Kant's Critique of pure reason

Front matter

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IN PREPARATION

Preface

THE present volume appears as the first one in a proposed series of ,; German Philosophic Classics for English Readers and Students," concerning which, in a printed " Prospectus." the following was said:

" Each volume will be devoted to the critical exposition of some one masterpiece belonging to the history of German philosophy. The aim in each case will be to furnish a clear and attractive statement of the special substance and purport of the original author's argument, to interpret and elucidate the same by reference to the historic and acknowledged results of philosophic inquiry, to give an independent estimate of merits and deficiencies, and especially to show, as occasion may require, in what way German thought contains the natural complement, or the much-needed corrective, of British speculation.

" It is intended that the series, when completed, shall consist of ten or twelve volumes, founded on the works of Leibnitz. Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. It will thus furnish in effect a history of the most conspicuous and permanently influential movement in the history of German thought, and its general object may be stated to be to render rea-

VI PREFACE.

sonably accessible to the intelligent English reader a knowledge of German philosophic thought in its leading outlines, and at the same time to furnish the special student with a valuable introduction and guide to more comprehensive studies in the same direction. "

Whatever judgment may be passed concerning the measure in which the present volume fulfils the promise of the prospectus, its author, as responsible editor of the whole series, refers with confidence to the names of the eminent scholars and teachers, who have promised to prepare other volumes, as furnishino' a sufficient guarantee that the series as a whole will worthily realize its published aim.

To the special student of Kant, the difficulties which must attend the attempt to furnish a summary account of the " special substance and purport " of the " Critique of Pure Reason " are well known. Not the least of these difficulties arises from the circumstance that Kant's work marks and conspicuously illustrates a stadium of transition in the history of modern thought. It is far more eminently the' story of a process of inquiry and demonstration than a didactic exposition of finished results. And with reference to this process the terminus a quo and the terminus ad quern are widely different. Hence, as the inquiry proceeds, words and phrases acquire, and have attached to them, new meanings. This produces an air of variability and uncertainty in the use of words, which Kant, owing, doubtless, in part, to the haste with which his work was written, has not taken

PREFACE. Vll

care to reduce to a minimum. Add to this the fact that Kant's intellectual attitude, in some of its most essential aspects, remains, to the end, thoroughly confused, and the reader will have some conception of the hindrances which lie in the way of an attempt to produce a " clear and attractive statement' 1 of w r hat Kant has to say. These things are mentioned, not to excuse any deficiencies in the work of the present author, but that the critical reader may not at the outset form a wholly unreasonable notion of what may justly be demanded in any professed exposition of Kant.

The author has had at his disposal a copious collection of works, old and new, relating to Kant. But as his primary object in the preparation of this volume was not to make a new contribution to ;, Kant philology." they could not serve him, or influence his judgment, in any such conspicuous measure as to make further, specific mention of them necessary. His best and most earnest wish is that this volume, and the series which it inaugurates, may serve the end of promoting genuine philosophic intelligence.

GEO. S. MOERIS.

Introduction

Apparently contradictory character of philosophical works 1

Philosophy the Science of Being .... 2

Its practical importance 3

Science of Being dependent on Science of Experience, or of Knowledge 5

From different views respecting the nature of knowledge result different conceptions regarding the nature or knowableness of being . 8

According to one view, knowledge is a purely mechanical process 11

The logical result of this view is not science, but nescience 13

Its practical result is materialistic . . . . 17

Knowledge is a more than merely mechanical process 19

It is an organic process, and the Science of Knowledge, as such a process, leads directly to a spiritualistic Science of Being ... 22

X CONTENTS.

Agnosticism, or Practical Materialism, is an

uncalled for apotheosis of physical science . 24 Prevalence of mechanical conceptions in modern

philosophy before Kant 29

Kant's early predilection for physical science . 33

Kant under the influence of British empiricism 34

Disturbed by Hume 37

Publication of the three Critiques .... 38 ^General purport of the " Critique of Pure

Reason " 40

The peculiar service rendered through it to philosophy .41

Chapter I. The Question Stated

What is Experience? Sensational psychology answers: "A bundle of conscious states . . 44

The relations among which are mechanical and fortuitous " . . 47

To this answer Kant demurs, on alleged grounds of obvious fact . 47

The main question is, How are the rebutting facts to be explained? or, ;; How are synthetic judgments a priori possible?" 50

Subdivision of this question 52

The inquiry a " transcendental " one ... 53

CONTENTS.

