The relations of the United States and Spain: the Spanish-American War

Preface

This work is intended in the main as a documentary history. An endeavor has been made to give all important orders, telegrams, and reports. It is not to be understood that these, or any considerable portion of them, are for the first time before the public. All of any real importance have already appeared in government publications or with governmental approval. The interior history of no war or other great event has ever before been so fully exposed as in the many volumes published by the American government and in the documents set forth with the authority of the government of Spain. These are given in detail in the bibliography.

Using the words of the Messenger in Antigone, the writer can say, in part, "I saw"; and in whole:

... I will speak and hold back

No syllable of the truth. Why should we soothe

Your ears with stories, only to appear

Liars thereafter? Truth is always right.

This is the writer's view of history: neither to magnify our own exploits nor to depreciate those of the foe. We were comparatively strong in the material of war; he was weak; we had the initiative of the Anglo-Saxon, he the spirit of passive sacrifice which, as shown through history, has made the Spaniard strong in defence. Spain defeated was not Spain dishonored. The sortie of Cervera at Santiago, the action of Montojo at Cavite, and the defence of El Caney must ever stand as notable examples

vii viii PREFACE

of the high spirit and sacrificing courage which are such great qualities of the Spanish race. The days of May 1, July 1, and July 3, in 189S, are dates of honor which both nations may well hold in lasting and proud remembrance.

Newport, Rhode Island, 17 January, 1911.

Contents

CHAPTER PAGE

I. Naval Movements and Preparations 3

II. The Forces 28

Chapter I Naval Movements And Preparation

The middle of January, 1898, found four of the armored ships of the North Atlantic squadron in Hampton Roads, and a fifth, the Texas, expected from New York. All had undergone the usual autumn overhauling, and had been collected at Hampton Roads with a view to going south to the winter drill-grounds off the west coast of Florida, a region selected for its genial winter climate, facility of supply, and a general shoalness of water, which, while having sufficient depth close to the land, was such as enabled ships to anchor as much, at some points, as a hundred miles from shore.

The recognition by the American government of the seriousness of the situation in Cuba is shown by the telegrams of the navy department at this time to the commanders-in-chief abroad. These telegrams directed the retention, as the law allowed, of men whose enlistment had expired; that to Admiral Selfridge, commander-in-chief in Europe, being dated January 11, and to Commodore Dewey, then at Yokohama, January 27. A telegram sent January 17 to Captain C. M. Chester, in command of the ships in the South Atlantic, announced that "affairs are very disturbed in Cuba; it is considered advisable to change the disposition of ships ; announce unofficially your intention to proceed with the Cincinnati and Castine on cruise to northward for exercise and drill and to visit the most northern part of the South Atlantic station ; as soon after as possible, without thereby causing comment, proceed to Par^, Brazil, at discretion, and there await further orders."

A telegram of the same date stopped the Wilmington, Commander C. C. Todd, on her way to the South Atlantic, and ordered her "about February 14 to proceed to La Guayra and await further orders." On the same day the Helena, Commander W. T. Swinburne, was stopped on her way to China and ordered to Lisbon.

On January 26 Rear-Admiral Thomas Selfridge, in command of the small force in the Mediterranean, the flag-ship of which was the San Francisco, was ordered to go to Lisbon after February 2, and remain there/

But these facts should not fix sinister design upon those charged with the movement of the North Atlantic squadron to Florida waters. It was to a great degree a squadron of exercise; it had been held north already two winters in a bleak winter climate to the detriment of its morale and efficiency, though the drill-ground, to which throughout this period it was desired to send these ships, was in our own waters, eminently suited for the purposes, and, indeed, the only place available so long as a West Indian cruise appeared undesirable on account of the Cuban situation. The fact that for two years the United States government had been willing at a marked sacrifice to its naval well-being and efficiency to forego the advantages offered by the waters of Florida is in itself proof of its general good intentions. In any case the difference in distance between Hampton Roads and the Florida Gulf from Havana is a negligible quantity. It is but two and a half days at twelve knots. It was thus thought that the much-desired change to our Southern waters could be made without trespassing too much upon the good understanding existing between the Spanish and United States governments. The former had, in December, expressed some concern on account of the proposed movement, but Senor Dupuy de Lome, the Spanish minister, was assured that there was no unfriendly intent.^

