The emotions

Front matter

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Book

Chapter I. First Element: Appetences

Sect. I. What Appetences are 7

II. Primary Appetences . . . . . .9

1. Love of Pleasure and Aversion to Pain. 2. Promoting Good of others. 3. Personal Attachments. 4. Tastes and Talents tending to act. 5. Bodily Appetites. 6. Love of Society. 7. Love of Esteem. 8. Love of Power. 9. Love of Wealth. 10. Esthetic Feeling. 11. Moral Sentiment.

III. Secondary Appetences 16

IV. {Supplementary.) Evolution of Emotions . . 21 V. {Supplementary.') Do the Derivative Appetences

bear a. Conscious Reference to the Original Ones 23

VI. Motives 25

VII. Differences of Appetences in Different In-

dividuals 27

VI CONTENTS.

PAQK

VIII. Conspiring Appetences 30

IX. Conflicting Appetences 31

X. Dominant Appetences 35

XI. Undeveloped Appetences . . . . 37

XII. The Motiveless Man 40

Chapter II. Second Element: The Idea (phantasm)

Sect. I. Nature op the Idea which calls forth the

Emotion 42

II. Works of Fiction 53

III. Association of Ideas in Emotion . . . 61

IV. Spontaneous Flow of Thought . .72

Chapter III. Third Element: Excitement With Attachment And Repugnance

Sect. I. Their General Nature 77

H. Action and Reaction of Feeling . . .84 III. Nature restoring itself .... 85

Chapter IV

FOURTH ELEMENT: THE ORGANIC AFFECTION. Some Empirical Laws 88

1. Idea of Good soothes, while Idea of Evil deranges the Frame. 2. Organs affected. 3. Bell's and Darwin's Observations. 4. Conclusions provisionally established by Darwin. 5. Expressions are produced by Emotions. 6. Truth in Physiognomy. 7. Mingling of Sensation of Pain with Emotion. 8. Effect of Imaginary Scenes. 9. Sympathy. 10. Bodily States produce Emotion. 11. Emotion craves for Expression. 12. What Effect of restraining Expression.

CONTENTS. Vll

Book Second

CLASSIFICATION AND DESCRIPTION OF EMOTIONS. CHAPTER I.

PAGE

CHAPTER II.

EMOTIONS AS DIRECTED TO ANIMATE OBJECTS.

Sect. I. Retrospective Emotions 115

Self-Satisfaction or Regret : Complacency or Displacency ; Self-Esteem or Self-Dissatisfaction ; Self-Congratulation or Self-Reproach ; Self- Sufficiency or Self-Depreciation ; Self- Adulation or Self- Accusation ; Mortification ; Bitterness ; Chagrin ; Pleasant Memories ; Self-Approbation or Self-Condemnation ; Self-Gratulation or Self- Humiliation; Repining. Moral Approbation and Disapprobation : Testimony of a Good Conscience ; Remorse. Benig.vancy : Thankfulness. Anger : Irritation ; Temper ; Indignation.

n. Immediate Emotions 123

Joy and Sorrow : Content and Discontent ; Gladness and Depression ; Cheerfulness and Dejection ; Good and Bad Spirits ; Rapture and Melancholy. Pride and Self- Humiliation : Self-Conceit ; Self-Respect ; Humility ; Vanity ; Haughtiness ; Contempt ; Disdain ; Scorn ; Sneering ; Meekness ; Repining ; Peevishness ; Sulkiness ; Disgust ; Good and Bad Humor ; Sourness of Temper. Pity : Hardness of Heart ; Sympathy with Joys and Sorrows ; Envy ; Trust or Suspicion ; Rejoicing in, or Jealousy of, Success of Others.

Vlll CONTENTS.

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III. Prospective Emotions 136

Surprise ; Astonishment ; Admiration ; Wonder ; Veneration. Hope and Fear : Anticipation ; Expectation; Assurance of Hope; Apprehension; Dread ; Terror ; Shyness ; Shame ; Modesty and Impudence; Horror; Despair; Anxiety; Disappointment ; Hope of Approval.

CHAPTER III.

EMOTIONS CALLED FORTH BY INANIMATE OBJECTS. THE ESTHETIC.