XI

Chapter II. The Non-contingent Form Of Sense

Sense, in order to be definable, must contain a

non-contingent element 56

This element must be at once formal and formative . 58

And is found in space and time 60

11 Metaphysical Exposition " of space and time . 60 " Transcendental Exposition " of space and time: Pure mathematics possible, only because space and time are of the nature indicated in the metaphysical exposition.

Ontological inferences

Psychological empiricism corrected . Sceptical Idealism ostensibly justified

But not really

Kant's doctrine of space and time point; direction of Spiritualistic Idealism the

68 70 70 72

Chapter III. The Understanding As A Non-contingent Faculty Of Sensible Knowledge

Sense and Understanding contrasted .... 80

Function of the Understanding 84

Fundamental categories or conceptions, of the understanding, as a faculty of sensible knowledge 87 xii CONTENTS.

Metaphysical exposition of the categories . . 88 The categories are deduced and defined with reference to their use and meaning in pure

physical science only 93

That they have no other use or significance is assumed, but not proved 96

Chapter IV. The " Transcendental Deduction " Of The Categories

General purport of the "transcendental deduction": Pure physical science possible, only because the categories are of the nature indicated in the preceding chapter .... 99

Sensible impressions, regarded as the elementary material of knowledge, are given without connection among themselves .... 102

So far as they are, as matter of experimental fact, really connected in our knowledge, this connection, or " synthesis," is the work of the understanding alone 105

And of the understanding, only in dependence on the synthetic unity of self-consciousness . 108

Sensible consciousness — pure physical science or knowledge of " nature " — must be subject at least to the universal, synthetic form of self-consciousness 113

CONTENTS. Xlll

And to the special forms of connection, or synthesis, denoted by the categories . . .115

In other words, sensible perception involves intellectual conception 116

Thus the " objective," insensible knowledge, depends on. or in its form is determined by, the 4i subjective " ; or, we, in knowing phenomena, prescribe to them, a priori, their laws . 118

The transcendental deduction, considered as a contribution to the science of knowledge, is marred by Kant's obstinate persistence in treating sensible consciousness, the mechanical product, as condition, rather than dependent result, of self-consciousness, the living, organic process 120

In this he resists the logic of his own " discoveries " . . . 130

Chapter V. The Principles Of Science

Namely, of pure mathematical and physical science 136

The principles are founded on the categories . 137 The : ' Schematism of the Categories " . . .139 The principle of all principles is the dependence

of sensible consciousness on self-consciousness 148 (1) All sensibly perceived phenomena have magnitude of extension 149

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(2) And, considered as sensations, vary in intensity 151

They must also be conceived (3), under the aspect of persistence in time, as substances . 157

(4) Under the aspect of determinate succession in time, as ;: causes " and " effects," or as subject to rule or law of succession . . . .162

And (5), under the aspect of determinate coexistence in time, as subject to rule or law of coexistence 171

Under various, defined conditions they must also be regarded as (6) possible, (7) real, or (8) necessary 176

Chapter VI. The Limit Of Science

Science extends only to phenomena; what ground for distinguishing the latter from Things-in-themselves, or from Noumena? . 181 Different Connotation of the two expressions

" Things-in-themselves " and " Noumena " . 183 Confusion in Kant's conceptions . . . .190 Kant's answers to the above question . . . 194 Theory of intellectual intuition . . . . 196

The conception of Noumena purely problematic, yet necessary 199

And the doorway to the realm of " rational faith " and " practical experience " . . . 200

CONTEXTS. xv

The whole movement of the Critique is in the direction of the philosophic and spiritualistic conception of Xoumena 206

The conception of Noumena as noting a limit of pure physical science 207

CHAPTER VII. Recapitulation 209

"Transcendental Dialectic"' as "Logic of Illusion" 212

Reason as the seat of this illusion .... 212 Transcendental Ideas of Reason . . . .217 General remarks on Kant's criticism of " metaphysics " 217

Criticism of Rational Psychology . . ... 219 Criticism of Rational Cosmology .... 226

The Cosmological Ideas 228

The Four Antinomies 230

The world of our knowledge is erroneously assumed, in the antinomies, to be absolute and noumenal, rather than relative and merely

phenomenal 236

Critical solution of the antinomies .... 239 Xo positive conflict between " transcendental freedom" and natural law 244

XVI CONTENTS.

