Attention and interest; a study in psychology and education

Front matter

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Chapter I The Given Situation In Attention

1. The Subject-object Relation. In a loose and popular manner, the object, as different from the subject is readily recognised. The man who picks up a book to read, the woman who selects goods for a dress, the child who plays with the toy, each, in a vague way, distinguishes an object which exists apart from the self. There may be present no intensive analysis of the nature of such existence, or of the meaning of the relationship, but for the practical purposes of usage and experience, the object, as existing apart from the subject, has a more or less utilitarian or esthetic value. In scientific research and laboratory experimentation a more rigid interpretation of 'object' is made. Close analysis is necessary sharply to define exactly what is 'subject' and what 'object' in a given situation, and every effort is made to eliminate the personal equation, emotional bias, illusion, or other personal factors. The astronomer limits his field to a portion of the heavens, the botanist busies himself with a bud, a seed, a root fibre, the geologist restricts his activity during a given investigation to some strata, rock formation, or what not, and so with investigators in other lines. Some situation is selected and treated as an object apart from the self. Many situations in the course of an investigation are so considered and made the object of close study.

The psychologist differs in nowise from other scientific investigators. In his work he deals with specific situations, and examines, interprets, analyses, and reasons much like scientists in other fields. His point of attack may be diiFerent, his interpretation may deal with qualitative or with quantitative aspects differing from those selected by a botanist or a physicist, but his basis is much like theirs. If his work is to have any value, it must be based on situations which have a concrete filling of some kind, on objects which are more or less definite, on situations which, while they are under investigation, must be considered apart from the self which is concerned with the experimentation. The scientific point of view is one which is recognised by the psychologist, but which is seldom held by cultured workers in other fields. The mind is usually considered by such as an ethereal will-o'-the-wisp, a spirit which appears, now here, now there, and which is so evanescent that one can speculate about it with safety, draw deductive conclusions, and construct hypotheses which can not be tested in concrete situations. That popular opinion is wrong in this connection will be readily understood by one who has seen the laboratory study of mental processes. Not the mind, but some situation is studied with special reference to consciousness. A given field is made the center of attention, tested according to some definite method, and studied in an inductive manner.

In general, the subject-object relation is one, which, from long habit, is accepted as a matter of course in most fields. This dual relationship fits in with the nature of things, stands the test of experience, of application, of work, and is believed in, regardless of metaphysical or other disquisitions to the contrary. From this point of view all else stands opposed to the self. Self and the rest of the universe constitute the whole. No doubt the rest of the universe exists for the self as an 'other' of related parts, as a whole which is affected by every act of the individual. In actual practice so extended an 'other' is narrowed down to some definite situation whicH can be manipulated and controlled. In a piece of work, a laboratory experiment, for example, the individual is not immediately concerned with the rest of the universe. He may affect it, his actions may result in a redistribution of relationships, but this is no direct concern of his. He is usually concerned with only what is under his immediate control. The rest of the universe is not so much 'object,' as 'objective' to him. The object is rather the point of junction between the individual and the rest of the system, between himself and all that is 'objective.' Some limited portion constitutes for the time the point of junction between the individual and what is objective. The individual localises his efforts and restricts the extent of his control.

2. The Point of Junction. 'Point of junction' corresponds loosely to what is called 'object,' as, for example, the material in an experiment, a place of business, a reading room in a library, a tool, or what not. Different kinds of such objects, however, may be distinguished.

(a) Real. As one looks before one and considers what one sees, the object in such a case is visual and somewhat extended. If touch and motor control enter in the determination of the object, the field at once becomes extremely narrowed. If other senses are involved, the field receives a richer content and means more to the individual who is in control. The quality and the extent of the point of junction thus depend upon the senses which are involved in the experiences. Any sense may mediate a point of junction. We may have a visual field, an auditory or a tactile field. So, too, a situation may be determined by all together. Usually several of the senses are called into play. An object is seized, tested, taken apart, put under the microscope, and controlled in as many ways as possible.

What is before one at any moment, what exists as a single pulse Of apprehension, therefore, can not always be said to constitute a situation given in full. To be given in toto^ to have the feel of reality, a situation must allow of reactive adjustment, must be under some kind of motor control. Only as one is before a situation which can be manipulated and reconstructed in a practical way, only as one can test the visual field by active selection and adjustment, can it be considered as basic and real. An essential aspect of a basic situation is this impelling and necessary character which it receives through touch and motor control. It may be denied metaphysically, it may be doubted philosophically, but practically, doubt or denial means destruction. For example, tentative denial of a stone wall may result in a bruise or other injury. Scholastic disbelief must be swept aside when actual contact is effected. Contrariwise, belief is never so strong as when motor control reinforces visual apprehension.

