New propositions in speculative and practical philosophy

Preface

The following pages are from my published and unpublished writings, which I have collected and put together in this small volume for the purpose of preserving in a compact form some original propositions and presentations that I have introduced in the realm of philosophy and mental and physical science. I use the term original propositions and presentations because I believe them to be new. At least they are new and original to me, never having read or heard them mentioned in my researches in the department to which the above treatises referred to belong.

L. S. Richards.

Marshfield Hills,

Massachusetts, U. S. A., 1903.

CHAPTER I. The Philosophy and Construction of Thought

First, it will be necessary in the study of this proposition to analyze thought — find its bearings and see how it is constructed and operated. When we visit Edison's phonograph we not only admire the mechanical and automatic conversations which are carried on by it, but are slow to leave the wonder without learning something of the instrument through which the sounds are produced. So with thought. We must first become familiar with the construction of its instrument, the brain, through which it manifests itself, before we examine the phenomena of thought per se. The three most important divisions of the brain are the cerebrum, cerebellum and the medulla oblongata. The cerebrum is the upper portion, and divided into two hemispheres : one on the left, the other on the right side of the head. This portion of the brain

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is more especially the instrument of thought. The cerebellum, which is immediately below and back of the cerebrum, and well covered by it, is used to regulate the voluntary and instinctive movements of the muscles, and is partially the seat of reproductive propensities. The medulla oblongata is the continued upper prolongation of the spinal cord, and runs into the central portion of the cranium. It is located in the lower portion of the head, and is the center of all movements concerned in the acts of respiration and deglutition, or swallowing — the two most important requisites in the continuance of our earthly being. These centers, however, are not operated by their own volition, but by reflex action, an involuntary movement. We observe this when we breathe and swallow ; there is no thought or will exercised in the performance of either. We do both unconsciously without a moment's thought. They work of themselves, the same as in the act of passing into sleep; we can arrive at that condition only by withdrawing ourselves from thought, and it is done so silently and thoughtlessly that we

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know not when we pass into it. How different are the workings of this portion of the brain from those of the cerebellum ! When we lift our arm it is a voluntary movement; our will is exercised ; we cannot raise it without thought, although we may often be unconscious when the latter is used in the movement. The cerebellum is the seat of all voluntary movements of the muscles, and in all animals below man belonging to the vertebrates, it is more largely developed than any other portion of the brain. It is the animalistic portion of the head; and the cerebrum, or the upper division of the brain, lessens in size as we pass from man through the lower orders of the animal kingdom. In man the cerebral hemispheres, or cerebrum, reach their greatest development and size, and here the intellectual faculties give a vast display of thought, as manifested in varied and graded forms. Another portion of the brain, the fourth and last division, but not the least, is the tubercular quadrigemina and other ganglionic masses, situated at the base of the cranium. They are connected with the nerves

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of special sensation, and correspond to the ganglions of some lower orders of animals in which is seated the sense of smell, of sight and hearing, and constitute in these animals the principal portions of the brain. In man, as well as in all animals, it is supposed to be the seat of the emotional and instinctive faculties. The question now arises, How does thought operate upon the brain? First, we will commence with its lowest form — that prompted by sensation. Up and down the spinal cord there are ganglia of sensation, upon which all sense of feeling is registered by impressions being made thereon. This principle is illustrated in the recently discovered phonograph. It was thought years ago that words spoken in a room or hall were impressed upon the walls ; but this in the minds of the masses seemed hypothetical, and the idea never took root. But to-day Edison has proven, through his little instrument, that this hypothesis was true ; for the words articulated in a room, striking a disk in place of the walls, are not only shown to be impressed thereon, but the little instrument — the phonograph —

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repeats word for word, and not only the words but the tone, high and low, soft and loud, spoken by the speaker. The impressions made upon these sensory ganglia are similar, though less marked in degree, to the inverted impressions made by an object seen upon the retina of the eye of an ox immediately after he is butchered. It was given in evidence in a court of justice in Italy, where a man was on trial for murder, that, the image of the murderer was impressed on the eye of the man murdered while the arm of the accused was raised in the act of stabbing his victim with the stilleto, the image being so plainly stamped on the victim's eye it could be readily seen and led to the murderer's conviction. These ganglia of sensation have posterior and anterior roots, and sensations are transmitted from the skin, or any portion of the body, to the posterior roots of these ganglia or nerve centres in the spinal cord, and impressed on the registering ganglions, and then pass up the sensory tract (a system of nerves of sensation) in which is deposited a gray matter, and thence to the brain. The

