Rudimentary ethics. A text-book for high schools and academies

Front matter

I^UDIMEJSTARY*

E>THie£*

Steele

Section 1. The Will

Threefold character of the soul. — Relation of Conditioning and conditioned. — Two functions of the will. — Volition not always immediate upon the action of choice. — Volition an effort of the mind, not of the body .... 2

Section 2. Arguments in Favor of Freedom. 1. Testimony of Consciousness. — 2. Universal conviction. — 3. Testimony of language. — 4. Implied in Law.— 5. Implied in Promises and Contracts 4

Section 3. Arguments against Freedom. 1. The power of motives. — 2. Human prescience of human conduct. — 3. The Law of Habit. — 4. Divine foreknowledge 6

Section 4. Habit in Relation to the Will. Habit defined. — The Will affected by Habit. — Effect on both Virtues and Vices. — One may lose Desire without losing Ability. — Responsible for evil choices and therefore for effects. — Habit as related to Virtue. — As related to Vice 10

Chapter II. — The Basis Of Ethics

Section 1. Origin of the Moral Conception. All sciences begin with the observation of phenomena. — Universality of the moral conception. — What is an act ? — The moral quality in the intention. — Do all actions have a

moral quality ? 16

v

VI CONTENTS.

Section 2. Theories of the Basis of Obligation. page

1. Utilitarianism. — 2. Reason for the rejection.— 3. Authority.

— 4. Intuitionalism. — 5. The first two theories not without value 18

Chapter III. — Springs Of Action

Section 1. The Appetites.

Definition. — Artificial appetites. — Moral uses of the appetites 2-1

Section 2. The Desires.

Definition. — Desire for Continued Existence. — For Wealth .

— For Knowledge. — For Power. — For Approbation. — For Liberty. — For Society. — Association and Individuality . 26

Section 3. The Affections

Differ from Desires. — Natural and Moral. — Benevolent and Malevolent. — Divisions of Benevolent Affections. — Of the Malevolent 30

Section 1. Self-Interest

Dependent on other desires. — Has reference to the future. — Difference between self-love and selfishness .... 33

Section 5. Conscience.

Diverse views on its function. — A separate and peculiar power. — Definition. — Tbree cases. — Conditions for the exercise of Conscience. — How far infallible .... 36

Section 6. Conflicting Impulses.

An order of worthiness. — Appetites and Desires. — Desires and Affections. — All these in conflict with self-love. — Self-love with Conscience. — The supreme arbiter. — This supremacy evident from several considerations. — Comprehensive self-love possibly coincident in its demands with conscience. — Difference between self-love as a motive, and conscience as a motive 39

Chapter IV. — Virtue

Section 1. Nature of Virtue.

Original meaning, Courage and Manliness. — Derived meaning. — Can there be Virtue where there is no temptation ?

— Not all moral excellence Virtue. — Virtue defined . . 44

CONTENTS. vii

Section 2. Relation of Virtue to Piety. page

An Atheist may possibly bo virtuous. — Yet a sense in which /

Virtue implies Piety. — Piety always implies Virtue . . 47 (s Section 3. The Virtues.

Virtue as a quality of the soul. — Groups of Virtues. — Is Prudence a Virtue ? — Fortitude ? 48

BOOK II.— PRACTICAL ETHICS. — DUTIES CLASSI- FIED. —DOUBLE OBLIGATIONS TOWARDS OUR FELLOW-MEN.

Chapter I. — Duties To The Body,— Their Im- Portance

Section 1. Subsistence.

Industry. — Wealth, and duties involved in its possession. — Labor a blessing. — Provision for the future. — Diligence, Frugality, Economy. — Limits of Frugality. — Wealth not a necessary evil 58

Section 2. Health.

Moral importance of Physical vigor. — Duty of Health.— Temperance. — Control of the appetites. — Consequences of intemperance. — Moral relations of Dress. — Generous use of water. — Sleep, Rest, Recreation. — Regular Habits.— Freedom and limitations of Impulses ... .62

Section 4. Chastity

Incontinence in relation to the individual. — To the body. — To the mind. — Evil to the Community. — A vast moral evil 67

Chapter II. — Duties To The Mind

General Duty. — Development of the several Faculties . . 69 Section 1. Duties to the Intellect.

Relation to Sensibilities and Will. — Mental training and discipline. — Wisdom more needful than knowledge. — Good Sense. — The highest power to be sought. — Utility of the Imagination. — Its moral value. — Moral uses. — Ideals . 69 viii CONTENTS.

