Preface
HHHIS WORK is designed for students in academies, high schools, and collegiate institutions. The writer, during many years' experience as a teacher in a seminary in which Psychology has been one of his principal branches, has found no suitable text-book, though he has sought it diligently, and has examined many volumes. The experience of other instructors, as reported to him, is the same. Whatever faults may exist in this presentation — and it would be strange if there were not some — it is, at least, very nearly what the writer would desire for his own classes.
It is what its title designates it, Rudimentary Psychology. There is very little effort at original discussion or speculation. It is an attempt to present in a clear and easily apprehensible form, with due regard both to scientific requirements and to the consensus of the best and most recent authorities, the main facts of Psychology. The more abstruse parts of the study have been omitted. Unnecessary technical terms, and such as are difficult to understand, have been avoided, and simple language has been used wherever it did not involve too much circumvi PREFACE.
locution. At the same time there is no affected juvenility of expression.
The writer has drawn freely upon the best authorities, but he has written very little which has not been through the crucible of his own mind. Among the authors made use of, Dr. Hopkins is the most prominent, and his views have been largely, but not wholly, adopted. Dr. Porter, Dr. Hickok, Sir William Hamilton, Reid, Stewart, Fleming, McCosh, and many minor writers have been freely consulted.
In the arrangement of topics the logical method has not been wholly followed, but rather the order in which the different phenomena present themselves to the mind. There are some faculties and powers of the soul upon which others are conditioned, and which, for that reason, might seem to demand prior consideration, but which are more subtle and abstruse, and less easily understood, than the others, and therefore were better deferred for later explanation and elucidation. Concrete illustrations have been used so far as the limits of the work would permit, as the writer has learned by experience that abstract science without such instances is, to young students at least, of little value.
The work is intended for a one-term study, with daily recitations. This will afford ample opportunity for special instruction, and for amplification on particular points.
A knowledge of one's self is of the first importance from the beginning to the end of education ; and a knowledge of one's self is essentially a knowledge of the powers
PREFACE. vii
and operations of the soul. That even a high school or academic education should conclude without a certain degree of such knowledge, would be a misfortune. At present our schools are seriously lacking in facilities for this study. Whether this attempt to increase these facilities will be successful, is yet to be determined.
The author desires to acknowledge his indebtedness to Miss Louise M. Hodgkins, professor of English literature in Wellesley College, for the examination of manuscript, and to Professor Benjamin Gill, of Wesleyan Academy, for reading the proof-sheets, and to both for valuable
suggestions.
GEO. M. STEELE.
WlLBRAHAM, MASS.,
January, 1890.
Contents
INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER.
MEANING AND SCOPE OF PSYCHOLOGY.
PAGE
Chapter I. Sense-perception
PAGE
Presentative Faculties described. —How can the Soul come into Communication with the External World ? — The Senses. — The Sensorium. — Sensation a State of Mind. — Perception. — Sensation and Perception defined. — Sensation Subjective, Perception Objective, 19
Chapter II. Hoav We Become Acquainted With The Outer World
Not directly through one or more of the Senses. — Sense of Smell. — No Intimation of Externality. — Taste not Separable wholly from Touch. — A Purely Mental State. — Hearing ; Nothing External cognized. — Sight ; Sense of Color. — The Knowledge Subjective. — Touch; Something besides Tactual Effect. — Pressure. — Knowledge of Externality not through Sense alone. — Through Resistance in connection with Touch. — Sensations Signs of External Objects, 22
Chapter III. Acquired Perceptions
Each Sense a Borrower from the Other. — Distance and Weight estimated by the Eye. — Also Certain States of the Mind. — Manifold Increase of Knowledge by this means. — Acquired Perception sometimes Deceptive, but Original Perceptions are not; Instances. — In the Destruction of One Sense the Others rendered more Acute. — Sight supplying Place of Hearing ; and Hearing and Touch, of Sight, 27
Chapter IV. Nature Of Knowledge Acquired By Sense-perception