The more direct and immediate control is possible when the situation is beneath one's feet or under one's hands. The various junctions, visual, auditory, tactile, etc., can then be bound together by the motor. Such a limited field is further widened by means which will facilitate motor contact. The microscope enlarges the visual field without bringing it outside of direct motor control, the railroad and the telegraph enable one to make as many points of contact as possible within a given time, touch and motor control are aided by delicate instruments, machinery does work which the hands can not do, and so on. Where no means exist for the realisation of motor control, a situation must remain incomplete, may, in fact, be considered a chimera. The pot of gold at the other end of the rainbow, for example, has still to be felt as a reality.

(b) Ideal. In an ideal, schematic, and representative sort of way a situation may assume a form somewhat removed from the original. An outhne, plan, picture, word, image, idea, thought, may take the place of the situation for the individual, may, in a number of ways, stand for the actual situation. One who wishes to buy a book, for example, needs but to utter the necessary words in order to realise his intention. 'Book' in such a case is all that is necessary for the purpose. If it is to be read, however, it must exist in more real form.

When a situation is present in ideal form it receives the stamp of reality when it points to some foundation situation which can be directly controlled in a motor way. It receives a tinge of the impelling and necessary nature of foundation situations only by the feel of motor tendencies which impel realisation. A book which, when thought of, calls forth tendencies to open and touch it, is much more real than simply 'book' spelled out or seen only visually. So, too, the idea of a plaything has reality for the child when he feels tendencies to play with it. An ideal scheme can have reality only as affecting practice, only as it leads to some basic situation. Until such realisation is possible it must be incomplete, it must exist much like a visual situation which lies outside the field of direct motor control.

Even as partial, as schematic and formal, ideas and images assume for the time a form determined in part by foundation situations. As a formal object, the thought exists in the shape of a word, diagram, outline, or expression. The formal aspect of thought and ideation receives its stability by the same means which give stability to basic situations. Motor control is called into service for the purpose of fixing the formal elements of ideal situations. Speech, writing, drawing, illustration, construction, etc., give to images and ideas a form which enables them to receive further verification in application and practice. In ideal situations we can not readily escape motor control. Images which are so flitting and transitory as to be outside the bounds of motor control and definite realisation of some sort, practical or esthetic, must stand outside the pale of belief. As ideal situations they can have little value.

(c) Possible. Ideal situations which have arisen out of immediate experience and direct control naturally have the feel of reality to a greater degree than ideas or images which have been acquired in a more indirect way. If, for example, one has seen snow, felt it, and handled it, one will have a greater belief in its existence, will read a reality into the word 'snow' more readily than the savage who has simply heard of it. Much of what is given in instruction, in reading, in conversation, etc., has a reality only in an indirect manner. Upon the basis of whatever experience has been acquired, a number of ideal situations acquire a reality in terms of transferred control. One may not have seen an emu, but if one is told that it is a bird similar to the ostrich, one more readily gives the term a reality which can be tested in some immediate, concrete situation. So, too, one may never have been in China, but actual situations before one, ideal situations in the form of pictures, descriptions, and the like, give one a basis which may be transferred to the possible situation implied in the term 'China.' The situation is possible in that there is a certain belief in its existence, in possible control and reaction in a sensorimotor manner. One feels sure, for example, that China exists, that travel to it is possible, that certain reactions may take place in it, that control in it is much like that under present conditions.

The possible, it is seen, is a form of the ideal, but it is a form in which transferred motor coefScients are called into service to give backing to belief in what is considered possible. Often one will believe in the reality of a possible situation which to others is just as surely a chimera. The broader and deeper the foundation of experience, the stronger will be the belief in situations which, to the untrained mind, seem to have no reality. The situation, for example, which was a possible one for Columbus and the early navigators, did not excite the same belief in the people about him. It became, to some extent, a real situation, when actual control was realised.

§11. ILLUSTRATION

1. Real. Real situations are best illustrated by laboratory and similar experimentation. Several examples will be given.

Action of Chloroform and Ether. Excise two frogs' hearts and place each in a watch glass containing 5 cc. of Ringer's fluid. To one add one drop of pure chloroform and cover with another watch glass. The heart will become feeble, lose tone, and finally stop beating. It will take about ten times as much ether to produce the same effect. Chloroform is ten times more potent a drug than ether. ^

Strike the chord c-e-g strongly upon the piano keyboard, directing the attention to the c. Is it intensified.'^

^ Practical Physiology, by A. P. Beddard, L. Hill, J. S. Edkins, J. J. R. Mcleod, and M. S. Pembry, 75.

