A grammar of logic and intellectual philosophy, on didactic principles ...

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GRAMMAR OF LOGIC

Introduction

Grammar, Logic, and Rhetoric are the handmaids of Literature, Science and Philosophy. The study of grammar is the study of language, and memory is the faculty which it chiefly employs and exercises. But in proceeding towards the cultivation of taste and genius, the acquisition of science, and other ulterior objects of education, the faculties most Susceptible of improvement and refinement are the imagination and the understanding.

Polite Literature is addressed to the imagination and the understanding in conjunction ; science is addressed to the

UNDERSTANDING alone.

With the view, therefore, of conducting youth from the mere exercise of memory, in the study of language, towards investigations on the powers of the understanding, in the regions of science, my Grammar of Rhetoric and Polite Literature professes, by a proper gradation, to occupy the mind, for some time, in those agreeable prospects exhibited to the imagination, and in those interesting speculations, also, addressed to the understanding, with which the arts of speaking and writing so amply abound.

But the most successful initiation and discipline into the researches of philosophy, are disquisitions about the objects with which we are familiar, and inquiries into the operations of the human mind, which we every day experience. And Logic has been justly styled the history of the human mind, inasmuch as it traces the progress of our knowledge, from our first and simple perceptions, through all their different combinations, and all those numerous deductions, that result from variously comparing them one with another. For it is thus, only, that we are let into the frame and contexture of our own minds, — that we learn in what manner we ought to conduct our thoughts, in order to arrive at truth, and avoid error, — that we see how to build one discovery upon another, and, by preserving the chain of reasoning uniform and unbroken, to pursue the relations of things through all their labyrinths and windings, and at length exhibit them to the view of the soul with all the advantages of light and conviction.

I, therefore, trust that this Grammar of Logic and Intellectual Philosophy will be found adequate to initiate youth in that history, and to resolve such inquiries respecting the operations of their own minds, as they daily experience. The plan of the volume is briefly as follows : — The First Book is devoted exclusively to the Definition of terms — Preliminary explanations — Enumeration of principles which are taken for granted — Inquiries into the nature and value of hypotheses — The doctrine of analogy — The proper means of knowing the operations of our own minds — The difficulty of attending to these operations, with observations which may assist us in overcoming this difficulty, — and, finally, A comprehensive division of the powers of the human mind.

The Second Book embraces Elements of Intellectual Philosophy, calculated to instruct youth in a knowledge of those principles to which the development of the mental faculties may be traced, and upon which we rest all our knowledge of legitimate logic. These elements comprise analyses of the faculties, Consciousness — Sensation — Perception — Attention — Conception — Abstraction — Association — Memory — Imagination — Judgment — Reason — Moral Perception.

The Third Book treats on Subjects of collateral Inquiry with the Intellectual Powers, — such, for example, as the Primary and Secondary qualities of bodies — Natural language and signs — Matter and Space — Duration, Extension, and Number — Identity — The train of thought in the Mind — and Prejudices.

The Fourth Book — The Grammar of Logic — unfolds the doctrines of Ideas — Propositions — Sophisms — Reasoning and Syllogism.

The Fifth Book concludes the volume, with a brief sketch of The Philosophy of Human Knowledge, as it is addressed to the memory, the understanding, and the imagination.

The foregoing arrangement was dictated by motives which the following observations pretend to explain.

In a work that treats of Logic and Intellectual Philosophy, and where selection is so imperiously required, there must be an equal necessity that certain fixed and intelligible principles should be preestablished. Nor, in handling subjects that have been controverted, and which, from their very nature, are ever liable to discussion, is there any thing of more consequence than agreement, at the outset, about the language we use ; for, when, in philosophical disquisitions, we are once agreed respecting the signification of the words and terms we employ, it is unlikely that we shall differ about their application, provided we continue to use them in the sense which we had already affixed to them : hence the position and division of Book First.

A knowledge of the powers of the human mind, and of the science of Intellectual Philosophy, furnishes the proper basis upon which every other science is grounded, because the human faculties are the instruments by which alone invention in all the sciences can be accomplished.

