cup of cold water only " in the name of Science, as well as he who gives it in the name of Christ, " shall in no wise lose his reward."

e. With these views and sentiments, this book is " cast upon the waters " and surrendered to its fate. Intelligent and candid approval will be grateful, and intelligent and candid criticism will be thoughtfully considered. That they who have wrought out systems of mental science for themselves, or they who have already adopted the theories of others, will lay them aside to take up the system of this book is not expected ; but it is hoped that they who have not as yet formed their opinions, and who are struggling to master the problems of mental science, will find some help from the study of these pages.

II. Subject-matter, a. Man, as a volitional, affectional, intellectual, ethical, and physical being, having both soul and body in one essential unity and life, is the subject-matter of this book.

b. The three great facts of the universe are Man, God, and Nature.

c. Man, though not the greatest fact in the universe, is yet the first fact met, and the first to be known by the human mind. When man is known, then may we know God ; and when man and God are both known, then, and not till then, may we know nature.

d. In treating of man, we shall find in him the following substantive faculties : 1. The Will ; 2. The Affections ; 3. The Intellect ; 4. The

Conscience; — together constituting one manhood, and all combining in the unity of one personality. These four faculties and the personality which they compose will be discussed in order, forming the five leading parts of the work.

III. Title. The full title and definition of this work is as follows :

autology a spiritual, vital, dynamical, and inductive system of mental

Science, whose centre is the Will, and whose completion is the Personality, HAVING ESSENTIAL BODY ; A VINDICATION OF THE MANHOOD OF Man, THE GoDHOOD OF GOO, AND THE DIVINE AUTHORSHIP OF NATURE.

a. This system of Mental Science is called Autology, because it is man's own knowing of himself, and because in thus knowing himself the knower and the known are not only actually identical, but also necessarily in the same consciousness with the act itself of knowing.

b. It is called Autology, because it is man's science of himself, and because it regards individuality as the law of liberty creating the wil], and the will as the essence of the mind generating its own qualities as faculties of the mind, and thus completing the personality.

c. It is called Autology, because it is only by making 'himself the first object of knowledge, and because he can and must make himself the first, the immediate, and the direct object of knowledge that man can either, begin to knoto at all or know anything certainly or absolutely.

d. It is called Autology, because the person thus known is not only the first fact of knowledge, but is the key, the only possible key, to all knowledge of God and of Nature — the first element in all possibility of knowing anything,; and here it is that we find the only veritable significance of the ancient apophthegm, "yvcbdi OcavTbv ,: '

e. This system of Mental Science is called spiritual, because the mind of man is essentially spirit in its nature.

/. It is called vital, because it starts with the elements of Essential Activity, which is the Life principle, and of Essential Intelligence, which is the knowing principle, and because from these grow up the whole nature of the mind by combinations and development.

g. It is called dynamical, because the relations of the elements to each other and to the faculties which they produce, and into which they are developed, are not only vital, but dynamical, and causative of these faculties thus developed.

h. It is called inductive, because it begins always with facts, and from them induces its principles ; or, rather, its facts are its principles, and hold a vital and dynamical relation to each other.

i. And, furthermore, this system of Mental Science is called spiritual, vital, and dynamical, because man has spirit, life, and force in his own nature in common with universal being as essential elements : it is, therefore, not simply a psychology, but is also in some sort an Ontology, comprising what is sometimes known as " Logic, Natural Philosophy, and the Philosophy ,of Mind ; " not that man is all being, or that all being is man ; but that man has in himself the same elements that are found in all things.

j. The mind is essentially spirit, essentially life, and essentially force ; the first of these possessing in itself both the second and the third, and the second having in itself the third also, while the third stands alone, without having in it any part of the second or of the first.

k. All things in the universe are divided into spirit, life, and force. Rational Souls belong to the class of spirit, Animal Nature belongs to the class of life, and Inanimate Nature belongs to the class of force. While this classification is true, it is also true that rational souls have in thciii. not only spirit, but also life and force ; that animal nature has in it life and force ; and that inanimate nature has in it only force, and no life nor spirit.

I. This system of Mental Science is said to have the Will as its centre, because the will is shown to be the essence of the mind in which all the faculties inhere.

m. It is also said to have its completion in the Personality, because the personality is the resultant of a combination of all the faculties in one living unity. As the will rises above mere self, in that it has liberty, so personality rises above mere will, because it has affections, reason, and conscience.