The four armored ships of the squadron then together (the armored cruiser New York, Captain Chadwick, in which was the flag of Rear-Admiral jNIontgomery Sicard, commander-in-chief, and the first-class battle-ships Iowa, Captain Sampson, Massa-

' Shortly after his arrival there the services of this valuable and experienced officer were lost to the service through his retirement under the law which retires all officers of sixty-two years who have not received the thanks of Congress. Admiral Selfridge was relieved by Commodore John C. Howell. The presence of the few ships of this command in peninsular waters gave great concern to the Spanish government, notwithstanding the fact that it was not a serious fighting force. (See Spanish Diplom., Cor. and Docs., 1896-1900, 80.)

' Chadwick, Rcl. of United States and Spain. Diplomacy, 532.

chusettSy Captain Higginson, and Indiana, Captain Taylor *), left Hampton Roads for Key West, January 16, 1898. The second-class battle-ship Texas, Captain Philip, left New York the day before and joined the flag just before the arrival of the squadron, after a slow passage, at Key West, Sunday, January 23. Ships of such deep draft must anchor outside the coral reef, which skirts the shore at this point at a distance of about five miles. This anchorage is thus in the open sea, in a depth of from sixteen to twenty fathoms, exposed to such seas as may be raised by the usual trade winds, but protected from the effects of the northers, the only gales which blow in winter, from the fact that the trend of the coast and reef is here in an east-and-west direction.

The admiral Avas at once joined on his arrival at the outside anchorage by the second-class battle-ship Maine and the cruisers Montgomery, Commander Converse, and Detroit, Commander Dayton, which were then lying at Key West, which had been used as head-quarters while these ships were employed in the suppression of filibustering.^ The torpedo-boats dishing. Lieutenant Gleaves, Dupont, Lieutenant S. S. Wood, and Ericsson, Lieutenant Usher, which had been employed on the same service, were in the harbor, six miles distant.

It had been the intention of the admiral to leave the next day with the whole of the eight ships with the flag for the harbor of Dry Tortugas, sixty miles west of Key West, and which from its situation with reference to the drill-ground, had been selected as the base for coal supply. The small steamer Fern, Lieutenant- Commander W. S. Cowles, was to be used as a general supplyvessel between Key West and Tortugas.

While there was grave concern as to the Cuban situation, and while it was the duty of the American government to be prepared for the worst, the fact that no immediate danger was feared is shown by the fact that the admiral's orders directed him to be in Hampton Roads again not later than April 1.

* Lieutenant-Commander John A. Rodgers (now rear-admiral) was in temporary command during Captain Taylor's absence through illness.

2 The Maine had, on request of Consul-General Lee, been assigned to this duty in order to have a ship of force at hand in case of an outbreak in Havana, which might render the presence of a ship necessary.

The Maine had been held at Key West since December 15 in telegraphic communication with the consul-general at Havana, and with orders to go there should he so request. The very serious disturbances of the 12th of January, when both officers and soldiers of the Spanish army joined in attacking the offices of the autonomist newspapers, the Diario de la Marina, Discusion, and the Reconcentrado, had produced such a state of alarm among the foreign residents that the consul-general telegraphed the next day to the department of state at Washington:

Uncertainty exists whether he (Blanco) can control situation. If demonstrated he cannot maintain order, preserve life, and keep the peace, or if Americans and their interests are in danger, ships must be sent, and to that end should be prepared to move promptly.

This dispatch was, of course, merely anticipatory, and there was nothing in the situation to prevent the Maine accompanying the squadron the 24th of January to the harbor of the Dry Tortugas, where the squadron anchored the afternoon of that day. At 9 o'clock in the evening the torpedo-boat Dupont arrived from Key West, directing the Maine to proceed to Havana. The consul-general had telegraphed Washington the same day: "Advise visit to be postponed six or seven days to give last excitement more time to disappear," but the secretary of state answered that the Maine had been ordered, and at 11 p. m. she proceeded upon her fateful visit, which, however it may have been regarded by the Spanish, whether in Havana or in Madrid, had nothing in it of an unfriendly character. The United States government would have been remiss in its duty to its many citizens then resident in Havana had it not given them some refuge such as the Maine afforded against the violence which seemed at the time so imminent.

