The method of the divine government, physical and moral

Book First

GENERAL VIEW OF THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT AS FITTED TO THROW LIGHT ON THE CHARACTER OF GOD.

CHAPTER LI.

Introduction

: PAwE

Srotron [L—Sources of our Idea of God, . 9 Secr. II.—Object of the Treatise ; Investigation of the Beaters of God, and the Conscience of Mian, or the External and Internal Govern-

‘CHAPTER IL.

GENERAL ASPECT OF THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT: PHENOMENA PRESENTED BY THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD, AND THE CON- ~ SCIENCE OF MAN, THOUGH COMMONLY OVERLOOKED.

Scr. 1—Instructive Views of God presented by His Government, ; 33 Szcr. I1.—The Existence of Extensive Suffering, Bodily and Mental, . 37 Srcr. IJ]. —The Restraints and Penalties of Divine Providence, . F 43 Sect. [V.—The Alienation of God from Man, ; ‘ ‘ ; 47 Szor. V.—The Alienation of Man from God, : : 52

Intustrative Nore (a).—The Religious History ‘of Mankind, : 55 Sror. VI—Schism in the Human Soul, : ; ; te : 65

Chapter III. The Actual World, And The View Which It Gives Of Its

GOVERNOR.

Sxcr. I—Particular Review of the Five Phenomena before specified, _. 68

Sxor. I].—Other General Phenomena fitted to throw Light on the Condition of the World, : : : : i 47 iv CONTENTS.

Book Second. Partioular Inquiry Into The Method Of The Divine Gov

ERNMENT IN THE PHYSICAL WORLD.

Chapter I. General Laws

Szor. L—Properties of Matter—Different Things denoted by the Phrase

“ Laws of Nature,” : : Intusrrative Nore. ealalinn of Cutie a Effect,

Secor. IL—Adjustment of the Material Substances, with their Propet to each other,

Sror. I1—Special AAfiatioiniia peated in bodes to prolee Gonatal Laws or Results, :

Intustrrative Notre Betas of ee ae Causes of Phenomena, Conditions of the Operation of Causes, Review of Whewell,

Sror. IV.—Wisdom displayed in the Pai ‘of Ghacedl nse ane observable Order in the World, Correspondence of External Nature to the Constitution of Man, Difference of Philosophy and Practical Sagacity, Science and Art, ‘ :

Secor. V.—Connection of God with His Works,

Srer. VL—Infinite Power and Wisdom required to governa World so constituted

Sxor. VI.—Unity of the Ritts Satara

CHAPTER IL.

THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD.

Secr, I—Isolated and Fortuitous Events resulting from the Adjustment of Material Substances to each other, Intustrative Nore (0)—Complexity of Hatue; Penland classified according as they are more or less Complicated, Review of the Positive Philosophy of M. Aug. Comte, Szor. Il—Powerful and Varied Means furnished by these Fortuities for the Accomplishment of the Divine Purposes, Intustrative Nore (p).—Combe’s Constitution of Man, ~Sror. I1L.—On a General and Particular Providence, Sxor. [V.—Method of Interpreting the Divine Providence, : Sgor. V.—Practical Influence of the various Views which may be taken of Divine Providence, Atheism, Pantheism, Superstition, True Faith, Sor, VI—Method of answering Prayer, and furthering Spiritual Ends,

Chapter III. Page

86 94

12¢ 151

159 162

181 193 196 201

218 226

RELATION OF THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD TO THE CHARACTER OF MAN,

Szcr. 1—General Remarks on the Relation of the Physical to the Moral Providence of God, ‘

7 ° *. . . .

CONTENTS. Vv e

Sxor. II.—Control which God has over Man by means of Physical Ar- ot te

rangements, ; . bi ; 240 Srcr. III—Aids to Virtue, Hi Reine s upon vice ; 244 Sror. IV.—State of Society when the Aids to Virtue and the Reseaues

upon Vice are withdrawn, : 251 Secor. V.—Adaptation of this World to Man, pander ag a iy Balled Beige, 259 Sror. VI—Explanation of the Mysteries of Divine Providence, furnished

by the Sinfulness of Man’s Character, . 2 : ‘ : 278

Book Third

PARTICULAR INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE HUMAN > MIND THROUGH WHICH GOD GOVERNS MANKIND.