Strike the chord again, directing the attention to the e or g. Is the tone attended-to intensified?^

Take two pieces of the same green paper. Lay one on a red background, the other on a background of its own color. Cover as before (with very thin tissue paper) and compare the two greens. Do similarly with red on a green and on a red background.^

2. Ideal. The two meanings of ideal should not be confused. In an ethical sense, 'ideal' refers to hope and aspiration, in a psychological sense, 'ideal' signifies simply what is representative, cognitive, imaginative, and the like.

1. Think of a bunch of white rose-buds, lying among fern leaves in a florist's box.

(a) Are the colours — the creamy white, the green, the shiny white — quite distinct and natural?

(b) Do you see the flowers in a good light? Is the image as bright as the objects would be if they lay on the table before you?

(c) Are the flowers and leaves and box well-defined and clear-cut? Can you see the whole group of objects together, or is one part distinctly outlined while the others are blurred?*

Etc., etc., etc.

As for the scheme I had in my head, it was not a bad one in itself. I was to go down the sandy spit that

^Titchener, Edward Bradford, Experimental Psychology, l:Pt. I, 111.

' Thorndike, Edward L., The Elements of Psychology, 232. *Titchener, E. B., Exp. Psych., l:Pt. I, 198.

divides the anchorage on the east from the open sea, find the white rock I had observed last evening and ascertain whether it was there or not that Ben Gunn had hidden his boat; a thing quite worth doing as I still believe. — Treasure Island, Stevenson.

Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thine heart: thou shalt in any wise rebuke thy neighbour, and not suffer sin upon him.

Thou shalt not avenge, nor bear any grudge against the children of thy people, but thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. — Leviticus, 19.

3. Possible. In a possible situation, realisation may be effected, or it may be simply hoped for. Both are illustrated in the following.

Macbeth. My dearest love,

Duncan comes here to-night.

Lady Macbeth. And when goes hence.''

Macbeth. To-morrow, as he purposes.

Lady Macbeth. O, never

Shall sun that morrow see !

And there shall accompany them fair damsels having large black eyes ; resembling pearls hidden in their shells : as a reward for that which they shall have wrought. They shall not hear therein any vain discourse, or any charge of sin ; but only the salutation, Peace ! Peace ! And the companions of the right hand (how happy shall the companions of the right hand be!) shall have their abode among lote trees free from thorns, and trees of mauz loaded regularly with their produce from top to bottom ; under an extended shade, near a flowing water, and amidst fruits in abundance. — The Koran, Sura LVI, Eng. tr. by G. Sale.

The last passage is a good illustration of transferred control. As Muir points out, Mohamet painted a Paradise which would appeal to the pleasure loving Arab, which 'would captivate the inhabitant of the thirsty and sterile Mecca.' In this case a basis of real experience was used in the reconstruction of an ideal Paradise which would be believed in by the Arab.^

4. Illustration by Diagram.

Fig. I. A, real. B, ideal. S, subject. O, real object. O', ideal object. O", situation to which, the ideal refers. F, focus. M, margin. C, center of control.

= Muir, William, The Life of Mohamet, 75.

1. Stages. It is highly probable, that the newly-born child is not conscious of subject or object in the same manner as is the grown adult. One is so accustomed to look upon an object as having some kind of existence apart from the subject that one tends to overlook the fact that this twofold relationship is the result of considerable development, the end station, as it were, of a somewhat complicated series of movements on the part of the child. Even in the developed consciousness, it is somewhat difficult sharply to differentiate what is subject, and what is object. In philosophy, for example, one aspect is often taken as basic, and the attempt is made to explain the other in terms of it. In psychology, too, one or the other aspect is unduly emphasised. As far as attention is concerned, from the objective side, it is viewed as simply a state of clearness and distinctness. From the subjective side, it is sometimes considered as ideal reinforcement or arrest of incoming impressions, or, by the older writers, as a species of mental activity.

It must be remembered, in the first place, that subject and object, though looked upon, in a developed state, as two distinct things, have existence only in a dynamic relationship, and, in the second place, that each in itself is an abstraction. We do not have the subject, as such, and apart from some connection with an object. So, too, an object, by itself, means nothing, as far as the conscious subject is concerned. An object is an object, only as it affects a subject, only as there is action and reaction of some sort between the two. In a state of attention, for example, the subject attends to some situation, and some situation is in the focus of attention. We speak of each in a logical manner as having a separate existence, but such discussion does not affect the situation as it actually exists. Continual treatment of these two phases, subjective and objective, as isolated units, leads one to look upon them as units which exist in independence of each other. In any conscious moment, however, the two wiU be found together.