Section 2. Duties to the Sensibilities. page

Important duties here. — Difficulty of controlling the Sensibilities. — Control of environment. — Conflicting desires. — Attainment of complete freedom. — Diagram. — Esthetic Culture. — Cheerfulness. — A Sensitive Conscience. — Its supreme authority. — Evil of a deadened Conscience . . 73

Section 3. Duties to the Will.

The Character-creating force of the soul. — Strength of "Will to be cultivated. — A paramount purpose. — Decision.

— Opposed to inaction and vacillation. — Rashness. — Fixedness of purpose. — Fickleness and instability. — Formation of a life-purpose. — Obstinacy. — Independence. — Must be genuine, not spurious. — Courage, Fortitude, Patience. — Difference between Courage and Fortitude. — Fortitude and Patience. — Manliness. — Certain Vices: Pride, Vanity, Self-conceit, Selfishness 79

Part II. — Duties To Our Fellow-men. Division I. — Justice

Difference between Civil and Ethical Justice. — Difference between Justice and Beneficence. — Classification . . 91

CLASS I. — DOMESTIC DUTIES.

CHAPTER I. — MARRIAGE. — MARRIAGE DEFINED. Section 1. Ethical Conditions of Marriage. Who may not marry. — Essential conditions. — Alien station in life. — " Marriages of convenience " 93

Section 2. Permanence of Marriage.

Bad consequences of Easy Divorce. —Unfortunate marriages.

— Mitigation of the evils. — Extreme cases. — Separation without legal divorce • 96

Section 3. Polygamy.

Monogamous marriage the original institution. — Reasons against Polygamy 98

Section 4. Marriage and the Civil Law. Marriage prior to society. — Still, civil sanction necessary. — Moral sanctions 99

CONTENTS. ix

CHAPTER II. — THE FAMILY.

Section 1. Husband and Wife. page

Duties binding. — Fidelity. —Mutual kindness and Forbearance . — Co-operation. — Equality. — Woman not a mere ornament. —A Helpmeet for Man 101

Section 2. Rights and Obligations of Parents. Ordering of the Child's early life. — Not a permanent right. — 'No right of maltreatment 104

Section 3. Rights and Obligations of Children. Right to support. — Right to demand that existence shall not be worse than non-existence. — To a certain Education and Industrial training. — Duties. — Obedience, Respect, and

Kindness 105

Section 4. Duties of Brothers and Sisters. The family a community. — Kindness and Affection. — Mutual forbearance. — Helpfulness. — Equality ... 107

Section 5. Masters and Servants.

Servants as members of the Family. — Not a Slave. — Under free contract. — Not to be treated as an inferior. — Duty of employer to make them happy as circumstances admit . 108

CLASS II. — DUTIES TO INDIVIDUALS IN SOCIETY.

CHAPTER I. — LIFE.

Section 1. The Sacredness of Life.

Murder. — The greatest possible wrong. — Voluntary Surrender of Life. — Forfeiture of the right to Life by crime. — The Death-penalty 110

Section 2. War

Is War justifiable? — The right of Self-defence. — Implied in the Police system. — Most wars might be prevented. — International Arbitration 112

Section 3. Trades which tend to Destroy Life. General principle laid down. — Liquor-traffic. — Its murderous character. — Other kinds of business the effect of which is to diminish Life 114

Section 1. Liberty under Law. Reference to conflicting impulses. — Liberty not antagonistic

to Law. — The largest Liberty where the laws are many

and thoroughly executed. — So in morals. — The largest

Liberty in the subjection of all desires to the supreme Law.

— Illustration and analogies. — When men are adjusted to universal law there will be universal and perfect liberty . 120

Section 2. Liberty in our Social Relations. Our liberty limited by the liberty of our fellow-men. — Violations of the right of liberty. — Physical Liberty. — Exceptions 122

Section 3. Slavery

No large need for elaborate argument. — The question settled. — Still, instances in which the spirit of slavery is active 125

Section 4. Mental Liberty

"What is implied ?— Answer to objection that by use of such liberty a man might harm himself. — Right of publication.

— But not to the interference with another's rights. — Nor

to stir up disorder and mischief 127

Section 5. Religious Liberty

In what it consists. — How violated. — Its abuse . . . 130

Section 1. The Right of Property

How this right originates. — Partial and limited ownership.