Of Individuals and not of Classes. — What do we perceive? — Qualities and not Substances. — Perception only One of the Elements of Knowledge. — Primary and Secondary Qualities of Matter. — Hamilton's Division of Qualities into Primary, Secundo-Primary, and Secondary 33
CONTENTS. xi
Chapter V. Attention
PAGE
The Mind Active and not merely Passive. — Meaning of Attention. — Seeming Inattention not always Actual. — Difference in Degrees of Attention. —Difficulty of fixing Attention. — Exceptional Intensity. — Can the Mind attend to more than One Thing at a time ? — Hamilton's Views. — Judgment and Comparison make Simultaneity Necessary. — How Many Things can the Mind attend to at once ? — Intensity Inversely as the Number. — Remarkable Instances. — Attention and the Will. — Hamilton's Three Degrees of Attention. — Reflection as distinguished from Attention 37
Chapter VI. The Inner-sense
External and Internal Phenomena. — How we know the Latter. — The Name of This Faculty. — Not properly " Consciousness." — Not " Self-Consciousness." — " Internal Perception." — " Inner-Sense " the least objectionable. — Its High Authority. — Sole Reliance in the Study of Psychology. — Relation to Attention. — Does it take Cognizance of all our Mental States ? — Facts bearing in Both Directions. — Reasons for believing that the Inner-Sense sometimes cognizes what it does not particularly notice. — States of Mind not cognized by the Inner Sense 43
Chapter VII. Consciousness
Two Different Uses of the Term. — Three Characteristics of Consciousness. — Formula of Consciousness in the Narrower Sense. — Objection to this. — Hamilton's Doctrine of Consciousness. — The Real Significance of Consciousness. — Dr. Hopkins's Definition. — The Proper Formula. — Physical Analogy. — Not under Control of the Will 48 xii CONTENTS.
Chapter I. The Representative Faculty Described
PAGE
Recurrent Ideas and Cognitions. — Dr. Porter's Definition. — A Power of the Mind itself. — Dr. Hopkins's " Mental Current." —The Recurrent States cannot he excluded. — Subject to Laws 55
Chapter II
Dr. Hickok's Statement and Illustration. — Definition by Isaac Taylor. — " Suggestion." — Two Classes of Laws. — Primary Laws: Place, Time, Resemblance, Contrast, Cause and Effect, Means and End. — These Principles sufficient to account for all the Phenomena. — May be placed in three Groups. -- Attempt to reduce to One Principle, not successful. — Secondary Principles of Association: Vividness, Recency, Repetition, Mental Peculiarities, Attention. — Causes of Suggestion not always Traceable. — These Principles all Natural Laws. — How far, and in what Manner, the Soul can influence the Order of Representation. — No Direct Influence. — Can give Attention to One rather than to Another Presentation. — Discipline Necessary to do this effectually 57
Chapter III. Forms Which The Representative Product Assumes
Three Forms. — Fantasy defined. — Distinguished from Memory and Imagination. — Spontaneous. — Fancy and Fantasy. — Memory : the Mind's Power to retain Cognitions and other States once experienced. — Two Functions of Memory. — Two Kinds of Reproduction. Spontaneous and Voluntary. — How the Latter operates. — Recollection. — Importance of Memory. — Essential to All Operations of
CONTENTS. xin
PAGE
the Intellect. — Varieties of Memory. — Instances. — Circumstantial Memory. — Logical Memory. — Verbal Memory. — Difference in the Power of Memory. — Extraordinary Instances. — Powerful Memory not Incompatible with Great Intellectuality. — Instances. — Cultivation of the Memory. — Mnemonic Systems. — Rules for Improvement of Memory. — Trusting the Memory. — Careful Attention.
— Imperfect Reading. — Association. — System and Order. — Relation to Writing and Extemporaneous Speaking. — Imagination: Definition. — Differs from Generalization, Conception, Fantasy, and Memory. — A Creative, not a mere Image-making Power.
— Two Grades, Recombination and Original Construction. — Illustrations. — Originality. — Office in Mechanical Invention. — Invention of a Machine. — Exists first in the Mind; Imagination mainly involved. — Something more than Recombination. — Creative not in the Extreme Sense but in the Ordinary. — Difference between Imagination and Invention 68
Chapter IV. Relation Of The Imagination To Some Other Faculties
As related to Memory. — To Judgment. — To Reasoning. — To Taste. — Active and Passive Imagination. — A Real Distinction .... 82
Chapter V. Utility Of The Imagination
Often regarded as merely Ornamental. — Use and Beauty not antagonistic. — Useful to Writers and Speakers. — Essential to Vivid Description. — Essential in Invention. — In Enterprise and Affairs; Napoleon. — Connection with Science. — Ideals and Character . . 85
Chapter VI. Cultivation Of The Imagination
Strengthened by Use and impaired by Disuse. — Physical Analogy. — Study of Great Masters. — Study of Nature. — Illustrations .... 89 xiv CONTENTS.