The examination and analysis of these faculties reciprocally open sources of intellectual improvement, and exercise the student in habits of thinking, judging, reasoning, and communication, upon which depend, not merely the study of logic, and the further prosecution of science, but almost entirely the active business of life. Nor does it appear to me that any other process could, with equal certainty of success, be adopted, by which the mind of youth, launching into a new and pleasing field of speculation, might be enabled to form an estimate of its own powers, of the acquisitions it has made, of the habits it has formed, and of the further improvements of which it is susceptible. For, when the student has acquired those habits of attention, and that capacity of observation, which the study of his intellectual powers must necessarily give him, it is then, and not till then, I have no hesitation in affirming, that he is qualified to enter upon a philosophical, but popular course of Logic.

Besides, as the progress of the intellectual powers is not prematurely quickened, an acquaintance with the phenomena of the human mind, arranged so as to enable us to profit by our personal experience, cannot be a subject of abstract speculation, but must be the channel through which we advance to the highest endowments of the understanding.

But the professed object of Logic is to teach us the right use or reason, both in the investigation and in the communication of TRUTH.

I have already pointed out the relation in which I conceive Rhetoric to stand to Grammar and Logic, and, without arrogating pretensions to superior discernment, which would only lay me open to the suspicion of a particular prejudice, I do not see how it is possible to conduct ingenuous youth upwards from the correctness of their taste to the cultivation of their understanding, but by previously explaining to them the faculties of the mind, and their various operations with which we are immediately or remotely conversant, the circumstances favorable or unfavorable to the development of those faculties, and the means by which their improvement may be most successfully undertaken.

In the execution of this task, I was also laid under an imperious necessity of banishing from my work all the trifling subtilties of the ancient Logicians, all the logomachy of the schools, all the puzzling distinctions which perplex us in most of the popular treatises of our modern philosophers. But I do not thence lay claim to any new discoveries either in the science of mind, or in the art of Logic.

It has been with me a principle of paramount importance, to endeavor to select the most unexceptionable materials from the most approved works of my predecessors or contemporaries,

A* employed, like myself, in extending the elements of science. And those subjects which seemed best adapted for the employment of youth at the commencement of then* philosophical studies, I have labored to present to them in this book with faithfulness and assiduity in their selection, and with simplicity and intelligibility in their form and arrangement.

Of the difficulty of executing an acceptable compilation of the elements of the science of mind with analyses of the intellectual powers, in the order of their connection and dependence, it would be superfluous to reason with empirics who have not added one iota to literature or to science. But the philosopher and the critic know that judgment in selection,, perspicuity of style, and compression of argumentation, the great requisites of every writer who would not become dull from crudity of conception, nor obscure from prolixity of reasoning, are indispensable to give anciently-received truths and established modern discoveries those charms which shall fascinate readers in the purple bloom of youth. And in pleasing satisfaction will my mind now repose, if, among the unambitious pretensions of a compiler, the reasonings which support those truths shall be found to possess conciseness, and the illustrations of those discoveries no more expansion of proof than the different steps of their relative processes required ; for, with youth whose mental faculties we would, by active discipline, invigorate, improve, and embellish, brevity is not less the soul of reasoning than of wit. Their knowledge, however, is not to rest on tarnished fragments struck off from splendid systems, nor on defective models the relics of doubtful institutes; but on the details of human knowledge, and such discipline of education as shall accustom them to exert their intellectual faculties, without preparation, and render them prompt in expedient, and active in resource.

Sufficient, however, has been said on Book Second, as well to show its high importance, as to satisfy every impartial reader, that, to have omitted it, or assigned to it any other place in the volume, would have evinced culpable neglect or capricious arrangement.

To have blended with the subjects in the Second Book those which constitute the Third, would have created a species of confusion, which, in elementary works, should always be avoided; and, besides, the relative importance this Book bears to the Second and the Fourth reciprocally, allotted to it that neutrality which makes it of easier reference to the numerous subjects that it may collaterally illustrate, or with which, in many instances, its materials may be directly conjoined. Nor is this the only light in which Book Third may be viewed. If the subjects of which it is composed be considered abstractedly, then does the student enter upon disquisitions and analyses of separate branches of intellectual philosophy, of primary importance on his entrance upon philosophical studies. But it is unnecessary to offer proofs for that which is clear as sunshine.