Sect. I. JEsthetical Theories 148

II. Place of Sensation in ^Esthetics . . . 153

III. Physical Beauty 157

Sound ; Form ; Color.

IV. Intellectual Beauty 163

Relations of Identity and Difference, Whole and Parts (Means and End) ; Resemblance (Classes) ; Space ; Time ; Quantity ; Active Property ; Causation (Final Cause).

V. The Idea raising the Esthetic Feeling . 169 VI. What is the true Theory of Beauty? . 176 VII. Influence of Association on Taste . .178 VIII. Complexity of the 2Esthetic Emotion . 179

IX. The Picturesque 181

X. The Ludicrous 184

XI. The Sublime 189

XII. Beauty in Natural Objects .... 192 Trees ; Mountains ; Waterfalls ; Ocean.

XIII. Scenery of Different Countries . . . 201

XIV. The Fine Arts . . . . . .207

Architecture ; Sculpture ; Landscape Gardening ; Landscape Painting ; Historical Painting.

CONTENTS. IX

Chapter I. Continuous Emotions

PAGE

Sect. I. Affections and Passions 215

IT. Love 216

III. Love of the Sexes 218

IV. Emotions come in Groups 222

V. Temperament . . . ... . .224

VI. Temper 226

VII. Prepossessions 227

VIII. Prejudices 229

IX. Fickleness of Feeling 231

X. Puling Passion ....... 232

Chapter II. Motives Swaying Masses

Sect. I. Community of Feeling . . . .237 II. Reaction of Public Sentiment . . .241 III. An Unwritten Chapter on Political Economy 245

Conclusion 251

INTRODUCTION.

ELEMENTS INVOLVED IN EMOTIONS.

Four persons of yery much the same age and temperament are traveling in the same vehicle. At a particular stopping-place it is announced to them that a certain individual has just died suddenly and unexpectedly. One of the company looks perfectly stolid ; a second comprehends what has taken place, but is in no way affected ; the third looks and evidently feels sad ; the fourth is overwhelmed with grief, which finds expression in tears, sobs, and exclamations. Whence the difference of the four individuals before us ? In one respect they are all alike, — an announcement has been made to them. The first is a foreigner, and has not understood the communication. The second had never met with the deceased, and could have no special regard for him. The third had often met with him in social intercourse and business transactions, and been led to cherish a great esteem for him. The fourth was the brother of the departed, and was bound to him by native affection and a thousand interesting ties, earlier and later. From such a case we may notice that in order to emotion there is need, first, of some understanding or apprehension. The foreigner had no feeling, because he had no idea or belief. We may observe further that there must be, secondly, an affection of some kind, for the stranger was not interested in the occurrence. The emotion flows forth l

Z INTRODUCTION.

from a well, and it is strong in proportion to the waters, — is stronger in the brother than in the friend. It is evident, thirdly, that the persons affected are in a moved or excited state. A fourth peculiarity has appeared in the sadness of the countenance and the agitations of the bodily frame. Four elements have thus come forth to view.

First, there is the affection, or what I prefer calling the motive principle, or the appetence. In the illustrative case, there are the love of a friend and the love of a brother. But the appetence, to use the most unexceptionable phrase, may consist of an immense number and variety of other motive principles, such as the love of pleasure, the love of wealth, or revenge, or moral approbation. These appetences may be original, such as the love of happiness ; or they may be acquired, such as the love of money, or of retirement, or of paintings, or of articles of vertu, or of dress. These moving powers are at the basis of all emotion. Without the fountain there can be no flow of waters. The passenger who had no regard for the person whose 'death was reported to him was not affected with grief. The two who loved him felt sorrow, each according to the depth of his affection.

Secondly, there is an idea of something, of some object or occurrence, as fitted to gratify or disappoint a motive principle or appetence. When the friend and brother of the departed did not know of the occurrence they were not moved. But as soon as the intelligence was conveyed to them and they realized the death, they were filled with sorrow. The idea is thus an essential element in all emotion. But ideas of every kind do not raise emotion. The stranger had a notion of a death having occurred, but was not moved. The idea excited

FOUR ELEMENTS IN EMOTION. 3

emotion in the breasts of those who had the affection, because the event apprehended disappointed one of the cherished appetences of their minds.

