The doctrine of the freedom of the will in Fichte's philosophy

PART I. — EXPOSITION. INTRODUCTORY. page

The words * unity ' and ' freedom ' the key to Fichte's philosophy.. 1-2

Chapter I

The Possibility of a System: of Philosophy. g 1.— Dogmatism and Idealism.

One principle necessary as a basis of all philosophy, both theoretical and practical 3

Dogmatism 4

Idealism 5

Why choose Idealism? 6

§ 2.— Fichte's Method.

Deduction and proof in general 10

Is the system absolutely proven ? 13

CHAPTER II. Theoretical Philosophy

The problem of theoretical philosophy stated 15

The/077?2 of consciousness reduced to the principle of consciousnes.s, 19

The fundamental principle postulated 20

The deduction 22

Recapitulation 23

CHAPTER Iir.

Practical Philosophy. g 1.— Practical Philosophy in General.

The problem of practical philosophy stated 27

The nature of activity in theoretical sphere * 33

The nature of activity in practical sphere 35

Subjective activity and objective activity, the subjective Ego and the objective Ego identified with the free activity of

the original Ego 38

g 2.— Practical Philosophy in the Ethical Sphere.

The problem stated ; the moral nature 42

The subjective Ego 45

The objective Ego and its relation to the subjective 47

The sense of moral obligation and the moral impulse 49

The relation between sense of obligation and freedom 51

Will, the essence of the self 54

The idea of necessity and of freedom 58

IV CONTENTS.

The Ego as fulfilling the concept of freedom. page

(a) As freely self-determining 61

(6) As producing being from thinking 66

The theoretical sphere subordinate to the practical 68

^B.—The Doctrine of Freedom in the Sittenlehre of 1812.

A different point of view and a different use of old terms 69

The Ego as free 74

Part Ii.— Criticism. The Doctrine Examined

Does Fichte advocate individual freedom ? 81

The notion of freedom 83

Psychological considerations.

(a) The Ego as conscious activity 85

(b) The Ego as something apart from consciousness 86

(c) The Ego as a series of mental states 87

{(i) The Ego as personality , .. 90

Metaphysical considerations.

(a) Is monism possible ? 91

(b) Does Idealism follow from the disproof of Dogmatism? ... 92

(c) Granting the truth of Idealism, is Fichte's conception of

the relation of the finite to the Infinite such as to make possible both the freedom of the individual and the personality of the Absolute? 93

Ethical considerations.

(a) The consciousness of free activity 96

{b) The consciousness of moral worth and responsibility 97

(c) The consciousness of supremacy over nature and necessity, 99

(d) Belief in freedom a ' rational faith ' 100

Preface

This essay is a critical study of the doctrine of the freedom of the will, as found in Fichte's philosophy, and especially in his ethical treatises. In Part I. the attempt has been made to give a fair and just exposition of what Fichte really taught on the subject, and, in order that the exposition should be distorted as little as possible through misinterpretation, exact quotations have been given wherever it seemed practicable to do so. Part II. is devoted to a critical examination of the validity of the doctrine as it is presented by Fichte.

Fichte's own works are the basis of the essay, and the references are to Johann Gottlieb Fichte's S'dmmtliche Werke^ herausgegeben von J. H. Fichte. The name of the treatise quoted from, or referred to, has been stated in each case, in order that the significance of the quotation may be the better understood.

I am under special obligation to President J. G.

Schurman for his encouragement, inspiration, and

criticism given in the direction of the work ; and to

Professor J. E. Creighton, under whose eflScient

leadership my serious study of Fichte's philosophy

was first undertaken.

J. F. B.

PART I.— EXPOSITION.

INTRODUCTOKY.