— Sharer in joint product. — Why some have larger shares

than others. — How this principle is abused .... 133 Section 2. Property acquired otherwise than by Labor. By Exchange. — Philosophy of exchange. — By Gift. — By Will. — By Inheritance. — By Possession .... 135

CONTENTS.

XI

Section 3. Violations of the Right of Property. — Theft

and Robbery. page

Definition. — Different kinds of Theft. — Purloining from the Government. — Embezzlement. — Peculation. — Forgery. — Robbery. — Property wrested by force. — Less of open Robbery than formerly. — But still carried on in subtler ways. — National Robbery 137

Section 4. Violations of the Right of Property. —Fraud in Exchange

Dishonest Commerce. — Law governing exchange. — Methods of Violation. — Duty of the Trader. — Obligations of the Buyer as well as the Seller. — Taking advantage. — Prices influenced by false means. — Combinations to control prices. — Moral character of certain speculations . . . 141

Section 5. Violations of the Right of Property. — Where the Equivalent is immaterial

Labor as a commodity in exchange. — "Wages. — Duties of the Employer. — Difficulties of just distribution. — Wages and Profits. — Several violations of Laborer's rights. — Advantages taken. — Obligations of the laborer .... 146

Section 6. Strikes and other Combinations. Ethical principle involved. — Right of combination. — Things to be considered. — Must be no violation of the rights of others in attempting to maintain their own. — Combination of employers 150

Section 7. Borrowing and Lending

Divisions of the subject. — Risk and Use. — Duties of the borrower. — When security is given. — A bankrupt morally bound to pay his creditors if he becomes able. — The ethics of Interest on money loaned. — The Hebrew law, and why not now applicable. — Obligation of the lender. — Of the borrower. — Buying on credit. — Mutual obligations. — Advantage taken by the creditor. — Rental of property. — Duties of the borrower. — Of the lender. — Unanticipated advantages of rented property 152

Section 1. Character

To a certain extent responsible for the character of others. — General rule of conduct. — Influence for evil. — Placing temptations in the way. — Corrupting influences . . . 160 xn CONTENTS.

Section 2. Reputation. page Value of a good Reputation. — Three forms of injuring one's reputation: 1. Slander. — Definition. — Its execrable character. — 2. Backbiting. — Described. — Hypocritical pretence. — 3. Rash Judgments. — .Malicious generalizations. — Flagrant injustice. — Malice and envy. — Indirect methods and false suggestions 1G2

Section 3. Cases in which Faults may be justly exposed. "When men are likely to be deceived by pretence of good character. — To what extent the character of others may be canvassed. — General disposition to license in this respect . 105

Chapter V.- Veracity. — How Veracity Dif- Fers From Truth

Section 1. What is a lie ?

Definition. — Illustration. — Fiction not always falsehood . 167 Section 2. Violation of the Law of Veracity. Lies usually subsidiary vices. — But very mean ones. — Utterance of what is known to be false. — Of what one does not know to be true. — Exaggeration and extenuation. — Any

method of false impression 168

Chapter II. — The Rights Of Society

Society has a right to its own preservation. — A right to levy taxes. — General education. — May demand the education of children. — May protect laborers from too great exactions. — Progress in this respect. — Whether society may

CONTENTS. xiii assume direction of industrial enterprises. — Not yet ready for Socialism. — Gambling. — Speculative Combinations. — "Trusts." — Liquor Traffic 179

Chapter III. — Duties Of Citizens

Obedience to the laws. — Injustice of the law not a sufficient excuse for disobedience. — Possible conflict of civil with moral law. — Disobey the civil law, but accept tbe penalty without resistance. — Duty of Citizens to see that good laws are enacted. — Evil of indifference. — Partisanship and local selfishness. — Duty to vote. — Also to aid in tbe execution of the laws. — To honestly pay the taxes. — Duty to promote peace and moral order 187

DIVISION II. -THE DUTIES OF BENEFICENCE.

Chapter I. — General Nature Of These Duties

The obligation implied. — Generous impulses, and what they imply. — Opportunities. — No subtraction from one's happiness 193

Chapter II. — Good Manners

Included in good morals. — Politeness not necessarily elegance, nor vice versa 196

CHAPTER III. — DUTIES TO THE UNFORTUNATE. Many everywhere needing sympathy. — "Wretchedness in the great cities. — Difficulty of comprehending the greatness of this misery. — Systematic and organized beneficence. — Increasing instead of diminishing tendency. — Plans suggested. — Necessary to understand the causes of the evil. — Four principal causes. — Remedies to be applied accordingly. — Two conditions to be recognized. — (1) Not so much subsistence needed as the means of earning it. — (2) The moral element essential. — The personal element needed . 198

CHAPTER IY. — BENEFICENCE TO THE CRIMINAL

CLASSES.