In the first pulse of life there is probably neither self nor object as a distinct phase of a situation. There is probably in the newly-born consciousness an undifferentiated whole, in which neither subject nor object stands out as a distinct existential fact. The nearest state in the adult consciousness is the dreamy condition usually present just before one goes to sleep, or when one is half asleep, and half awake. Out of this raw material are developed notions of self and object. In early childhood self and object are often confused, and the gross division between the two is the result of considerable development. When the object is looked upon as more or less distinct from the self, attention, though existing from the very beginning, can be considered as a separate, conscious process. The three stages may be illustrated by the following diagrams, each of which represents a phase of a complicated process which at times combines the other phases :

A, B C

Pig. II. A, subject and object not differentiated. B, subject (S) and object (O). C, object in the focus of attention.

2. Process. The process by which the notions of 'self and 'object' are constructed is essentially a motor one. As soon as more or less definite motor reactions and movements begin, as in seizing and grasping, some portions of the field of consciousness become outlined, cut out of their setting, and woven into the personal history of the individual concerned. A child which seizes a pencil, for example, plucks it out of its setting, gives it outline, uses it perhaps, and places it as a separate object among other objects. While the pencil may have had a more or less distinct visual outline, its control by the child would give greater vividness and strength to impressions of its separate existence. In fact, for grown people, manipulation and motor control is a test of the individual existence of an object. If one is not certain, for example, whether an object is fastened to some other, is part of it, or one separate from it, one wiU take it in hand, lift it, and try it in a number of ways.

The changing nature of the objective field, too, tends to give it the stamp of existence apart from the self. A portion of the field comes and goes, suffers reconstruction or even destruction, and seems a flux opposed to a more or less stable background of individual feeling and consciousness. It is the same mass of feeling, for instance, which accompanies the act of throwing a toy out of the window, as that which goes with the activity of looking out of the window, or of going down stairs to look for the toy. Feelings of motor activity, of satisfaction, pain, etc., are re-' f erred to the self in a more or less conscious manner. These give the self a value as a more or less unchanging, existential fact. In addition, visual elements, as of form of the body, remain much the same, and reinforce the feelings of motor activity, satisfaction, ease, quiescence, pleasure, and the like.®

An aid in this process of differentiation is such control of others as enters into the child's^ field of experience. Conflict of control will bring out the 'other' as a separate factor in the total field. The difference in the conduct of others when entering in the same field of objects controlled by the child will also tend to stamp the 'other' as an existential fact apart from objects within the child's field of activity. A grown person, for example, will take an object from the child, will take the child from the object,

« See: Stout, G. F., 'The Genesis of the Cognition of Physical Reality,' Mind, 15, 1890. Baldwin, James Mark, Mental Development in the Child and the Race, 112-120, and Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development, Ch. I. Preyer, W., The Development of the Intellect, Eng. tr. by H. W. Brown, Ch. XIX. Compayre, Gabriel, Development of the Child in Later Infancy, Eng. tr. by M. E. Wilson, Ch. VIII. Wundt, Wilhelm, Grundziige der Physiologischen Psychologie, 3:Ch. XVIII, §1, f. James, William, Principles of Psychology, Ch. X. and The Meaning of Truth, Marshall, H. R., Consciousness, Arnold, F., 'Consciousness and its Object,' Psych. Bev., 12, 1905.

will assist the child in the control of the object. Such conflict of control, even with adults, emphasises the existence of another as a separate fact which is to be reckoned with in the manipulation of objects.

Within the objective field many changes may take place because of the manipulation and control attempted by the child. Development of the situation may proceed by increase in the number and kinds of the points of contact which are made. When a child sees an object, he usually tries to seize it, bite it, throw it about, take it apart, test it in every possible manner. Each point of junction is a new experience for the child and gives fuller meaning to the situation in hand. Development of a situation is also possible through reconstruction or partial destruction. To a beholder the activity of the child may not mean development, may, in fact, seem a waste of time, or a positive nuisance. But to the child such control as he exercises, whether destructive or not, results in a widening of his own experiences, and in instructive changes in the field before him.