That the United States government did not desire to be offensive in action is shown by the proposed withdrawal of the Maine but a few days after her arrival at Havana on the score of health. A telegram was sent February 4 from the department of state to General Lee:

Secretary of the navy thinks not prudent for a vessel to remain long in Havana; sanitary reasons. Should some vessel be kept there all the time? If another sent what have you to suggest as to kind of ship ? Telegraph your views.

General Lee answered the same day:

Do not think slightest sanitary danger to officers or crew until April or even May. Ship or ships should be kept here all the time now. We should not relinquish position of peaceful control of situation, or conditions would be worse than if vessel had never been sent. Americans would depart with their families if no vessel in harbor on account of distrust of preservation of order by authorities. If another riot occurs will be against governor-general and autonomy, but might include anti-American demonstration also. First-class battle-ship should replace one if relieved as object-lesson, and to counteract Spanish opinion of our navy, and should have a torpedo-boat with it to preserve communication with admiral.

The torpedo-boat Cushing was then at Key West, and Lieutenant Gleaves, the excellent and capable young officer in command, was ordered to take over the duty (previously the Maine's) of keeping open the telegraphic communication between Havana and Key West. Says Lieutenant (now Captain) Gleaves:

It was arranged that telegrams should be exchanged daily between Consul-General Lee and myself, and in case of any serious outbreak in Havana, or any other occasion arising demanding the presence of a war-ship, a preconcerted cipher was to be sent by the consul-general to the Cushing, and in the event of anything of great importance I was to inform the senior officer afloat, and also Admiral Sicard, the commander-in-chief, who was with the fleet at Dry Tortugas.

After the departure of the Maine this programme was carried out for a few days, when I received a letter from General Lee, expressing the opinion that further communication of this kind would be unnecessary, as everything was quiet in Havana.

On February 11 the department ordered the Cushing to Havana on special duty to communicate with Captain Sigsbee, of the Maine, and then to return immediately to Key West. . . .

The Cushing sailed at 7.30 k. m., FelDruary 11, and did not arrive at Havana until 3 p. m., having encountered a severe gale in the straits and a heavy sea. It was on this passage that Ensign Joseph Cabell Breckinridge [a valuable young officer whose loss was much regretted] was washed overboard and drowned. He was the first victim of our trouble with Spain.

The detachment of the Maine interfered, of course, in no wise with the works of the squadron except that it removed one of the units of a fo.'ce already smaller than wished for the evolutionary drills which it was desired to carry out, and which were at once begun. These drills, the coaling in Tortugas harbor, and the general duties of the squadron were soon fairly in train.

Excepting for the presence of the squadron, nothing could be less warlike than the appearance of the harbor, which was formed by a series of low-lying sand keys and by coral banks lying just short of the water surface. On the largest of the keys is Fort Jefferson, an extensive casemated fortification of granite and brick of the same general character as were many constructed from 1840 to 1860, and of which the better-known Fort Sumter, at Charleston, was a type. The fort, however, was entirely dismantled, the wooden portions of the gun-carriages rotten and the guns on the parapet sunk in the uncut grass, the whole the picture of a peace apparently not to be broken. The only application of the fort at the period was as a quarantine station for yellow-fever patients from ships bound to United States ports in the Gulf of Mexico.

Squadron drills and exercises had at once begun, the squadron leaving Tortugas harbor and occasionally anchoring elsewhere, the whole of the waters on the west coast of Florida being, as mentioned, one vast anchoring ground rarely disturbed in winter by rough weather. These exercises were somewhat broken in upon by coaling and the grounding, though happily without injury, of two of the battle-ships on coral lumps in the harbor, which had not been found by any of the surveys. The admiral, who had been ill from a long-standing malarial trouble, had left on a short leave, intending to be absent at Tampa for a couple of weeks, but finding a hotel less comfortable than his ship's quarters, returned after a few days. When he left it was thought scarcely possible that he could return, and the writer, in command of the New York, finds himself stating in a letter home that "Sampson of course will be in command while the admiral is away. If there is to be a change, I wish it would be he who would be appointed." This, it may be mentioned, was the general feeling of the squadron.

