A philosophical enquiry into the origin of our ideas of the sublime and beautiful; with an introductory discourse concerning taste

Front matter

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PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY

INTO THE

Preface

I HAVE endeavored to make this edition something more full and satisfactory than the first. I have sought with the utmost care, and read v^ith equal attention, every thing which has appeared in public against my opinions ; I have taken advantage of the candid liberty of my friends ; and if by these means I have been better enabled to discover the imperfections of the w^ork, the indulgence it has received, imperfect as it was, furnished me with a new motive to spare no reasonable pains for its improvement. Though I have not found sufficient reason, or what appeared to me sufficient, for making any material change in my theory, I have found necessary, in many places, to explain, illustrate, and enforce it ; I have prefixed an introductory discourse concerning Taste : it is a matter curious in itself, and it leads naturally enough to the principal inquiry. This, with the other explanations, has made the work considerably larger, and, by increasing its bulk, has, I am afraid, added to its faults ; so that, notwithstanding all my attention, it may stand in need of a yet greater share of indulgence than it required at its first appearance.

They who are accustomed to studies of this nature will expect, and they will allow, too, for many faults. They know that many of the objects of our inquiry are in themselves obscure and intricate ; and that many others have been rendered so by affected refinements or false learning ; they know that there are many impediments in the subject, in the prejudice of others, and even in our own, that render it a matter of no

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VI PREFACE.

small difficulty to show, in a clear light, the genuine face of nature. They know that while the mind is intent on the general scheme of things, some particular parts must be neglected; that we must often submit the style to the matter, ani frequently give up the praise of elegance, satisfied with being clear.

The characters of nature are legible, it is true ; but they are not plain enough to enable those who run to read them. We must make use of a cautious, I had almost said, a timorous method of proceeding. We must not attempt to fly, when we can scarcely pretend to creep. In considering any complex matter, we ought to examine every distinct ingredient in the composition, one by one, and reduce every thing to the utmost simpUcity, since the condition of our nature binds us to a strict law and very narrow limits. We ought afterward to re-examine the principles by the eflfect of the composition, as well as the composition by that of the principles. We ought to compare our subject with things of a similar nature, and even with things of a contrary nature ; for discoveries may be, and often are, made by the contrast, which would escape us on the single view. The greater number of the comparisons we make, the more general and the more certain our knowledge is like to prove, as built upon a more extensive and perfect induction.

If an inquiry thus carefully conducted should fail at last of discovering the truth, it may answer an end, perhaps, as useful, in discovering to us the weakness of our own understanding. If it does not make us knowing, it may make us modest. If it does not preserve us from error, it may, at least, from the spirit of error ; and may make us cautious of pronouncing with positiveness or with haste, when so much labour may end in so much uncertainty.

PREFACE. Vll

I could wisb that, in examining this theory, the same method were pursued which I endeavored to observe in forming it. The objections, in my opinion, ought to be proposed, either to the several principles as they are distinctly considered, or to the justness of the conclusion which is drawn from them. But it is common to pass over both the premises and conclusion in silence, and to produce, as an objection, some poetical passage which does not seem easily accounted for upon the principles I endeavor to establish. This manner of proceeding I should think very improper. The task would be infinite, if we could establish no principle until we had previously unraveled the complex texture of every image or description to be found in poets and orators. And though we should never be able to reconcile the eflfect of such images to our principles, this can never overturn the theory itself, while it is founded on certain and indisputable facts. A theory founded on experiment, and not assumed, is always good for so much as it explains. Our inability to push it indefinitely is no argument at all against it. This inability may be owing to our ignorance of some necessary mediums : to want of proper application ; to many other causes besides a defect in the principles we employ. In reality, the subject requires a much closer attention than we dare claim from our manner of treating it.

