The elements of moral philosophy

Preface

rT^HE time lias come when moral philosophy must obey the law which has, within the past half century, acted so powerfully upon the sciences, and speak the language of the people. Fifty or sixty years ago, moral philosophy had a brilliant epoch, insomuch as it was called the queen of the sciences ; but since that time, its progress has been retarded. Meanwhile, the physical sciences have made a wonderful advance. One reason for this phenomenon is that the physical sciences have been popularized, while moral philosophy has spoken in the language of the universities.

Better results are accomplished with students in this branch of education by the topical, than by the Socratic method of instruction by questions and answers. The teacher of moral philosophy ought not to rest contented with asking a question and receiving an answer, perhaps in a monosyllable. Eather let him name a topic, and require the pupil to state in his own words what he

IV PKEFACE.

has learned. This plan will he found to he improving and scientific.

Many persons — even the young — already know what their duty is in a given sphere of action. Where they are not thoroughly informed, they need to be instructed ; yet the chief thing is for them to he reminded of their duty over and over again, so that they may put it into practice. This truth must he kept in view constantly, if the grand object of instruction in moral science is to be attained. The student is both to know and do his duty; thus the problems in moral philosophy are impressed upon him with all the force of personal illustrations.

W. A. S.

Columbia, Tenn., January, 1883.

Chapter I. The Nature And Importance Of Moral Philosophy

PAGE

Division of the Mental Powers 8

Harmony 9

Causes by which this Harmony is Interrupted 10

Interest of this Science 17

Sources of Knowledge : 18

CHAPTEE II.

FIRST TRUTHS.

In the Science of Moral Philosophy 19

Resemblance in Mental Philosophy and Ethics 21

Classification „ 22

The Nature and Quality of Actions 23

A Great First Cause , 24

Moral Responsibility 25

Future Existence 25

Consequences of these First Truths 25

VI CONTENTS.

Chapter III. Moral Feelings

PAGE

Man 27

The Desires, the Affections, and Self-Love 29

The Human Will 30

Explication 30

Deliberation 31

Conscience 31

Man's Relation to God 32

Chapter IV. The Desires

Remark 34

Animal Propensities 35

The Desire of Wealth 38

Ambition 37

Illustration 38

Emulation 38

The Desire of Society 39

Of Esteem 40

The Desire of Knowledge 40

Kinds of Knowledge 41

Moral Improvement 41

The Desire of Action 42

Regulation of the Desires 43

Chapter V. Affections

Justice, Integrity 45

To Freedom of Action 45

CONTENTS. Vll

PAGE

Justice to Reputation 46

Duty to Our Neighbor 47

Conduct and Character 47

Candor 48

Justice to the Feelings 49

The Golden Rule 50

Moral Condition 50

CHAPTEK VI.

COMPASSION AND BENEVOLENCE.

Benevolences to Distresses 53

To Reputation 54

To Character and Conduct 55

To Feelings 56

Caution 57

Improving Moral Condition 57

Definition.. . . c 57

Chapter VII. Veracity

Love of Truth 61

Ascertaining Facts 61

Delivering Statements 62

Observations 64

Truth of Purpose 64

Chapter VIII. Friendship And Kindred Affections

Friendship, Love, and Gratitude 65

Love of Country 66

Domestic Affections 66

Vlll CONTENTS.

