A course of philosophy. Embracing logic, metaphysics and ethics. Designed as a text-book for the use of schools

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Preface

T is the unanimous opinion of those best qualified to judge, that a knowledge of the first principles of Philosophy is necessary to complete any course of classical or scientific studies. Experience as well as reason teaches that those who complete their education with a course of sound Philosophy, thus acquire an accurate method for the continuation of their studies, for the instruction of others, or for the pursuit of any calling to which they may devote their talents.

The man who learns what truth is, learns also to love it ; and will not be easily led astray by the systems of error which are everywhere paraded before him, labelled with the false appellation of Philosophy : he despises the contradictions of pseudophilosophers, he abhors the repulsive doctrines of the wicked, and avoids with care the corruption of morals which always accompanies them. Everywhere and always he perceives the presence of the Divinity, and is accordingly filled with awe and reverence : he sees also, with consolation, the excellence of his own soul and its future destiny, and not only preserves it from the contamination of vice, but also adorns it with every virtue ;• thus conscientiously discharging all the duties of his station in life, he must ascend higher and higher in the scale of being,

4 PREFACE.

When we thus point out the abundant and inestimable fruits of Philosophy, it is evident that we do not speak of that so-called Philosophy which ignores the light of Divine revelation, but of that true Christian Philosophy which is guided as far as possible by reason, but which freely admits the light of faith where that of reason fails : for, as we shall see, reason alone is not capable of completely solving some of the most serious problems which concern the salvation of man.

The young man who, while at college, has either wholly neglected to study the rules of judging and knowing, or who has not engraven them deeply on his mind, wanders without a guide through dark and devious ways, and is " carried about by every wind of doctrine. ' ' He reads indiscriminately every book, good or bad, that chance throws in his way, and peruses them with little attention or reflection. Hence he fills his mind with imperfect notions of things, without any order ; everywhere he sees contradictory systems, and in the midst of this general darkness he remains uncertain of the truth, and even becomes doubtful of the very existence of certitude. Soon the truth of religion appears to him as not sufficiently proved ; and, owing to the prejudices to which he has yielded, he begins to deny that there is any excellence in virtue or any turpitude in vice. Passions rise in his heart, which, not being restrained, but rather flattered and excited by many causes, soon lead to deplorable results ; for they shake his reason, which is already weak and deprived of its natural support, they destroy the vigor of his

PREFACE. O

physical system, they deprave his nature, and finally carry the unfortunate youth to utter destruction.

That this is not an overdrawn picture is plain to any one who chooses to look around him with an unprejudiced eye; and it shows conclusively the importance of a knowledge of the primary principles of Philosophy. On this knowledge, in truth, depends the progress which we shall make in science, the solidity of our mind ; our love of truth and detestation of falsehood, our sagacity in choosing what is best, the integrity of our morals, the peace of families, the well-being of society, in a word, our happiness both in public and in private life.

The teacher, therefore, who is incompetent, negligent or dishonest, is the cause of an irreparable loss to those under his care ; while he who is learned, diligent and consistent in his instruction, sows in the minds of those committed to his charge the seeds of truth and virtue which will bring forth an abundant harvest of the richest fruits of a good education. To attain so desirable an end, the pupil should be guided, not by obscure and uncertain precepts, but by those which are established upon the clearest principles of reason : even as a child as yet unacquainted with the way is guided, not by the hand of an ignorant or a dangerous man, but by that of his father.

We do not approve of the method of teaching Philosophy by lecture ; for long lectures, however well developed, are not always understood by the student and are very easily forgotten : we are rather in favor of placing in the hands of the pupil a b PREFACE.

small but comprehensive text-book, which, he can readily commit to memory, and easily retain. Such a text-book should be concise without being obscure, so that the attention of the student may be sufficiently attracted and exercised ; but, more than all, a book written for this object should be exact.

An elementary book of this kind is not often found ; indeed it may be doubted whether one possessing all the qualities mentioned above exists in any modern tongue. Some excellent compendiums written in the Latin language have been published since 1825 ; but they cannot serve our purpose, which requires a manual of Philosophy adapted particularly to the wants of those who are not acquainted with the classics. To unlock the treasures of Philosophy for them, we concluded that it would be well to prepare a text-book having as far as possible the requisites mentioned above.

During the preparation of our manual we have diligently consulted the best works on the subject ; and we now submit the result of our labors in the form of an elementary text-book on Philosophy, which we trust will meet the requirements of those for whom it is intended : and may God grant that, owing to the good intentions of the author, this book may be the means of advancing the best interests of the youths for whom it was written.