The Marhlchead, Commander McCalla, joined February 7, only to be sent to New Orleans to lend eclat to the Mardi Gras festivities, and the Nashville, Commander Maynard, also newly arrived, was ordered with the Texas to Galveston for a like purpose. The Montgomery on January 31 was ordered on a cruise to the eastward, taking in Matanzas and Santiago de Cuba, with a special view to inquire into the suffering reported to exist.

About 4 A. M. of the 16th of February the torpedo-boat Ericsson arrived from Key West with a despatch from the commandant of that station, enclosing a telegram which he had received from Havana, stating that the Maine had been destroyed by an explosion in Havana harbor.^ The admiral, shordy after 7 o'clock, called a council of the captains, the consensus of which was that the flag-ship should return at once to Key West, to be in direct telegraphic communication with Washington. The New York thus found herself on the afternoon of the 16th again at anchor off the reef. The Massachusetts and Indiana were left for the time at Dry Tortugas, but the loiva was ordered to Key West on the 19th, her captain, Sampson, being ordered as senior member of a court of inquiry upon the destruction of the Maine, of which the other members were Captain Chadwick and Lieutenant-

* The reception of this telegram is described by Captain Gleaves: "On the night of the 15th of February, about 10 p. m., the quartermaster informed me that there was a gentleman on deck who wished to see me on a very important matter. I went on deck immediately, and found our secret agent. He told me that he had just received a telegram from his representative in Havana stating, 'that the Maine had been blown up by her powder magazine,' and adding, 'that it was a curious sight to see a man-of-war sinking in the harbor.' I expressed doubt as to the truth of this report, as rumors were circulated in Key West every day of either the destruction of the consulate in Havana or the assassination of General Lee. The agent, however, was so thoroughly satisfied himself, that I decided, in accordance with my orders, to confer with the senior officer afloat, Lieut.-Commander W. S. Cowles, commanding the Fern. I suggested to Captain Cowles that we three go to the cable office, and there await further news, which would be Bure to come by the preconcerted message if the report was true. In the cable office at the time Captain Sigsbee's despatch was received were the operator. Captain Cowles, the secret agent of the government, and myself. We sat in silence in the operating-room and waited for some time. Finally, about 11 o'clock, the instruments began to click, and the operator wrote out the message as it came in. When it was about half through, the operator exchanged a glance with the secret agent, who himself was an operator, and had been reading the message. It was quite evident to me then that the report was true. When the message was finished, the operator handed it to the agent, and after reading it he passed it to Captain Cowles, who handed it to me. It was the telegram addressed to the secretary of the navy by Captain Sigsbee announcing the destruction of the Maine, and suggesting that public opinion be suspended until further reports. There was no one else present when this telegram was received." (Notes of Captain Gleaves to author.)

Commander Potter, with Lieutenant-Commander Marix, ordered from Washington, as judge-advocate.

This court left for Havana on the evening of February 20, in the Hght-house tender Mangrove, aboard which, while at Havana, the court remained and had its sittings. The tender Fern, the coast-survey steamer Bache, and, on March 8, the cruiser Montgomery, were ordered to Havana to assist the court in various ways, more particularly in looking after the personnel sent from the squadron to aid in examining the wreck.^ The sittings of the court, which were carried on with great deliberation and with no hint of direction or hurry from any one, were not completed until March 21, 1898.

The most elementary sense of precaution had now demanded an extension of the cautionary orders already given to our naval commanders. The loss of the Maine had, of course, already greatly added to the tension in the United States, already sufficiently great over the situation in Cuba, where Spanish effort to establish autonomy now seemed completely unsuccessful, and the suffering and terrible mortality of the people on the increase.^ Thus on February 17 the Cincinnati, Captain Chester, and Castine, Commander R. M. Berry, were directed to such port north of Pard as the senior officer might select. On the 25th the ships at Lisbon were ordered to keep full of coal, and on the same date Commodore Dewey was telegraphed:

Secret and confidential. Order the squadron, except Monocacy, to Hong-Kong. Keep full of coal. In the event of declaration of war [with] Spain, your duty will be to see that the Spanish squadron does not leave the Asiatic coast, and then offensive operations in Philippine Islands. Keep Olympia^ until further orders.