PAGE

The Defensive Affections 67

Exercise of the Affections 68

Observations 69

Moral Approbation. 70

Happiness 71

Downward Progress 72

Temper 72

Self-Love 73

Sense in which Self-Love is Used 73

Compared with Selfishness 74

Eemarks 75

Tendency of Self-Love 75

Selfishness 76

Disinterested Conduct and Self-Denial 77

Observations 78

Chapter IX. The Will

Volition 80

Moral Causes 81

Their Nature 81

Uniformity of Moral Relations 83

Knowledge 83

Attention 84

Moral Habits 84

The Influence of Habits upon Character 85

Means of Correcting Injurious Habits 86

Conclusions 87

Divine Assistance 87

Its Necessity and Probability 88

Faith 88

Illustration 89

CONTENTS. IX

Chapter X. Conscience

PAGE

The Moral Principle 90

Conscience 92

Its Function 92

Proofs of the Existenca of Conscience 93

Nature of its Operation 94

Obsarvations 95

Conscience and Reason 96

How Conscience Acts. .• 97

A Portion of God's Spirit 97

Right and Wrong 97

The Influence of Conscience 98

Knowledge Derived from Conscience 98

Divine Attributes Compared with the State of Man 99

The Christian Revelation 100

Impaired Conscience 101

Its Influence 102

Attention 103

Responsibility for Belief 103

Moral Emotions and Intellectual Processes 103

Harmony 104

CHAPTER XL

THE ORIGIN OF VICE AND VIRTUE.

Conscience 106

The System of Mandeville. . 106

System of Clarke and Wollaston 107

Of Utility 108

The Selfish System 109

X CONTENTS.

PAGE

Selfishness 110

Paley's System , 110

Defect of Moral Systems 110

Barbarous Nations Ill

Theory of Sympathy Ill

The Use of Sympathy 112

Reason in Moral Decisions 112

The Corruption of Conscience 113

Harmony of the Moral Feelings 113

Consistency of Character 114

Chapter XII

man's relation to god.

An Appeal to the Deity 117

A Close Relation 117

Justice, Benevolence, etc 118

View of the Divine Character 118

Moral Feelings 119

The Divine Presence 119

Submission 120

Our Moral Imperfection 121

Gratitude, Affection, and Love 121

Character 122

Means of Cultivating a Sense of the Divine Presence 122

Habitual Effort 123

Faith 123

Its Province 124

Illustration 125

Truths which are Faith's Object 125

The Influence of Faith 126

Moral Condition 127

Its Province in Christianity 128

COHTE^TS. XI

PAGE

Christianity and Moral Philosophy 130

The Will of God 130

Common Sense 130

Growth in Beauty 131

Appendix

Political Economy 132

Domestic Economy 133

Esthetics 133

Natural Theology 134

Evidences of Christianity 134

Alphabetical Index 137

Chapter I

The Nature and Importance of Moral Philosophy — Division of the Mental Powers — Harmony— Causes by which this harmony is interrupted — interest of this Science — Sources of Knowledge.

The Nature and Importance of Moral Philosophy. — The mental powers are divided into intellectual and moral : ethics, or moral philosophy, is the science of duty, and duty is anything that ought to be done.

Man is to be contemplated as an intellectual, and as a moral being. By his intellectual powers he acquires the knowledge of facts, observes their connections, and traces the conclusions which arise from them. These mental operations, however, even in a high state of cultivation, may be directed entirely to truths of any extrinsic kind — either to the moral condition of the individual, or to his relations to other sentient beings. They exist in the man that is so selfish that he cares for nothing, and for nobody but himself and his own good ; he feels little beyond the personal wants, or the selfish enjoyments of the hour that is passing over him. But when we contemplate man as a moral being, new relations open on our view, and these are of mightier import. We find him occupying a place in a great

14 ELEMEISTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

system of moral government, in which he has an important station to fill and high duties to perform. The two parts of his mental constitution we perceive to be remarkably distinct from each other. The intellectual powers may be in vigorous exercise in him who has little feeling of his moral condition; and the moral feelings may be in a high state of culture in the man who, in point of intellectual acquirement, knows little beyond the truths which it most concerns him to know — those great but simple principles, which guide his conduct as a responsible being.

Intellectual philosophy teaches about the mind, and moral philosophy treats of the soul.

Division of the Mental Powers into Intellectual and Moral. — Man is to be contemplated as an intellectual, and as a moral being.

By his intellectual powers man acquires the knowledge of facts.

They may exist in an eminent degree in the man who lives only for himself, and feels little beyond the personal wants, or the selfish enjoyments of the hour that is passing over him.

But when we contemplate man as a moral being, new relations open on our view, and these are of greater import.

We find him occupying a place in a greater, or moral government, in which he has an important station to fill and high duties to perform.

