France and the alliances: the struggle for the balance of power

Preface

Having been requested, in 1908, to deliver, under the auspices of the French Circle of Harvard University, the annual course of lectures there, founded by- Mr. James H. Hyde a dozen years ago, I explained in my eight lessons the subject treated of in this book. Although to-day, in its published form, my subject contains developments which would not have been possible in a three weeks' series of lectures, I have modified neither its spirit, nor its plan, nor its conclusions.

Its spirit first. Cultivated Americans, who have in their universities such an admirable instrument of work, are all acquainted with France of the past ; her history, her literature, and her art. To show them France of to-day, in presence of Europe and the world, such as she has been shaped, after painful experiences, by thirty-eight years of sustained effort and diplomatic action, is the aim that I have proposed to myself.

The plan resulted from the subject itself. It was through the Russian Alliance that France issued from the isolation in which she had been placed by defeat. It was by her understandings with Great Britain, Italy, and Spain that she subsequently pursued the satisfaction of her interests. It is in presence of the Triple Alliance, dominated by Germany, that she has raised the edifice of her agreements. It is against Germany that she has been compelled to defend and complete it. Such is the woof of this book of contemporary history, which is supplemented by a necessary study of Franco- American relations.

vi PREFACE

My conclusions come out on eacli page from the narration of events. In this diplomatic drama, the unity of which is equal to that of the antique tragedies, France has fought for the balance of power. Both militarily and politically destroyed in 1871 by Germany's triumph, this equilibrium has been gradually reconstituted. It exists to-day. But it is unstable. The heirs of Bismarck have not yet resigned themselves to the loss of the hegemony which — though it could be only temporary — he had secured for his country. Will they accept the new order of things which, through symmetric groupings of Powers, expresses the necessity for stability in the various international elements? This is a question that, in the near future, will be settled either by peace or war.

A Frenchman could not treat such a subject otherwise than from a French point of view. But to try to understand one's adversaries is already to do them justice. With this spirit of justice I have endeavoured to inspire myself, yet not seeking to hide errors, which indeed do not fundamentally affect the whole of the French achievement.

If Americans should see in this book, which has been written in good faith, fresh reasons for loving and esteeming France, then I shall have attained my object. The historic souvenirs which unite the two Republics have created imperishable ties between them. Being convinced that they may find in the study of the present time a positive justification for their old sympathies, I have striven to the best of my ability to make this justification clear, by telling, in the field of diplomatic action, the struggles of France for peace through the balance of power.

Paris, September 1, 1908.

Contents

PAGE

Preface v

Chapter I

I. Geographical necessity of the Franco-Russian Alliance — Hindrances — Mistakes of the Second Empire — Institutions — Men — Bapprocheme nt — European equilibrium

— Scare of 1875 — Bulgarian incident of 1887 — Russian loans

— Nihilists — Weapons and arms ordered — Cronstadt — Protocols of 1891 and 1892.

II. Eranco-Russian Alliance judged by contemporary opinion — Speeches of the Baron de Mohrenheim, Mr. de Ereycinet, and Mr. Ribot — Practice of the Alliance — Eranco-Russian f§tes — Their exaggeration — Subaltern position of Erance.

III. Deviation of the Alliance — Trans-Siberian Railway

— Chinese question between 1895 and 1902 — Eranco-Russian note of March 19, 1902 — Mr. Delcass^ and the Russo- Japanese war — French disappointment — Mr. Combes' mistakes in tact — Manchuria and Morocco — Eranco-Russian set-back.

IV. Future of the Alliance — Veering of French opinion in favour of Russia — Mr. Isvolsky and the return to Europe

— Mr. Isvolsky and the Alliance of the Three Emperors — Mr. Bompard superseded — Financial and economic relations — Russian Army and the reforms necessary — Lasting necessity of the Alliance.