CHAPTER I. ; MAN’S ORIGINAL AND INDESTRUCTIBLE MORAL NATURE. Sxcr. [—The Will or the Optative Faculty—Conditions of Responsibility, 278 Scr. I1—Responsibility and Freedom compatible with the Causal Connection of God with His Works, : 279 Intustrative Nore (£). nie of Canes id Effect in the Human Mind, : ‘ 291 Sxcr. I[L—Distinctions to iS anendod to in Ethical inthe ‘ 294 Secr. [V.—Inquiry into the Nature of Conscience, or the Mental Faculty or Feeling which draws the distinction between Right and Wrong, . 297 Secor. V.i—Common Quality of Virtuous Action, . 312 Sror. VI.—Practical Rule to be followed in NORTE hint is Good aid (ol 7 : ; 2 324 Secor. VII. ea edenicy of eee Action, 825 Szor. VIII—General View of Man’s Original Moral Goustitation: as ae trative of the Character of God, : : . : : 880 CHAPTER II.

ACTUAL MORAL STATE OF MAN.

Sxcr. I—Some peculiar Laws of the Working of Conscience, . : 884 Szor. I].—Influence of a Depraved Will upon the Moral Judgments, “ 839 Sxor. IJ]—Judgment pronounced by the Conscience upon the Character of Man, . : 852 Sror. IV.—Farther Inquiry ths ihe Giana ee more particalaxdy the Godliness of Man’s Character, : : 360 Srcr. V.—Theory of the Production of the Existing ‘Moval State of Man, a 372 Srcr. VI—State of the Conscience in the Depraved Nature, : 378

Sror. VIT.—Restraints laid upon Man a the Conscience—their Extent a Character, : : 4 7 ° 889 vi CONTENTS.

PAGE Sror, VIIL—On the Evil Effects produced by a Condemming Conscience, 394 Srcr. [X.—General Review of Man’s Existing Moral Nature, ; 408 CHAPTER III.

OTHER GOVERNING PRINCIPLES OF THE HUMAN MIND. Sxcr. L--Governing Principles neither Virtuous nor Vicious—The Appetites and Instinctive Desires, . > ' ‘ ‘ 415 Sect. I1—The same Subject.—The heaton . ‘ : ‘ 420 Secor. 11I.—Governing Principles that are Evil, . ° 425 Sxor. [V.—Influence exercised by these A ence in biasing ths Cal science, . 432 ILLUSTRATIVE om OTE (ny oo Vico (so called) an Vines running into each other, ; 440 Secor. V.—Summary of the Argument from the Ocnittined Fier of the Physical and the Moral, ; : , 445 ——————_=> o-< 0——__—_ BOOK FOURTH.

RESULTS—THE RECONCILIATION OF GOD AND MAN, CHAPTER I.

NATURE AND REVEALED RELIGION—THE CHARAOTER OF GOD. Srcr. —Advantage of Harmonizing Nature and Revelation, : ial 447 Secr. Il—Prevailing Defective Views of the Divine Character, . ; 452 Sxcr. I1l—Character of God as Revealed in Scripture, . : : 458

CHAPTER II.

RESTORATION OF MAN. ; Srcr. I.—Symptoms of Intended Restoration, : 464 Scr. I].—What is needful in order to the Restoration of Man —(1,) fs Relation to the Character of God, ; 469 Secr. III]—What is needful in order to the Restate of Man. ~(2,) in its Relation to the Character of Man. The need of an Interposition in the Human Heart and Character, ‘ 474 Secr. 1V.—Same Subject continued.—Means of ‘amd the iid, ‘ 481 Ittusrrative Nore (@).—The German Intuitional Theology, P 499

Secor V —The World to Come, 507

Preface

WE live in an age in which the reflecting portion of mankind are much addicted to the contemplation of the works of nature. It is the object. of the author in this Treatise to “ interrogate nature,” with the’ view of making her utter her voice in answer to some of the most important questions which the inquiring spirit of man can put.

He thinks it needful to state thus early that he proceeds on the inductive method in his inquiry, and not after the plan of those British Rationalists, on the one hand, who set out with a preconceived system which they dignify with the name of Rational, and then accommodate all that they see to it; nor of those German Intuitionalists, on the other hand, who boast that they can construct the existing universe by @ priori speculation.