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anterior roots of these ganglia are the roots of motor nerves, and after the sensation has passed up the sensory tract to the brain, the motor tract (a system of nerves) receives this sensation and conveys it down the ganglia or nerve centers, and is there transmitted to the spot in which the sensation originated, and if an injury, pain is felt. These sensations may be the result of some injury to the body, or sensations of pleasure, or they may be sensations resulting from the action of thought ; all are, nevertheless, registered upon the registering ganglions ; and these impressions stamped upon these ganglions, as in thought registerings, remain impressed thereon for years, and reappear or reproduce themselves strangely at times in our dreams, or unconsciously at other times in our passive meditations. The sensory tract conveys sensation to the back portion of the brain, where the feelings and the animal propensities are seated, and the motor tract passes into the front portion of the brain, where the intellectual faculties are located. These tracts meet in the brain. If the sensory nerves or tracts

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be severed no sensation below it will be felt; all feeling in that direction ceases ; but the motor tract is unimpaired, and conveys the motion. Let the motor tract be severed, and it destroys all motion below it; one cannot raise his foot or arm but the sensory tract or set of nerves is disturbed thereby, and the sensation is felt the same. The two tracts are independent of each other, yet operate, perhaps, together for the attainment of the same object. The spinal cord in the infant extends down to the sacrum, or the lower part of the vertebra, while the upper portion terminates in the brain ; in fact the cerebrum, the cerebellum and the medulla oblongata are simply the extensions of the spinal cord. In the adult the spinal cord does not extend down to the very lowest portion of the vertebra, but extends farther upward and develops into the cerebrum, or the intellectual lobes of the brain. As the sensory ganglia scattered through the spinal cord is the register on which all sensations or feelings are impressed, so the ganglia or grand sensorium in the brain is the store-house or record-book in which the

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higher feelings, developed into intellectual thought, stamped and stored to be brought out and used, perhaps to-morrow, next year or years in the future, as circumstances arise to recall it. I am well aware that every particle of matter, it is said, that existed in the body seven years before, has wasted and passed away, and it would seem that the ganglion registering sensations, with the impressions, passes away with it. The ganglion does

probably waste and disappear, but the process, the new taking the place of the old — is so very gradual that the stamp, the impression, the form, remains thereon — the same as a scar on the body remains unchanged for scores of years, or for life.

Does thought begin in man? We will pass down the long chain of animal life, commencing with the lowest forms and work up and study the development of thought. Beginning with the protozoa, the lowest form of animal life, to which sponges belong, we find no trace of thought, simply because there is no receptacle, or brain, through which it can make itself manifest. Nature always adapts

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means to ends ; and if there is a use or demand for any faculty or property, an instrument or organ is gradually fashioned through which it can be exercised. If on the other hand, any organ of the body ceases to be used or exercised in the course of many generations, the organ dwindles away, and is lost Passing to the next order in the animal kingdom we come to the radiates, to which star fishes, jelly fishes and the polyps, or coral builders belong; and do we find thought manifested in this order? It might be argued that the beautiful forms of coral, the mammoth coral reefs, the large islands of coral built by these polyps exhibit some traces of thought ; and yet when we study into their habits, we find that coral is simply the secretions of this animal, the same as guano mountain deposits in Peru are dropped by the birds soaring among the Andes. The mode of sustaining life among the polyps by throwing out its circle of feelers and taking into its mouth that which happens to pass within its reach, exhibits that want of energy and thought manifested in the higher animals ; and among

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the various families comprising the order of radiates the same absence of a receptacle or brain for the exercise of thought is as apparent as in the protozoa, the lower order heretofore described. So low are these animals in the scale of creation that they are blessed with only two important organs, and those are the mouth and stomach, (a simple sac to receive the food) and the waste passes out of the body at no particular place, but here and there, wherever it can find vent.