Chapter II '

I. Franco-English rivalry — Three centuries of war — '/-""'^^ Attempts at an understanding, and their failure — Algeria

— Tunis — The Niger — The Congo — The Upper Nile and Egypt — Eashoda.

viii CONTENTS

PAGE

II. Causes of the Franco-English raviorochement — ^Gergiany and England — : Bismarck's policy — German progress — CommCTcial..compjetition — EhglisTT merchants and consuls — Political distrust — British impeachment — France and the balance of power — Franco-English commerce — End of the colonial quarrel.

III. Entente Cordiale — Eole of Edward VII — Visit of 1903 — Negotiations — Agreement of the 8th of April, 1904 -rJigypt — Morocco — Value of the arrangement — Franco- English manifestations — German policy and the evolution of the Entente Cordiale — Anglo-Russian rapprochement.

IV. Entente or Alliance — Military problem — Weakness of the English Army — Mr. Haldane's reforms — Their insufficiency — State of English opinion — French interests — Policy of neutrality — Conditions of an Alliance — Failing these conditions, friends, but not allies.

CHAPTER III France and the Mediterranean Understandings . . 81

I. Franco-Italian understanding — France and the Mediterranean — Italy and the Mediterranean — Franco-Italian hostility — Tunis and the Triple Alliance — Crispinism — Causes of the Franco-Italian rapprochement — Tunisian treaties — Treaty of Commerce — Political agreements — Morocco and Tripoli — The rapprochement and the Triple Alliance — England and the rapprochement — The rapprochement and African problems — Conclusion.

II. Franco-Spanish understanding — Spain after the war

— Economic situation — Moroccan aspirations — Penal settlements — Spain and France — Period of the Triple Alliance

— Difficulties in coming to an understanding with regard to Morocco — First negotiations — Spain and the Franco-English agreement — Franco-Spanish agreement — Trans-Pyrenean railways — Alfonso XIII and the "Western Powers.

III. France and Morocco — Moroccan exclusiveness — Early reign of Abd el Aziz — Moroccan wealth — Franco- Moroccan commerce — Morocco and Algeria — Franco-Moroccan relations — R^voil — Guebbas agreements — French programme of reforms — Pacific penetration.

CONTENTS ix

Chapter IV Faob

I. Formation of the Triple Alliance — Crisis of 1875 and the Eussian intervention — Bismarck and the '■'■coalition nightmare'''' — Congress of Berlin — Austro-German Alliance — Italy's accession — Isolation of France.

II. Hegemony of the Triple Alliance — Kalnoky and Crispi — Bismarck and Russia — Triple " Counter-assurance" of Skiernevice — Double "Counter-assurance" of 1887 — Bismarck and England — Bismarck and French colonial policy — Bismarck's threats — Military laws — Speeches of the 8th of January, 1888, and the consequences.

III. Triple Alliance and the Franco-Russian Alliance. — German anxiety — German attempt to capture the Dual Alliance — Advances of William II — Policy of William II — Cooperation of the two systems. — Favourable situation of Germany — Mr. von Buelow's mistake.

IV. Triple Alliance and the Western understandings — Apprehensions of William II — Economic crisis in Germany

— Germany and Italy — Italy and Austria — Speeches of William II — Policy of reserve — Russian defeats — Conflict of the Alliances.

Chapter V

I. German offensive — Mr. von Kuhlmann's statements

— Cause and pretext — William II at Tangier — Mistakes of Mr. Delcass^ — Prince Henckel of Donnersmarck — Scare in France — Mr. Delcass6's resignation.

II. German success — Mr. Rouvier and the conference — Acceptance of the conference by France — Moroccan concessions of Germany — Success of the great German design,

m. German discomfiture — Situation just before Algeciras — Germany's error — Fluctuations of German policy — Ends and means — "European reprobation" — Failure of the German attempt to restore the Bismarckian hegemony — Russian Alliance and the Western understandings — Triple Alliance — Opinion in Germany — Resignation of Prince von Buelow to the inevitable.