Of Book Fourth, assigned to Pure Logic, I shall say a few words. But I premise, that of all arts, that surely is entitled to attention which pretends to tell us how we may improve and properly employ the understanding, — the faculty by which man is most eminently distinguished above the other creatures of this world, and by which, perhaps, he partakes most of the constitution of superior natures. Now, Logic is that art. Its professed purpose, as we have observed above, is to teach us the right use of reason, both in the investigation and in the communication of truth ; — to inform us how to introduce clearness and good order among our ideas ; — to explain the operations of the mind which are conversant about those ideas ; and by the proper exercise of which operations, we shall be least in danger of deviating into error.

The understanding is occupied entirely with knowledge — the end of all science is to instruct us in knowledge ; and the same end is pursued by all study, whether prudential, political, moral, or mechanical. In what way soever we exert and exercise our understanding, it is to obtain some information that we did not before possess ; and the design of logic, considered as an art, is to hold forth the manner of attaining that knowledge with the greatest ease and expedition.

From these views of the nature and end of Logic, it is apparent, that it claims our attention as one of the first arts to which we should apply, in our progress towards knowledge, either as the best means of fortifying or of improving the understanding. The more acute the understanding is, the more successful will it be in the investigations of science. The less it is liable to err, the more certain and expeditious will be its progress in new and untried pursuits. The more we are acquainted with those sophistries which have misled other reasoners, the less liable shall we be to fall into similar mistakes. The better we understand the nature of the instrument which we employ, we may reasonably expect to be more expert and successful in its use. Every thing, then, in Logic, that does not contribute to improve the understanding, and to promote our progress in useful knowledge, deserves no attention ; but every thing, on the other hand, that promotes these ends, cannot obtain more attention than it deserves.

Though no art ever gave occasion to so much idle research and fanciful refinement as Logic ; though none ever so much bewildered the human mind, and repressed every useful exertion of the understanding, as that which pretended to enlighten and improve this faculty, and to guide it in the road to truth ; though all the syllogism of the schools, after the thousand volumes that have been written on it, and after the employment of a series of ages to bring it to perfection, never enriched science or art with one useful discovery, — we must not rashly conclude that these abuses furnish proofs of the general inutility, or insignificance, of Logic as an art.

As, then, the sophistry and absurdity with which Logic has been disgraced, are no valid objections against its use in a philosophical course of education, so neither is it to be contemned because we hear some men reason very justly without any acquaintance with its rules. There is in all mankind some natural logic, for it is one of those arts which may be learned by practice, with out the knowledge of theory.

One of the best methods of making progress in the art of reasoning, is actual practice, or the acquisition of the habit of examining a train of ideas constituting an argument ; and of this branch of the art all men acquire some share by experience — many men acquire a great deal ; but though long experience in sound reasoning may render us expert logicians, in the same manner as practice, without the knowledge of principles, may form eminent practitioners in any other art, yet this success will not justify any inference against the utility, or even the propriety of the theory. The end of all theory in the arts, is, to render us more methodical and reputable in their performance; and a knowledge of the principles on which, in this volume, the art of Logic is founded, can scarcely fail to facilitate the progress of youth in becoming good reasoners.

Of this they may be assured, if they have sufficient candor to admit there is such a thing as good reasoning, that there is no accomplishment or qualification any man can acquire more important than the art of reasoning well. Whether, then, youth shall become, in life, men of speculation or men of business, in every step they take, their rational faculties must be constantly exercised ; and the subject of which we now speak is calculated entirely to render them expert and successful in that exercise.

The Fifth Book, which offers a sketch of "The Philosophy of Human Knowledge," seemed a necessary Appendix to the volume; but it was not my object, in the compass of a few pages, to enter upon a subject which I intend to publish in a separate work, as a sequel to my Grammars of Rhetoric and Logic.