Successive acts of control result in increased differentiation and development. Residual effects accumulate both in the subject and in the objective field. In the individual such cumulative results are represented by habits, mental dispositions, memories, and the like. The child, in popular parlance, 'will know better next time.' In the objective field we have, in the more advanced stages, material progress, tradition, moral law and order, custom, etc. The latter then reacts on the former and tends to preserve control within the grooves of custom. The social background is usually able to enforce its conventions and manners on the individual, who, in turn, may be able to effect changes in such conventions and traditions. Action and reaction go together, here as elsewhere. On the basis of cumulative residua, the individual is able 'to rise on his dead self to higher things.' Whatever he has accomplished can be used as a foundation for further control. The child, for example, who has mastered writing and reading, is able to spend his energy on other things. Below is a schematic outline which illustrates progress and individual endeavour on a broad platform of habit.

Development of a situation in the manner suggested above demands a narrowing of the field under manipulation, a fixation of the object, a closer and more refined series of adjustments, a more delicate interpretation, a finer feel or body

-1 IMPULSE

Pig. III. Individual Development (after Baldwin, J. M., Ment. Dev.).

attitude, in short, attention. The subject must select his object, examine aspects of it, try it in various ways, and control it in a more or less definite manner. Self and object exist together, each is influential in producing changes, each must be considered in relation to the other. The objective side of the situation gives us the field of attention. The subjective side gives us those motor adjustments, ideal elements, and reinforcing factors which are usually present in the more advanced stages of attention. Both aspects, the subjective and the objective, must be considered in the treatment of attention.

Certain biological considerations necessitate such differentiation and discrimination as are found in the subject-object relation, and in attention. Some restriction of the objective field is necessary for the continued existence of the organism. Discrimination and selection are necessary even in animal life, and in the more elementary functions of eating and drinking. The savage who misses his aim may have to go hungry or starve. The hunter who can not find signs of water may perish. The child who is unable to control his knife will cut himself. The adult who does not hear the horn of the electric car may lose his life. Focalisation and definite reaction are necessary to ensure a modicum of ease and satisfaction. Strange and uncommon situations which may result in pain or death must be focalised before further reaction of definite nature is possible. Moreover, focalisation with selection may be needed to ensure safe control.

Where a situation is more or less known, further knowledge is possible only by analysis, discrimination, selection, and restricted control. Scientific workers are continually constructing mechanical aids by means of which given situations can be cut up into smaller parts, restricted within a limited field, and intensively controlled. Specialisation is but another name for such focalisation and concentration.

Chapter II The Objective Aspect Of Attention

1. Clearness and Distinctness. A striking characteristic of the field of attention is the change in the clearness and distinctness which results from the motor and ideal processes which are aroused. As control of a situation becomes restricted, as the field narrows and becomes cut out of its setting, it is said to become distinct. The situation is distinct in that it is more or less sharply defined, in that it stands out from its surroundings. The outline of a flying bird as seen against a clear sky, the blur on the horizon which is recognised as a ship, these are distinct, though they can not be said to be clear. When, in addition, the parts of the situation stand out within the whole, when the relations between the parts become evident, the situation is said to be clear. The flying bird is then seen to have certain coloration, the ship is then recognised as a steamship, with two or more stacks, and so on. Distinctness refers to the totality as set off against a marginal background. Clearness refers to a further differentiation of the parts within the whole.

Clearness and distinctness are terms which have historical connections. Descartes used clearness and distinctness as signs by which to judge of the truth of notions.

I call that clear which is present and manifest to an attentive mind; . . . and distinct, that which is so separate and distinguished from every thing else that it contains within itself only that which is clear.^

Clearness and distinctness have also been ememphasized in connection with visual metaphors. The 'Blickpunkt'' view of attention has been prominently brought forward by Wundt and Titchener, but it was used long before them. Fortlage likens attention to the 'clear glance of observation'^ and Lotze compares it to the 'retina of the eye.'^ Hamilton writes in a similar strain.

Consciousness may be compared to a telescope, attention to the pulling out or in of the tubes in accommodating the focus to the object; and we might, with equal justice, distinguish in the eye, the adjustment of the pupil from the general organ of vision, as, in the mind,

^Princ, Pt. I, § XLV.

^ Fortlage, Karl, System der Psychologie, 1855, § 12.

distinguish attention from consciousness as separate faculties/

This predominance of visual terminology is not strange when we consider, as Jevons points out, that at least 246 words in the English language have been derived from the root 'spec.'^

A third characteristic of the field of attention, emphasised by some, denied by others, is intensity, or rather, increase in intensity. Considerable discussion of the hair-splitting variety may be found defending one or the other view.^ Any contentions one way or the other in this connection disregard the basic function of such changes in the situation as take place. These changes are secondary and subordinate to the motor control and manipulation which is to be