Thirdly, there is the conscious feeling. The soul is in a moved or excited state, — hence the phrase emotion. Along with this there is an attraction or repulsion : we are drawn toward the objects that we love, that is, for which we have an appetence, and driven away from those which thwart the appetence. To use looser phraseology, we cling to the good, and we turn away from the evil. This excitement, with the attractions and repulsions, is the conscious element in the emotion. Yet it all depends on the two other elements, on the affection and the idea of something fitted to gratify or disappoint it. The felt excitement or passion differs according to the nature of the appetence and the depth of it, and according to what the idea that evokes it contains. A smaller gain or loss does not affect us so much as a greater, and the greatness or smallness of the gain or loss is determined by the cherished affection. What is a loss to one is not felt to be so by another, because the ruling passions of the two men differ.

Fourthly, there is an organic affection. The seat of it seems to be somewhere in the cerebrum, whence it influences the nervous centres, producing soothing or exciting and at times exasperating results. This differs widely in the case of different individuals. Some are hurried irresistibly into violent expressions or convulsions. Others, feeling no less keenly, may appear outwardly calm, because restrained by a strong will ; or they may feel repressed and oppressed till they have an outlet in some natural flow or outburst. But it is to be observed that this organic affection is not the primary nor the main element in anything that deserves the name of

4 INTRODUCTION.

emotion, such as hope and fear, joy and sorrow, reproach and despair. A sentence of a few words announces to a man the death of his brother, and reaches his mental apprehension by the sense of hearing. First he understands it, then he feels it by reason of his cherished affection, and then there is the nervous agitation. Emotion is not what * it has often been represented by physiologists, a mere nervous reaction from a bodily stimulus, like the kick which the frog gives when it is pricked. It begins with a mental act, and throughout is essentially an operation of the mind.

He who can unfold these four elements and allot to them their relative place and connection will clear up a subject which is only imperfectly understood at present, and show what emotion is in itself, and what its place in the human constitution. Each of these aspects has been noticed in works written both in ancient and modern times. The Scottish school of metaphysicians, and especially Dugald Stewart, have sought, but not in a very searching manner, to determine man's springs of action. It will be shown that Aristotle and the Stoics knew that in all emotion there is a phantasm or opinion involved. Dr. Thomas Brown has given us an eloquent description of the mental excitement, which, however, is chiefly left to novelists, who often make mistakes. Physiologists have had to take up the organic action, hitherto with not much success. But so far as is known to me, the four elements have not been exhibited in their combination and their mutual relation by any one.

Book First. The Four Elements In Emotion

CHAPTER I.

FIRST ELEMENT: APPETENCES.

Section I. What Appetences Are

By the word appetence I understand what is commonly but vaguely designated by "motive," "spring of action," "disposition," "inclination," "affection." But all these have larger and more indefinite, not to say ambiguous, significations, and have more or less of the element of will. It is necessary to remark thus early that appetence has nothing in it of the nature of voluntary action, which belongs to a very different department of the mind. It is simply a tendency in the mind to crave for an object for its own sake. It is not desire ; it precedes desire and leads to it. It is not action, but a spring of action. The phrase I prefer is a convenient one, as the noun has cognate adjectives, appetible and inappetible. It has often been incidentally noticed, though it has seldom been formally announced, that, as the basis of all emotion, there is a mental principle determining its nature and its intensity ; this I call an appetence.

It would be of great service to every branch of mental science to have an approximately good classification of the appetences by which mankind are swayed. This is a difficult work, more so than a classification of plants or animals, the determining motives being so many and so varied in appearance and in reality. Some seem to act under no guiding principle, as if on an unaccountable impulse ; but if we reflect, we shall find that they must have been pursuing some end, indulging a lust or passion, or restlessly seeking a change of state or position. In many cases the man himself could not tell us, and we could never discover, what swayed him, but we may be sure that there was a glittering object attracting him. Every man we meet with, hurrying to and fro on the streets of a great city, dancing in a ball-room, or idling in a summer saunter, has, after all, Ian end which he is seeking. " For every man hath business and desire, such as it is." It may be possible to form, if not a perfect, a good provisional arrangement of man's springs of action.