Chapter I. Thought And Thinking
PAGE
Previous Presentations. — Individuals, not Classes. — Intuitive as distinguished from Elaborative. — Thought and Thinking. — Restriction of " Thought " to Discursive Operations. — The Different Classes of Phenomena. — Efficiency and Importance of Thought. — Illustrative Instance 95
Chapter II. Conception And Concepts
Double Meaning of " Conception." — Conception, the Power and Process; Concept, the Product. — Several Distinct Operations. — Not always conscious of the Process of Cognition, still there is a Process. — First Process that of Analysis. — Abstraction, Comparison, Generalization, Denomination. — Formation thus of a Class or Concept. — Concept of a Quality, or of a Class. — Concept denned. — Individuals in same Concept differ, and yet are alike. — Higher and Lower Concepts. — Classes of Classes. — Going from the Individual to the Summum Genus, the Number of Objects increases, and the Number of Qualities decreases, and vice versa. — The Two Wholes of Extension and Intension. — Summum Genus and Infima Species. — The Individual physically, but not logically divisible. — Absolute Summum Genus. — Importance of Accurate Conceptions. — The Three Great Virtues of Conception. — Clearness, Distinctness, Adequateness. — Division and Definition. — Office of Each. — Rules for Division. — 1. Must proceed from Genera to Species. — 2. One Fundamental Principle. —3. Mutually Exclusive. — 4. Sum of Parts equal to Whole. — 5. Not by Negatives. — Logical and Physical Division. — Importance of Division. — Rules for Definition. — 1. By Essential Marks. Species = Genus + Specific Difference. — 2. Definition should not include the Name of the Thing to be defined. — 3. Must include all the Objects to be defined and Nothing more. — 4. Must not be by Negatives. — 5. Free from Surplus Words 99
CONTENTS. XV
Chapter III, Judgment
PAGE
Definition. —Judgments and Propositions. — Predicate and Subject.— Analysis of a Judgment. — Judgments Classified. — Quantities, Universal, Particular, and Singular. — Distributed Terms. — Qualities, Affirmative and Negative. — Four Kinds of Judgments. —Distributed Predicate. — Judgments, Categorical and Hypothetical. — Hypothetical Judgments as Conditional, Disjunctive, and Dilemrnatic. — Problematic, Assertory, and Apodictic Judgments. — Judgment the Essential Factor in all Thought. — Primitive Judgment. — All real Thinking is essentially Judging. — A Perpetual Mental Operation. — Hamilton on the Functions of Judgment 114
Chapter IV. Reasoning And Inference
Definition of Reasoning. — Basis in the Nature of Things. — Deductive and Inductive. — Difference between Reasoning and Inference. — Analytic and Synthetic Reasoning. — Inference, Immediate and Mediate. — Several Forms of Immediate Reasoning. — Opposition. — Contrary, Sub-contrary, Subaltern, and Contradictory Opposition. — Value of this Means of Inference. — Conversion: Definition. — Rule for Conversion. — Different Kinds of Conversion. — Utility of this Kind of Inference. — Mediate Inference. — Three Judgments involved, but related. — Arguments. — The Syllogism. — Analysis of it. — Function of the Middle Term. —Aristotelian Dictum; Hamilton's Maxim. — Dr. Hopkins's Objection to these. — Necessity of beginni ig with Propositions on which All are agreed. — Different Kinds of Syllogisms. — Categorical and Hypothetical. — Conditional Syllogisms. — Rules. — The Disjunctive Syllogism. — Its Principle. — Modus Tollendo Ponens. — Modus Ponendo Tollens. — Dilemmatic Syllogisms. — Three Forms. — Famous Dilemma of Demosthenes against iEschines 122 xvi CONTENTS.