On February 26 the Wilmington was ordered to report to Captain

' For the personal views of the writer in the subject of the destruction of the Maine, see the previous vohime, Diplomacy, 559-563 (note).

* See Consul-General Lee's testimony in regard to Cuban conditions. Sen. Doc, 230, 55 Cong., 2 Sess., 534 et seq.; also his report of December 13, 1897. {Ibid., 544), giving the opinion that there was no possibility of terminating the war by arms, autonomy or "by purchasing the insurgent leaders as recently attempted or, as far as I can see, in any other way." Also the consular reports. Ubid., 552-563.)

* The Olympia had orders to return to the United States.

Chester, who had gone from Pard to Barbados. On the same day telegrams were sent to all commanders-in-chief to "keep full of coal the best that can be had."

On March 3 the Columbia and Minnea'polis, laid up at Philadelphia, were ordered to be got ready for sea, and enlistments ordered for them which were in excess of quota authorized by law, and on the same day the old wooden corvette Mohican was ordered to take on board the ammunition at the Mare Island Navy Yard which had been sent there for the ships in Asia, and to go at once to Honolulu, two thousand miles distant, and transfer it to the Baltimore, Captain Dyer, the flag-ship of the Pacific station. Rear-Admiral J. N, Miller, who was in command of that station, was ordered, as soon as the ammunition should be shifted, to send the Baltimore to Hong-Kong to report to Commodore Dewey. He himself was directed to proceed with his staff to San Francisco. The Mohican arrived at Honolulu March 19, and the Baltimore left Honolulu the 2oth, carrying what was, in the conditions, a priceless cargo, Commodore Dewey being telegraphed on March 21 of her expected departure.

On March 7, in contemplation of the organization of the flying squadron, to the command of which Commodore W. S. Schley was ordered, the Brooklyn, Captain F. A. Cook, then at La Guayra, Venezuela, was telegraphed :

The situation is getting worse. Proceed without delay to Hampton Roads.

At this time there was evidently some anxiety as to the ammunition supply, for on March 9 Admiral Sicard was directed not to expend any until further orders.

On March 12 Commodore Howell, at Lisbon, was directed to send at once the Bancrojt to Norfolk and the Helena to Key West. Two days later he was telegraphed :

Proceed at once to Newcastle-upon-the-Tyne. Upon arrival communicate immediately with the United States naval attach^ at London. Hoist United States flag upon Amazonas and Abreu. Appoint to the command of former Lieutenant-Commander A. P. Nazro and sufficient oflBcers and crew of the San Francisco. Proceed to New York. San Francisco to convoy. Utilize your staff watch duty.'

On March 15, Captain Chester, at Barbados, with what had been the South Atlantic squadron, was ordered to Port Antonio, Jamaica. He was informed that the Anna'polis, Commander Hunker, on a practice cruise with a crew of apprentices, had left Cura9ao the day before, to arrive at Key West not later than March 31. Trouble must at the moment have appeared imminent, as the telegram added, " He does not know the altered situation. Try to intercept and direct to proceed to Hampton Roads," the purpose being to give her a crew of men and otherwise prepare her for active service.

On March 1 the Oregon, which had been docked at Bremerton, in the state of Washington, was directed to go to San Francisco as soon as possible and fill w^ith ammunition. She arrived March 9, and on the 12th was ordered to proceed and reach Callao as soon as practicable. Captain Charles E. Clark took command March 17, relieving Captain McCormick, who had been condemned by medical survey. The ship left San Francisco March 19, and arrived at Callao April 4, making on the passage an average speed of 10,7 knots. The gun-boat Marietta, Commander Symonds, then at Panama, had been ordered, March 22, to Callao, to arrange for coaling the Oregon at once on her arrival, and then proceed to Valparaiso with a view of taking charge, in case the negotiations for purchase from Chile of the armored cruiser O'Higgins should be successful.