X CONTENTS

^- CHAPTER VI

/j/^ PA6B

The New Asiatic and European Understandings . . 210

I. Asia and the German policy — Sino-Japanese war — Combined action of Germany, France, and Russia — The "break-up of China" — Crisis of 1900 — Russo-Japanese war — German profit — Three risks of France,

II. Asia and the French policy — Russo-Japanese reconciliation and the agreements of 1907 — Franco-Japanese reconciliation — Anglo-Russian reconciliation — Persia, Afghanistan, Thibet, the Persian Gulf — France and the Anglo-Russian agreement — French profit accruing from it.

III. European developments — Evolution of the Anglo- Russian understanding — Germany's attitude — Interview at Revel — Anglo-Russian understanding in Macedonia — End of the Austro-Russian understanding — Anglo-Spanish and Franco-Spanish agreements — Tendency to an equilibrium.

Chapter VII

I. Sentiment and business — Souvenirs of the Independence struggle — Two Sister Republics — Politics and the "Imponderable" — Franco- American manifestations — Words and Deeds — Franco-American commerce — Commercial agreements — Possible improvements — France and the American financial crisis of 1907.

II. Politics — France and the Monroe Doctrine — American affairs — France and the " hig stick'''' — Asiatic affairs — United States and the " Open Door" — Mr. Hay and Russia — United States and Japan — Franco-Japanese agreement and the United States — European affairs — United States

nd the Moroccan crisis — Conference of Algeciras — Reasons oi the American policy — United States and the Entente Cordiale — United States and the balance of power in Europe.

Conclusion

Index of Proper Names . . . . . . . .311

Chapter I

I. Geographic necessity of the Franco-Russian Alliance. — Hindrances. — Mistakes of the Second Empire. — Institutions. — • Men. — Rapprochement. — European equilibrium. — Scare of 1875. — Bulgarian incident of 1887. — Russian loans. — Nihilists. — Weapons and arms ordered. — Cronstadt. — Protocols of 1891 and 1892.

II. Franco-Russian Alliance judged by contemporary opinion.

— Speeches of the Baron de Mohrenheim, Mr. de Freycinet, and Mr. Ribot. — Practice of the Alliance. — Franco- Russian fetes. — Their exaggeration. — Subaltern position of France.

III. Deviation of the Alliance. — Trans-Siberian Railway. — Chinese question between 1895 and 1902. — Franco-Russian note of March 19, 1902. — Mr. Delcasse and the Russo- Japanese war. — French disappointment. — Mr. Combes' mistakes in tact. — Manchuria and Morocco. — Franco- Russian set-back.

IV. Future of the Alliance. — Veering of French opinion in favour of Russia. — Mr. Isvolski and the return to Europe.

— Mr. Isvolski and the Alliance of the Three Emperors, — Mr. Bompard superseded. — Financial and economic relations. — Russian Army and the reforms necess y. '■ — Lasting necessity of the Alliance.

I

The Franco- Russian Alliance may be considered as a perfect type of the ^'mariage de raison" ; not that by this should be understood a bond imposed upon the contracting parties through a will foreign to their own, but one which, suggested first by a correct appreciation of interests, corresponded, when once formed, to the sentiments of each.

To be convinced of this, one needs only to examine a map. From time immemorial, France, as a continental power, badly protected on her northeastern frontier, had found herself on land in rivalry, if not in open struggle, with her eastern neighbour, formerly Austria, to-day Germany. And always also, in order to keep this rival or adversary at arm's length, she was obliged to seek allies in the east of Europe, — Turks, Swedes, Poles, these last more recently replaced by Russians. In 1717, Peter the Great, during his travels in France, said to the Regent Philippe d'Orleans, when offering him his alliance, ''I will stand to you in the stead of Poland, Turkey, and Sweden." ^ A century and a half later, at the close of the Crimean war, Bismarck expressed the opinion that a ''Franco- Russian Alliance was in the nature of things." As a matter of fact, the Russian Empire and the French Republic worked for the increase of their own security by fortifying the equilibrium of Europe, on the day that they recorded in a treaty of alliance the lasting community of their essential interests.