Chapter V. Induction
PAGE
How to ascertain the Facts from which to reason. — Meaning of Induction. — Absolute Certainty not Attainable. — Fair Presumptions furnished. — Two Determining Principles. — 1. Enumeration of All Particulars. — Nothing gained by this. — 2. Principle of a Common Cause. — The Underlying Axiom. — Uniformity of Nature not an Axiom, but Uniformity of Causation is. — Can Induction be brought under tbe Form of the Syllogism ? — Difference of Opinion. — Exact Induction not much used. — Great Practical Value of General Induction. — Dr. Porter's Illustration. — Analogy and Experience. — Meaning of Analogy. — Its Use. — How Experience differs from Analogy. — Induction among the Uneducated. — Achievements of Scientific Induction. — Illustration 138
Chapter VI. Demonstrative And Probable Reasoning
Difference between them. — The Term "Probable" misleading.— Practical Certainty. — Three Kinds of Evidence. — Testimony. — Probahle in Itself. — Substantia] Agreement of Witnesses. — Limitation. — Things to be taken into Account. — Absurdity of rejecting Testimony where no Defects exist. — Circumstantial Evidence. — Its Nature. — Dr. Wayland's Three Rules. — Application to a Concrete Case 146
PAKT IV.
THE REGULATIVE FACULTY.
Chapter I. Nature Of The Regulative Cognitions
Explanation of Terms. — Why not considered Earlier. —These Cognitions not through any of the Powers previously described. — Three Characteristics. — Origin of the Idea of " Substance." — Known as certainly as Qualities. — Not an Inference. — An Immediate and Necessary Cognition is Essential to all other Knowledge 155
CONTENTS. xvn
Chapter II. The Faculty Which Furnishes These Cognitions
PAGE
No Agreement as to the Name. — " Regulative Faculty."— " Intuition." — Objection. — Objection to " Reason." — " The Common Sense" — General Names of the Cognitions. — Logically First in Order but Last to be Apprehended 159
Chapter III. Products Of This Faculty
Being or Existence. — Space. — Space Subjective or Objective? — Time: Origin of this Notion. — Personal Identity. — Its Origin and Nature. — Number.— Resemblance : Basis of All Classification and All Science. — The Infinite : not a Necessary Idea. — Possible Origin. — Substance and Motion. — By Some regarded as Necessary, by Others as not. — Motion as given by Perception. — Other Necessary Ideas. — Truths as distinguished from Ideas. — First Truths. — Characteristics. — Distinguishing Marks of these Ideas and Truths . 161
DIVISION SECOND.
THE SENSIBILITIES.
Chapter I
GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE SENSIBILITIES, AND THEIR RELATION TO THE INTELLECT.
Tri-partite Division of the Soul. — Function of the Sensibilities. — Sensation and the Sensibilities. — Relation of Sensibilities to the Intellect. — Some Form of Good radical in All Products of the Sensibilities. — Evil and Good. — Different Meanings of Good. — Divisions of the Sensibilities 171 xviii CONTENTS.
Chapter II. The Emotions
PAGE
Emotion used in Two Senses. — Definition.— Beauty. — Its Double Sense. — Subjective and Objective. — 2s ot confined to Material Objects. — Not to be confounded with Utility. — Deformity. — Is there a Standard of Beauty ? — Differences resulting from Differences of Culture. — Grandeur and Sublimity. — Akin to Beauty. — More Powerful Emotions than Beauty. —Hamilton's Three Forms of Sublimity. —Moral Sublimity. — The Ludicrous. —Not Easily defined. — Its Occasions. — Incongruity a Prominent Element. — Wit. —Its Meaning formerly Wider than now.— Higher Form of the Ludicrous. — Dr. Barrow's Description. — Burnett. — Dr. Upham. — Burlesque. — Hudibras. — Irving. — Difference between Wit and Humor. —The Ludicrous dots not imply Contempt. — Utility of the Ludicrous. — Liable to Abuse. — Its Benefits. —Danger of Sarcasm . . 174
Chapter III. The Emotions - Continued
Good as a Product to be reckoned among the Necessary Ideas. — So also of Beauty and the Ludicrous. — Difficulty about the Name of this Power. — " Affective Reason."— The Self-regarding Emotions. Cheerfulness. -^Partly a Matter of Temperament. — Its Higher Forms. — Dejection. — Sorrow ; not the Same as Dejection. — Self-Respect. — How it differs from Self-Love. — From Self-Esteem.
— Self-Complacency. — Self-Satisf action. — Self-Sufficiency. — All These have their Normal Spheres. — Pride defined. —Distinguished from Vanity. — Egotism. — The Opposite Emotions. — Displeasure. Disgust. — Indignation. — Surprise. — Astonishment. — Wonder. — How These differ. — Their Utility. —Reverence. — Hope and Fear.
