The philosophy of Spinoza as contained in the first, second, and fifth parts of the "Ethics,"

Front matter

lliil

5 0'

V- aV

Preface To The First Edition

As it is the purpose of this little volume to set forth the philosophical system of Spinoza in the philosopher's own words, and not merely to prepare a book of disconnected extracts from his writings, I have followed a plan which may seem somewhat unusual in works of this kind.

The philosophy of Spinoza is contained in its final form in the " Ethics." By translating in full the first, second, and fifth parts of the "Ethics," giving the author's prefaces to, and summaries of, the third and fourth parts, and supplying in foot-notes passages in the omitted portions to which reference is made, I have found it possible to give a just idea of the doctrine contained in the " Ethics," while reducing the work by about one-half, and bringing it within the limits demanded by this Series. That it is not easy to cut into a work constructed as is this one, anyone may readily satisfy himself by examination. I think, liowever, I have omitted nothing essential to a comprehension of Spinoza's metaphysical system, and have preserved intact his chain of argument.

Lack of space has made any extended criticism of his reasoning out of the question. A very brief examination of some of the cardinal points in his system I have thought it desirable to insert in the form of notes. These are referred to by number in the text, and will be found in the back of the book.

IV PREFACE.

In making the translation I have used the excellent Latin text of Van Vloten and Land, which appears to be remarkably free from errors of any sort, and have endeavored first of all to be exact and to avoid paraphrases. This has sometimes resulted in a sacrifice of grace, but it is, of course, worth the sacrifice.

I take this opportunity of thanking my colleague and former pupil, Dr. Wm. Romaine Nevvbold, for a number of suggestions which have materially improved my translation.

GEORGE STUART FULLERTON.

October, 1 89 1.

Preface To The Second Edition

This second edition is so different from the first that it may ahnost be regarded as a new book. The general plan is retained, but the translation has been freely altered throughout, and in Part III. propositions I to II have been added. Some of the introductory matter is new, and the critical and explanatory notes have been greatly multiplied. I have discussed at length in a prefatory note the nature of Spinoza's reasoning and the foundations upon which it rests ; and I beg the reader to examine this carefully before proceeding to a study of the text. It has been my experience that, even to intelligent students, the argument of the " Ethics " presents serious difficulties. In my notes I have taken great pains to make the author's meaning plain, and have not hesitated, with this end in view, to repeat the same thought in different places, when, in the interests of clearness, it has seemed wise to do so. I have, of course, been somewhat hampered by the necessity of keeping the size of the volume within reasonable limits.

Explanations and excuses are always rather stupid, but it may not be wholly amiss for me to state here that, when the first edition was printed, an uncorrected copy of the translation of Part I. was sent, through a misunderstanding, to the printer. As the

VI PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

proofs were corrected for me by a friend, while I was suffering from a serious illness, the fact was not discovered until after the publication of the book. It, hence, contains some errors from which the present edition is free.

George Stuart Fullerton, June, 1894.

Contents

PAGE

Bibliography i

Sources of Spinoza's Philosophy ' ii

Brief Exposition of Spinoza's System. — Spinoza's

Influence upon Subsequent Thinking 13

The Ethics :

Part II. Of the Nature and Origin of the Mind 74

Part III. Of the Origin and Nature of the Emotions 132 Part IV. Of Human Bondage, or of the Strength of

the Emotions 153

Part V. Of the Power of the Understanding, or of

Human Freedom 171

Critical and Explanatory Notes 209

Introductory Note : I. Spinoza's Epistemology :

1. Ideas and Things 210

2. Parallelism of Ideas and Things 211

3. The Test of Truth 213

4. The Concatenation of Ideas 214

5. Mind and Body 215

6. Summary 216

Introductory Note : II. Spinoza's Realism the Key to the Reasonings Contained in the " Ethics ":

7. The System of Ideas 217

8. Spinoza's Realism. . . . 219

Vin CONTENTS.