And, for the purpose of initiating youth in the doctrines of the Philosophy of Mind, I have constructed, on this Grammar of Logic, a Book of" Questions and Exercises," with a " Key" to the same ; as, in my humble judgment, no discipline is more successful in accomplishing its end, than that which reduces literature, philosophy, and science, to interlocutory discourse, conducted in the style and manner of a spirited dialogue. The ease with which the entire volume may be converted into " Dialogues on Logic and Intellectual Philosophy," by means of its companion, the " Book of Questions," can only be equalled by the advantages which youth ever derive from catechetical instruction, possessing the sprightliness of living language, and familiarizing the speakers to unpremeditated extempore discussion. If any thing can verify the observations contained in this Introduction, it must be the practice of the catechetical method which I now recommend — a practice which distinguished the instructions of Socrates, which Plato has preserved in his Dialogues, and to which Cicero has reduced almost all his philosophical writings.

ALEXANDER JAMIESON

London, March, 1819.

Book I

Chapter. Page.

I. Terms defined and explained 17

II. Principles taken for granted 27

III. Of Hypotheses 32

IV. Of Analogy 35

V. Of the proper Means of knowing the Operations of

our own Minds 38

VI. Of the Difficulty of attending to the Operations of our own Minds, interspersed with Observations

which may assist us in overcoming this Difficulty 40

VII. Divisions of the Powers of the Mind 42

Book II. Of The Intellectual Powers

I. Of Consciousness 45

II. Of Sensation 46

III. Of Perception 50

IV. Of Attention 53

V. Of Conception 61

VI. Of Abstraction 66

Of Abstract or General Terms. , . 67

Of General Conceptions 70

Of General Conceptions formed by analyzing Objects 73

Of the Operation of Generalizing 75

General Conceptions formed by Combinations 77

VII. Of the Association of Ideas, or Combination 84

Association by essential Relations 86

Accidental Relations or Sources of Association 93

Of the Influence of Association on our various Judgments 96

As it affects the Decisions of Taste ib.

As it affects the speculative Opinions of Mankind 97

The Influence of arbitrary Association, as it affects our

Moral Judgment 101

VIII. Of Memory 102

Things obvious with regard to Memory ib.

CONTENTS. 15

Chapter. Page.

Memory an original Faculty 104

Analysis of the Faculty of Memory 105

Varieties of Memory in different Individuals 107

Of the Decay of Memory in old People 109

Of the Improvement of Memory 110

IX. Of Imagination 112

Analysis of the Operations of Imagination 113

Of Imagination in its Relation to some of the Fine Arts . . . 120

The Relation of Imagination and of Taste to Genius 122

Of the Influence of Imagination on Human Character and

Happiness 123

On the Culture of the Imagination 125

X. Or Judgment 127

Analysis of this Faculty in general ib.

Of the Exercise of Judgment in the Formation of Abstract

and General Conceptions 131

Of the Objects of Sense 133

XI. Of Reason 136

Definition and Analysis of this Faculty ib.

Of Demonstrative Reasoning 139

Of Probable Reasoning 141

Division of Probable Evidence into different Kinds 143

XII. Of Moral Perception 149

The Rational Principles of Action in Man ib.

Of Regard to our Good on the whole 150

Analysis of Conscience, or the Moral Principle 153

Analysis of Duty, Rectitude, and Moral Obligation 156

Analysis of the Sense of Duty 158

Of Moral Approbation and Disapprobation 160

Book III. Subjects Of Collateral Inquiry With The In- Tellectual Powers

I. Of the primary and secondary Qualities of Bodies.. 162 II. On Natural Language and Signs 165

III. Of Matter and Space 168

IV. Of Duration 171

V. Of Identity 173

What is meant by Identity in general ib.

Of Personal Identity 174

VI. Of the Train of Thought in the Mind 177

VII. Of Prejudices 187

Prejudices of the first Class, or Idola Tribus 188

Prejudices of the second Class, or Idola Specus 193

Prejudices of the third Class, or Idola Fori 194

The Prejudices of the fourth Class, or Idola Theatri 198

Rules to prevent Prejudices, and direct our Judgments. . . . 200

Concluding Remarks 206

16 CONTENTS.

Book IV. Grammar Of Logic

Chapter. Page.