)i. This personality is described as having " essential body " because it is the- nature of the spirit, or the mind, to embody itself ; for, as souls have in them force as well as spirit and life, they have thereby in themselves the power of self-embodiment. As souls embody themselves before they are born into the world, so have they ever the power, and so is it ever their nature and tendency, to. embody themselves ; death 'is nothing but disembodying, it does not take away the power of the soul to renew its body, nor its tendency to do so.

o. Moreover, as each self-conscious spirit necessarily includes itself ■ in its own self-consciousness, and excludes every other spirit from it, so that they are always mutually impenetrable and objective to each other, they must always, of necessity, present themselves to each other as having body or quantity as well as soul, and, consequently, communicate with each other by means of signs of thought ; and all this by virtue of the simple fact of their reality as living and actual beings.

p. This spiritual, vital, dynamical, and inductive system of mental science is an Autology, because, when done, it forms one vital whole, one live man, one complete and effective personality having essential body, which, as such, actually performs all the functions of a human being.

IV. The Terminology, a. He that thinks his own thoughts will feel the necessity of using his own words, and of constructing his own sentences ; hence every original thinker and writer will find himself either using old words in a new signification, or coining new words in order to express his thought and discriminate his meaning ; and the structure of his sentences and the whole cast of his style will also of necessity have a strongly marked individuality.

b. If an author has never had occasion to coin a new word, if he has never found it necessary to recast or redefine an old one, it is to be feared that he never coined a new. idea, or so reproduced or perfected an old one as to make it his own. If an author has a now and original thought, or a new cast of an old one, he has a right to the clearest and directest manner of expressing it, either by a new word or by an old word redefined and made new for his purpose.

c. All that any reader has a right to demand is, that his author shall use words well defined and clear, and always in the same sense. To require an author to adopt another man's terminology or to imitate another man's style is to infringe upon the liberty of thought, and to attempt a petty tyranny in the republic of letters. Criticism performs its smallest and least honorable office, when, in reviewing a scientific work, it descends from logic and clearness in thought and expression to the mere milliner's work of dogmatizing over terms and style.

d. Nor is it fair to judge of a scientific and logical discussion as we would of a mere literary essay or a set oration ; for, as in mathematics the same signs and formulas must be used and repeated at each step of the argument, and as the accuracy of a mathematical conclusion depends on the exactness of the terms used, and especially on the identity of those terms in each recurring place, so also in metaphysical science terms and definitions must be exact, and used and repeated always in precisely the same words,: — ipsissimis verbis, — or they will mislead and conduct to error and not to truth.

e. No earnest and competent student whose spirit yearns to know the meaning of his author and the force of his argument, will ever complain of either new words or new definitions ; nor of repeating them ; nor of any peculiarity of style ; if so be his author makes himself clearly and unmistakably understood. .Words and definitions that mean one thing, and nothing else, in the connection in which they are used — that mean the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth — are to be found if possible, and when found, to be employed and repeated in the same identical and invariable form and sense in all parts of the same argument ; and that regardless of all considerations of mere > variety of expression in the use of terms, or elegance of style in the construction of sentences. If, according to Daniel Webster, "clearness, force, and earnestness are the qualities (in the orator) that produce conviction," then are they all-sufficient for the metaphysician, who seeks no other result.

V. Questions. a. The two great generic questions of mental science, are, How can the mind begin to act? and how can it begin to know? These questions involve others of great importance ; as, 1. What is liberty, what is will, what is choice:'' 2. What is consciousness? 3. What is knowing? 4. What is the first object of knowledge ? 5. What is the true key of knowledge? 6. Can the mind know absolutely ? 7. Can the mind know the absolute? These questions are the same as asking whether the mind can do anything, or know anything.

b. The answer to these questions, is, that man is to himself, of necessity, the first fact of liberty and the first object of knowledge, and thus the test of all freedom and the key to all knowledge. Man can. and must, begin his own action, and originate his own knowing; which is equivalent to saying, that he can act freely, and can know absolutely, and the absolute. For to begin to know is to know one's sell' as the first object of knowledge, and to know one's self is to know absolutely, because the knower and the known are identical — and to know one's self as a free affectional, rational and ethical soul, is to know that such a soul had of necessity a beginning and a beginner, both of which must necessarily be absolute.