We find man placed in certain relations to a great

ELEMEOTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 15

moral Governor who presides over this system of things.

Man is possessed of powers which qualify him to feel these relations, and of principles calculated to guide him through the solemn responsibilities which attend his state of moral discipline.

In a well-regulated mind there is an intimate harmony or a cooperation between these two departments of man's nature.

Harmony That Ought to Exist between These Classes. — There is nothing so pleasant as to see harmony and friendship existing between the intellectual and moral powers.

Yet harmony and friendship should not merely exist between classes, but in all the faculties.

While I am speaking upon the subject of Harmony, I shall say something upon the subject of Association. In the class now to be mentioned, the associations are formed according to relations, which are local or casual. Thus a fact, a thought, or a mental impression is associated with the person by whom it was communicated, and is recalled to the mind when the place or person is seen, mentioned, or considered.

Some persons seem to form almost no other associations than those of this description.

When a place which they had visited, for example, is spoken of, they immediately relate, in connection with it, the persons whom they met there, incidents which occurred in their company, and opinions or statements

16 ELEMENTS OF MOBAL PHILOSOPHY.

which were mentioned in conversation with them; and from this, perhaps, they may branch off to other circumstances relating to these individuals, their families, or connections.

These associations, however, often make a great impression on the mind.

Thus we avoid a place that is associated with some painful recollection.

Without harmony of the moral and intellectual powers there can be no perfect character. The intellectual faculties maybe in a healthful state while the moral are not, or the moral faculties may be in a healthful condition while the intellectual are not; and, of coarse, no harmony will exist under these circumstances. But to form a perfect moral character, there should be perfect harmony in the intellectual and moral parts of our nature.

We must have a sound mind, in order to know and understand what God commands us to do. We need, also, a good, forgiving disposition, so that we can do our duty toward our fellow-men, and do unto others as we would have them do unto us.

Causes by Which This Harmony Is Interrupted, and Means of Counteracting Them. —

It requires only slight observation to show us that a perfectly regulated mental condition does not exist in the generality of mankind.

Dr. Abercrombie does not enter into particulars in tracing the circumstances which bear upon producing this mental derangement. Being surrounded by objects of sense, our minds are, of course, influenced by external things, and it is natural that some facts should escape our memory; but this would not be the case if the mind were left at liberty to recall its own associations. We have two sources of knowledge, which will always be correct guides ; these are the light of conscience and divine revelation. But some object to an appeal to the sacred writings ; for they say it is a departure from the strict course of philosophical inquiry.

Interest of the Science of the Moral Feelings. — The subject of the moral feelings is one of intense importance. Its importance, then, of course, renders it difficult.

It suggests great powers and properties of the thinking principle. This leads us to think of a probable time when this body is dissolved, and our thinking and reasoning powers pass into a higher state of being, where they will still exercise their faculties — where the life of each individual can be brought up at one glance.

Could we realize such a mental condition, we should contemplate the impressions then made with feelings far different from those which influence us now.

This science must be considered as the highest of all our pursuits, the science which contemplates man with relation to God and eternal things.

In this great science we have two infallible guides which, if we heed them, will conduct us to the truth. These guides are conscience and divine revelation.

If, in investigating this science, we disregard the light of the Holy Bible, we shall resemble an astronomer who depends npon his unaided sight for things which can only be revealed to him by the most powerful telescope.

Peculiar Source of Knowledge Bearing- upon it from the Light of Conscience and of Divine Revelation. — There are the lights of divine revelation. Some will consider an appeal to sacred writings a departure from philosophical method. This opinion is at variance with the truth.

Induction of sound philosophy, along with the dictates of conscience and the light of revealed truth, we shall find to constitute a harmonious whole.

The various parts tend to establish and illustrate each other. If, indeed, in any investigation of moral science, we disregard the light which is furnished by the sacred writings, we resemble an astronomer who would rely entirely on his unaided sight, and rejects those optical inventions which extend so remarkably his field of vision, and are to him a revelation of things not seen.