Punishment not sufficient for reformation. — Obstacles in the way of individual restoration. — Remedies suggested . . 207

CHAPTER V. — BENEFICENCE TO OUR ENEMIES.

Spirit of retaliation. — Moral effect of generous kindness. — Compatible with justice 209 xiv CONTENTS.

Part III. — Duties To God. Chapter I. -love In Its Relation To The Moral Law

How Love fulfils the Law. — Effect on the subject. — Love and sacrifice 213

CHAPTER II. — DUTIES GROWING OUT OF OUR IM- MEDIATE RELATION TO GOD.

Three kinds of relation. — Three classes of duties . . . 215 Section 1. Worship.

Character and effect of Worship. — Prayer. — Its reasonableness and efficacy 216

Section 2. A Special Day for Religious Observance. Antiquity and universality of Religious Days. — Physical and Moral advantages. — How the day should be observed. — Rest, not idleness. — Contemplation, reflection, and instruction. — Not to be made disagreeable to the young . . . 217

Section 3. Study of the Scriptures.

Design and contents of the Scriptures. — Obligation to regard and reverence such a revelation 219

CHAPTER III. — THE RELIGIOUS USE OF ALL OUR POWERS. Performance of special duties not sufficient. — The performance

of Religious service not incompatible with happiness . . 221

Section 1. The Service of our Bodies

To make our Physical Powers of the highest efficiency for the Divine service. — This service not abstract from common human interests 222

Section 2. Service of the Intellect

The whole process of training the Intellect, a religious service. — What is implied in this service. — All Scientific truths, truths of God. — Immaterial and Spiritual truth . 223

Section 3. Service of the Sensibilities. Here the springs of action. — Love as Duty and Service. — Harmony of Desires object to be aimed at ... 224

Section 4. Service of the Will

Executive power of the Soul. — Supreme question. — Strength of Will. — Cultivation of the Will 226

BOOK I

THEORETICAL OUTLINE.

Chapter I. Freedom Of Human Action

Ethics is the science of moral conduct. It is usually divided into Theoretical and Practical Ethics. Strictly speaking, the former is the science as presenting in systematic form the principles on which right moral action rests. The latter is the application of these principles to human conduct, and consists mainly of rules for the regulation of this conduct. Though a brief survey of the underlying principles seems essential to a clear understanding of the subject, this volume will be devoted chiefly to Practical Ethics.

There are certain terms in constant use in our language, and corresponding terms in other languages, to which one attaches definite meanings ; such as innocence m . ,

, ', Terms lmply-

and guilt, condemnation, approval and disap- ingfree proval, responsibility, good and evil conduct. But a £ enc y* these terms really mean nothing unless our actions are free; that is, determined by ourselves and uncaused by any extraneous power. The very definition of an action would imply this. This definition is as follows : —

An act or action in the strict sense of the words, is the intentional putting forth of an effort by an intelligent being , or one capable of setting before him an object or end, and the means of achieving it. This implies a personality, that is, a What is an Will, and freedom in its exercise. This putting act? forth is by the power of the Will, and is known

as Volition. But it involves more than this ; namely, the selection of the object to be accomplished in preference to any other. This is the power of Choice, and implies a purpose or intention.

The fact that there are certain philosophers now, as there have been in the past, who insist upon the theory that man is not free, that all his actions are controlled by forces that he cannot resist, and that his character is thus determined, not by influences to which he exposes himself, but by influences to which without any choice of his own he is exposed, render it necessary that we should discuss to some extent that constituent of man's nature denominated the Will.

Section 1. — The Will

The phenomena of the soul are of three kinds, and are usually set forth under a threefold division, as the Intellect, Threefold tne Sensibilities, and the Will. This is not a character of separation of the soul into parts, since it is one and indivisible ; but a classification of its energies and susceptibilities. The Intellect is the mind perceiving, judging, reasoning, knowing, etc. The Sensibilities are the mind feeling, that is, enjoying, suffering, craving, and impelling. The Will is the mind choosing, determining, putting forth effort. It is the executive power of the soul.