It is obvious that men cannot be swayed by every conceivable motive. No man can be made to choose pain as pain. He may choose pain, but it is supposed to promote some other end which has power with him, because it may secure pleasure, or reputation, or moral good. There are motives swaying some which have little or no power over others. Multitudes are led by the love of property or of reputation, while others scarcely feel these inclinations. Of some, we are sure that they are incapable of doing a mean or dishonorable deed. Of others, we believe that they will never perform an act of benevolence or of self-sacrifice. When a crime is committed, there may be certain persons suspected ; there are others of whom all are sure that they have had no participation in it. Let us try to ascertain the motives by which all mankind are swayed, and. which we call: —

PRIMARY APPETENCES. 9

section n.

PKIMARY APPETENCES.

I. Every man is swayed by the love of pleasure and the aversion to pain. This is not the result of deliberation, or an exercise of choice ; it is instinctive. We shrink from suffering as suffering ; we lay hold of enjoyment as enjoyment. Through a great part of our waking moments we are influenced by these ends, — seizing this, and avoiding that. Even when we resist these motive powers, — as when we stretch forth our hand to ward off a blow intended for our neighbor, — we feel them, and have to counteract them by some higher considerations.

Little more need be said on this subject ; indeed, little more can be said. "Pain" and "pleasure" cannot be defined ; this, not because of their complexity, but of their simplicity, there is nothing simpler into which to resolve them. They do not need to be defined, for all sensitive beings know what they are. I rather think that all pain originates in a derangement of our organism. But it is not felt as pain till perceived by the conscious soul.

The question arises, Is this the only consideration by which man can be influenced ? The language used by many leaves upon us the impression that this is so, — it is so in their estimation. Some theorists derive all our motives from this one. This, however, is not the view which presents itself at first sight, which shows such an infinite variety of other attractions, such as kindness, sympathy, the desire for power and for society. But they tell us that we have found power and social intercourse leading to enjoyment, and they argue that the very idea of these, as associated with pleasure, raises appetence. While the principle doubtless ha3 its modifying influence, it cannot account for the whole phenomena as exhibited in human nature. There are appetences other than those looking to pleasure and pain, such as the love of children for parents and for brothers and sisters, arising so early, abiding so steadfastly, and so marked in individuals and in families, that they are evidently in the very nature and tendency of the soul. 1

II. Man is inclined to promote the happiness and avert the unhappiness of his fellow-men. No doubt he may be able to restrain this disposition by a cherished selfishness. But there will be times when, in spite of all attempts to repress it, it will come forth in some kind deed or wot;d. So far as the great body of men and women and children are concerned, there is a disposition to oblige, to help a fellow-creature, if this can be done without injuring their own interests ; and, in the case of not a few, it is a benevolence which prompts to self-sacrifice and labors for the good of others. Besides the instincts which lead us to seek our own good, there are evidently others which incline us to find for our fellow-men the things which we regard as good for ourselves.

III. There are the attachments to relatives, as of parents to children, and of children to parents, of brothers and siafers to one another, and, I may add, of grandmothers and grandfathers to their grandchildren, and

jUterJoi more distant kindred. In all such cases there is a natural appetency, and this is called forth by the idea of the person and of the relationship of that person. Take the case of a mother. There is a fountain within ready to flow out. It does not appear' till there is a child, though it seems to manifest itself at times in an irregu-

1 As to the theory which draws them by evolution from pleasure and pain, see Section III.

PEIMARY APPETENCES. 11

lar manner in the attachment of a childless woman to animals or other pets, or in the craving for an adopted son or daughter. Let there be an idea of the relation in which the child stands to the mother, of the child being her offspring, and being dependent on her, and associated with her now and for life, and the stream begins to flow. It is the same with all other relative attachments, say paternal, filial, sisterly, or brotherly. First there is a predisposition, and then an idea of the intimate connection. Along with this there are frequently natural affinities, or common tastes and tendencies, which draw the related parties closer to each other. We have all read tales in which a mother is represented as recognizing her longlost child, and a sister falling into the arms of a brother whom she never saw, simply on meeting. But there is no ground for making such a representation. The natural likenesses in mind, body, and feature may predispose relatives towards one other; but, after all, there must be ground to lead to and justify the discovery. The affection thus called forth by the appetence and apprehension is made livelier and stronger by frequent intercourse, by exchanges of affection, by offices of kindness, by common ends and pursuits, and may be lessened, and in some instances all but destroyed, by clashing interests, — say, about money, — by quarrels, and eveivby long separations. The affection of friends is gendered in the first instance by affinities of tastes, dispositions, and motives, probably favored by circumstances, and is kept up by frequent association and mutual kindness.