I. Of Ideas 207

Of simple and complex Ideas 208

Of distinct and confused Ideas ib.

Of adequate and inadequate Ideas 209

Of particular or abstracted Ideas 210

Rules for the Acquisition and Examination of Ideas and

Words 211

Of the Ambiguity of Words 215

Of Enumeration, Description, and Definition , 219

II. Of Propositions 223

Knowledge and Truth ib.

Different Kinds of Propositions 225

Sources of Human Knowledge 228

Of mathematical, moral, political, and prudential Reasoning 232

Different Species of Reasoning 238

Examples of Reasoning a Priori. 240

Example of Reasoning a Posteriori ib.

Analytic and Synthetic Reasoning 241

Example of Analytic Reasoning 242

III. Of Sophistry 243

IV. Of Reasoning and Syllogism 249

Of the Constitution of Syllogisms 250

Of plain, simple Syllogisms, and their Rules 253

Of the Modes and Figures of simple Syllogisms 255

Of complex Syllogisms 259

Of conjunctive Syllogisms 261

Of compound, imperfect, or irregular Syllogisms 265

Of the Merit of Syllogistic Reasoning 272

Book V. The Philosophy Of Human Knowledge

I. Human Knowledge addressed to the Memory 278

II. Human Knowledge addressed to the Understanding 285

III. Human Knowledge addressed to the Imagination.. 295

GRAMMAR OF LOGIC

INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY

Chapter I. Terms Defined And Explained

1. The professed end of logic is to teach men to think, to judge, to reason, and to communicate their thoughts to each other with precision and accuracy.

Observation 1. This, then, being the design of logic, it has justly been styled the history of the human mind ; inasmuch as it traces the progress of our knowledge from our first and simple perceptions, through all the different combinations, and all those numerous deductions, which result from variously comparing these perceptions one with another.

2. It is thus that we are let into the frame and contexture of our own minds, and learn in what manner \ve ought to conduct our thoughts, in order to arrive at truth and avoid error. We see how to build one discovery upon another, and, by preserving the chain of reasoning uniform and unbroken, to pursue the relations of things through all their labyrinths and windings, and at length exhibit them to the mind with all the advantages of light and conviction.

2. By the mind of man, we understand that in him which thinks, and feels, and wills, and which is conscious of its actions or operations.

3 The essence of body, as well as that of mind, is unknown to us. We know certain properties of the first, and 1 certain operations of the last, and by these properties and operations we define or describe both body and mind.

4. We define body to be that which is extended, figured, colorable, movable, divisible, hard or soft, rough or smooth, hot or cold ; that is, we define it in no other way than by enumerating its sensible qualities.

5. In like manner we define mind to be that which thinks. We are not immediately conscious of its existence, but we are conscious of sensation, thought, and volition — operations which imply the existence of something that feels, thinks, and wills. Every man, too, is impressed with an irresistible conviction, that all these sensations, thoughts, and volitions, belong to one and the same being, which he calls himself; a being which he is led, by the constitution of his nature, to consider as something distinct from his body, as not liable to be impaired by the loss or mutilation of any of his organs ; and this being, this principle of intelligence, we call the mind or soul of man.

6. When we witness the effects of similar operations or actions performed by our fellow-men, we have sufficient evidence that all human beings have minds.

Ohs. 1. The conduct of brute animals, too, proves that they have a thinking principle, though of a nature very inferior to that of man, insomuch that its principal qualities are included in those of the human intellect.

2. The proofs of intelligence and of superintending providence, which are amply furnished by a survey of nature's works, lead us to a firm belief in the existence of a supreme and all-governing Mind, of a nature infinitely superior to that of the minds of men.