Rational Theology; its necessary presuppositions and true method ........ 250

The method of dogmatic metaphysics . . . 255

The Ontological Argument 257

The Cosmological Argument 258

The Teleological Argument 260

" Metaphysics " can neither prove nor disprove God's existence 261

Chapter VIII. Metaphysics As A Science

The " Discipline of Pure Reason 1 ': the method of pure mathematical and physical science must be abandoned by metaphysics . . . 264 " Practical " problems of metaphysics . . . 267 The History of Philosophy . . . . . .269

Conclusion 271

INTRODUCTION.

THE works that have marked epochs, of one kind or another, in the history of philosophy are very different in character. Some of them are constructive, and lead to positive conclusions; others are destructive, and end mainly in negations; others, still, are " critical, 1 ' marking periods of transition in the history of philosophic intelligence, from negative or skeptical to more positive and affirmative convictions. Examples of the first class are found in the writings of Plato, Aristotle, Leibnitz, Hegel, and others. Hume's " Treatise on Human Nature " illustrates conspicuously the second class; while of the third, Kant's ;i Critique of Pure Reason " furnishes the most noteworthy instance.

This apparent oscillation of philosophy between contradictory extremes of affirmation and negation has, as is well known, given abundant occasion to its enemies to blaspheme. If, it has been plausibly argued, philosophers persistently contradict each other, it is safe to infer that none of them have demonstrative knowledge of that whereof they affirm. And yet this inference is extremely superficial, as all know who have thorough comprehension of the true nature of philosophy's peculiar problems, and of ihe results which have attended their investigation.

All science involves two elements: knowledge of the particular, and knowledge of the universal. A particular fact is not scientifically known until it has been classified with some other fact or facts. This means that it is not an object of scientific knowledge until there is discovered something — a nature or law — which is common to it and to other facts. And that which is thus common to all is the so-called " universal." It is the universal quality, or mode of existence, or of activity, of the class of facts or objects in question.

Now, it is peculiar to all objects of knowledge that, in some form or other, they exist. To all of them Being of some kind is ascribed. This is their universal predicate. The peculiar object of philosophic science is the determination of the meaning of this predicate. What do we mean when we say that an object of knowledge is, that the universe is, that man is? What is it to be? What is? What is the universal nature of existence? And if there are more kinds of being than one, what is that universal kind which includes and explains them all? Such are the first and cardinal inquiries of philosophy, which, accordingly, was with perfect accuracy defined by Aristotle, more than two thousand years ago, as the ''Science of Being as such."

Now, that the results of such a science, — far from being, as is often thoughtlessly supposed, merely " speculative," and so unpractical and useless, — are of the highest consequence, both for the universal enlightenment of intelligence and for the direction of conduct, becomes upon reflection perfectly obvious. A science so universal in its range as philosophy, by its definition, is, must contribute something to our comprehension of every object of knowledge; and inasmuch as conduct depends on knowledge, it cannot be without its powerful influence upon the practical direction of human affairs.

Let us look at the case more concretely. The answers which, as matter of historic fact, have been given to philosophy's central inquiry, are implied in such expressions as theoretical Materialism, practical Materialism, or Scepticism, or Agnosticism, and Spiritualistic Idealism. The theoretic Materialist holds that whatever is, is material. Suppose this principle established, and it follows at once that, if there be forms or spheres of existence which appear to be non-material, we must not allow ourselves to be misled by this appearance, but must train ourselves to look for and to find in them nothing but peculiar manifestations or varieties of that which in essence and mode of action is material. Thus, if the materialistic thesis or principle be true, the knowledge of it serves to prevent or demolish contrary prejudices and to promote universal intelligence. Moreover, it has immediate bearings upon life. When consistently developed, it teaches us to look upon ourselves as mechanically determined, and hence irresponsible, in all our actions, and to correct accordingly those notions of human relations — of man and man, in Society; of man and the universe, in Art, and of man and God, in Religion, — which, being apparently founded in human experience, are currently adopted among men. The like, in substance, is taught by practical Materialism, or Agnosticism,