PAGE

9. The Concept 225

10. Concepts made Causes 233

11. Concepts, though Causes, yet Universals 235

12. The Word " Involved " 239

13. Essence 244

14. Deduction of Ideas from the Idea of God 252

15. The Dual Causality of the " Ethics" 254

16. The Eternity of Essences 255

17. Summary 258

Notes to Part I 262

Notes to Part II 283

Note on the Mind and its Knowledge 317

Notes to Part III 325

Notes to Part IV 330

Notes to Part V 335

Index 355

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

It would not be profitable to attempt, in a work of this sort, anything like a complete bibliography of Spinozistic literature. Such a bibliography would be very extensive, and of little value to most of those who will use this book. I shall, consequently, merely indicate, for the sake of the few who may wish such information, where it may be looked for, and shall then confine myself to mentioning a limited number of books readily obtainable, which the student will find of service in gaining a good knowledge of the life and philosophy of Spinoza. A list of Spinoza's works will be found in the Biographical Sketch following this Bibliography.

In 187 1 Dr. A. van der Linde published at The Hague a full and excellent catalogue of the Spinozistic literature, under the title " Benedictus Spinoza : Bibliografie." This brings the bibliography down to 1871. The introductory chapter to Sir Frederick Pollock's volume on Spinoza (to be mentioned later) supplements this, and brings us to 1880. What has appeared since, those interested in the subject will not find it difificult to trace.

The last edition of the complete works of Spinoza, and one which should be on the shelf of every careful student of his philosophy, is that of Van Vloten and Land (2 vols., The Hague, 1882-83). It is attractive in typography, and very free from errors of

2 BIBLIOGRAPHY.

any sort. This edition has been used in the translation of these selections.

The German reader will doubtless find it helpful to sometimes compare with the Latin Auerbach's translation (" Spinoza's Sammtliche Werke," 2 vols., Stuttgart, 187 1). Auerbach follows the Latin very closely — more closely, indeed, than an English writer would dare to. Where a passage admits of more than one meaning he seems to use excellent judgment in making a selection. Readers of French may use in the same way Saisset's translation of Spinoza's principal works (3 vols., Paris, 1872). It is not, however, as close as Auerbach's.

There is no complete English translation of the works of Spinoza. A translation of his most important works, by R. H. M. Elwes, appeared in 1883-84 (2 vols., London, Bohn's Philos. Lib.). This contains the "Theologico-Political Treatise," the "Political Treatise," the unfinished work on the " Improvement of the Understanding," the " Ethics," and an abridgment of Spinoza's Correspondence. The translation of the " Ethics " I have compared pretty carefully with the original, and have found it careful, generally quite close, and graceful. The translator has used Bruder's text (1843), which is now superseded by the text of Van Vloten and Land, With Elwes's rendering of some passages I do not agree, as is, of course, to be expected ; but I can recommend his translation, and the student would do well to secure these volumes. There are several other translations of the"Ethics,"the best of which is that by William Hale White (London, 1890, second edition, by Mr. White and Amelia Hutchinson Stirling, 1894). This seems to be accurate, but is not as readable as the translation just men-

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 3

tioned. Another translation, which is, however, quite inferior to those by Elwes and White, was made by Professor Henry Smith of Lane Theological Seminary (Cincinnati, 1886). It is preceded by a lengthy criticism of Spinozism, and especially of its significance for theology. An anonymous translation, which appeared before any of these (New York, 1876), is not reliable.

The expository and critical volumes on Spinoza by Sir Frederick Pollock (" Spinoza : His Life and Philosophy," London, 1880), Dr. James Martineau ("A Study of Spinoza," London, 1883), and Dr. John Caird (" Spinoza," Edinburgh, 1888), will be found helpful to a comprehension of his system. They are written from different points of view, and will serve to supplement each other. Pollock lays especial stress on the scientific side of Spinoza's thought, and emphasizes the harmony of some of his doctrines with the conceptions of modern science. His book is full of valuable information communicated in a very clear and straightforward way. His admiration for the philosopher, however, makes him, in my judgment, a little blind to his errors in reasoning, and inclined to pass lightly over that aspect of his philosophy which finds its explanation in his Jewish birth and training. Dr. Martineau gives more attention to Spinoza's metaphysics, and his criticisms will be found acute and suggestive. Dr. Caird writes from what one may call the Neo-Hegelian point of view, and is most in sympathy with what Pollock is inclined to explain away. If one is unable to procure all three of these books, and has to choose a single one, he would better take the volume by Dr. Martineau.