INTRODUCTORY.

BEFOBE entering the sanctuary of Philosophy, a few words are necessary by way of introduction. We shall arrange these preliminary remarks under four heads. Under the first we shall give the Definitions of several woeds of common occurrence : under the second we shall examine the Definitions of Philosophy: under the third we shall give the Divisions of Philosophy : and under the fourth we shall say something of Argument.

I. Definitions of Words

A being or thing is that which exists or may exist : it is therefore twofold, real or possible.

Existence is the real union of the parts or attributes which constitute a being.

Possibility is the agreement of the attributes which constitute a being, in such a way that its existence does not involve any contradiction.

The attributes are the qualities of a being : they are essential or constitutive when the thing cannot exist without them, and accidental when the thing can exist without them.

The essence of a being; consists of the collection of

O INTRODUCTORY.

its essential or necessary attributes. The essence of a thing is also called its nature ; although the word nature is more extensive than essence, since the nature of a being sometimes includes its accidental as well as its essential attributes. Nature is also used to signify the whole collection of corporeal beings.

A genus is a collection of beings having one or more attributes common to each. A genus must be sufficiently general to be divided into subordinate classes, called species.

A species, therefore, is a collection of beings belonging to one and the same genus, but having particular and constitutive properties by which they are distinguished from any other collection of beings of the same genus.

For example, being, the most general genus, is divided into two species, corporeal and incorporeal beings. These two species are each divided into other species, and consequently they are genera with reference to the subsequent divisions. Corporeal bodies form two species, things with life and things without life. Things with life, considered -with reference to a further division, form a genus which is divided into two species, animals and vegetables.

The genus may be either remote or proximate. It is remote when there is at least one division intervening between the species and the genus referred to. For instance, when I say, Man is a rational being, the genus, being, is remote ; but it is proxiiinate when I say, Man is a rational animal.

Each species must have an essential attribute which makes it distinct from every other species of the same genus : this attribute is called the difference. When this difference consists of an attribute which separates every being of the species from every being of another species, it is called the specific difference. We have an example of this difference in the following definition, Man is a rational animal, where the word rational indicates the specific difference, distinguishing man from any other species of the genus animal.

Individuals are those beings to which, considered separately, the same genus and the same difference pertain.

In Ontology we shall give the definitions of Substance, Modification, Subject and Object, also of Order and Relation.

Science is a series of notions deduced from principles firmly established, disposed in a methodical order and referring to one and the same object.

Science is either subjective or objective; subjective when we consider it as existing in our own minds, and objective when we consider it as existing in the object contemplated : it is again either speculative or practical.

Practical science is the source of art .

Art is the application of science to external things, according to determined rules. We will here observe that the same species of knowledge may be at. the same time a science and an art. Arithmetic and Geometry, considered in themselves, are sciences ; but applied to external things they are arts. Logic, 1* considered in itself, is a science ; but applied to trie investigation of truth and its manifestation, according to determined rules, as in the method of Aristotle, it is the Art of Eeasoning, or the Art of Thinking.

Knowledge, in general, is the representation taking place in the mind, of something, in some manner ; it differs very little from idea, as we shall see. It is intuitive when the object appears so clearly to our intellect that we perceive it without reasoning, and discursive when we need some demonstration to perceive the object.

Knowledge has for its objects either natural or supernatural things.

Faith, in general, is the assent of the mind to some truth, on the testimony of another person. When this assent is founded upon the authority of G-od, it is Divine Faith ; it is Human Faith when established upon the testimony of men.

II. Definitions of Philosophy

It often becomes necessary to give definitions, in order to avoid obscurity or uncertainty. A definition is an explanation of a word or of a tiling. The definition of a word is said to be etymological when its origin is given, and significative when its meaning is explained.

The definition of a thing is that which shows the nature of the thing. It may be merely descriptive, and then the definition is called imperfect; or it may be accurate and perfect, and this only deserves the name of definition. Description is suitable to oratory, but definition belongs especially to Philosophy : it gives precisely what is necessary in order that the thing may be understood and distinguished from every other thing, by enumerating its essential qualities.

Three conditions are requisite to a perfect definition : 1st, It must be clear, that is, free from any obscure or ambiguous expression ; 2nd, It must be orief, that is, free from all unnecessary words ; and 3d, It must give the 'proximate genus and the specific difference. When these three conditions are found, the definition applies to the thing defined, and to nothing else, so that the thing and its definition are reciprocals.