In the words '■ unity ' and ^ freedom ' is to be found the key to Fichte's entire philosophical system. To formulate a philosophy whose every part should radiate from a single, absolute principle, was the end to the attainment of which his keen constructive intellect aspired. To vindicate the moral freedom of the individual was the imperative demand of his fervent ethical nature. To satisfy this demand of logical thought on the one hand, and of moral impulse on the other, is his constant eifort ; and, although he sometimes seems to lose himself in a bewildering maze of 'deductions' and 'proofs,' he invariably closes the discussion in hand with one or both of these ends consciously in view. It was the strength of his desire for a monistic system of thought, that led him while yet a theological student, to accept Spinozism, with its sweeping determinism, even though the longings of his moral nature cried out against it. It was the satisfaction of this hitherto unsatisfied longing that led him to rejoice so greatly in his discovery of the " new gospel " of the Kantian philosophy, which, in its underlying principles, was to satisfy both the logical demand for unity and the ethical longing for freedom.

INTRODUCTORY.

Whether Fichte was really as successful as he himself thought he was, in constructing a system of philosophy that should contain a single, fundamental principle, and, whether in this claim to unity in all his philosophical treatises, he was always consistent with himself, it is not within the province of this study to determine. We have only to show, as clearly as we may be able to do, what Fichte's doctrine of freedom really was, and then to examine the tenability of the theory. This being our purpose, we shall introduce so much, and only so much of his metaphysical thought as may be helpful in the understanding of the subject in hand. We shall avoid, so far as possible, the peculiarly technical and difficult terminology of the author, and, where this is impossible, we shall try to translate this terminology into such other terms as, while they maj^ lay little claim to being transcendental, may yet lay some claim to being perspicuous.

CHAPTER I.

THE POSSIBILITY OF A SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY.

For Fichte the first requirement of a system of philosophy is that it should be all of one piece. There must be one absolute, fundamental principle from which all other principles can be deduced, and by reference to which everything can be explained.^ If there be not one such principle, then, in the attempt to reach a resting place for thought, we either fall into an infinite regression, and no system is possible ; or, if there be more than one absolute principle, then there must be erected on them, not one system, but more than one, and the philosophical aspiration for one system is still unsatisfied.^ The sensible world and the intelligible world, and the latter in both the theoretical and the practical sphere, must alike find their ground and explanation in one absolute fundamental principle. Kant forgot this fact, " for he nowhere treated the ground principle of all philosophy, but, in the Critique of Pure Reason^ only the theoretical, in which the categorical imperative could not be discussed ; and, in the Critique of Practical Reason^ only the practical, in which he had

lUeber den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre, Werke I., 38-40. 2Ibid,WerkeL, 52-54.

2 (3)

to do merely with the content of consciousness, and the question as to its nature could not arise." ^ To find, then, the one, absolute, fundamental principle that shall explain the sensible and the intelligible, the theoretical and the practical alike, is the task of the philosopher.2

There are in general two systems of philosophy, each of which claims to fulfill the conditions required by philosophical thought and to explain all phenomena by reference to one absolute, fundamental principle. The one of these systems Fichte calls Dogmatism or Dogmatic Kealism, the other, Idealism.^

^' A system of speculative philosophy that would explain the idea ( Vorstellung) by positing the Non- Ego as cause of the idea, and the idea as eff*ect of the Non-Ego, so that the Non-Ego is the real ground of all, and is absolutely because it is and what it is, (Spinoza's necessity) ; and so that, moreover, the Ego is merely an accident of the Non-Ego and not substance at all ; such a system is material Spinozism or Dogmatic Eealism."^ Dogmatism would explain the intelligible by the sensible, consciousness by the thing. The thing is the essence, the substance, consciousness an accident belonging to it. The thing is independent.^ The object that appears before the mind with

1 Zweite Einleitung, Werke I., 472. 2Ersce Einleitung, Werke I., 423,

3 Grundlage, Werke I., 119, 120, note, 155 : Erste Einleitung, Werke I., 426.

DogmoMsra and Idealism, 5

the feeling of necessity is to be regarded as a thing-in-itself, and is the ground of explanation of all consciousness and all experience.^