We pass now to the next order in animal life — the mollusks, or shell animals ; do we find thought, in any form, displayed in this order? Take the clam or the oyster with which the masses are most familiar, and how imperfectly developed are they ! A lump of flesh, with but few organs, no evidence is manifested of a receptacle, or brains for thought, nor the least manifestations of it in their works. Next in the order of the animal creation comes the articulate, which includes the worms, insects and spiders. In the works of these animals there is certainly so/ne skill and ingenuity displayed, and here

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begins our study of thought; here is seen the rudimentary manifestation of thought undeveloped, and here for the first time in our researches through the lower orders, do we find a receptacle, or brain, for the exercise of thought.

We call it thought, although it is hardly worthy the name in comparison with the thought manifested through the brain of man. It bears the same relation to the latter as does the simple and shapeless oyster to the complex man, in belonging to the one great family which characterizes the animal kingdom. Although we find a brain in the articulates, yet it lacks one of the important divisions which gives man his superior intelligence — the cerebrum, or the upper hemispheres of the brain; and the works and labors of these animals are what one might expect from such an organized brain. The bee that exhibits such wonderful mechanism, such ingenuity in its movements, such rules of government in its colony, is, after all, largely automatic in its labors. The bee cannot, like man, or even the horse or dog, be

Prop 2

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educated; it is no further advanced or developed than it was one or two thousand years ago. The same is true of the spider. And yet when we look at the labors of the tarantula, the ingenious spider that builds its nests in the ground, the interior of which is a fine piece of masonry and as smooth and polished as the walls of the finest house around us, the material consisting of fifteen layers of silk, and as many layers of clay, laid alternately, with a trap door ingeniously made, (a hinge on the back of it, and the door smoothly beveled to fit the entrance perfectly) these works, as I viewed them in the mountains of Sierra Nevada, impressed upon me a feeling of admiration for the genius displayed by these not altogether lovely, but death-stinging insects.

Nevertheless this ingenuity existed a thousand, or thousands of years ago, no improvement has ever been made, and doubtless never will be by them ; this is instinct ; a manifestation of thought nevertheless, and in some instances perhaps a feeble attempt at reason. Instinct is that part of our intellectual being,

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and of all animal creation (save the few lower orders) that is not susceptible to development or growth, but remains nearly the same through all the species, and for all time, save perhaps in some rare cases in individual movements, while reason is that property in animals that can be, and is, improved or developed. A dog searching for his master comes to two roads which make an acute angle; not knowing which one to take, he stops and looks about. If he were governed simply by instinct he would not hesitate a moment, but take one of them instantly, unhesitatingly, the same as a bee a long way from home strikes a straight line immediately, unhesitatingly for its hive; the dog, however, in the absence of any direct knowledge as to his master's whereabouts is obliged to stop and think. Possibly a previous experience in choosing the wrong road has taught him to be more cautious; and this time he stops to reason, and considers the point — which road the master would be most likely to travel ; he has lost the scent, and finally after mature deliberation he takes the road he thinks is the right one, and

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goes in search of him. The chief promoter of reason or thought is experience, and when an animal possesses the instrument, the organ, which is the cerebrum, in which thought can be exercised and developed, then reason crops out above instinct. But in the articulates the cerebellum is the highest division of the brain, and here is the seat of instinct. We must call it thought, although it is the lowest manifested form of it ; and here we will divide thought into two parts, or forms: instinct and reason; instinct being the lower form, undeveloped and uneducated, while reason is the higher, and susceptible of improvement or development. Instinct works as though governed by reflex action, the same that operates our swallowing and respiration — an automatic, unconscious movement, in which our volition has but little part. We breathe because we cannot help it. No amount of will left to itself can stop it. Having found that thought in its lower form, instinct, is manifested in the order of animals called articulates we shall leave the bees, spiders and worms to enjoy their rudimentary shadow of

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intelligence as best they may and pass on to the next order of animals called the vertebrates, or those having a backbone, of which man is a part and parcel. To the ordinary observer it would at first appear that the lower animals of this order are almost entirely destitute of thought, and, instead of being placed higher in the scale of animal creation than the bees and ants, they should be placed lower; for the thought manifested in the latter, through instinct, is certainly higher than the apparent absence of thought in the fishes. But this is erroneous, for these creatures of the watery deep do possess thought, and it is brought out when properly induced. Some years ago a little girl residing in one of the rural districts upon the South Shore, not very far from where I lived, became interested in fishes, and every morning visited a small river which flowed through the town of Hingham. After throwing crumbs to these creatures every day, she at last succeeded in calling them up near the shore to their breakfast. She soon became famous in that region, and people far and near called to witness her re-