For most of our information concerning the life of

4 BIBLIOGRAPHY.

Spinoza we are indebted to Colerus. An old English version of Colerus' account is reprinted by Pollock {pp. at., Appendix A.). It gives a vivid picture of the man and his surroundings. Both Pollock and Martineau (especially the latter) devote a good deal of space to Spinoza's life. In connection with the above it would be well to read four essays on Spinoza by Land, Kuno Fischer, Van Vloten, and Renan, which have been edited in an English dress by Professor Knight of St. Andrews (London and Edinburgli, 1882). The German reader will enjoy Auerbach's historical romance (" Spinoza, Ein Denkerleben," Stuttgart, 1880. A translation by Charles T. Brooks, New York, 1882), which is excellent.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH.

Baruch de Spinoza was born at Amsterdam, November 24, 1632. He was the son of Spanish or Portuguese Jews who had taken refuge in the Netherlands from the cruel persecutions directed against their race in the Peninsula. His early education, which was entirely Jewish, was probably largely confined to the study of the Hebrew language and literature, in which, at the age of fifteen, he was regarded as a very promising scholar. Latin he learned from the free-thinking physician Francis van den Ende, from whom also he may have gotten his knowledge of German, his initiation into the sciences, and an introduction to the works of Giordano Bruno and Descartes. He was acquainted with Spanish and Portuguese, as these languages were spoken in the Jevvish colony to which he belonged, and one of them was his mother tongue. Italian he learned, probably, from his teacher, the Rabbi Morteira, who was a Venetian. Dutch he never used with fluency, although he spent his life in Holland.

His studies and the reflections to which they gave rise produced in him a gradual separation from the faith of his fathers. In 1656 it was deemed necessary by the rulers of the synagogue at Amsterdam to take steps to remove the scandal occasioned by his heretical opinions and his lax observance of the ceremonial law. He was offered an annuity of 1000 florins on condition of an outward conformity. This being

s refused, he was excommunicated for thirty days. During this period, as he was one evening leaving the Portuguese synagogue, he was set upon by an unknown man armed with a dagger, who, however, succeeded only in piercing his coat. After this event he removed from Amsterdam to tlie house of a friend — himself a heretic, as he belonged to the sect of the CoUegiants — two or three miles from the city, on the Ouwerkerk road. On the 27th of July, 1656, he was formally excommunicated, and cut off from his people. This was the occasion of his substituting for his Hebrew name Baruch, its Latin equivalent Benedict.

Spinoza had learned the art of making lenses for optical instruments, and he now supported himself by it. He acquired a reputation as an optician, and was consulted in this capacity by Leibnitz and Huygens. About the beginning of the year 1661 he moved with his Collegiant friend to Rijnsburg, near Leyden. Three years later he moved again to Voorburg, a suburb of The Hague, where he spent six years. In 1670 he took up his residence in The Hague, and there lived until his death, which occurred on February 21, 1677.

Spinoza lived much alone — in part, probably, from choice, but also in part from necessity. His separation from his kindred was complete after his excommunication. On the death of his father, his two sisters made an effort to deprive him of his share of the inheritance, on the ground that he was a heretic and cut off from Israel. An appeal to the civil power established his right, but he afterward voluntarily resigned to his sister^ all that came to him except one bed. As he never joined any Christian sect, his companionship with Christians was necessarily not of the closest, and his opinions, which he took no great pains to conceal, inspired with horror many who would have been drawn to him by the beauty of his life. Yet he had a limited number of enthusiastic disciples who studied his manuscript works with ardor, and addressed him as master. Reacquired the friendship of persons high in position, notably of the De Witt brothers, and of a number of scholars who addressed to him letters on scientific and philosophical subjects. Not the least interesting part of his writings is this correspondence, which throws light on several important points in his philosophy. At the time of the French invasion of the Netherlands in 1672, he was sent for by the Prince of Conde, who wished to make his acquaintance. On his arrival at the camp he found the Prince absent, but was informed that he could probably obtain a pension from Louis XIV. by dedicating some work to that monarch. This offer he refused.