In order to succeed in concluding this Alliance,

both French and Russians had a good deal to undo.

Of the various regimes in power since 1815, the

Government of the Restoration alone, and notably

* See Albert Vandal in his Louis XV and Elizabeth of Russia.

that of Charles X, had clearly understood the profit France would derive from a rapprochement with Russia. The Due de Richelieu, Chateaubriand, and Polignac were the first partisans of the Russian Alliance. And it was largely because he was assured of Russia's support that, in spite of England's threats, the last mentioned statesman undertook the Algerian expedition. On the other hand, the reign of Napoleon III had a deplorable influence on French relations with Russia. The Crimean campaign was a mistake ; and the policy followed in the affairs of Poland was another. When the war of 1870 broke out, Russia did nothing to defend us. During his stay in Saint Petersburg, Thiers obtained neither '^ understanding nor engagement." The Czar saw in our disasters nothing more than an opportunity to bring about the revision of the Treaty of Paris. Gortchakoff had full confidence in Prussia; and this confidence was destined to last until the Congress of Berlin. The diplomatic combination known under the name of the Alliance of the Three Emperors left France isolated. Vanquished and alone, she had only herself to rely on.

Many circumstances, indeed, then prevented the hope of her being able to escape from this isolation by an alliance with Russia. An initial obstacle existed in the wide difference between the two countries' domestic regimes. For the Republican form of government the Russian Court felt very little sympathy. And if communications were set up between Paris and Saint Petersburg, it was usually between the respective oppositions, Russians blaming the Radical trend of French politics, Frenchmen praying for the success of Russian Liberals. Already, before the end of the Franco-Prussian war, one of the members of the Government of the National Defence, put forward the absurd proposal of a pardon for Berezowski/ Ten years later, the refusal to extradite the nihilist Hartmann, who had taken refuge in Paris, grievously offended the Czar's Government.^ A no less unfavourable impression was produced by the pardon granted to Prince Kropotkine. These incidents turned to the advantage of Bismarck, who openly declared himself opposed to a Franco-Russian rapprochement. "I won't live," he said, '' between two enemies."

Personal reasons were added to those arising from circumstances. In choosing diplomatists to represent France in Russia, the French Government was not always well-inspired. At Saint Petersburg the souvenir still remains of blunders in language committed by Admiral Jaures. He it was who, seeing in the Palace the portraits of the ancient Czars of Moscow, asked a Master of the Ceremonies : —

''Who are those ugly creatures?"

He it was also, who, when dining with the Minister of the Interior and speaking of certain Nihilist outrages, finished up by sententiously remarking : —

* Berezowski had fired a pistol at the Czar during his stay in Paris in 1867.

^ Hartmann had blown up a train which he supposed to be the Czar's.

''You will only get out of the mess by establishing a Republic."

On the contrary, his successor, General Appert, was quite in the Czar's good graces. But the bruskness of his recall irritated Alexander III, who, by way of protest, ordered his Ambassador in France to take a long leave of absence from the country. Then, there was the Floquet question. Under the Empire, Mr. Charles Floquet, a young barrister at that time, had greeted the Czar, during his Imperial visit to the Palais de Justice, with, "Vive la Pologne, Monsieur!^' ^ When the fiery law-student of 1867, became Chairman of the Lower Chamber and subsequently Prime Minister, a regular negotiation had to be carried through for relations to be established between him and the Russian Ambassador. Mr. Grevy, who remained at the EJysee until 1887, was, moreover, hostile to any diplomatic action — and especially to the Russian Alliance. To him the policy of absolute reserve and of isolation alone seemed reasonable. He was of the opinion that we had nothing to expect from negotiations with autocratic Russia, and that, in entering upon them, we should only alarm Germany without any positive benefit accruing.