The relation of these faculties to one another is that of the conditioning and the conditioned. The Intellect is the first and lowest, as being a condition for the others. There can be no feeling except in view of some revealed fact, that is, of something known. I am glad or sorry, if at all, because of something which is made known to me ; and Relation of it is impossible to conceive of an emotion which conditioning

1 t and con-

is not occasioned by some knowledge or belief, ditioned.

So, too, the Will acts only when some desire or emotion

is present in the soul. There must be some impulse, or

motive, some reason for its acting.

There are two functions of the Will; namely, Choice

and Volition. There are always two or more acts or

courses of action before the mind when the Will Two functions

is called into exercise, and it must determine of the will.

between them. In other words, there must be Choice. It

is to be noted that the mind must choose. Whatever we

may conclude concerning the question of freedom as the

result of this discussion, it is not free to decline to choose.

There is a necessity in this case. Having chosen which

of several acts it will perform, Volition naturally follows.

This is the effort of the will to carry its choice into effect.

In many cases, perhaps in most, it follows instantly on the

choice, but not always. I may make a choice to

' , . \ , J , , ,, ,. The Volition

perform a certain act to-morrow ; but the voli- not always

tion will not ensue until that time comes. It is imme( * iate

upon the even possible that in the interim something may action of

occur to change my purpose, and so the volition may never follow. But when I determine to perform an act at once, the volition necessarily follows. Dr. Hopkins teaches that the freedom of the Will belongs to the power of Choice and not to that of Volition. This seems to me somewhat doubtful, though the fact that the Volition in certain cases necessarily follows the act of Choice is perhaps in favor of this view.

Volition is not the physical effort, but an effort of the

mind to perform an act. I may decide to leave the room,

and forthwith proceed to put my purpose into

effort of the execution; but! rind that the door is locked, mind. Nevertheless, there has been a complete act of

the Will, a Choice, and a Volition. In this case there has been also a physical effort. But I may stop short of that. Before I get to the door I may find that it is locked. So I put forth no further physical effort. It is even possible that before I put forth the physical effort, I may find that I am paralyzed, and though I essay to move, I cannot make the physical effort. The action of the Will is, however, still complete, the Choice and the Volition have both been made.

Section 2. — Arguments In Favor Of Freedom

The following are the chief reasons for believing in human freedom.

1. Our Consciousness testifies to it. Every man is conscious, when two objects or acts are presented to him, that „ he may choose either. When there must be a

Testimony of . J .

Conscious- choice between them, or when there is such an ness * alternative that one must be taken and the

other refused, he always recognizes it as a fact that he is not compelled to take either, though he must take one.

Nor can it be avoided by saying he may choose neither, for this is a case when to refuse one is virtually to choose the other ; and if there be a case where both may be refused, still there is a choice. For instance, he may change his position or retain it. He may prefer to choose neither, but that is to choose to remain as he is. In any case be is certain that whichever he decides to do, he might have decided to do the other. It is true that a man is sometimes deceived, and that of what he believes himself to be conscious he is not conscious ; yet these instances are so manifestly infrequent and exceptional that they do not materially affect the question.

The simple fact is, that if we cannot trust our consciousness we cannot trust anything, and thus nothing will be certain to us. This should settle the matter. Furthermore, if there were any force in the argument that men are in exceptional instances deceived as to the testimony of their consciousness, it still ought not to shake conviction concerning a matter in which nearly the whole race in all ages and under the widest possible diversity of conditions agree.

2. The way human conduct is universally regarded confirms the conviction just spoken of. Men regard themselves as having done what they were under no necessity universal of doing, and reproach themselves for their Conviction, folly or their wickedness. Even men who deny this freedom talk and act as though they regarded it as a fact. They reproach their fellows for actions as being base and unworthy and vicious, and approve and praise what is noble and heroic or virtuous.

3. The Language of all nations, ancient and modern, civilized and barbarous, and even savage, unmistakably indicates this. The remarkably significant word Testimony of ought, which has its equivalent in so many Ian- Language, guages, is a simple instance of this kind. Obviously what ought to be done can be done, and we have no right to say that a man ought to do what some extraneous power prevents him from doing. The terms guilt, responsibility, punishment, repentance, remorse, condemnation, and so many others in all tongues, that if obliterated from the vocabulary of any nation would seriously demoralize the language, show this. Men are not responsible for doing what they are compelled to do, nor for failing to do what is impossible.