IV. The native tastes and talents, and our very acquired ones when they become part of our nature, prompt to action, and excite emotion when gratified or disappointed, and this independent of pleasure, or pain, or any other end. This seems true of our organic activity.

The lamb frisks, the colt gambols, impelled by a life in their frames ; the child solves the problem of perpetual motion ; and all our lives, till the vital energy is dried up, and aged men and women are satisfied with their couch and their chimney-corner, we are impelled to movement and change of movement, owing to the organs of our frame demanding action. We see this strikingly in the musical talent, which often comes out in very early life. Our intellectual powers, our memory, our reasoning, all tend to act, and will act, unless restrained. Talents, arithmetical, mathematical, mechanical, artistic, poetical, historical, metaphysical, fitted for the study of objects in nature, inanimate and animate, sun, moon, and stars, plant and animal, will all find a field to work in, even in the most unfavorable circumstances. These may show themselves in childhood, and continue dominant throughout the whole life, determining, it may be, in spite of difficulties, the man's trade or profession, and, indeed, his whole earthly destiny, and possibly prompting him, though engrossed with earthly business, to devote the few leisure hours he has to writing a work on natural history, a poem, or a philosophical treatise. Not only are there intellectual, there are emotional and, it may be added, moral powers, seeking out their appropriate objects, and making the possessors search for lovely landscapes or beautiful paintings, or leading them to visit the house of mourning, and relieve distress. All these, when gratified, stir up pleasing emotions, and when disappointed unpleasing. Intimately connected with these —

V. There are the appetites, as of hunger, thirst, rest, of motion, or sex. They originate in the body, but they become mental. They crave for their objects, and this for their own sakes, not merely for the pleasure they

PEIMAEY APPETENCES. 13

give, or the pain from which their gratification delivers us. It is not the pleasure that gives rise to the appetite ; it is rather the action of the appetite that gives rise to the pleasure, — though doubtless the two move in the same direction, and each gives an impetus to the other.

VI. There is the love of society. This propensity appears among the lower animals, some tribes of which are gregarious. It comes forth in very early life among children, who draw towards others of about the same age. With some, as they advance in life, it becomes a strong and confirmed passion, so that they cannot live without the excitement produced by running round the circle of society, till they become giddy and fall. Solitude, except for a time to soothe the mind, is felt to be irksome by most people. Solitary confinement is one of the severest of punishments, and when carried out rigidly has been known to end in lunacy. It is to be observed that persons associate most pleasantly together when their trains of mental association run in the same direction, or parallel to each other. Hence it is that people of the same craft or profession, tradesmen, merchants, lawyers, doctors, preachers, students, teachers, are apt to meet with each other in larger or smaller companies. I have noticed that the most popular men and women in society are those whose trains of thought and of conversation, and whose opinions and sentiments, are in thorough accordance with the circles in which they move. The best liked people are those whose whole manner and style of remark is a sort of flattery to those they meet.

VII. There is a love of esteem, commendation, praise, glory, appearing also in early life, and capable of becoming a dominant passion. It is apt to associate itself with the motive last mentioned ; and the young delight in a smile, an approving word, or a gift from those whom they love, or with whom they associate, from father, mother, teacher, and sometimes stronger than any others, from companions. This principle, the desire to keep or retain the good opinion of others, often makes the tyranny exercised over boys by their companions, in workshop, in school, and college, more formidable than any wielded by the harshest masters or rulers. As persons advance in life it becomes a desire to stand well with the circle in which they move, their professional circle, or the gay circle, or the fashionable circle, or the respectable circle, or the good moral circle, or their religious circle, say, their congregation or the denomination of which they are members. The fear of losing the esteem or incurring the censure of their social set or party is sometimes a means of sustaining good resolutions, and of keeping people in the straight course ; quite as frequently it tempts to cowardice, as they have not the courage to do the right and oppose the evil, since it would make them unpopular. In the case of many the desire becomes a craving for reputation, a passion for fame, burning and flaming, and it may be consuming the soul. This often leads to. great deeds in war and in peace, in the common arts and in the fine arts, in literature and science. But being ill regulated or carried to excess it is often soured into jealousy, or envy, or issues in terrible disappointment. Being thwarted, it may become a love of notoriety, which commonly springs up in the breasts of persons who, having met with opposition, or failed to secure from the good the applause which they expected, perhaps by honorable means, or having incurred odium, possibly undeserved, are bent on having reputation by any kind of means, or from any sort of people. The passion may become so strong as to need no aid from the pleasure derived from