If it should not appear on^ the face of the work, I must caution the reader against imagining that I intended a dissertation on the "Sublime and Beautiful. My inquiry went no farther than to the origin of these ideas. If the qualities which I have ranged under the head of the Sublime be all found consistent with each other, and all different from those which I place under the head of Beauty ; and if those which compose the

Vlll FREFACE.

class of the Beautiful have the same consistency with themselves, and the same opposition to those which are classed under the denomination of Sublime, I am in little pain whether any body chooses to follow the name I give them or not, provided he allows that what I disposed under different heads are in reality different things in nature. The use I make of the words may be blamed, as too confined, or too extended ; my meaning can not well be misunderstood.

To conclude : whatever progress may be made toward the discovery of truth in this matter, I do not repent the pains I have taken in it. The use of such inquiries may be very considerable. Whatever turns the soul inward on itself tends to concentre its forces, and to fit it for greater and stronger flights of science. By looking into physical causes, our minds are opened and enlarged ; and in this pursuit, whether we take, or whether we lose or gain, the chase is certainly of service. Cicero, true as he was at the Academic philosophy, and, consequently, led to reject the certainty of physical, as of every other kind of knowledge, yet freely confesses its great importance to the human understanding : " Est amimorum ingeniorumque nostrorum naturale quoddam quasi pabulum consideratio contemplatioque naturae^'' If we can direct the lights we derive from such exalted speculations upon the humbler field of the imagination, while we investigate the springs, and trace the courses of our passions, we may not only communicate to the taste a sort of philosoph ical solidity, but we may reflect back on the severej sciences some of the. graces and elegances of taste without which the greatest proficiency in those sci ences will always have the appearance of something il liberal.

CRITICAL NOTICE.

The following critical notice of the first edition of this work was written by the late William Leggett, Esq., and published in the " Critic," a weekly periodical of which he was, at that time, the editor. To the present edition the notice is as applicable as it was to that, as the work has since undergone no alteration whatever.

The New- York American, the Courier and Enquirer, the Commercial Advertiser, the New- York Observer, and all the other leading journals of the city, contained corresponding views of the merits, both of the original " Inquiry," and of the labors of the editor.

" A Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful. With an Introductory Discourse concerning Taste. By the Right Hon. Edmund Burke. Adapted to popular use by Abraham Mills, Teacher of Rhetoric and Belles-Lettres. 12mo. New- York, 1829. G. C. &. H. Carvill.

" Of the character of Burke's admirable treatise on the Sublime and Beautiful, a work that has been so long and thoroughly known, and so highly estimated by all who have any pretensions to letters, it would be indeed superfluous, at this day, to enter into an examination. But, notwithstanding the high reputation which it has deservedly acquired, on account of its pervading merits, and its very great utility in improving the taste, and giving a proper direction to the mind of the scholar, it has always been an objection to this ster-

X CRITICAL NOTICE.

ling production, that, in some parts, it was stained with indelicacies of thoughts an 1 allusion which could not but have a pernicious influence on juvenile learners, and which constituted a sufficient barrier to its introduction into institutions for the instruction of females.

" To do away with these unseemly blemishes, without materially changing the language of the author, and without interrupting, in any degree, the chain of his reasoning, has been the principal motive of the present editor ; and in this we have great pleasure in saying that he has so fully succeeded, that there is not now, throughout the wholo 250 pages of the volume before us, a single passage wherein that purity of thought or expression is \ iolated, by which all works should be characterized, but especially those which are intended for the use of schools. In some instances this end has been effected by expunging a few objectionable sentences, and, in others, by a slight alteration of the original text.

" To extend the usefulness of this work, the present editor has annexed to all the Latin and Greek quotations made use of in the course of it a free translation into English ; thus doing away with those unpleasant obstructions which impede the progress of a mere English scholar, and frequently turn him aside from studies that would otherwise be pursued with equal pleasure and advantage. In addition to this improvement, questions are subjoined at the foot of every page, intended to exercise the learner, and impress on his mind the whole substance of the author. These appear to us to have been prepared with great care and skill. The editor of this expurgated edition of Burke on the Sublime and Beautiful has been facilitated in his labor by long experience as a teacher ; and he has produced

CRITICAL NOTICED XI

a work which we can commend, with the utmost confidence, to general adoption in seminaries for the instruction of young persons of either sex throughout the Union. Why the task which he has so ably accomplished has not been undertaken before, is really a matter of surprise, when the great and acknowledged importance of this treatise to Belles-Lettres scholars is considered. But perhaps it is well for future students that it was reserved for Mr. Mills : for he has acquitted himself in a manner which at once reflects the highest credit on himself, and will prove of the utmost service to those whose attention shall be directed to the volume which he has produced.