— Matter of Doubt. —Meaning of Hope. — Its Utility. — Double Meaning of Fear. — Not the Exact Opposite of Hope. —Alarm. — Terror. — Horror 185
CONTENTS. xix
Chapter IV. The Moral Emotions
PAGE
Relation to Ethics. — Determination of Right and Wrong. — Occasions of Moral Emotions. — Three Cases. —1. Obligation, Judgment, Conscience—Limited Function of Conscience; a Simple Impulsive Faculty. — 2. Approval and Disapproval of Our Own Acts. — 3. Approval and Disapproval of Acts of Others. —Repentance and Penitence. — Contrition, Compunction, and Remorse. — Faith .... 193
Chapter V. The Appetites
How Appetites and Desires differ from Emotions. — What Appetites and Desires have in Common. — Appetites defined. — Have their Causes in the Body. — Periodicity. — Kinds. — Object. — Self-limiting. — Possible Abuse. — Artificial Appetites. — Narcotics. — Alcohol. — Normal becoming Abnormal. — Instincts. — Definition. — Not without Design. —Intelligence, but not of the Subjects. — Incapable of Improvement. — Human Instincts. — Inverse Ratio of Instinct and Intelligence. — Instincts of Children. — Men do Certain Things entirely by Instinct 197
Chapter VI. The Desires
Definition. — Different Kinds. — Continued Existence ; Instinctive and Voluntary. —Desire of Property. — Design of this Desire. —Curiosity. — Its Universality; its Utility. — Desire of Power. — Normal, but may be abused. — Ambition. — Desire of Esteem. — A Proper Desire. — Not necessarily Selfish. — Limitations. —Vanity.
— Society, Liberty, and Happiness. — Doubtful if to be classed here.
— No Man Sufficient to Himself. — Society a Condition Men are born into. — The Desire of Happiness, or of Good : the Same as Self-Love. — Differs from Other Desires in that it depends on them for Gratification ; does not lie Proximate to the Will. — Self-Love and Selfishness. — Desire of Liberty : Relation to Other Desires. —
A Simple Definition 204
XX CONTENTS.
Chapter VII. The Benevolent Affections
PAGE
How Affections differ from Desires. — Characteristic Element. — Aversion. — Classification as Benevolent and Malevolent objected to. — Beneficent and Defensive or Punitive. — Affections purely- Personal. — Love of Kindred. — Earliest and most Primitive.— Parental Love. — Mainly Instinctive. — But the Subject of Culture.
— Its Utility. — Filial Love. — An Implanted and Abiding Principle. — Fraternal Affection. — Friendship. — Gratitude. — Something more than a Mere Feeling. — Kindness awakens Affection. — Patriotism. — Conspicuous under a Popular Form of Government.
— National Life. — National Consciousness and Sensibility. — Philanthropy. — A Positive Affection. — Not Exceptional nor Local.
— Benevolent Enterprises. — Reformatory Movements. — Noted Philanthropists. — In Barbarous Tribes. — Sympathy. — Not a Simple Emotion. — Affected by the Emotions of Others. — More affected by Adversities of Others than by their Prosperities. — Reasons for the Difference. — Difference between it and Commiseration and Compassion. — Not Pity. — Pity and Commiseration 211
Chapter VIII. The Malevolent Ob Maleficent Affections
Reasons for adhering to These Terms. — Anger. — Basis of All Malevolent Affections. - Instinctive and Voluntary. — May be diminished or enhanced by Reflection. — Affected by Imagination. —Instinctive Anger. — Culpable in Persons of Culture. — Not necessarily wholly Inconsistent with Our Constitution. — A Proper Place and Use for it. — Instinctive Resentment, no Moral Character. — Voluntary Resentment, how far Justifiable. — Different Kinds of Resentment. — Indignation, Wrath, Rage, Fury, Revenge, Envy, Jealousy. — Peculiarity of the Last 222
CONTENTS. xxi
DIVISION THIRD.
THE WILL.