The Holy Bible spreads forth truths, the view becoming clearer and brighter the farther they are pursued, and the rays which illuminate the path converge in the throne of him who is eternal.

CHAPTEE II.

First Truths in the Science op Moral Philosophy — Resemblance in Mental Philosophy and Ethics— Classification— The Nature and Quality op Actions — A Great First Cause — Moral Responsibility — Future Existence— Consequence op these First Truths.

First Truths in Moral Science.— The knowledge which we gain through our intellectual powers, may be divided into two classes; namely, knowledge which is acquired, and that which is intuitive; but we shall speak principally of the intuitive knowledge.

This knowledge is a part of the mental constitution, arising with a feeling of certainty in every sound mind. The convictions derived from this source seem to occupy the same place in the moral system that the intuitive articles of belief do in the intellectual. They do not admit of direct proofs by the process of reasoning. Intuitive knowledge is in itself more simple than anything by which it could be proved.

The intuitive convictions differ in different individuals, arising from the peculiarities of their own mental condition. When, therefore, we appeal to certain conditions in the mental constitution, our appeal is made to a mind which is neither obscured by depravity, nor bewildered by the refinements of a false philosophy.

ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

These two elements must go together in every correct inquiry in moral science, and we would no more think of applying to a man in an opposite condition, in regard to the principles of moral truth, than we would to a maniac. By this intuitive knowledge, we have a perception of the nature and quality of actions, as just or unjust, right or wrong, and a conviction of duties which a man owes to other men. Every man, of course, expects the same offices from others, and on this expectation, is founded the precept, that we should do unto others as we would that they should do unto us. From this moral impression, there arises a conviction of the existence of a great moral Governor of the universe. A belief in this Being as the First Great Cause is derived by a simple step of reasoning, that every event must have an adequate cause.

First Truths in the Science of Moral Philosophy. — We have several first truths in the science of the moral feelings.

1st. We have perceptions of the nature of actions, to show whether they are just or unjust, and a conviction of certain duties which every man owes to his fellow-men.

2d. When this is fully impressed upon the mind, there arises the conviction of the existence of a moral Governor of the universe.

3d. A sense of moral responsibility; and,

4th. A belief in our existence in a future life.

There are certain truths laid down in the beginning of every science, which are so plain that they do not admit of a proof ; for anything used to prove them would he harder to understand than the principles to be proved; hence, we call them intuitive principles, or first truths. Thus, in geometry, we have axioms; such as, ' ' Things which are equal to the same thing are equal to each other," etc. These first truths form the basis of the science. In moral philosophy, we also have first truths ; we know that to injure any one, or give him pain is wrong; this knowledge is not acquired, but intuitive. If we violate one of these principles, it is readily seen how easily we violate another ; we go on until we become wicked, and finally lost as a moral being. All the moral principles have some relations existing among them. Again, by observing these principles that we know are right, we are led on and on, until we become benevolent and useful to our fellow-men.

Resemblance between First Truths, or Intuitive Principles of Belief in Mental Philosophy and in Ethics.— In intellectual philosophy, we have certain principles, which are recognized by the common consent of mankind ; they are called First Truths.

In moral philosophy, we also have first truths ; they correspond with those of the intellectual science.

These truths, in both sciences, do not admit of being established by any process of reasoning ; attempts of this kind have been made, but more harm than good has resulted from such attempts.

The only evidence we have of the existence of first truths, in both of these sciences, is an appeal to the consciousness of every sound, rational being.

They correspond to each other, and the first thing that we do in an investigation is to look for these truths. A person may become immoral, and these first truths in intellectual philosophy will remain sound, but the truths of the other sciences may be injured by a wrong process of the mind. If the thoughts are unholy, they will have a vicious influence upon the character, and these truths may finally be forgotten ; at least, they will exert no influence.