Occupied with his philosophical studies and correspondence, and with his manual labor, Spinoza led a quiet and laborious life, sometimes remaining in his apartments for days together. His simple recreations were smoking an occasional pipe of tobacco and conversing on ordinary matters with the people of the house, watching the habits and quarrels of spiders, working with a microscope, and making sketches of his friends with ink or charcoal, in which last exercise he appears to have had some skill. A book of such sketches was in existence after his death.

The character of Spinoza was singularly pure and beautiful. With a single-minded devotion to truth, and a willingness to suffer martyrdom for his convictions, he combined an earnest desire for a tranquil and quiet life, and a catholicity of sympathy which manifested itself in a generous tolerance. Though he had suffered for his opinions at the hands of both Jew and Christian, toward neither does he show any trace of bitterness or spite. The material goods valued by the multitude — money, position, reputation — he regarded with the indifference of the Stoic sage. A gift of 2000 florins from Simon de Vries, a disciple and admirer, was refused ; and when, later, De Vries wished to make the philosopher his heir, Spinoza dissuaded him from the act, saying that the money ought to pass to tlie natural heir, a brother of De Vries. The estate was so disposed of, but with the proviso that a pension be paid to Spinoza during his lifetime. The heir having fixed this pension at 500 florins, Spinoza declared the sum excessive, and refused to accept more than 300. When the Elector Palatine Charles Lewis offered him the chair of Philosophy at Heidelberg, it was declined on the ground that the duties attached to it might interfere with philosophical research, that liberty of thought and expression might be restricted, and that he preferred the quiet of private life to the honor of the position tendered him. The picture of this private life left us by Colerus, the Lutheran minister who afterward occupied apartments Spinoza had lived in at The Hague, shows it to have been simple and frugal in the extreme. A number of sensational stories concerning his death-bed were circulated soon after his death. They are all denied by Colerus. For years Spinoza had suffered from consumption, but his death was sudden and unexpected. On the morning of the day in which he died, he came down and conversed with the people of the house. In the afternoon he passed away while alone with his friend and physician Lewis Meyer. There is every reason to believe that his death was as quiet and peaceful as his Hfe. His estate scarcely more than sufficed to pay his debts and the expenses of his funeral.

The only bit of romance his biographers have connected with his life must be received with hesitation. The story goes that Van den Ende, under whom, as has been said, Spinoza acquired the Latin, was assisted in his teaching by his daughter Clara, a young woman of learning and intelligence. Spinoza became her lover, but was defeated by a more fortunate rival named Kerkering, who was his fellow-pupil, and whose addresses were made irresistible by the gift of a valuable necklace. It is true that Van den Ende's daughter Clara married a man named Kerkkrinck, but the marriage took place in 167 1, and the bride was then only twenty-seven years old. She could not, consequently, have been more than twelve when Spinoza left Amsterdam. Besides this, the reputed rival was seven years younger than Spinoza, and it is not likely that they both studied under Van den Ende at an age in which rivalry could arise betw^een them. It is, however, possible that Spinoza kept up his visits to the house of his former teacher after he took up his residence out of the city, and we have in this possibility a straw for those to cling to who wish to believe in the story of his love. Yet there is little in the life or writings of the philosopher to indicate that he was susceptible to a romantic passion. He lived in a world of the intellect and not of the emotions.

Only two of Spinoza's works were published during his lifetime. The first was a summary of the first and second parts, and a portion of the third part, of Descartes' " Principles of Philosophy," arranged in lO BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH.

the form of mathematical demonstration. This appeared at Amsterdam in 1663. In 1670 he put forth anonymously the " Tractatus Theologico-Politicus," which is an attempt to prove not only that freedom of thought and speech may be granted without danger to piety and the peace of the commonwealth, but also that such freedom cannot be denied without danger to both. To prove his point he enters into an exhaustive examination of the nature of prophecy, the authority of the Biblical writers, the principles of interpretation, and the relation of theology to philosophy, all of which subjects he handles with the utmost freedom and boldness. His methods are those of the modern school of historical criticism, and it Avas but natural that both methods and results should give offense. Especially offensive was his Erastian doctrine of the supremacy of the state in matters ecclesiastical. The book was speedily condemned by the Reformed churches and put on the Index of the Church of Rome.