Interest, however, which was pushing France and Russia nearer each other, was ultimately fated to carry the day. As early as 1873, the Due de Broglie, uneasy at Germany's attitude, had solicited through Comte de Chaudordy an intervention of Prince

1 " Hurrah I for Poland, Sir."

Gortchakoff; and the Russian Chancellor, receiving the French envoy, had said to him : —

"We want France as strong as she was in the past."

Two years later, in 1875, German threats were more openly expressed/ It was the time when Bismarck thought of exhausting us by a fresh bleeding, and the Berlin papers spoke without disguise of another war. The only thing left to conjecture was, whether the war would break out in the spring or the autumn. Russia could not overlook the fact that, the issue of this unequal struggle would bring with it a definite rupture of the European balance of power to the benefit of the German Empire, and would mean, as the Due Decazes said, "the enslaving of the Old World." Prince Orloff, who was then Ambassador at Paris, encouraged our Minister for Foreign Affairs not to yield an inch.

"Be firm," he repeated, "be very firm."

The French Ambassador at Saint Petersburg was General Le Flo, who, being in possession of the Czar's entire confidence, pressed him to intervene. And, Alexander II inclined more every day to the idea of intervention.

"If you are really menaced," he said, "you shall know it by me."

And, in fact, he refused to meet the overtures that Mr. von Radowitz, a German diplomatist, was at this moment commissioned to make him ; and conveyed to General le Flo, through Gortchakoff, that

* See Hanotaux' History of Contemporary France.

France had nothing to fear. On the 10th of May, he arrived in Berhn, and, in an interview with Bismarck, spoke out so plainly that, a few days later, the cloud passed away/

The Eastern question and the Congress of Berlin — which Gortchakoff called the darkest page of his history — completely loosened the ties of Russo- German intimacy. Even in the Conference of Constantinople, that is to say, before the commencement of the Russo-Turkish war, Bismarck had played a double game. He continued doing so during the Congress. On the morrow of this European assize, Russia was as isolated in the East as France was in the West. The Russian newspapers, the Moscow Gazette, for instance, preached the French AUiance. On the 7th of October, 1879, the conclusion of the Austro-German Alliance, two years subsequently, transformed into a Triple Alliance by Italy's adhesion, and directed even more against Russia than against France; brought an extra argument to the Francophile campaign. The Russian Czar and the German Emperor continued their reciprocal assurances of ''cordial affection"; but the old confidence was lacking. During his ephemeral premiership of 1881, Gambetta felt that the moment had arrived to profit by this change. And, in appointing Comte de Chaudordy Ambassador at Saint Petersburg, he said to him : —

* See Hanotaux' History, already cited. The Czar said to Mr. de Gontaut-Biron, the French Ambassador at Berlin: "I hope our relations will become increasingly cordial. We have common interests. We must remain friends."

'^Leaning on Russia and on England, we shall be unattackable."

Another five years, however, elapsed without any advantage being taken of such favourable conditions. By another diplomatic masterpiece, Bismarck had, indeed, contrived, in 1887 first, and, subsequently in 1888, to form with Russia a counter-assurance which warded off all danger of a Franco- Russian alliance. To Mr. Flourens, who was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Goblet Cabinet on the 13th of December, 1886, the honour belongs of having for the first time turned the suggestions of interest into acts. The Eastern crisis supplied him with an occasion. Bulgarian delegates had come in January, 1887, soliciting the support of the great Powers against Russia. Mr. Flourens declared to them that their first duty was to reach an understanding with the Saint Petersburg Cabinet. The German campaign on behalf of the military Septennatj and the warlike ardour it aroused in Berlin, enabled the French Government to ascertain that their attitude with regard to Bulgaria had been appreciated in Russia. Important movements of troops on the Polish frontier, showed that the Czar's Government, while not yet making alliance with us, yet intended to be in a position to have a word to say in the matter, if France were attacked. A week after, the Czar, in annotating a confidential report of Mr. de Giers, his Minister of Foreign Affairs, wrote on the margin, "We must not let France be diminished."