To guard against misapprehension, he wishes it to be understood that he treats in this book of the Method of the Divine Government in the world rather than in the Church ; of the ordinary providence of God rather than his extraordinary dealings towards his redeemed people.

The reader of severe taste will be inclined to regard the Introductory Book as too loose and discursive; and all the apology that the Author has to offer is, that he was afraid of driving back the general reader, by leading him into the minutiz, before he had contemplated nature under its general aspect.

The general reader, on the other hand, may be disposed to complain, that the style of discussion followed in some of the Sections and Notes of the Second and Third Books is of too abstract a character. He has to justify himself to such by stating that he did not feel himself at liberty, in such an age as this, to avoid grappling with any of the difficulties that fell in his way; ~ and he has attempted to confute the wrong conclusion drawn by a superficial philosophy—by the principles of a deeper philosophy. He has, in most viii PREFACE.

cases, so constructed his work, that the general reader may pass over the more abstract portions (as, for instance some of the Illustrative Notes)* without losing the train of argument.

It is due to the memory of the late Dr. Chalmers to acknowledge, that had not the author enjoyed the inestimable privilege of sitting for four or five sessions at the feet of this illustrious man in the University of Edinburgh, he would, in all probability, never have had his thoughts directed in the train which he has followed, and have been without the spirit which he has sought to cultivate, as he would certainly have been without not a few of the principles which he has carried along with him in his investigations. It is with no feeling of presumption that he regards it proper to add, that did he not imagine that he had some truth to communicate not contained in the works of Dr. Chalmers, he would not have obtruded himself on the public notice, as it could never have occurred to him that he was able to state the ideas of Dr. Chalmers so clearly or impressively as he has done himself in his works, now so extensively circulated.

He has to acknowledge his obligations to Principal Cunningham, to Professor Buchanan, and to the Rey. Dr. Hanna, for the kind encouragement which they gave him to proceed with this work when submitted to them for their counsel ; as also to the two last-mentioned gentlemen and the Rev. John Mackenzie, Ratho, for their judicious assistance in overlooking these sheets as they passed through the press.

Breouin, January 1850.

* For example, the discussion on Cause and Effect at page 94.

METHOD OF THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT.

Book First

GENERAL VIEW OF THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT AS FITTED TO THROW LIGHT ON THE CHARACTER OF GOD.

CHAPTER [L—INTRODUCTION.

SECTION IL—SOURCES OF OUR IDEA OF GOD.

Suppose that the sun, rising and setting as at present, had been perpetually hid from the eye by an intervening cloud or shade which concealed his body without obstructing his beams, there might still have been a universal impression that a great luminary existed as the cause of the light which daily illuminated our globe. Different persons might have fixed on different objects as reflecting the light of heaven most impressively ; some on the fleecy or gilded clouds ; others on the lively verdure of the grass and forests, or on the cerulean ocean, or on the rich grain of autumn glistening in the yellow beams; but all would have rejoiced to conclude, that there was a sun behind the veil.

Though God is invisible to the bodily eye—though he is, as it were, behind a veil, yet the idea of his existence is pressed on the mind from a variety of quarters. Were it not so, the apprehension of, and belief in, a supernatural power or being would not be so universally entertained. The mind which refuses the light that comes from one region, is obliged to receive the light that comes from another quarter of the heavens or earth. It may be interesting to trace to its sources the most important conception which the human mind can form. |

First, THERE IS THE DESIGN EXHIBITED IN THE SEPARATE MATERIAL WORKS OF Gop.

An acquaintance with the depths of science is not needful, in order to enable mankind to appreciate this argument. Every person who has observed the springing of the grass and grain, or the budding of flowers, or who has taken but a passing survey of his own bodily frame, or of the sun, moon, and stars, has had the idea impressed upon his mind of reigning wisdom and love. 'The boy who has marked the instincts of birds in building their nests ; the shepherd who has watched the habits of his flocks and herds, and of the beasts of prey that attack them; the peasant who has attended to the migration of the swallow, or the cuckoo, or any other favorite bird, or who has noted the working of bees —their government and order in the hive in which he and his family feel so deep an interest—has seen enough to constrain him to acknowledge that there must be higher intelligence to instruct these creatures, which have manifestly nothing in themselves beyond blind and unreasoning instinct.