" Nur mit ein bischen andern Worten" On the other hand, the Spiritualistic Idealist holds that the universal nature of Being is spiritual; that the essence of all absolute reality is not materialistic and dead, but idealistic and living: that the universe is an organism of Mind, of activities whose ultimate origin is in Will, of purposes whose explanation is Intelligence, of laws and of orders whose reason is the Good. This is in substance the doctrine, in the maintenance of which all of the philosophers of the first, or constructive, class above mentioned agree. It is the catholic doctrine of philosophy. It represents the positive results of scientific inquiry respecting the problems peculiar to philosophy. It is true to all the sides of human experience, and so is capable of comprehending and being just to whatever of relative truth may be contained in theoretical Materialism or in Agnosticism. Nay, more, in the relative and hence only partial truth of Materialism and Agnosticism, Spiritualistic Idealism sees its own larger lineaments prefigured and implied, and so sees in the whole history of philosophy nothing but consentient witness to its own truth. How this can be, will, it is hoped, presently be made more definitely to appear. It suffices here only to remark that the positive fruit of the idealistic doctrine, in contributing to the intelligent comprehension of all experience and the guidance of life, is (surely!) not less conspicuous, and, in its range, universal, than that of Materialism. Whatever be true, then, in philosophy, its importance can be denied only by an intelligence that is absolutely blinded by prejudice or by unculture. That something is thus true, or that the cardinal question of philosophy must receive, and is capable of receiving, some sort of an intelligent answer, is implied in the fact that all men, by their conduct, virtually adopt one philosophy or another. Practically they give to its fundamental query either a materialistic or an idealistic answer; and this — since all men are or would be rational — is tantamount to a mute assertion that the answer in question can be justified before the forum of intelligence.

Philosophy is the Science of Being. But Being, or the Universe of Reality, is given only in the realm of experience. The Science of Being can therefore be studied only through study of the content of experience. And thus it is studied. Philosophy does not transcend, nor pretend to transcend, the range of experience. And if ;; philosophies " have differed in their ostensible results, this has been only because their respective advocates have found, or thought they found, some more, others less, contained in experience.

But what is experience? It is only by a figure that experience can be likened to a vessel, which " contains" objects or the knowledge of objects. At all events, the relation between experience and its so-called contents is not purely mechanical and accidental, so that the nature of the latter may be studied apart from the former. No, the " study of the content of experience," considered absolutely, cannot be carried on without studying experience itself. Now, experience is nothing other than our real or implicit knowledge, or our real or implicit consciousness. It results, therefore, that the Science of Being and the Science of Knowledge are organically one and inseparable. The study of the one can be prosecuted only through, in, and along with, the study of the other. The recognition of this fact is of capital importance for him who would understand the peculiar nature of philosophy's problems, and comprehend the historic methods and results of philosophic inquiry.

The interdependence of these two, ideally, but not really, distinguishable sciences is illustrated in the whole history of philosophy, and contains the key to the explanation of the apparently conflicting results of philosophic investigation. The germs of the science of knowledge lay scattered — in no great profusion, it is true — in the pre-Socratic "philosophy" of Greece. Such as they were, they furnished the impulse for that intellectual movement which resulted in the classic philosophy of Greece, — the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. Plato's " Theory of Ideas " is at once science of Knowledge and, through and in it, of Being. The philosophy of Aristotle has its real strength in his science of