Classification of First Truths in Moral Science. — The first truths in moral science are classed : 1st. A perception of the nature and quality of actions, as just or unjust, right or wrong, and a conviction of certain duties, as of justice, and kindness, which every man owes to his fellow-men. 2d. From this primary moral impression, there arises a conviction of the existence of a great moral Governor of the universe. Our sense of his moral attributes arises, with a feeling of equal certainty, when, from the moral impressions of our own minds, we infer the moral attributes of him who thus formed us. 3d. From these combined impressions, there naturally springs a sense of moral responsibility, that for the just performance of the duties which are indicated by the conscience, man is responsible to the Governor of the universe. 4th. From this chain of moral convictions, it is impossible to separate a deep impression of continued existence.

Perception of the Nature and Quality of Actions. — A perception is noticed of the nature and quality of actions, as just or unjust, right or wrong, and a conviction of certain duties; as, of justice, veracity, and benevolence, which every man owes to his fellow-men. Every man, in his own case, expects the same offices from others ; and on this feeling is founded the precept, which is felt to be one of universal obligation, to do to others as we would have others do to us.

There are rules given us, and they are briefly stated here, in reference to the place which they hold as first truths.

In applying to these important articles of belief the name of first truths, some persons ascribe to them the nature of innate ideas.

It appears to be a point of the utmost practical importance, that we should consider them as arising out of principles which form a part of our moral constitution; and it is in this way only, that we can consider them as calculated to influence the mass of mankind. But, notwithstanding all their truth and all their utility, it may be doubted whether they are to every one the foundation of his faith in another state of being.

Certain fixed and defined principles of relative duty appear to be recognized by the consent of mankind, as an essential part of their moral constitution, by as absolute a conviction as that by which our bodily powers are recognized.

Conviction of the Existence and Attributes of a Great First Cause. — There exists, most certainly, in each human being, a conviction of certain duties ; as, benevolence, justice, etc., which are due him from his fellow-beings ; and in return, of course, he is expected by others to perform the same offices.

From this first moral impression the very natural result is a conviction and belief in a great moral Governor.

And the cause of our belief in this greater and purer Being, is clearly shown by mankind, and a survey of nature in its wonderful works. Our certainty of God's existence becomes stronger, as we view man's moral impressions, and then think of Him who created man. And when these thoughts are gathered together, they make us feel a moral responsibility ; that is, we believe that, according as man performs the many duties dictated by his moral conscience, he is responsible, and must answer to the Great Creator and Governor of the universe.

In feeling thus, man must surely have sentiments also of awe and homage for this Great First Cause, very different from those which are due to his fellow-mortals. And at last, there is connected with these impressions, and inseparable from them, a belief in a state of happiness and moral reward beyond this present existence.

Conviction of Moral Responsibility. — There are certain first, moral principles, which arise in the mind of every man, on the slighest reflection ; one of these is, the conviction of moral responsibility ; that is, the conviction that, in the due performance of all our duties indicated by conscience, we are responsible to God ; and farther, that we owe to Him a certain homage distinct from that which we owe our fellow-men.

Impressions of Future Existence. — There are certain impressions, which show that we shall have a future existence.

Some believe that when a man dies, he is no more ; that there is no future existence. Others, that there is a future state, where all our thinking faculties, our feelings, and our soul still live, and are not destroyed by death.

The soul lives in this world, and in a world to come. Knowing this, we should be ready for the future.

Consequence of These First Truths. — The importance of these convictions of the existence and attributes of a Great First Cause and Moral Governor, of moral responsibility, and of future existence, as intuitive articles of belief, is clearly seen.

In our moral science, as well as in intellectual and other great sciences, there must be some established first truths, which admit of no argument, and afford no doubt. In moral philosophy, we have some important first truths, which, if we do not accept as such, all far- 2 ther investigation relating to this science is fruitless. The Supreme Being has furnished us with a power, by which, from the perception of nature, we may judge of actions as right or wrong, just or unjust ; and from this, we are compelled to acknowledge a Great First Cause and Moral Governor as the author of our being. Man, going thus far in such a belief, must feel that he is responsible for his actions, when he knows that he has the power of distinguishing right from wrong. We must not deny a first truth, but accept it as a first truth. With these intuitive articles of belief, man is prepared to live, and to strive, in order to fit himself for a future and better state. Without these convictions, everything would be in a more corrupt condition than we now find it ; there would be no desire to do anything good ; for man is prone to evil.