_ Socrates representing in this, as he did in everything else, the

philosophy of profound common sense—such as shrewd, observant, unsophisticated men in all ages have delighted in—has led the way in the statement of this branch of the evidence. “Is not the providence of God manifested in a remarkable manner, inasmuch as the eye of man, which is so delicate in its structure, hath provided for it eyelids like doors for protection, and which extend themselves whenever it is needful, and again close when sleep approaches?” ‘Js it not worthy of admiration that the ears should take in sounds of every sort, and yet not be too much filled with them?’ “That the fore-teeth of the animal should be formed in such a manner as is evidently best fitted for the cutting of its food, as those on the side are adapted for grinding it to pieces ?”

It is pleasant to reflect that God hath so arranged his providence, and so constituted man, that it does not require an acquaintance with abstruse science, to enable mankind to attain to a knowledge of God. But while scientific knowledge is not required, in order to produce the conviction in the first instance, it is gratifying to find that physical research in every department of nature multiplies the proof by exhibiting an indefinite number of new adaptations. Every new discovery in science yields its contribution to the proofs and illustrations of the wisdom, power, and goodness of God. ‘This scientific argument was prosecuted, as far as anwe cient science admitted, by Cicero in his Treatise on the Nature of the Gods. In modern times, it was followed out by Derham and Ray; at a later date, Paley became its most elegant and judicious expounder, and it has kept pace with modern science in the Bridgewater Treatises and the Fragmentary Works of Sir Charles Bell. |

There is nothing abstruse, or complicated, or mysterious in the chain of reasoning which leads us to believe in a supernatural intelligence, or rather in the single link which connects the works of God and the worker. It is represented by Dr. Thomas Reid, as containing in its logical form two propositions—the major, that design may be traced from its effects; and the minor, that there are appearances of design in the universe.* It is one of the most

* “The argument from final causes,” says Dr. Reid, “when reduced to a syllogism, has these two premises. First, that design and intelligence in the cause may with certainty be inferred frora marks or signs of it in the effect. This is the principle we have been considering, and we may call it the major proposition of the argument. The second, which we call the minor proposition, is, that there are in fact the clearest marks of design and wisdom in the works of nature; and the conclusion is, that the works of nature are the effects of a wise and intelligent cause. One must either assent to the conclusion, or deny one or other of the premises.” (Essay vi.c. vi.) The French Atheistical School, headed by M. Aug. Comte, would at times cast doubts on the second proposition, and explain away some of the supposed marks of design, dwelt upon by writers on natural theology. But in doing so, it may be invariably remarked, that they only succeed in referring a given adaptation to a more general cause; and they do not seem to reflect that we are ready to follow them thither, and to point out the adaptation there, possibly under a double form, or one adaptation adjusted so as to produce another. When we point, for instance, to the eye, as showing such thought, such care, such refinement, such advantage taken of the properties of natural agents, “and fitted,” as Sir John Herschell remarks, “to force upon us a conviction of deliberate choice and premeditated design, more strongly perhaps than any single contrivance to be found in art,” the Atheist contents himself with saying, that the eye is produced by that law of nature according to which children resemble their parents ; and he forgets that we follow him from the child to the parent, and there discover the very same adaptation ; with this farther adaptation, that the parent’s frame is so constructed as to be able to produce an offspring after his own likeness.

And all the miserable cavils of the Atheistical school leave a host of traces of design undenied and even untouched. As the second proposition cannot be denied with any appearance of plausibility, they set themselves with most vigor to attack the first, and represent all the apparent traces of design as mere “conditions of existence.” “The provision made for the stability of the solar system,” says M. Comte, “is no evidence of a final cause. The pretended final cause reduces itself, as has been seen in all analogous occasions, to this puerile observation—there are no stars inhabited but those that are habitable. They return, in a word, to the principle of the conditions of existence, which is the true positive transformation of the doctrine of final causes, and of which the fertility and bearing are vastly greater.” If there be any logical force in this recommon of all kinds of argument, and is altogether suited to man’s habits of observing and thinking. Every man is obliged to proceed on the argument, in the acquisition of necessary secular knowledge, and the discharge of the ordinary business of life.

SEconDLY, THERE ARE THE RELATIONS WHICH THE PHYSI- CAL WORLD BEARS TO MAN, WHICH WE CALL THE PROVIDENTIAL ARRANGEMENTS OF THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT.