INTRODUCTION. i

Knowledge. The great merit of the modern German movement in philosophy, from Kant to Hegel, lay in the new development which it gave to the same science. It was through this science that the final leaders in this movement rehabilitated the science of Being. It w T as through it that, in the language of a recent German writer, these men rescued the modern mind from the barren heath of purely arbitrary reflection and subjective uncertainty, and brought it back to the green pasture of objective reality, restoring us to rich and concrete knowledge of ourselves and of the world. And the impulse to the modern movement was the same in kind with that which brought forth the ancient one. It consisted in the intense cultivation, on the part of earlier "philosophers" (Locke, etc.), of certain rootlets, or first beginnings, of the science of Knowledge, with results which were so far from corresponding with human knowledge, or experience, in its actual organic wholeness that they contained a direct challenge to farther and more complete inquiry. Outside of the two historic movements of philosophic inquiry which culminated with Aristotle and Hegel, it can hardly be said that the science of Knowledge, organically one with, and absolutely inseparable from, the science of Being, or from philosophy proper, has ever been investigated in such way as to take complete account of all the elements of the problem as presented in conscious experience. It is certainly true to say that, independently of these two movements and of their influence, the problem in question has never been thus investigated. And it is also true that the result of the modern investigation was confirmatory of the result of the ancient one, but enriched with fuller detail and more copious demonstration.

The science of knowledge is the key to the science of Being, and the different conceptions respecting the nature of Being, or of absolute Reality, which have been propounded in the guise of philosophy, all result from different conceptions respecting the nature of knowledge. The different views which have been held respecting the nature of knowledge are simply so many views respecting the nature, conditions and range of experience. Further, these differences of view are — if the expression may be allowed — rather differences of more and less, than of contradiction. Knowledge is a complex process, and the different views held concerning it result from the circumstance that some look only at one or two sides of the process, while others — the true philosophers — look at all sides. The former, of course, see in knowledge or experience less, the latter more. Those who see the more see also and recognize the less. There is here no contradiction. Apparent contradiction arises only when those who see only the less declare that the less is all, and so deny the more. Such contradiction, however, is purely dogmatic, and does not arise from the nature of the case itself which is under examination. In other words, the positive, scientific results of inquiry are not contradictory, but complementary.

Of the whole nature of knowledge, or conscious experience, the theoretical materialist sees least, and it is he whose inquiries into the subject are most superficial. He observes, in common with all men, that knowledge, in one of its characteristic aspects, is an affair of sensation; it is "conveyed to us in through the senses." This he adopts as the whole account of knowledge. The senses he looks upon as reporters — and the only reporters — of that which we know, and consequently of that which we must believe to be. But the senses report a ; ' material universe." Consequently, a material universe, and nothing else, exists. Whatever truly is consists of atoms of material substance, about whose origin or end no rational inquiry can be raised.

Theoretical or absolute materialism is purely dogmatic. It has no scientific standing whatever. It is refuted by its own premises. Accordingly, whenever in the history of philosophic inquiry it has reared its head, this has been only for a brief period. The witness of scientific inquiry has speedily demolished it.

Materialism says, All knowledge is sensible knowledge, and consequently all existence is purely sensible, i.e. material. It is indeed by such reasoning that materialism must justify itself, if justification be possible. It is on such a theory of knowledge as is enunciated in the foregoing premise, that the theory of Being affirmed in the conclusion must be founded, if foundation it is to have. But the peculiarity and defect of materialism is, that it substitutes dogmatic assertion for scientific inquiry into the meaning of

10 kant's critique of pure REASOK.

its own premises. There have been plenty of men, in ancient and modern times, who have adopted the materialistic premise, and who, in addition, have inquired into its meaning. They have examined the nature and conditions of sensible knowledge as such, and have set up a science — true enough as far as it goes --of such knowledge. And the uniform result of their investigations has been, not that because (as assumed) all knowledge is sensible knowledge, therefore all existence is material, but that, in the words of Mr. Herbert Spencer, " our own and all other existence is a mystery absolutely and forever beyond our comprehension. '' The inference of theoretical materialism was hasty, superficial, illogical: that of agnosticism is founded on scientific inquiry, and is true. And if all human knowledge were specifically and exclusively sensible — in the sense in which this term is technically employed and will presently be explained — agnosticism would be the last word of philosophy. But this is the same as to say that philosophy would not, in any positive sense, exist. For philosophy is the science of Being; but agnosticism consists in nothing but a persuasion that no such science is possible.