" It remains for us but to add that the mechanical execution of the work comports with its intrinsic excellence, and is another specimen of that neatness of typography by which the publications of the Carvills are usually distinguished."

Contents

Page

Introduction. On Taste . . . 17

Part I

Sect. I. Novelty 41

Sect. II. Pain and Pleasure 42

Sect. III. The Difference between the Removal of Pain and positive Pleasure 45

Sect. IV. Of Delight and Pleasure, as opposed to each other . 47

Sect. V. Joy and Grief 49

Sect. VI. Of ihe Passions which belong to Self-preservation . 50

Sect. VII. Of the Sublime 61

Sect. VIII. Of the Passions which belong to Society . . .52

Sect. IX. Of Beauty 54

Sect. X. Society and Solitude 55

.Sect. XI. Sympathy, Imitation, and Ambition . . . .56

Sect. XII. Sympathy 56

Sect. XIII. The Effects of Sympathy in the Distresses of others . 58

Sect. XIV. Of the Effects of Tragedy 60

Sect. XV. Imitation .' 62

Sect. XVI, Ambition -64

Sect. XVII. The Recapitulation 66

Sect. XVIII. The Conclusion . 67

Part II

Sect. I. Of the Passions caused by the Sublime . . .72

Sect. II. Terror 72

Sect. III. Obscurity 74

Sect. IV. Of the Difference between Clearness and Obscurity with

regard to the Passions . . ... . .75

Sect. V. The same Subject continued 76

Sect. VI. Power 81

Sect. VII. Privation 90

Sect. VIII. Vastness . . 90

Sect. IX. Infinity 92

Sect. X. Succession and Uniformity 94

Sect. XI. Magnitude in Building 96

Sect. XII. Infinity in pleasing Objects ...... 97

B

XIV CONTENTS.

Sect. XIII. Difficulty 98

Sect. XIV. Magnificence 98

Sect. XV. Light 101

Sect. XVI. Light in Building 102

Sect. XVII. Color considered as productive of the Sublime . . 103

Sect. XVIII. Sound and Loudness 104

Sect. XIX. Suddenness . . . 105

Sect. XX. Intermitting 106

Sect. XXL The Cries of Animals 107

Sect. XXII. Smell and Taste. Bitters and Stenches . . .108 Sect. XXIII. Feeling. Pain 110

Part III

Sect. L Of Beauty 112

Sect. II. Proportion not the Cause of Beauty in Vegetables . 113 Sect. III. Proportion not the Cause of Beauty in Animals . . 118 Sect. IV. Proportion not the Cause of Beauty in the Human

Species 119

Sect. V. Proportion farther considered 126

Sect. VI. Fitness not the Cause of Beauty 130

Sect. VII. The real Effects of Fitness 133

Sect. VIII. The Recapitulation 136

Sect. IX. Perfection not the Cause of Beauty .... 137 Sect. X. How far the Idea of Beauty may be applied to the

qualities of the Mind 138

Sect. XI. How far the Idea of Beauty may be applied to Virtue 140

Sect. XII. The real Cause of Beauty 140

Sect. XIII. Beautiful Objects small 141

Sect. XIV. Smoothness 143

Sect. XV. Gradual Variation 144

Sect. XVI. Delicacy 146

Sect. XVIL Beauty in Color . .147

Sect. XVIII. Recapitulation 148

Sect. XIX. The Physiognomy . . . . . . .148

Sect. XX. The Eye 149

Sect. XXI. Ugliness 150

Sect. XXII. Grace 151

Sect. XXIII. Elegance and Speciousness 151

Sect. XXIV. The Beautiful in Feeling 152

Sect. XXV. The Beautiful in Sounds .154

Sect. XXVI. Taste and Smell .156

Sect. XXVII. The Sublime and Beautiful compared .... 157

Part IV

Sect. I. Of the efficient Cause of the Sublime and Beautiful . 159 Sect. II. Association .... f .... 161