Philosophy has been defined as "the science of things knowable by the light of reason," or "the science of reason."

But these definitions, while they distinguish Philosophy from theology, do not separate it from the physical and mathematical sciences ; and in our day these sciences have been so far extended that they have ceased to belong to Philosophy, as it is now taught in the schools. The following definition of Philosophy might consequently be accepted : ' ' The science of supersensible things knowable by the light of reason." This definition has the three requisite marks : it is clear, short, and contains the proximate genus, "science," and the specific difference, "supersensible," which word distinguishes Philosophy from the physical sciences, and "knowable by the light of reason," which words distinguish Philosophy from theology.

III. Divisions of Philosophy

Division, in general, is the distribution of a whole into its parts. A whole is that which is formed of parts really or logically distinct. The whole is said to be metaphysical, jjhysical or logical, according as its parts belong to one or other of these orders.

The division, to be accurate, must have these three conditions : 1st, It must be adequate, that is, it must include as many members as there are in the whole which is to be divided ; 2nd, It must be distinct, that is, one part must not be included in another ; 3d, The parts must be proximate, otherwise there would be confusion, the following division, for instance, would be wrong : Living beings are divided into three classes, men, beasts and plants. A proximate division would be : Living beings are divided into two classes, animals and vegetables, and so continue, always giving first the proximate, or nearest, division, and the subdivisions in like order.

Philosophy, as we have learned, is the science of supersensible things. In order to proceed methodically in the acquisition of this science, we must first give the rules for the investigation of truth, and then investigate the things which form the object of this science, beginning with the most important, namely, God and the soul. The nature of God and the soul being known, we may examine the relations existing between God and the soul, between the soul and the body, and finally the relations of men to each other considered as social beings. We have then three parts which form the Divisions of Philosophy: namely, Logic, Metaphysics, and Ethics.

IV. Argument

The different points to be treated under this head will be given in Logic. We will here say only a few words in regard to equivocal propositions, which we may sometimes' have to deal with.

1st. We must distinguish and point out clearly the equivocal expressions.

2nd. If these expressions are not clear of themselves, we must define and explain them.

3d. We must concede the proposition in the sense in which it is true, and deny it in the sense in which it is false ; and in both cases give our reasons for doing so, if necessary.

A COURSE OF PHILOSOPHY.

Part I.— Logic. Logic

Definition — Division.

FOR the acquisition of science the human mind must first be provided with rules, and so be enabled to avoid error and establish truth on the solid foundation of reason.

The word philosophy, as we have seen, is as universal as the word science itself, and logic is the key of this science. Logic is consequently the first part of Philosophy, the part which treats of the first efforts of the human mind to discover truth, and afterwards gives rules by which this truth may be demonstrated. We may therefore define Logic to be, "The science which directs the operations of our mind in the investigation and demonstration of truth/'

When this science is put in practice it becomes "The Art of Reasoning," which words may be accepted as a definition of logic, considered as an art. In the foregoing definitions we find the three requisite conditions of a good definition : 1st, clearness, 2nd, conciseness, and 3d, reciprocity, that is, the proximate genus and the specific difference are given.

The natural order observed by the mind in the investigation of truth may be described as follows : We first represent objects*to ourselves, we next judge of them, we then compare our judgments and draw conclusions, and, finally, we arrange these conclusions in a certain order. Hence we have in the science of logic four different .parts or divisions ; the first treating of our Ideas of objects, the second of our Judgments concerning those ideas, the third of our Eeasoning concerning the judgments, and the fourth of the Method in which we dispose of the conclusions of our reasoning.

As soon as we have considered these four divisions of the science we shall apply it to a the investigation of the existence of truth, or Certitude ; and, logically speaking, this question comes first. Is there anything certain, is there any certitude? and, if so, how can Ave prove its existence ? Although this question, in reality, forms the introduction to the study of Philosophy, since without an affirmative answer to it we cannot make one step in the science, yet some authors treat it as a part of logic ; and we adopt this plan as more convenient, and shall therefore treat of certitude as the fifth part of logic.

FIRST DISSERTATION.

ON IDEAS.

An idea may be considered as existing either in the mind or out of it : consequently this first dissertation may be divided into two chapters.

CHAPTEK FIKST.

Of Ideas Considered as Existing in the Mind.