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markable power in this direction. Multitudes of fishes would obey her call to the shore as quickly as a dog answers the call for his dish of meat and quicker than most cats for their daily meal. This it must be perceived is a step beyond instinct, it is thought, educated and trained. The fishes were educated into the belief that her call meant something — something to satisfy their hunger ; and off they rushed to the shore to obey it. This I am aware is a low manifestation of thought ; and yet how many of the "lords of creation" rise much higher than answering calls to satisfy the wants of the stomachs? The ants, governed by instinct, would not respond to such a call. We will next advance a step to reptiles. Rev. Thomas Hill, ex-president of Harvard college, tells the following: "While observing a toad which made itself at home around my front door step, I found it struggling in the attempt to swallow a large grasshopper; it succeeded in partially swallowing the front portion, but the insect was too long, and the hinder portion protruded from the reptile's mouth with but little prospect of any

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further progress in passing down the valley of death through the throat. The toad realizing its critical condition, bent its head towards the ground, and endeavored to push it down the sesophagus, but after repeated and unsuccessful attempts, the trial was given up, the angle being so small that there was not purchase enough to crowd it down. The toad, however, was master of the occasion, and at once raised its hind legs, thereby making a greater angle; (nearly perpendicular) and thus the insect was easily pushed down the broad highway leading to the stomach. On another occasion this toad experienced a similar struggle with a large earth worm. It succeeded in swallowing about three-fifths its length, but at last, through fatigue, it could not swallow fast enough, and the worm succeeded in crawling out of the toad's mouth faster than the latter could swallow it. At last the reptile used its wits, and with its forward feet clenched its own throat, and held the worm fast, while it succeeded in swallowing another inch; then clenching the throat again, and holding it firm in its grip until an-

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other swallow was made, it finally succeeded in devouring the entire worm. Here is a manifestation of thought" continues Ex-Pres. Hill, "higher than instinct; for through experience the toad found that no regular or ordinary methods would apply in these cases, for its peculiar situation demanded extra exertion and thought to secure its prey and find relief."

Passing on to the next higher order in animal life we come to birds. Here we find the brain a little more highly developed. The cerebral hemispheres are yet small, the cerebellum being much larger. Many of the domesticated birds exhibit at times considerable thought when called out. We see this, in a low degree, in the ready obedience of hens, ducks, etc., to the call of their keeper, while greater development of thought is manifested in the trained canary bird and the parrot. The next higher order of animals comes the quadrupeds ; and here a more highly developed brain is quite apparent, and consequently a higher grade of thought is found. The dog is perhaps as high a representative of this

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class as any, and its intelligence is, I think, largely due to its intimate association with man. Wherever man is found on the face of the globe, there the dog is also. The intelligence of man is undoubtedly imparted in a low degree to the dog. Through countless generations his brain has been developing by means of this intimacy until now a dog that fails to manifest some thought in his movements is pronounced worthless. Instinct is a large factor in a dog, but it is not by any means the only factor. Reason crops out here and there in a thousand remarkable incidents which are familiar to most men.

The cerebrum is larger in quadrupeds than in the lower order of animals, but the cerebellum and the medulla oblongata are by far the largest portions, and furnish a much lower order of thought, because animalistic in its make-up. The brain in some quadrupeds is larger and heavier than that of man, but the size is no indication of the amount of thought it is capable of producing. For that we must look to the portion of the head in which the brain is situated ; if in the back and lower

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portion, where the cerebellum lies, as in the quadrupeds, and lower orders, there less thought is displayed ; but if it lies largely in the upper portion, or in the cerebrum, as in man, there thought has full sway; while the amount varies in different individuals in proportion to the shape of the cerebrum, or the cerebral hemispheres, and the quality of the brain mass therein contained. Our next step is the consideration of thought manifested in the quadrumana, which includes the apes, baboons, monkeys, etc. Here I shall not attempt to prove that the thought of the ape is any more identical with the thought of man than is the thought of the lowest Hottentot with that of Herbert Spencer. Nor is it my purpose to compare the general structure of the quadrumana with that of the bimana — man. To the brain we look for thought ; and what do we find? The ape is the highest representative of the quadrumana, but its skull exhibits a very small receptacle for the cerebral hemispheres. The frontal portion o£ the head, so conspicuous in man, retreats backward in the ape, and hence the back brain