CONTENTS. XV

Sect, IH. Cause ef Pain and Fear 162

Sect. IV. Continued 164

Sect. V. How the Sublime is produced 165

Sect. VI. How Pdin can be the Cause of Delight .... 166 Sect. VII, Exercise necessary for the finer Organs , . . 168 Sect. VIII. Why Things not dangerous sometimes produce a Passion lilte Terror • 169

Sect. IX, Why visual Objects of great Dimensions are Sublime . 169

Sect. X. Unity, why requisite to Vastness 171

Sect. XI. The artificial Infinite 172

Sect. XII. The Vibrations must be similar 174

Sect. XIII. The Effects of Succession in visual Objects explained . 174 Sect. XIV. Locke's Opinion concerning Darkness considered . . 177 Sect. XV. Darkness terrible in its own Nature . . . .179 Sect. XVI. Why Darkness is terrible . . . . . .180

Sect. XVII. The Effects of Blackness 182

Sect. XVIII, The Effects of Blackness moderated . . . .185

Sect. XIX. The physical Cause of Love 186

Sect. XX. Why Smoothness is beautiful 188

Sect. XXI. Sweetness, its Nature 188

Sect. XXII. Sweetness relaxing 191

Sect. XXIII. Variation, why beautiful 193

Sect. XXIV. Concerning Smallness 195

Sect. XXV. Of Color 199

Part V

Sect. I. Of Words 201

Sect. II. The common Effect of Poetry, not by raising Ideas of

Things 202

Sect. III. General Words before Ideas 204

Sect. IV. The Effects of Words 206

Sect. V. Examples that Words may affect without raising Images 207 Sect. VI. Poetry not strictly an imitative Art .... 213 Sect VII. How Words influence the Passions .... 214

Introduction

ON TASTE.

On a superficial view, we may seem to differ very widely from each other in om- reasonings, and no less in our pleasures ; but, notwithstanding this difference, which I think to be rather apparent than real, it is probable that the standard both of Reason and Taste is the same in all human creatures ; for if there were not some principles of judgment as well as of sentiment common to all mankind, no hold could possibly be taken, either on their reason or their passions, sufficient to maintain the ordinary correspondence of life. It appears, indeed, to be generally acknowledged, that with regard to truth and falsehood, there is something fixed. We find people in their disputes continually appealing to certain tests and standards, which are allowed on all sides, and are supposed to be estabUshed in our common nature. But there is not the same obvious concurrence in any uniform or settled principles which relate to Taste. It is even commonly supposed that this delicate and aerial faculty, which seems too volatile to endure even the chains of a definition, can not be properly tried by any test, nor regulated by any standard. There is so continual a call for the exercise

From what does it appear probable that the standard of both Reason and Taste is the same in all human creatures ? How does it appear that with regard to truth and falsehood there is something fixed ? Is there the same obvious concurrence in reference to the principles which relate to Taste ? Of this delicate and aerial faculty what is commonly supposed''

B2 of the reasoning faculty, and it is so much strengthened by perpetual contention, that certain maxims of right reason seem to be tacitly settled among +he most ignorant. The learned have improved on this rude science, and reduced those maxims into a system. If Taste has not been so happily cultivated, it was not that the subject was barren, but that the laborers were few or negligent ; for, to say the truth, there are not' the same interesting motives to impel us to fix the one which urge us to ascertain the other. And, after all, if men differ in their opinion concerning such matters, their difference is not attended with the same important consequences ; else I make no doubt that the logic of Taste, if I may be allowed the expression, might very possibly be as well digested, and we might come to discuss matters of this nature with as much certainty, as those which seem more immediately within the province of mere reason. And, indeed, it is very necessary, at the entrance into such an inquiry as the present, to make this point as clear as possible ; for if Taste has no fixed principles, if the imagination is not affected according to some invariable and certain laws, our labor is likely to be employed to very little purpose ; as it must be judged a useless, if not an absurd, undertaking, to lay down rules for caprice, and to set up for a legislator of whims and fancies.