At this date, owing to tie clear-sighted initiative of her financiers, France was able to gain a fresh hold on Russia's gratitude/ With a trend more and more directed towards an intensive policy of economic development, the Russian Empire needed capital. In order to procure it, she had, up to then, applied to bankers who, after subscribing the loans, sometimes found, sometimes did not find, people to invest in these values, of whose Exchange rates they thus remained masters. In reality, it was especially on the Berlin market that such operations were effected. A group of French financiers, at the head of whom was Mr. Hoskier, a banker of Danish origin, thought it would be to the interest both of France and of Russia to substitute for this system, precarious in its principle and limited in its extension, that of floating the Russian loans on the French market and among the French public. In the month of June, 1888, Mr. Hoskier opened negotiations for this purpose with Mr. Wichnegradski, the Russian Minister of Finance. In the following December, after the scheme had been thoroughly dealt with, a first loan of 500,000,000 francs was issued in Paris, of the 4 per cent type, at 86 fr. 45 c, which was subscribed by more than a hundred thousand persons. Other loans followed: in 1889 (700,000,000 and 1,200,000,000 francs), in 1890 (300 millions and 41 milhons), in 1891 (320 milHons and 500 miUions), in 1893 (178 miUions), in 1894 (454 miUions, 166

^ See Ernest Daudet's Diplomatic History of the Franco-Russian Alliance.

millions, 400 millions), ir 1896 (400 millions), in 1901 (424 millions), in 1904 (800 millions), in 1906 (1,200 millions). And France thus became Russia's creditor for a sum which may be estimated, with municipal loans and industrial enterprises, at twelve billions of francs/ It was a new principle of solidarity between the two countries, and, from 1889, offered to political combinations the broad, solid basis of financial interests.

The French Government resolved to take advantage of it. On his nomination to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which he held till the 11th of January, 1893, Mr. Ribot resolutely lent his efforts to the forming of an alliance with Russia. His chief agent was our Ambassador at Saint Petersburg, Mr. de Laboulaye, one of the most remarkable of our diplomatists of the Third Republic, for qualities of shrewdness, firmness, and tact. Moreover, the whole Cabinet were in agreement on the subject. In 1890, Mr. Constans, the Minister of the Interior, placed a trump card in the Ambassador's hand, by effecting the arrest of a band of Nihilists that were manufacturing in Paris bombs intended to serve against the Czar and his family. At the same date, Mr. de Freycinet, the Minister of War, rendered Russia a service of another kind, no less appreciated, by putting our Chatellerault Arms Factories at her

' To the loans above mentioned must be added the 5 per cent loan of 1822, quoted on the Exchange, on and after February 22, 1890 ; the Interior loan, admitted on 'Change June 2, 1894; and, last of all, the Austrian portion of the 1900 loan, which has remained on the Paris market.

disposal. Every day the atmosphere grew more favourable.^ With statesmanlike perspicacity, Mr. de Laboulaye saw that the time had come for action, and that only the approval of the people was required to bring to a successful issue these combinations, previously conceived in the secret councils of the two Chancelleries. In the summer of 1890, he organized the visit of the French fleet to Russia ; but, for reasons of opportuneness, the project was not realized until the next year. On the 25th of July, 1891, Admiral Gervais' squadron arrived off Cronstadt.

The memory of this triumphal visit is so recent that I need not dwell upon it. All Europe was astounded at the Russian nation's enthusiasm. All at once, in spite of distance, in spite of a past of mistrust, in spite of differences of every sort, political, intellectual, and moral, Russian opinion and French opinion, breaking a long silence, united in applauding the act which manifested the rapprochement. Although the Alliance was not yet made, it was already looked upon as certain. A few weeks later, in the Reichstag, the Count von Caprivi, Chancellor of the German Empire, said in the course of an Army speech: '^There can be no doubt that a close rapprochement has come about between France and Russia. It has been in preparation for a long while. But to-day, everything, Cronstadt included, seems to indicate that an alliance is intended." This Alliance was signed on the 22d of August, 1891, by ^ See Ernest Daudet's book already cited.