Spinoza had arranged that after his death the desk containing his letters and unpublished manuscripts should be carried to Jan Rieuvvertz, a publisher at Amsterdam. This was done, and in the same year (1677) appeared the " Opera Posthuma," which contained the " Ethics," the " Tractatus Politicus," the unfinished "Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione," a selection of the letters written to Spinoza by various scholars, and his answers to them, and a " Compendium of Hebrew Grammar." In 1687 was printed at The Hague Spinoza's brief " Treatise on the Rainbow," which for years was supposed to have perished, but was discovered and reprinted in 1862 by Dr. J. van Vloten in a supplement to an edition of Spinoza's

SOURCES OF SPINOZA S PHILOSOPHY. II

works. In the same supplement appeared for the first time the early essay entitled, " A Short Treatise on God, and on Man and his Blessedness." A few letters not contained in the collection of the " Opera Posthuma" have since been published.

SOURCES OF SPINOZA'S PHILOSOPHY.

The reader of Spinoza is struck by the fact that one finds in his philosophy, curiously blended with one another, two widely different elements. He is, on the one hand, a mediaeval realist, a mystic, dwelling in a world which seems to the modern thinker strange and unreal. On the other hand he is a scientific thinker who has anticipated with remarkable acuteness some of the most important conceptions of later scientific thought. The mind of a philosopher is not a mere aggregation of independent elements easily separated and traced to different sources ; but if we venture to make the distinction between Spinoza the scientific thinker and Spinoza the religious philosopher, we may regard the former as the child of Descartes and the latter as the descendant of the mediceval Jewish philosophers, who held to an Aristotelianism colored by Neo-Platonic. conceptions.

Born a Jew, and early impregnated with the Jewish literature and philosophy, it is scarcely conceivable that Spinoza should have escaped the influence of the semi- Oriental character of the leading scholars of his race. Although but one direct reference to the Kabbala occurs in his writings, and that one is contemptuous in tone, it is sufficiently evident that the Neo-Platonic conceptions at the root of the Jewish philosophy have

12 SOURCES OF SPINOZA S PHILOSOPHY.

contributed much to the form and spirit of his doctrine. That Spinoza was familiar with the works of the Jewish philosophers we know. It is, furthermore, very probable that he was influenced by the writings of Giordano Bruno, the mystic and pantheist. In these facts we have enough to account for the presence of one element in his philosophy ; and that an element so important, as the reader will see, that the reasonings of the "Ethics" cannot be made intelligible unless its presence be constantly recognized.

That Spinoza owes much to Descartes, I have just said. He was, perhaps, at no time a Cartesian ; but it is easy to find in Descartes' "Meditations" and " Principles of Philosophy " passages which appear to belong more properly to the later system, and which, more fully developed, might have resulted in some of its leading ideas. Nevertheless, the notion that the philosophy of Spinoza is simply the logical outcome of the philosophy of Descartes, and only brings to light what was implicit in the latter, cannot justly be held. It leaves out of view a very important element in the Spinozistic philosophy. The fusion of the two elements and the resulting system of doctrine was, of course, due to the genius of Spinoza himself.

BRIEF EXPOSITION OF SPINOZA'S SYSTEM. SPINOZA'S INFLUENCE UPON SUBSEQUENT THINKING.

■ Influenced by the conceptions at the root of the medieval Jewish philosophy, Spinoza transformed the Cartesian doctrine of two independent substances, mind and matter, into a pantheistic doctrine which recognizes but one substance, God, of which thought and extension are mere manifestations.

Substance is defined as that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself. Only one substance can exist, and this must be infinite, and self-caused. It is the real cause of all that exists, and, indeed, is all that exists, for all things are but manifestations of the one substance, which unfolds itself in manifold forms through an inner necessity of its nature. This substance is God, a being not outside of the world and acting upon it as men exercise their activity upon external things, but an immanent cause, the very being of whatever is.