Now, the question between those who limit all knowledge to sense and those who recognize for it a more comprehensive nature is a question of experimental fact, to be settled, not by mere assertion, but by scientific examination of the facts themselves. It is in this way that the true philosophers have sought to settle it. Knowledge is a conscious process. The question is, What is the nature and true description of this process? and what are the terms or factors involved in the process?

The process of knowledge most obviously involves the distinction of two factors, termed subject and object. It is in these factors that Being inheres. The process into which they enter is, in its results, knowledge (knowing), consciousness, experience. What is the relation between the. factors as involved in this process? This may be termed the fundamental question, or problem, of the science of Knowledge. Upon the answer given to this question depends the answer which must follow the further inquiry, What is the nature of the factors themselves? Are they knowable, and, if so, as what are they known to be? Or, otherwise expressed, Is a science of Being achievable by man, and, if so, what does it teach?

The sensationalist, looking at knowledge in its sensible aspect, finds that the relation between subject and object is here, apparently, a purely mechanical one: and, in truth, this appearance is the essential characteristic of sensible knowledge, qua sensible. The technical meaning, above alluded to, of the phrase ''specifically sensible knowledge" is precisely this, to wit, Knowledge resulting from, or at all events depending on. a purely mechanical process. The sensationalist, dogmatically assuming from the start that all knowledge is sensible, and only sensible, maintains that the only relation subsisting between subject and object is a mechanical one; or, vice versa, dogmatically maintaining that no other than a mechanical relation exists, or can exist, between subject and object, thence concludes that all knowledge is necessarily of a purely sensible nature. A "mechanical relation" — what does this imply? It implies that the terms of the relation — in this case the subject and object of consciousness — are not only numerically different, but are also per se wholly independent of and separate from each other. A mechanical relation is a purely external and accidental relation. It consists in mere coexistence, or, at most, in superficial contact. It is such a relation, only, which the sensationalist conceives as existing between subject and object in knowledge. The relation obviously presupposes a materialistic conception of the probable absolute nature of subject and object. There, without, is an aggregate of varied objects; here, within, is another object, which plays the role of subject, having originally no determinable nature, but being rather " like a piece of white paper on which nothing has been written." And now the objects begin to play upon the subject in the only way which is possible for them, namely, in the way of contact or impression. And then, as if by magic, the impression becomes illuminated with the light of consciousness. By a wonderful transfiguration it becomes an element of knowledge, part and parcel of our conscious experience. But where in this result are the factors which produced it? They are not contained in the product, but are left beliind or without it. By virtue of the very nature of the terms in which they were conceived, and of the relation posited as existing between them, it is impossible that this should be otherwise. Materialistically conceived, and incapable of entering into any other than a purely mechanical relation, neither of them can enter into the other, nor into a tertium quid, termed consciousness or knowledge. They can at most only be imagined as coming into contact with each other, or, so to speak, with consciousness; they cannot become a part of consciousness itself.

What have we, then, as the result of this theory? We have, not a scientific explanation or comprehension of conscious knowledge, but an act of thaumaturgy. We have, on the one side, contact of object and subject, or, if you please, communication of motion from the environment of a nervous organism to the organism itself; on the other, something toto coelo different, namely, conscious states. How the former can be transformed into or result in the latter, it is forever impossible to see. The two terms, mechanical contact, or motion, and consciousness, are absolutely incommensurable. And so it is no wonder that the sensationalists themselves unanimously confess the case to be involved in a baffling mystery, thus virtually admitting the failure of their own theory as ostensibly a complete science of knowledge. And how about object and subject? These were assumed as factors of consciousness, and consequently as something lying within consciousness, or as real terms, and hence objects, of knowledge. But in the result they have disappeared. They remain without the pale of consciousness, and hence of knowledge. They are unknowable. There remains nothing but a series of conscious states, each of which, while one and indivisible, is yet — by another miracle! — not one, but two, being at once subject and object, or conscious (as subject) of itself (as object). Thus the purely sensational theory of knowledge explains (?) knowledge, or consciousness, by explaining away, as unknowable, its real factors, and then making consciousness itself (conceived as a series of passive states) do duty in place of those factors, at once as its own subject and object.