Mr. Ribot, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Baron de Mohrenheim, who was the Russian Ambassador at Paris. At the end of June, 1892, General de Boisdeffre, being at the head of the Army Staff, went to Saint Petersburg, for the purpose of negotiating a military arrangement completing the initial protocol, and gave the Cabinet's seal to a defensive pact between France and Russia.^ The two countries thus abandoned their isolation, and thereby reestablished the balance of power in Europe.

II

During four years longer, the signatory Governments forbore to render their Alliance public ; but, in the meantime, they determined its character more precisely. On the 31st of August, 1891, at a fete given in his honour at Cauterets, the Russian Ambassador, Mr. de Mohrenheim, said : —

Mr. Prefect, you have just alluded to the mutual current of sympathy set up throughout Russia and France. . . . There are many reasons why this should be so.

A few days later at Vandeuvre, Mr. de Freycinet, who combined with his Premiership the Ministry of War, held in his turn the following discourse : —

Don't let us tire of improving and strengthening our Army. It is one of the elements, and not the least, of our influence in the world. It has its share in the events that are a joy to our patriotism. Its progress, which Europe sees and France applauds, inspires some with confidence, others with respect. Such prog-

* See Jules Hansen's book. The Baron de Mohrenheim' s Ambassadorship at Paris.

ress, moreover, proves that the Government of the Republic, in spite of superficial changes, are capable of long designs, and that in the accomplishment of national tasks, they manifest a consistency that is not inferior to a Monarchy's. No one to-day doubts our strength. Let us show that we are prudent. We shall know how to maintain, in a new situation, the coolness, dignity and moderation which, during days of misfortune, prepared our recovery.

Finally, on the 29th of September at Bapaume, Mr. Ribot, Minister of Foreign Affairs, said : —

After hesitating for some time, Europe has, at last, done us justice. A Sovereign, who is far-seeing and firm in his designs, and pacific like ourselves, has publicly demonstrated the deep sjnmpathies uniting his country and our own. (Enthusiastic applause. Cries of: 'Long live the Czar! Hurrah for France! Hurrah for Russia ! ')

The Russian nation have joined their Emperor in giving us proofs of cordial friendship. (Fresh applause.)

You know how well we reciprocate these sentiments. (Yes! Yes!)

The events of Cronstadt have had an echo even in our smallest hamlets, our tiniest villages. ...

From them has resulted, as Justly remarked, a new situation, which does not mean that a new policy needs to be adapted to it. . . .

. . . Just at the moment when we are able to practice peace with more dignity, we are not likely to expose ourselves to its being compromised. Conscious of her strength and confident in her future, France will continue to exhibit the qualities of prudence and coolness which have gained her other peoples' esteem and have helped to restore her to the rank due to her in the world.

In other words, to a state of forced peace succeeded one that was voluntary. Doubtless, the Franco- Russian Alliance was not an alliance formed for revenge. Its object was not to give us back Alsace-

Lorraine. But it insured us in Europe a moral authority which, since our defeats, had been wanting to us. It augmented our diplomatic value. It opened to us the field of political combinations, from which our isolation had excluded us. From mere observation, we could pass to action, thanks to the recovered balance of power.

To prove that such was the character of the Franco-Russian Alliance, I cannot do better than quote the Chancellor of the German Empire. Returning from Saint Petersburg to Paris early in June, 1902, I had the honour of a long interview with Count von Buelow at Berlin. After speaking to me of the journey Mr. Loubet had just made, as President of the Republic, to Russia, he added: —