Idealism has a different object, that is, it puts forward a different ground for the explanation of experience. In the Ego, in consciousness — and critical Idealism makes no pretense of going beyond the facts of consciousness, except by abstraction^ — there are always two factors present, viz. : the subjective and the objective. Dogmatism attempts to explain this duality in consciousness by referring the subjective to the objective as thing-in-itself, for explanation. But Dogmatism does not satisfy the philosophic instinct of the idealist, hence the latter takes the only other road that is open, and attempts to explain experience by referring the objective to the subjective. But what is the subjective? How does it manifest itself to us ? Can we form a conception of it such that the objective can be referred to it for explanation? Our fundamental conception of the subjective, as it appears to us in consciousness by means of an intellectual intuition (intellectualle Anschauimg)^ is that of a free activity. I act and I act as I choose, or. if I do not act, I remain passive by my own free choice. Of this activity or passivity I am directly conscious. No one can prove it to me, nor can I describe it to another, except in a merely lErste Einleitung, Werke I., 426-428, 430.

2 Ibid, Werke I., 425; Sonnenklarer Bericht, Werke II., 333; Sittenlehre of 1798, Werke IV., 16-17.

negative way. It is not a sensible but an intellectual intuition. I am directly conscious of myself, of the Ego as acting. The Ego exists only as it acts, or rather, only as activity.^ We cannot predicate existence of it apart from activity .^ The essence of the Ego is activity.^ This is the one fundamental principle to which the idealist reduces all conscious experience. Instead of saying that our conscious experience is explainable through the thing-in-itself by means of the category of necessary mechanical causality, as the dogmatist claims, the idealist urges that all experience can be explained only through the activity of the Ego by means of the category of free causality. Granted the assumptions of the dogmatist, the truth of his theory follows with logical necessity. Granted the assumption of the idealist, and the truth of his theory follows with equally logical necessity. Neither theory can be absolutely disproved by the other .^

How, then, shall we decide which system to choose? In Fichte's own words w^e give the answer: '' The kind of philosophy one chooses, depends upon the kind of a man one is ; for a philosophical system is not a dead piece of furniture to be rejected or accepted as one pleases, but it is animated by the soul of the man who has it. One who is indolent by nature, or who has become so through mental slavery, learned luxury and vanity, will never rise to Ideal-

1 Sittenlehre of 1798, Werke IV., S8, 57.

3 Grundlage, Werke I., 97 ; Grundlage des Naturrechts, Werke III., 22. 4 Erste Einleitung, Werke I., 429.

Dogmatism and Idealism, 7

ism/' 1 This statement must not be interpreted to mean that Fichte thinks there is no theoretical ground for preferring one system to the other. In the quotation just given, and in other statements bearing a similar import,^ there is perceptible a delicate touch of irony, and a quiet contempt for the thinker who can so far overlook the facts of common consciousness as to be able to admit the assumptions of the dogmatic school. For his own mind a mere statement of these required assumptions is sufficient refutation of the system. But, nevertheless, he proceeds to give cogent theoretical reasons why dogmatism is not satisfactory, which reasons may be briefly stated as follows.

Dogmatism does not afford a satisfactory explanation of the phenomena of consciousness. Its ground of explanation is the thing-in-itself, mere being, working through the concept of mechanical causality. But this will not do, in the first place, because the thing-in-itself is a chimera, and we can form no conception of it.^ What could mere being mean without some consciousness for which it exists?^ By hypothesis it has no consciousness in itself, and, if we do away with consciousness apart from the thing, as the theory requires, we have left mere being without consciousness. Such a conception is not only unmeaning, but impossible to creatures consti-

lErste Einleitung, Werke I., 434. 2 Ibid, Werke I., 432-433, 443-444. 3 Ibid, Werke I., 431. ^Sittenlehreof 1798, Werke IV., 17.