" An idea is the mere representation in the mind of some object." We cannot, therefore, have an idea of nothing ; for nothing has no property or attribute by which it might be represented in the mind. The definition- of an idea being given, we have now to examine, 1st, the division of ideas, 2nd, their properties, and 3d, the operations of our mind in regard to them.

§1. The Division oe Ideas.

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In regard to their origin, some authors divide ideas into three classes : First, innate ideas, or those born 'with us ; second, adventitious ideas, or those coming to us from various causes in the course of time ; and third, factitious ideas, or those formed by ourselves.

In regard to their object, we have, first, the idea of substance, when we consider the substance of a thing as abstracted from its modifications ; second, the idea of modification, when we consider the modifications of a thing as abstracted from its substance (these two ideas are called abstract ideas) ; and, third, the idea of modified substance, which is called a concrete idea.

Concrete ideas may be produced by sensation or by the imagination. They are produced by sensation when they represent objects which strike our senses and which, therefore, really exist : they are produced by the imagination when they represent objects which, may exist, hut which do not strike our senses.

All these ideas are called ideas of sensible things when their objects are sensible things ; and they are called ideas of intellectual things when the objects which they represent cannot affect the senses : the ideas of moral things belong to this second class.

An idea is simple when the object represented cannot be divided, as, "an affirmation ;" complex when the object is qualified, as, " a good man ;" compound when the object may be divided into several parts, as, "a horse," " a tree ;" collective, when the object is a unity formed of several objects belonging to the same species, as, "an army;" universal when the object represents all the beings of the same species, as, " man in general;" particular when the object represents only a part of the beings belonging to the same species, as, "several men;" singular when the object refers to one individual of a collection, as, "Peter," "John;" and adequate when the object appears with all its attributes : God only has adequate ideas, we have but inadequate ones.

§11. Properties of Ideas.

Ideas are, first, either true or false. They are true when they conform with their objects, false when they do not. But since this conformity is always with the objects as represented in our minds, and not as they may be in reality, we may, with this explanation, admit the opinion of those who pretend that there are no false ideas. Ideas are, in the second place, either clear or obscure, and these words need no explanation. Thirdly, they are either distinct or confused. An idea is distinct when it can be readily separated from any other idea, as the idea of "a certain house" or of "a certain person;" and it is confused when the object cannot be distinctly determined. If I say, " Many persons are standing at a distance from me, and I cannot see whether they are armed or not, ' ' I have a confused idea. .

' The comprehension of an idea signifies the sum of the attributes which constitute the nature of the object. The comprehension of the idea of man includes everything necessary to constitute a man, as man, thus distinguishing him from everything else, as a tree or a stone.

The extension of an idea signifies the whole collection of the individuals which the same idea embraces. The extension of the idea of man includes all those beings that have the human nature, that is, all men.

§ III. Opeeations of the Mind in Begaed to Ideas.

The principal operations of the mind in reference to ideas are attention, abstraction and comparison.

Attention is that operation of the mind by which we lay our ideas, as it were, before the eyes of the mind, in order to examine them with care and master them. Attention and reflection constitute the foundation of science and the source of learning.

Abstraction is that operation of the mind by which we consider one or more qualities of an object, the other qualities being laid aside. Abstraction is not only possible and even easy of attainment, out it is also necessary.

Having examined several qualities and found that they belong to a certain object, if we unite these qualities in order to form this object again, we perform an operation which is called synthesis : on the contrary, if an object is given us to study, and we divide it into its parts, examining successively each part, we perform an operation which is called analysis. We may, therefore, see that analysis is a decomposition, while synthesis is a recomposition.

When, in order to form a species, we collect several individuals having Common properties, we perform an operation which is called generalization.

When we consider two or more ideas, in order to find their consistency or their inconsistency, we perform an operation which is called comparison. This operation is, of course, the most important ; without it we could not improve in any branch of science or art.

Chapter Second

Of Ideas Considered as Existing Out or the Mind.

There are three ways by which we may express what we represent to our mind, namely, gestures, speech and writing ; and these three are designated by the general appellation of signs.

For the development of this chapter see the remarks on the "Origin of Language," in experimental Psychology.

SECOND DISSERTATION.

ON JUDGMENT.

When the mind after having compared two ideas declares their consistency or their inconsistency, it makes a judgment. Consequently c ' Judgment is that operation of the mind hy which it pronounces on the consistency or the inconsistency of two ideas, or declaring that a certain quality exists or does not exist in a certain object. We may readily understand that our errors proceed from mistaken judgments only, for we cannot err in perceiving or in feeling.