Chapter III

Moral Feelings — The Desires, the Affections, and Self-Love— The Human Will— Explication— Deliberation— Conscience— Man's Relation to God.

Moral Feelings. — We have feelings which are intuitive, and others which come to ns through our five senses. Conscience, however, is the principal of the moral faculties, placed in us by Deity, to guide us in all of our actions ; and by it we are able to know right from wrong. Act as we may, conscience dictates to us what is just and what is unjust.

Our desires are those feelings which prompt us to act for our own good and pleasure, without always caring about the feelings of others ; they are such as the desire for wealth, the desire for moral improvement, and so forth.

The affections lead us to act for the pleasure and benefit of others, regardless of our own comfort; they are such as benevolence and justice. All of these are moral feelings, which are regulated by conscience ; that is, when it is allowed to rule. In many cases, however, the authority of conscience is disregarded.

Let us now attempt to make an analysis of man as a moral being. In this analysis, the first thing to be considered is the action of man ; for by this we judge his internal principles. But one action may proceed from several motives which are different in character. When we are capable of comprehending motives, we shall then be able to judge of man's moral character. The elements which constitute a sensible and responsible person are various ; we may study them one at a time, and then take them together,* remembering that while we are thus occupied, we are gaming a knowledge of ourselves.

There is a certain condition of the mind, in regard to things to be obtained. This is called desire. But when it is relative to actions towards others, it is affection. Then there is another condition, which is somewhat connected with both of these, and this is self-love. It influences us to seek protection for ourselves, and to try to obtain every thing that will be to our advantage. This principle is sound and good in its place, but when allowed to overreach its boundary, and gain too much influence over us, it becomes selfishness. Then a man can entertain very little affection for his fellow-beings. But there is still another element of man's nature, and that is the moral principle, which is known as conscience; this often requires a sacrifice of self-love, and thus prevents it from exercising a bad influence over man's affections. Self-love, in moderation, is right ; but selfishness is wrong. Self-love makes us take proper care of ourselves, but it degenerates into selfishness when it becomes excessive.

The Desires, the Affections, and Self-Love.

— When an object presents itself to our view, we mayhave a desire to obtain it, and if we have reason to believe that it is within our reach, we experience hope; if we think we can obtain it, we then have faith; if we do obtain it, the result is joy; but if not, we suffer disappointment and sorrow.

If we have an affection, we wish to be able to act in accordance with it. This is natural, and we suffer when our affections are not duly exercised. Seeing a prospect of satisfying an affection, we entertain hope. The reverse of this is despair.

We have a desire for an object, and an affection for a person. Sometimes we desire power; this is the desire of ruling. Again, we have a desire for society, and this is one of the most common desires; as almost every person wishes for society, in every condition of life, and in all stages of civilization. One of the greatest of the desires is that of moral improvement. We desire to be better than we are. This leads to the highest state of man, and it belongs to every state of society ; every person should have a desire to improve his moral habits.

Now let us notice the affections. As the desires are calculated to bring some gratification to ourselves, the affections lead ns to our relations to other men, and to a certain line of conduct which arises out of these relations. Our affections show themselves in a great many ways. Thus, for example, a mother proves her love for her child, when she watches day and night over its sick-bed, and never stops to think about being tired, but continues showing her affection for her offspring.

Self-love. There has been some dispute respecting the term self-love, both as to its general propriety and as to the mental feelings which ought to be referred to it. There can be no doubt, however, that every person has some self-love, and hence all study their own interest, gratification, and comfort. While some people have self-love in a low degree, many carry it to an excess, or do not keep it under control.

The Human Will. — Simple volition, or the will, is that state of mind which immediately precedes action. If we will an act, the act follows, unless it is prevented by some restraint, or physical inability to perform the action. The will is regulated by fixed principles, and these principles are influenced by moral causes, as the affections and moral rectitude. The will is also influenced by attention, habit, knowledge, and reason. Divine aid is necessary to restore the will when it is impaired, and this is the province of faith.