The term Taste, like all other figurative terms, is not extremely accurate ; the thing which we under-

Why have certain maxims of right reason been tacitly settled among the most ignorant ? How have the learned improved on this rude science ? Why has not Taste been so happily cultivated '! If differences in opinion with respect to Taste were attended with the same important consequences that differences with respect to Reason are, what would follow? Why is it necessary, at the entrance into such an inquiry as the present, to make this point as clear as possible ?

stand by it is far from a simple and determinate idea in the minds of most men, and it is therefore hable to uncertainty and confusion. I have no great opinion of a definition, the celebrated remedy for the cure of this disorder ; for when we define, we seem in danger of circumscribing Nature within the bounds of our own notions, which we often take up at hazard, or embrace on trust, or form out of a limited and partial consideration of the object before us, instead of extending our ideas to take in all that Nature comprehends, according to her manner of combining. We are limited in our inquiry by the strict laws to which we have submitted at our setting out.

A definition may be very exact, and yet go but a very little way toward informing us of the nature of the thing defined ; but let the virtue of a definition be w^hat it may in the order of things, it seems rather to follow than to precede our inquiry, of which it ought to be considered as the result. It must be acknowledged that the methods of disquisition and teaching may be sometimes different, and on very good reason, undoubtedly ; but, for my part, I am convinced that the method of teaching which approaches most nearly to the method of investigation is incomparably the best ; since, not content with serving up a few barren and lifeless truths, it leads to the stock on which they grew ;

it tends to set the reader himself in the track of inven-

Why is the term Taste liable to uncertainty and confusion ? In defining Taste, of what do we seem in danger ? Why is not a definition here requisite ? Why is the method of teaching which approaches the most nearly to investigation the best ?

tion, and to direct him into those paths in which the author has made his own discoveries, if he should be so happy as to have made any that are valuable.

But, to cut off all pretence for caviling, I mean by the word Taste no more than that faculty or those faculties of the mind which are affected with, or which form a judgment ^Ipthe works of imagination and the elegant arts. This is, I think, the most general idea of that word, and what is the least connected with any particular theory. And my point, in this inquiry, is to find whether there are any principles, on which the imagination is affected, so common to all, so grounded and certain, as to supply the means of reasoning satisfactorily about them. And such principles of taste I fancy there are, however paradoxical it may seem to those who, on a superficial view, imagine that there is so great a diversity of tastes, both in kind and degree, that nothing can be more indeterminate.

All the natural powers in man, with which I am acquainted, that are conversant about external objects, are the senses, the imagination, and the judgment. And, first, with regard to the Senses. We do, and we must suppose, that, as the conformation of their organs are nearly or altogether the same in all men, so the manner of perceiving external objects is in all men the same, or with little difference. We are satisfied that what appears to be light to one eye appears light to another ; that what seems sweet to one palate, is sweet to another ; that what is dark and bitter to this man, is likewise dark and bitter to that ; and we con-

What is meant by the word Taste? In this inquiry, what is the object? What are all the natural powers of man that are conversant about external objects ? Why is the manner of perceiving external objects in all men so nearly the same ? How is this illustrated ?