Here again we may consider judgment as existing either in the mind or out of it, and consequently this dissertation is also divided into two chapters.

CHAPTEK FIKST.~

Of Judgment Considered as Existing in the Mind.

Judgment is a positive act of the mind, and not a mere sensation, as Condillac said, or a perception, according to the opinion of Mallebranche. It is an act, since we judge and pronounce, and we can do neither without acting ; it is, besides, a simple act, since it consists of an affirmation or a negation, and, consequently, cannot be divided.

Judgment is very probably produced both by the intellect and by the will.

A judgment is either necessary or free. A necessary judgment is one formed when the mind is so strongly impelled to judge that it cannot refrain from judging. ' ' I exist, " is a necessary judgment.

A free judgment is one which the mind is not forced to pronounce.

A judgment is, in the second place, either true or false, depending on the fact as to whether the things are, or are not, as the mind declares them to he.

Thirdly, a judgment is certain when it is established on an infallible foundation, as, "Our Lord died," "Bodies exist/'

Fourthly, a judgment is evident when it rests upon a clear and distinct perception of the consistency or the inconsistency of two ideas, as, "Two and two equal four."

Lastly, a probable judgment is one established on trustworthy, but not infallible, reasons, as, " It is probable that a sick man will recover when several good physicians are of opinion that such will be the "case."

CHAPTEE SECOND.

Of Judgment Considered as Existing out of the Mind.

"When we express our judgment we form what is called a proposition. To constitute a proposition three terms are necessary, a subject, a verb, and an attribute, one or even two of which may be understood.

In every proposition the attribute always expresses a notion more extensive than the subject. Aristotle gives ten classifications of attributes, which he calls cle categoriis ; Kant gives but four. Nothing is more obscure and less useful than such classifications.

A proposition is universal when the subject is taken in all its extension, as, " Every substance is divisible/' "No spirit is mortal."

A proposition is particular when the subject is not taken in its full extension, as, "Some men are learned." Even such expressions as "All young men are fickle" are but particular propositions.

A proposition is singular when the subject is but one individual, as, " Cassar was a great general."

A proposition is affirmative when the attribute is declared to be consistent with the subject, negative when declared inconsistent.

The following axioms in reference to affirmative and negative propositions are given in this connection ; we shall need them farther on :

1st Axiom. The attribute of an affirmative proposition is taken in its entire comprehension, but not in its entire extension ; consequently, the attribute of an affirmative proposition is a particular term. For example, if I say "All angels are spirits," the attribute ' ' spirits ' ' is taken in its entire comprehension, but not in its entire extension ; for other beings than angels may be spirits.

2d Axiom. The attribute of a negative proposition is not taken in its entire comprehension, but is taken in its entire extension ; consequently, the attribute of a negative proposition is a universal term. For example, if I say, "A man is not a stone," the attribute ' ' stone ' ' is not taken in its entire comprehension, since both "man" and "stone" have the comprehension of material substance ; but it is taken in its whole extension, for no stone whatever is a man.

A proposition is grammatical when we consider 2 only the terms as abstracted from the sense, and logical when we consider the proposition as having a determined sense.

The sense of a logical proposition may be proper or foreign: it is proper, or natural, when we give to the words their ordinary meaning ; and it is foreign when we give to the terms a signification which is not their own.

The sense may also be either divided or composite ; or, to use the Latin expressions, the proposition may be taken either in sensu diviso or in sensu composite. For instance, if I say, "The blind may see," the proposition is true in sensu diviso, but false in sensu composito. In the first sense the proposition means, "The blind, if restored to sight, may see ;" in the second it means, "The blind, though remaining blind, may see." In the course of this work we shall have more to say of this distinction.

A proposition is true when it declares its subject to be as it is in reality, as, " God is powerful ;" and false when it declares its subject to be as it is not in reality, as, " God is cruel."

Sometimes a proposition has two senses, and then it is called equivocal. To obtain the true sense of a proposition it is often necessary to stake the proposition in a different manner, to change the order in which the terms have been first presented ; sometimes also when two propositions are given and compared it becomes necessary to judge of the contrary or the contradictory of one of them: it is therefore necessary for us to learn something of the conversion and the opposition of propositions.

§1. Conversion of Propositions.

The conversion of a proposition is the changing of it into another proposition of the same -meaning.

This conversion is simple when the whole attribute is substituted for the subject, and the subject for the attribute ; and it is accidental when a part only of the attribute takes the place of the subject.

The following rules must be observed in the conversion of propositions :