4. It is further implied in the existence of laws and rules of action. The moral law, as believed to be imposed by Law assumes the Ruler of the universe, would be, were there of^ndfvidud no free a g enc y of tne individual, not only like Action. the natural law in the absolute certainty of its execution, but at the same time misleading and preposterous in that, unlike it, it is accompanied by penalties for its violation and assumes the possibility of disobedience to its mandates. The laws of nations and of families go on the same supposition. It would be senseless for a legislature to enact laws, or for a monarch to issue edicts, if it were the fact that some extraneous force determines obedience and disobedience to them. So of the government of families and other cognate societies, in which, if the members have no power of choice, the authority of those who govern can have no effect on conduct.

5. Promises and Contracts imply a belief in freedom of action. The promiser has not the slightest doubt that he will be free to attempt what he promises, and the promisee accepts and relies upon such promise in the same natural conviction. It is considered a valid reason for the nonperformance of a contract if there are unforeseen obstacles which render the performance impossible.

Section 3. — Arguments Against Freedom

The arguments against human freedom are curious and interesting, and might be convincing to many but for the overwhelming force of those for the affirmative.

1. There is the supposed power of the strongest motive. It is admitted that the mind acts in view of motives, and that it frequently yields to that which it re- The Power of gards as the most desirable on the whole. Is it Motives. not natural to believe that it is the strongest in such cases that prevails? But what is meant by the "strongest" motive ? To this question there is no satisfactory reply. The only definite answer that can be made, as it would seem, is that it is the motive which prevails, and so we get an argument in a circle.

The doctrine of the power of motives is altogether mechanical, and inapplicable to spiritual action. If we are to regard the motives as forces compelling the action of the mind, it is pretty likely to be the case that in the conflict of two such forces impelling the mind in different directions it would move in neither direction, but in a line between the two after the analogy of the composition of forces. For instance, if I stand at one angle of a parallelogram and am attracted by some object in front of me, and at the same time by another object off at my right hand, according to this theory I should go to neither of them, but to a point somewhere between them.

It is clearly possible for motives to influence the mind and at the same time to have no compelling power. We are to make the distinction here as elsewhere Difference bebetween cause and condition. The former anTcon^ compels an effect; the latter is the reason why tion. the effect takes place. Motive is a condition and not a cause of action.

2. It is urged in favor of necessity that if we know the character of the man we can generally foretell what his conduct will be under certain circumstances. It is true that we can frequently anticipate what a person with whom we are intimately acquainted, or whose principles Human Pre- and manner of life we know by report, would be

Human Con- likel y to do m a g iven exigency. For instance, duct. we have great confidence that a friend whom

we know as a stanch total abstainer, if at a party where wine should be on the table, would turn down his glasses. I have lived many years by a gentleman of strict integrity in all his conduct. When word is brought to me that he has deliberately lied about a certain matter of personal interest, I do not for a moment believe the report, and I think it much more likely that the reporter lies than that my neighbor does. But these cases, and hundreds of others like them, are cases of very great likelihood, not of certainty. Character is not so fixed as to be unchangeable. Great revolutions sometimes take place ; and so many are the exceptions, that the French proverb says, " It is the unexpected that happens." It may be said that if we perfectly knew a person's character we could perfectly predict his conduct under perfectly given conditions- But this is begging the question. It is impossible that we should know all this, and it is preposterous to assert what would be the effect of an impossibility. Furthermore, it is more than doubtful that if the conditions were granted it would disprove freedom. For, as we shall see directly, a man might be in a condition that he would certainly do certain things and not do others, and still be under no compulsion whatever.

3. It is further said that the power of habit is such that Power of it becomes at last irresistible. If this were so, Habit. it would not prove that a habit must become

irresistible, as it may be controlled and checked in its beginnings if not later. It is no doubt true that a man may so yield himself to bad motives that the good motives may be displaced and that there will be no motive to a good deed. But this does not imply inability to do otherwise than he does, but a stubborn disinclination. So a good man may suppress and extirpate all motives to wrong action, and will then not sin, not because he cannot, but because he does not want to, just as he does not leap off the top of a house, not because he cannot, but because there is ordinarily no motive for him to do so.

4. Another assigned reason for denying the freedom of the individual is found in the Divine prescience. If God is omniscient, he must know beforehand all our Divine Fore . acts. If he knows that a certain act will take knowledge, place, then it must take place, and thus all human conduct is previously fixed. So runs the argument. To avoid this conclusion, some believers in freedom have been led to deny God's foreknowledge.