In observing these, the mind rises beyond. mere isolated material objects and laws, and even beyond the relations between them, to contemplate the grand results in the dealings of God towards his creatures. It is to this Jatter class of facts that the majority of mankind look rather than to the other. An extended observation of the nice adjustments in material objects requires a kind of “microscopic eye and a habit of fixed attention, such as the great mass of mankind do not possess; and men generally look not so much to these-as to prominent events cognizable by the senses without any minute inspection, and which indeed force - themselves upon the attention; the providential care of God, and the restraints of his government, being not so much isolated adaptations as the grand results in their bearings upon mankind to which these adaptations lead. ‘The common mind, unaccustomed to dissection, can prosecute the scientific argument, and the observation on which it proceeds, but a very little way; but mark, it must be held as affirming that no adjustments, however numerous and strikingly applied to secure an end, can be held as evidential of design. Now, let us apply this to the common illustration, We lift a watch, found lying on a bare common, and examine it, and are about to conclude that it must have had a maker, when M. Comte comes to us and assures us that all this adaptation of wheel, and axle, and notch, and hand, and figure, is but the condition of the existence of the watch. True, it is the condition of the existence of the watch, but it is a proof too of a designing mind arranging the condition. We certainly hold the remark to be sufficiently “puerile,” and the sneer reared upon it to be sufficiently profane. “ At this present time, for minds properly familiarized with true astronomical philosophy, the heavens display no other glory than that of Hipparchus, of Kepler, of Newton. and of all who have helped to establish these laws.” No persons were more willing to admit than the parties now named, that the laws which they discovered, must have existed before they could discover them; and that the glory belongs to Him who established these laws, and to them but the reflected glory of having first interpreted them to mankind. Once admit, as we think the rational mind cannot but admit, that adjustments towards a given end, if sufficiently numerous and striking may be held as proving the existence of a designing mind, and the number and nature of such adjustments in the universe will at once force upon us the conclusion that this world has a presiding intelligence.—(See Pos. Phil. vol. ii. pp. 28, 39.)

this other it can pursue toa great length. Inquire into the ground of the belief in the existence of God, entertained by the working man or man of business, and you will probably find it not an ingenious observation of his own frame, or of any material object, but of the care which God takes of him, and the judgments with which from time to time he visits the world. It is this latter observation which falls in most readily with his habitual train of thought and feeling, and which comes home most powerfully to his heart and experience.

The argument under this second head is not different in its logical nature from the former; but the class of objects on which it is founded is different. And it is, as we apprehend, the class of phenomena now referred to, which raises the mind to the idea of a God above nature and ruling over it. “As the consideration of nature,” says a sagacious thinker, “shows an inherent intelligence, which may also be conceived as coherent with nature, so does history, on a hundged occasions, show an intelligence which is distinct from nature, which conducts and determines those things which may seem to us accidental; and it is not true that the study of history weakens the belief in a divine providence. History is of all kinds of knowledge the one which tends most decidedly to that belief’’* There is ground for the remark here made, both as to the effect usually produced by the contemplation of nature, and the impression left by the intelligent contemplation of history. He who confines his attention to the mere structure and laws of physical nature, is apt to speak and think of God as merely a kind of intelligent principle inherent in, and coherent with, nature. It is when we contemplate the dealings of God towards the human race, whether in the events of past history, (to which Niebuhr more particularly refers,) or in those which fall under our observation and experience, that we rise to the idea of a God distinct from nature and above nature, controlling and governing it. “God,” says Leibnitz, “has the qualities of a good governor as well as of a great. architect.”t The physical inquirer discovers the qualities that indicate the former of these, and speaks of God as a great architect, or an ingenious mechanician, or an unrivalled artist. It is from a survey of the events of providence, being the combination and results of those

* Niebuhr’s Lectures, vol. i. p. 146. + Essays on the Goodness of God.—P. iii. « .

laws which the man of science investiga.es severally, that we rise to enlarged views of the Governor of the universe.

THIRDLY, T'HERE IS THE HUMAN SOUL WITH ITS CONSCIOUS- NESS, ITS INTELLIGENCE, AND ITS BENIGN FEELINGS.

A reference is made to these at present, not as the agents by which the process of proof is conducted, but as the objects contemplated, and on which the proof rests. ‘The human reason must be the instrument employed in every branch of the argument, and whatever be the data on which it proceeds; but in the case now before us, the reason finds its data in the mind itself.