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or the cerebellum predominates in these creatures. The quadrumana, however, is a long step in advance of quadrupeds, both in the. structure of the cranium and brain, and the quality of thought. We see this in the ordinary monkey traveling in our country towns with its bosom friend, the organ-grinder. It fills the office of treasurer by passing around its tiny hat among the crowd to collect funds sufficient to please its master. It is anxious for a cent, and will work as hard for one, as most of its superiors whom we call man. It is said that no animal but man can use tools or weapons for defence. Monkeys, however, are known to open boxes, and baboons, when traveling together in large numbers, will attack men by throwing stones at them. Apes, when domesticated, sometimes use knives and forks at the table in eating their meals, with the ease of man. One is described as making his own bed, carefully and smoothly laying out the clothes, and borrowing or imitating some of the evils of its superiors, it stealthily passes into the chamber of its master and draws out a nice blanket from the

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made up bed, runs off, and places it on its own, showing conclusively that he is equal to man in his appreciation of a good bed. This ape lived in the house with the family, and its habits and manners were like those of a child. All it appeared to require to perfect its accomplishments was articulation, or speech. In Paraguay there are monkeys that can utter five distinct sounds to express their varied emotions and feelings. The apes in their native haunts, use a language among themselves. When traveling on a foraging expedition into an African village, the main body oi them will keep a little back and allow the scouts to go ahead; and if any danger is apparent they sound an alarm, and the pickets will beat a hasty retreat. Thought may be further divided into three parts : Intellectual, moral and animalistic. The latter is common to all animals, from the spiders upward, and is confined to the cerebellum and the medula oblongata, while the moral is seated at the top of the cerebrum, near the crown of the head, between the intellectual and animal faculties ; and the shape of the cranium in the

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monkeys, running comparatively high from the ears to the crown, indicates a fair amount of morality. Some time ago a keeper entered a cage in which were kept a baboon and a monkey. Through some unexplained cause the baboon attacked the keeper and would have dispatched him in a short time had not the monkey, through its generous and sacrificing nature, attracted the attention of the baboon toward itself by its cries and bites. The keeper escaped, but the poor monkey paid dearly for its generosity. The affection of some monkeys for their young is very great; at the death of their offspring some mothers have been known to mourn themselves to death over the loss. The intellectual faculties are active in some. An inexperienced monkey will place an egg on the ground, take a stone up into a tree, and let it fall on the egg to break it. The egg scatters and is lost on the ground, and the monkey gets but little. He does not repeat this operation a second time, for the experience of the first has demonstrated the fact that none of the yolk can be obtained by this method. Hence

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his reason (the outgrowth of experience) dictates to it the second time not to go up into the tree, but to crack the shell of the egg gently with his hand and save the contents. Although the thought manifested in the quadrumana is in advance in quality above the quadrupeds, yet it is far inferior to that manifested by man ; for the lowest barbarian on the face of the earth exhibits qualities of thought superior to the highest quadrumana. The barbarian, however low, is master of the most powerful quadruped. He hunts the lion and the tiger, and through his genius succeeds in conquering them. He constructs a hut close by the dead carcass, kindles a fire, dresses the meat, and cures the skin to throw over him ; while no single quadrumana ever attacks a lion or tiger, constructs a hut for shelter, dresses meat, cures the skin, or kindles a fire to keep him warm, although apes have been seen warming their hands over the fire hunters had left, and mourning over the expiring embers, but not manifesting sufficient thought to throw wood thereon and keep the fire alive. The nearest imitation to man

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in dress is in placing mats, made of leaves, upon their heads, and sometimes covering the body with leaves when lying down to sleep. We do not discuss in these papers whether man, the bimana, is an outgrowth of the quadrumane or not. What we want to follow is the line of thought running through the various orders of the animal kingdom. Since leaving the articulates, or the bees, spiders, etc., we find that instinct is being gradually developed into intelligence or reason. Instinct still preponderates, in all orders of animal life below man. We come now to the brain of man, through which thought makes itself manifest. If the increase or development of thought is in exact ratio to the increase or size of brain mass, we should expect to find in the whale, which has a brain nearly twice the size of man, a corresponding increase in intellectual power. But instead of finding double the intelligence that is displayed by man this monster of the deep scarcely touches the hem of thought emanating from the brain of even the lowest races of men ; and the same is true of the elephant and

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