ON TAStft. 21

elude, in the same manner, of great and little, hard and soft, hot and cold, rough and smooth, and, indeed, of all the natural qualities and affections of bodies. If we suffer ourselves to imagine that their senses present to different men different images of things, this sceptical proceeding will make every sort of reasoning, on every subject, vain and frivolous, even that sceptical reasoning itself which had persuaded us to entertain a doubt concerning the agreement of our perceptions. But, as there will be little doubt that bodies present similar images to the whole species, it must necessarily be allowed, that the pleasures and the pains which every object excites in one man, it must raise in all mankind, while it operates naturally, simply, and by its proper powers only ; for, if we deny this, we must imagine that the same cause, operating in the same manner, and on subjects of the same kind, will produce different effects, which would be highly absurd. Let us first consider this point in the sense of taste, and the rather as the faculty in question has taken its name from that sense. All men are agreed to call vinegar sour, honey sweet, and aloes bitter ; and as they are all agreed in finding these qualities in those objects, they do not in the least differ concerning their effects with regard to pleasure and pain. They all concur in calling sweetness pleasant, and sourness and bitterness unpleasant. Here there is no diversity in their sentiments ; and that there is not, appears fully from the consent of all men in the meta-

What will be the consequence of suffering ourselves to imagine that their senses present to different men different images of things? There being little doubt that bodies present similar images to the whole species, what must be allowed, and why ? In what are all men agreed ? and what follows ? In what farther are they agreed ? How does it appear that there is no diversity in their sentiments on this subject?

2S INTRODUCTION.

phors which are taken from the sense of Taste. A sour temper, bitter expressions, bitter curses, a bitter fate, are terms well and strongly understood by all ; and we are altogether as well understood when we say a sweet disposition, a sweet person, a sweet condition, and the like. It is confessed that custom, and some other causes, have made many deviations from the natural pleasures or pains which belong to these several tastes ; but then the power of distinguishing between the natural and the acquired relish remains to the very last. A man frequently comes to prefer the taste of tobacco to that of sugar, and the flavour of vinegar to that of milk ; but this makes no confusion in tastes, while he is sensible that the tobacco and vinegar are not sweet, and while he knows that habit alone has reconciled his palate to these alien pleasures. Even with such a person we may speak, and with sufficient precision, concerning tastes. But should any man be found who declares that to him tobacco has a taste like sugar, and that he can not distinguish between milk and vinegar ; or that tobacco and vinegar are sweet, milk bitter, and sugar sour, we immediately conclude that the organs of this man are out of order, and that his palate is utterly vitiated. We are as far from conferring with such a person upon tastes, as from reasoning concerning the relations of quantity with one who should deny that all the parts together were equal to the whole. We do not call a man of this kind wrong in his notions, but absolutely mad. Exceptions of this sort, in either way, do not at all

What examples are given ? What is here confessed ? But what power still remains? Why does not the preference given by some men to things alien to the natural palate produce confusion in tastes ? What do we conclude of the man who declares that to him tobacco has a taste like sugar, &c. ? Why do not exceptions of this sort, in either way, impeach our general rule ?

impeach our general rule, nor make us conclude that men have various principles concerning the relations of quantity, or the taste of things. So that when it is said, Taste can not be disputed, it can only mean that no one can strictly answer what pleasure or pain some particular man may find from the taste of some particular thing. This, indeed, can not be disputed ; but we may dispute, and with sufficient clearnes, too, concerning the things which are naturally pleasing or disagreeable to the sense. But when we talk of any peculiar or acquired relish, then we must know the habits, the prejudices, or the distempers of this particular man, and we must draw our conclusion from those.

This agreement of mankind is not confined to the taste solely. The principle of pleasure derived from sight is the same in all. Light is more pleasing than darkness. Summer, when the earth is clad in green, when the heavens are serene and bright, is more agreeable than winter, when every thing makes a diflferent appearance. I never remember that any thing beautiful, whether a man, a beast, a bird, or a plant, was ever shown, though it were to a hundred people, that they did not all immediately agree that it was beautiful, though some might have thought that it fell short of their expectation, or that other things were still more beautiful than it. I believe no man thinks a goose to be more beautiful than a swan, or imagines that what they call a Friezland hen excels a peacock. It must be observed, too, that the pleasures of the sight are not near so complicated, and confused, and altered