It is never to be forgotten, that apart from a reflex contemplation of the human soul, it is impossible to rise to the conception of a living and intelligent God. It is in the human soul, small though it be when compared with the object reflected, that we are to discover most distinctly represented the image of a spiritual God. Without taking human consciousness and intelligence and feeling into view, God could be conceived of as a mere principle of mechanism, or order in nature, or a power of fate, or a law of development above nature, (as with Schelling,) rather than a*real and living agent. It is the possession of consciousness and intelligent purpose by man that suggests the idea of a conscious and a personal God. From what we have ourselves experienced, we know that intelligence is needful, in order to produce such effects as exist in nature around us; and thence we rise in our conceptions to a living soul presiding over the universe and regulating it, not according to a mere law of mechanism or development, but by the wisdom of spiritual intelligence and love.

The very existence of the human soul asa created object, which it evidently is, implies an intelligent soul as its creator, and that a soul of a prodigious compass of power and intelligence. If the creation of the beautiful forms of matter argues an extraordinary power and skill, does not the creation of spiritual intelligent being, impress us still more with the knowledge and wisdom of the Creator ? ;

Some think that the proof of the existence of God, derived from the human soul, can be stretched much farther; and they find among the depths of the human mind, and among its necessary ideas, what they reckon the most solid and conclusive of all arguments. The attempt of this nature in a former age by Newton and Clarke in this country, is now generally regarded as unsuccessful; but the failure of these giant intellects has not prevented the German philosophers, and those French writers of the Eclectic School, who have entered so much into the German spirit, from boldly renewing the attempt made by the schoolmen to construct an arguinent for the Divine existence, from ideas independent of all experience. In such metaphysical disquisitions, it is often dif. ficult to determine whether the discussion does not turn upon mental abstractions rather than realities. In this treatise, at least, we are not disposed to push the argument farther than the mind can easily follow it. We are contemplating the arguments which do, in fact, lead mankind in general upwards to the conception of a supernatural power, rather than those speculations which may carry conviction to those who habitually dwell in the profundities of abstract philosophy. For the purpose at present in view, it is enough to insist that it is by the human consciousness and intelligence that the idea of a personal, a spiritual, and an all-wise God is suggested, and by which there is furnished the most convincing evidence of His being and some of His highest perfections.

FourRTHLY, THERE ARE THE MORAL QUALITIES OF MAN.

We refer more particularly to the conscience. This conscience isin allmen. Man has not only powers of understanding, such as the memory, the imagination, and the judgment ; not only feelings and emotions, such as love, hope, fear—he has likewise a higher faculty or sense, which judges by its own law of evely other principle of the mind, and claims authority over it. Just as all men think and reason by the powers of the understanding, and as all men feel by their emotional nature, so all men have some sense (it may be very faint and imperfect) of the distinction between good and evil, by means of the moral power or powers with which God has endowed them.

For the proof of the existence of the conscience, we appeal with Butler and Mackintosh to the consciousness. We have only to compare our nature with that of the brute creation, to discover at once that there is some such principle in the human mind. The lower animals we find so far resembling man, that they are possessed of certain appetites and propensities, but they have no regulating, in short, no moral principle. Following their impulses spontaneously, they gratify them; and no blame attaches to them, and they feel no reproaches or compunctions of conscience. But let man proceed to gratify the appetites and passions of his nature to excess, and in an irregular way, and he meets with some check, (it may be a feeble one,) warning him at the time, and followed by reproach ; something which, if it does not proclaim aloud, at least whispers in accents loud enough to be heard, that he is doing wrong. Unable, it may be, to stem the strong current of the evil passions, this conscience is yet like a breaker placed in the midst of the stream, which if it does not stop the torrent, at least announces its own existence and its purpose by the agitation which it produces.

Now, the conscience is a ready and powerful means of suggesting the idea of God to the mind. We believe that it is by it, rather than by any careful observation of nature, material or spiritual, that mankind have their thoughts directed to God. It is not so much by what he sees around him, as by what he feels within, that man is led to believe in a ruler of the world. A conscience, speaking as one having authority, and in behalf of God, is the monitor by which he is reminded most frequently and emphatically of his Governor and his Judge.