3. Many speculative men, both ancient and modern, have conjectured that those natural phenomena which cannot be easily explained by mere matter and motion, are the operations of various orders of intelligent beings, in the universe, of various rank and dignity. Others have been inclined to explain these phenomena by the agency of beings that are active without intelligence, so as to perform their destined work without any knowledge or intention. But we may safely say, that, whatever may be the result of future investigations or discoveries, we have, as yet, no certain evidence with respect to either of these conjectures.

7. By the operations of the mind, we understand every mode of thinking of which we are conscious.

In all languages, as far as we know, the various modes of thinking have always been called operations of the mind, or by names of the same import.

8. We ascribe to body various properties, but not operations: it is extended, divisible, movable, inert; it continchap. i. Terms defined and explained. 19

ues in any state in which it is put ; every change of its state is the effect of some force impressed upon it, and is exactly proportional to the force impressed, and in the precise direction of that force. '

These are the general properties of matter, and these are not operations; on the contrary, they imply its being a dead, inactive thing, which moves only as it is moved, and acts only as it is acted upon.

9. But the mind is, from its very nature, a living and active being. Every thing we know of it implies life and active energy ; and the reason why all its modes of thinking are called its operations, is, that in all, or in most of them, it is not merely passive, as body is, but is really and properly active.

10. In all ages, and in all languages, ancient and modern, the various modes of thinking have been expressed by words of active signification; such as seeing, hearing, reasoning, willing, and the like.

Corollary. It seems, therefore, to be the natural judgment of mankind, that the mind is active in its various ways of thinking ; and for this reason they are called its operations, and are expressed by active verbs.

11. Every operation supposes a power in the being that operates ; for to suppose any thing to operate, which has no power to operate, is manifestly absurd. But, on the other hand, there is no absurdity in supposing a being to have power to operate, when that being does not operate.

Illustration. Thus, I may have power to walk, when I sit ; or to speak, when I am silent.

Corol. Every operation, therefore, implies power; but the power does not imply its being always exerted to produce an operation.

12. The terms faculty and power, as applied to the mind, are not exactly synonymous, though they are often taken in the same radical meaning. The latter is of more extensive import than the former, since it may be used in relation to material as well as mental objects.

13. From observing the changes which are made, or the effects which are produced, by one external object upon another, as well as by these objects upon the mind, through the medium of the senses, we derive our first notion of power.

lllus. 1. Thus, if a needle be placed on a table, standing horizontally, it lies at rest ; but if a magnet be brought within a certain distance of the needle, motion instantly commences, and the needle rushes to the magnet. You have witnessed the change ; you contemplate the effect — the two objects are conjoined. Remove the magnet, leave the needle on the table at rest, and place a piece of flint where the magnet lay when it attracted the needle, no motion takes place, the needle remains at rest.

2. Now, that in the magnet which produced motion in the needle, is not perceivable by the senses ; for it is neither in the shape, nor in the color, nor in the weight of the substance called magnet, that this singular property resides. But to that unknown something, to that unperceived energy in the magnet, the term power is given ; and when we speak of this energy or property in relation to the effect — that is to say, the conjunction of the two objects — we call it the cause of the motion that we witnessed in the needle rushing to the magnet.

3. This is an apt illustration of the connection, or relation, that subsists between cause and effect.

14. By observing the changes of motion and direction in the several members of the body, arising from an act of the will, we arrive at a similar conclusion. We are conscious of an exercise of that faculty, and we observe, at the same instant, that a change in the members of the body has taken place. We are likewise conscious of certain acts of the will directing the motions of the mind. The act of the will and the corresponding change are, in all those cases, so closely conjoined, that they naturally force themselves upon our observation, and, ever after, remain associated in the particular relation of cause and effect. What did we observe more than the change 1 Nothing. — We saw indeed a fact, in a particular circumstance, resulting as a consequent from an antecedent ; but of the cause, that is to say, the power, considered metaphysically, we can form no distinct notion.

15. We can entertain clear and distinct notions of an effect, while we find it impossible to penetrate into the nature of the cause whence that effect proceeds. Of the effects, for instance, which spring from the union of mind and body, in the human constitution, we have a lively perception ; but of the principle upon which that union is founded, we cannot form the most remote conception.