Chapter I. General Characteristics Of The Will
PAGE
Recapitulation. — Intimate Relations of the Three Divisions of the Soul. — What is the Will ?— Not an Entity, but a Power. —Definitions: Hopkins, Reid, "Whedon. — Acts with Reference to the Other Powers. —Illustration. — The Real Act of the "Will. — Volition follows Choice, but not necessarily. — Choice Incomplete in itself. — Two Constituents of the Will, Choice and "Volition. — Will conditioned on Other Acts. — Volition not Physical Effort 231
Chapter II. Choice And Motive
Motive not a Part nor a Cause of the Willing, but an Essential Condition. — Condition differs from Cause. — Conflicting Motives. — Classes of Motives. — Alternatives of Duty and Pleasure. — Subsidiary Motives. — No Choice compelled, — Choice not Preference. — Determination 236
Chapter III. Man As A Free Agent
Free only within Certain Limits. — Neither Body, nor Intellect, nor Sensibilities absolutely Free. — Even the Will has its Freedom restricted. — Must choose between Contradictory Alternatives.
— Liberty of Choice not Liberty of Action. — Conflicting Influences.
— But Freedom Absolute within its Sphere. — Testimony of Consciousness. — Universal Conviction. — Approval and Disapproval of Acts of Others. — Responsibility implies Freedom. — Judgment modified by Circumstances. — Power of the Will and the Influences affecting it Variable. — If the Influences are Controlling, then there is no Will. — Weakness and Strength of Will depend on the Subject 239 xxii CONTENTS.
Chapter IV. The Will Not A Susceptibility, But A Power
PAGE
Effect of the Composition of Forces. — Dr. Schuyler's Illustration. — Motive the Reason why, but not the Cause. — The Will a First Cause.
— A Finite First Cause just as Real as an Infinite First Cause. —
A Supernatural Power. — Man the Master of his Cravings .... 244
Chapter V. Moral Choice
Preliminary Deliberation. — Sometimes a Protracted Struggle, and sometimes an Immediate Decision. — Usually between Self-Interest and Duty. — Deliberation in Other Cases, but more easily settled.
— Difference in the Consequences. — This Distinction not wholly Clear. — A Tinge of Obligation even in Self-regarding Desires. — Illustration. — Will in Relation to Construction of Character. — Order of Relative Importance among the Principles involved in the Making of Character. — Law of Right Paramount. — Will as a Governing Purpose. — The Final and Supreme End of Action. — The Opposite Interest 247
Chapter VI. Complete Individual Liberty
Liberty and Freedom. — Liberty in a Modified Sense. — The Child's Definition of Liberty. — This nearly the Correct Notion. — No One in Possession of this Liberty. — Desires mutually Restrictive. — Is Perfect Liberty Attainable ? — It is at least Conceivable. — A Perfect Character implies Perfect Liberty. — We are under a System of Law. — Our Mai-Adjustment to it. — The Object of all Ethical Training is to effect a Re-adjustment. — When One's Desires run Parallel with the Divine Desires they will be Parallel with Each Other, and Conflict will be Impossible, and Liberty will be Perfect. — Liberty of Saints and Angels, not because they cannot do Wrong, but because they do not want to. — We do not want to put our Hands in the Fire, but we are at Liberty to do so 252
CONTENTS.
Chapter VII
NECESSARY IDEAS PRODUCED BY THE COMBINED ACTION OF THE INTELLECT, SENSIBILITIES, AND WILL.
PAGE
Reference to Necessary Ideas previously considered. — Personality. — Closely related to all Other Necessary Ideas of this Class. — Undefinable. — Person and Thing. — Power and Cause. — Not Identical, but closely connected. — Cause implies Power. — Power not Phenomenon. — Not a Product of the Discursive Faculties. — Its First Cognition in Personal Exercise of it. — " Invariable Antecedency."
— An Antecedent not necessarily a Cause. — Dr. Hickok's Illustration. — Successive Events caused by a Common Force. — Notion of Cause not gained by Experience. — An Antecedent with Power. — Axiom implied. — Freedom. — Origin of the Idea. — The Occasion.
— Rights and Obligations. — Origin of the Idea of Right. — Of Obligation. — Obligation related to Intellect, Sensibility, and"Will. — Contains Elements of both Reason and Impulse. — An Authoritative Impulse, an Inward Law. — The Law Promissory and Minatory, but not Compulsory. — Merit and Demerit — Their Nature. — Responsibility. — Dependent on the Will as Free. — Unthinkable without Freedom. — Differs from Obligation.— Punishment. — Not
the Same as Consequence of Conduct. — Penalty and Punishment . 256
PSYCHOLOGY.
INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER.
MEANING AND SCOPE OF PSYCHOLOGY.