Attribute is defined as that which the understanding perceives as constituting the essence of substance. Substance consists of an infinite number of infinite attributes, only two of which can be known by us. These two are thought and extension. Each attribute expresses, though in a different way, the essence of the one substance. Hence different attributes, while they are conceived as distinct, are not really different entities, independent substances, but the one thing viewed under different aspects. God is, therefore, a thinking being in so far as he is contemplated under the attribute of thought, and he is extended in so far as he is contemphited under the attribute of extension. The same may be said in the case of all the other attributes to us unknown. Between different attributes there cannot be any interaction. The spiritual cannot act upon the material, nor the material upon the spiritual. As aspects of the same thing they are absolutely parallel and perfectly correspond, but they can exercise upon each other no influence. Only body can act upon body, and thought upon thought.

Modes are individual things. The modes of the attribute thought are ideas. Those of the attribute extension are material things, or bodies. As it is the one substance that is revealed under the two attributes thought and extension, a body and the idea of that body are one and the same thing expressed in two ways. The order and connection of things is, therefore, identical with the order and connection of ideas. For every mode in the attribute of extension there is a corresponding mode in the attribute of thought, and in each of the other attributes. All the modes in each attribute are causally connected with each other, and form an endless chain of causes and effects.

The human body is a mode in the attribute extension, and the human mind, which is composed of ideas, is the corresponding mode in the attribute thought. Consequently, the mind cannot act upon the bod}', nor the body upon the mind. All the actions of the body must be explained by material causes, and all changes in ideas by reference to other ideas. Both physical and mental changes follow unvarying laws, and there is no possibility of freedom, in the common acceptation of the word. " Nothing in the universe is contingent, but all things are determined by the necessity of the divine nature to exist and act in a definite manner." When men, therefore, believe themselves possessed of free will, it is because they are conscious that they will and desire, but are ignorant of the causes which have impelled them to do so.

Every one of man's actions is, hence, to be regarded as a link in an infinite chain of causes and effects. Each idea may be traced back along the ideal series, and each physical fact along the series of physical facts. Neither series has a beginning, and, as perfectly parallel, they can by no possibility come together. Man is, in modern phrase, a physical automaton with parallel mental states.

Man necessarily seeks what he deems to be useful to him, and that alone is useful which preserves and exalts his being. The terms "good" and "evil" indicate nothing really in things regarded as they are in themselves : by " good " we mean what we know to be useful to us, and by evil what we know to be a hindrance to us in the pursuit of any good. Virtue is power, the power of furthering one's being, and self-preservation is the supreme law. As, however, man is but a part of nature, and his power is inferior to that of other things, he cannot indefinitely preserve his being, but must ultimately go to the wall. In so far as he is acted upon by external things, he is in a state of passivity, or is subject to the passions, which are natural phenomena, belonging to the -fixed order of nature, and may be studied as one studies the geometrical properties of bodies.

This doctrine of human bondage to the order of natural causes would seem to cut off completely the i6 EXPOSITION OF Spinoza's system.

possibility of any sort of freedom in human action, and yet it is the teaching of the " Ethics " that man may hberate himself from this dependence upon external causes, cease to be "a part of nature," and become free. Such freedom is the goal that he is to set before him, and in its attainment consists his blessedness. To understand Spinoza's deliverances on the freedom of man, one must examine his conception of the relation of substance to its modes, and his doctrine of essences.

It has been said above that substance is the cause of all things that exist, and that it is, at the same time, their very being. How can these two statements be reconciled? A cause is something numerically distinct from its effect, and how can it be its very being ?

The careful reader of the " Ethics " will discover that Spinoza has three distinct conceptions of God or substance, and that he passes from one to another in a very confusing way. I discuss all this at length in my notes, and shall not dwell upon the subject here, but it will suffice to state that sometimes he conceives the relation of substance to its modes as that of cause to effect, sometimes as that of a whole to its parts, and sometimes as that of a universal to the individuals subsumed under it. It is the last conception that it is important for us to consider in this connection.