PKIMAEY APPETENCES. 15

it, — nay, may lead the man to injure his health and incur suffering, in order to secure posthumous fame of which he can never be conscious.

VIII. There is the love of power. It is conceivable that this motive might be generated by the love of pleasure and the aversion to pain, for in ordinary circumstances power enables us to multiply our enjoyments and to avoid suffering. But then it appears in so marked a form in individuals and in families that we are forced to conclude that it is native ; we discover that it is often inherited from ancestors. It is the grasping of power combined with the thirst for fame which constitutes ambition, the character of the ambition depending on the relative strength of the two elements : the former leading to the performance of more brilliant feats, but the other leading to the more determined action, the two united producing the men whom the world calls great, but who have often been the servants, or rather the very slaves, of their passions. The love of dominion is the most unrelenting of all the passions by which man can be swayed, being the power which gives its strength and persistence to tyranny under all its forms.

IX. There is the love of property, what is called acquisitiveness. This is often represented as springing from the love of power, always combined with the love of pleasure. Wealth gives us means of securing many kinds of enjoyment, and no doubt is commonly coveted because it is so associated in our minds. But there are cases in which the passion appears in very early life, and in which it is handed down from father to son, and runs in families. "We see it in an instinctive form in the lower animals, as when the dog hides his bones for future use.

It is necessary, in order to make our enumeration of primary springs of action complete, to mention two others ; but it will not be necessary to dwell upon them, as they will fall to be noticed more appropriately elsewhere.

X. There is the aesthetic sentiment, making us seek and delight in the beautiful, the picturesque, the humorous, and the sublime.

XL There is the moral sentiment, prompting us to seek and to do what is good. 1

From these leading forms as they mingle with each other and are influenced by circumstances, there proceed others, which are called : —

Section III. Secondary Appetences

From the time of Hobbes of Malmesbury, in the middle of the seventeenth century, there has been a tendency among metaphysicians to make the original inlets of knowledge as few as possible. Locke made them only two, sensation and reflection, and Condillac, with his followers in France, reduced them to one, sensation. For two centuries ingenuity strained itself to the utmost to derive all our ideas, even those of God and necessary truth and duty, from the two sources, or more frequently from one. I make this historical remark simply as introductory to another : that during the same period there was a like determination to diminish the original motive principles of the mind. Hobbes by a summary process referred all men's activities to motives drawn from pleasure and pain. During the last century and the beginning

1 See Dngald Stewart's Desires, in Active and Moral Powers, vol. i. I treat of the ^Esthetic Emotions in book second, chap. ii. I hope to treat of the Conscience and Will in another little volume.

SECONDARY APPETENCES. 17

of this, wasted labor was spent in showing that, given only one or a very few springs of action, the whole of man's conduct can «be explained by the association of ideas.

There has been a change in all that theorizing since Darwinism has become a power. All along thinkers not carried away by the dominant philosophy were slow to believe that there were no special intellectual powers, that there were no special propensities native to mankind generally, to races or individuals (Robert Burns doubted whether all sense of beauty could be explained by the association of ideas) ; for they thought they saw traces of these appearing at a very early age and going down in families. Since the doctrines of evolution and heredity have come into prominence, the current of opinion has entirely changed. Now the number of powers and propensities in human nature is supposed to have become so great by differentiation and specialization that it is impossible to enumerate them and difficult to classify them. Having tried to give a provisionally good arrangement of the primary appetences, let us now look at the others.