* Commander Brownson had been sent to England on the passage, March 9, of the appropriation of $50,000,000 for national defence with reference to the purchase of ships, but the purchase of these two had already been arranged by Lieutenant Colwell, then naval attach^ at London. The only other vessels purchased were a small torpedo-boat in Germany (renamed the Somers), the Diogenes, a gun-boat (renamed the Topeka), and, in Brazil, the Nictheroy, a sister ship to the Yankee (renamed the Buffalo) . The San Francisco anchored at Gravesend on March 18 and reached New York with the Amazonas (renamed the New Orleans) on April 13. Captain W. M. Folger was ordered to command the latter, and in seventeen days she was ready for eea. She arrived at Newport May 2, for her torpedo outfit, and joined the flying squadron at Hampton Roads on May 8. The Abreu (renamed the Albany) was far from completion, and thus could not be delivered until after the war.

The Marietta contracted for the Oregon's coal and had it ready for her in Hghters; she then left, March 31, for Valparaiso. The Oregon arrived at Callao April 4, took on board eleven hundred tons of coal, of which one hundred tons were in bags on deck, and left the evening of April 7 for the Straits of Magellan.

Before leaving Callao Captain Clark telegraphed the navy de-» partment April 6 :

On account of navigation of Magellan Strait, and reported movements Spanish torpedo-vessel near Montevideo, I should recommend Marietta to accompany this vessel. If required, I could touch Talcahuano, Chile, for orders six days after my sailing.

The department replied the same date:

Proceed at once to Montevideo or Rio Janeiro. The Spanish torpedo-boat Temerario is in Montevideo. Marietta has been ordered to proceed to Sandy Point, Patagonia, to arrange for coal. How many tons of coal will you require? The Marietta and Oregon to proceed together. Keep secret your destination. Keep secret this message.

and telegraphed the Marietta:

Oregon leaves to-day from Callao for Sandy Point, Patagonia. Go ahead and secure 600 tons of coal for her and accompany her to the north. The United States consulates in Cuba have closed. United States consul-general is coming home.

The Oregon reached the entrance to the Straits at 3.30 p. m., April 16, a severe gale of wind breaking before an anchorage could be reached. Only seamen who have experienced such conditions in the western entrance of the Straits of Magellan can understand the trying situation of the ship. A gale with rain so dense that the great cliffs bordering the narrow and tortuous channel way could not be seen, night falling with pitchy darkness, no soundings obtainable, fierce gusts beating down the glacial openings of the mountainous shore, make a trying moment for a captain, and particularly for one who so fully appreciated the momentous nature of his charge. Captain Clark reports that "just before dark the anchors were let go on a rocky shelf fringed by islets and reefs in thirty-eight and fifty-two fathoms of water, and they fortunately held through some of the most violent gusts I have ever experienced." The writer can well believe, from a like experience, though he has never known Captain Clark to so express himself, that the war, which was about to begin, held for him no more anxious moments than those he passed during the night in these narrow passes of gloomy and Dantesque grandeur.

The ship arrived at Sandy Point the next evening (April 17), having made an average speed from Callao of 11.75 knots. The Marietta arrived a few hours later. The hulk from which was to be taken the coal contracted for by Captain Symonds, of the Marietta, was loaded with wool over the coal, a condition which would have given much labor and a delay had not the Chilean officials kindly permitted government coal to be taken. Both ships left Sandy Point April 21, and on account of the Marietta's low speed, made still lower by the head winds and sea north of La Plata River, did not reach Rio de Janeiro until April 30. A cautious, though needless, watch was kept for the torpedo-boat destroyer Temerario, which, as it turned out, was in no condition to move.

On his arrival at Rio, Captain Clark received a telegram from the navy department, dated April 30:

War has been declared between the United States and Spain from April 21. Temerario has left Montevideo, probably for Rio Janeiro. Await orders.

and on the next day (May 1):

Four Spanish armored cruisers, heavy and fast, three torpedo-boat destroyers, sailed April 29 from Cape Verdes to the west, destination unknown. Beware of and study carefully the situation. Must be left to your discretion entirely to avoid this fleet and to reach the United States by West Indies. You can go when and where you desire. Niciheroy ' and the Marietta subject to the orders of yourself.