Psychology is the science of the human soul. The term soul is used here rather than mind, as more obviously covering the whole subject of inquiry. As Dr. p syc h i og y Porter says, the terms Science of Mind, Mental defined. Philosophy, and Mental Science are apt to be applied only to the power of the soul to know — to the intellectual faculties — and are not generally used with reference to the capacity to feel and to will, or for its functions taken together.
As just stated, Psychology is a science. It is important to understand definitely what is meant by science. The general meaning, of course, is knowledge. But psychology science as used among scholars is something a science, other than this. It means knowledge systematized and classified, embracing also a knowledge of laws, causes, and relations. While often used as substantially synonymous with Philosophy, it yet differs from it in this Philosophy respect, that Science pertains more to mat- ™^IT ters of fact, and Philosophy to speculative from science, matters. Perhaps we may be justified in saying that Philosophy deals with truth, Science with facts. Philosophy deals also with first principles; that is, the principles which are prior to all science, and which underlie all knowledge. It is scarcely possible, then, to pursue the study of any science without an implied philosophy.
The first thing to be done in the study of any science is to observe the Phenomena. By phenomena we mean sim- Phenomena P^ those things which present themselves to to be studied our powers of intelligence, — those which appear. We classify these and endeavor to ascertain the causes of them, and the laws and principles by which they are governed. We must pursue this course in the study of the human soul. The peculiarity of this Observation study is that our observations of the phenomena of psychical of the soul are to be made by one of the facby a faculty ulties of the soul itself. We have a distinct of the soul. f acu ity, the function of which is to take cognizance of the operations of the soul. Popularly it is known by the name of Consciousness, but scientifically this term has a broader signification, as will be seen when we come to study it more particularly. The faculty is called more definitely by the name of the Inner-Sense. By it we gain all the knowledge we have of the phenomena of the mind or soul.
OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MATTER AND MIND.
Is there any good reason for believing in the existence of mind or soul as something separate from matter? Mate- Materialistic rialistic philosophy answers this question in the arguments, negative. It asserts that there is nothing in the universe but matter, and that what we call mind, soul, spirit, is only a form, or perhaps some function, of matter. The main arguments for this doctrine are as follows : 1. The soul is connected with a body. 2. It is developed with the body. 3. It is dependent on the body for its knowledge and enjoyment. 4. It is also dependent on the body for its energy and activity. 5. And finally, that we know nothing about soul, while we have a definite knowledge of matter.
To these arguments it may be replied : That while we admit that the body is a condition for the soul, counter and that the latter is dependent to a certain arguments, extent on the former, still there are many conclusive reasons for believing it to be a separate existence.
1. While by sense-perception we know nothing about the soul, except its operations, we still know quite as much about it as we know about the body. The only w , intelligence we have concerning the latter, ex- much about cept the fact of its existence, is the qualities about the and properties which appeal to the several senses. body# The same is true concerning the mind. We know by the Inner-Sense only its energies. The knowledge of the substance in both cases comes to us by the very constitution of the mind itself — we know that such substance or substances exist, as soon as we cognize the qualities. It is in both the same. The Inner-Sense apprehends certain operations constituting mental phenomena, and we at once and necessarily know that these phenomena have a basis, a substance, just as we perceive certain qualities of matter; and there necessarily follows in the mind the knowledge that there is a substance in which they inhere. If either of these be known more If eitber directly than the other, it is the soul, since the known more Inner-Sense gives us the phenomena of this the other, it directly ; while in the case of matter the Inner- 1S the soul * Sense must first be cognizant of sensation before perception can apprehend any external phenomena.
2. The two sets of phenomena are radically different in The two sets many respects ; in this, particularly, that those radlcaSy'S. 8 ' °^ matter are mainly properties and qualities, ferent. while those of soul are energies and activities.
3. The soul distinguishes itself from matter. It is clear to itself that it is not matter. It knows, as certainly s ui di f - as ^ knows anything, that the perceiving agent guishes itself is not the same as the material objects which it
from matter. . T , , . . ,, » ,
perceives. It also resists the forces and movements of its own body, and in so doing distinguishes itself from that which it resists.
4. The laws of matter are not compatible with the phenomena of soul. Take the law of inertia, which is an Laws of mat- essential law of matter. A body will continue oTmind t in - S8 m a state °f res t or motion, whichever it may compatible, be, unless some force outside of itself operate upon it and change that state. The soul is subject to no The soul self- such law. It is self-active. It knows itself as active. acting voluntarily. It acts from within by an energy of its own, and not merely as it is acted upon.
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