tuted as we are.^ This objection alone is sufficient to overthrow the whole system of Dogmatism.^ But there is yet another objection to the theory. If we grant for the sake of the argument the possibility of the conception just referred to, it can never account for the facts of consciousness, representation, ideas, the Ego. G-iven the thing-in-itself, mere being, being without consciousness of being; required, all the facts of conscious experience. This same thing-in-itself, acting through the category of necessary causality, is to produce representation, the Ego, being and consciousness of being in one.^ But being as an ultimate, can not, through the category of causality, produce that which it does not itself contain. At most it can only produce more being.* It can not produce both being and consciousness of being, and this is just what is required. How, then, are we to bridge the chasm between being as the ultimate principle, and consciousness, which is a fact of common experience?^ Clearly the second objection is also valid and the theory fails. A complete dogmatism destroys itself since it destroys the possibility of consciousness.^

There is a third argument, a practical one, in favor of Idealism and against Dogmatism, viz.: the fact that freedom must be guaranteed to the indi-

4Ibid, Werkel., 486.

sGrundlage, Werke I., 120.

Dogmatism and Idealism. 9

vidual in order that he may maintain his dignity as a man, and that the deepest longings of his moral nature may be satisfied ; and this, Dogmatism does not accomplish. Even if the theoretical arguments for the two systems were absolutely equal, this practical demand of the moral nature must turn the balance in favor of Idealism. ^

Dogmatism can satisfy only those who think everything explainable through the category of causality, a causality that is mechanical and necessary .^ In the mind of such a thinker, there can be no conception of freedom as real.^ "Every logical dogmatist is necessarily a fatalist. He does not deny the fact of consciousness that we regard ourselves as free, but he jDroves from his principle the falseness of the testimony."^ He must regard the facts of consciousness as phenomena differing not in kind, but only in degree from the thing-in-itself, which he makes the ground of explanation of all experience.^ Nevertheless we must accept this theory of Dogmatism, with all the concessions which it demands, unless we can find a way of escape by postulating the freedom and self-dependence of the Ego. The idealist makes this postulate, the dogmatist denies it. So far apart are they at the beginning, and, granted the fundamental assumptions of either system, there

1 Sittenlehre of 1798, Werke IV., 53-54. 2Erste Einleitung, Werke I., 437-439. 3 Sittenlehre of 1798, Werke IV., 136.

5 Ibid, Werke I., 437; Die Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns, Werke II., 623-624.

is no transition from one to the other. But for Pichte there is no such thing as sacrificing the independence of the Ego to that of the thing-in-itself, and he becomes the outspoken advocate of Idealism.^

So far we have followed the line of approach to Fichte's own philosophical camp. We have found that the unity of the system and the freedom of the individual are two ideas which he keeps constantly in view ; that the principle of unity is to be found in each of two proposed systems, Dogmatism and Idealism, and, granted the fundamental assumptions underlying these systems, neither of them can, by any possible means, be refuted by the advocates of the opposing system ; and, lastly, we have seen that, for both theoretical and practical reasons, Fichte clings to Idealism. Before entering our leader's camp, it will be necessary to consider briefly the method of the Fichtean philosophy.

For Fichte the task of all philosophy is 'Ho give the ground of all experience. "^ This explanation, if it is to be had at all, will be found in a coherent system of thought, based on a single, unproved and unprovable, absolute, fundamental principle.^ In so far as this absolute principle can not be proved, it may be said that the system as a whole can not be proved, since every step in the system is dependent for its certainty upon this ground principle.^ But, unless

1 Erste Einleituug, Werke I., 432; Sittenlehre of 1798, Werke IV., 54.

aibid, Werkel.,423.

*Ibid. Werkel., 43.

Fichte^s Method. 11

the validity of thought is to be destroyed altogether, it must have a starting point in some accepted though unproved proposition. Fichte takes as this starting-point a principle which, he says, needs not the proof that is denied to it, for it appears as a direct fact of experience in every consciousness, as a fact which no one will deny.^ It is the most fundamental, the most incontrovertible fact of all consciousness. By hypothesis now this ground principle is the one absolute principle upon which the only true system of philosophy can be founded. The validity of this principle, as a fact of experience^ needs no proof, for it appears directly in all consciousness. But its validity, as ground principle of a system of philosophy^ does need proof, and this proof can be found only in the fact that a satisfactory system of philosophy is actually constructed on it as ground principle thereof. That a system of thought is possible at all, can only be proved by the actual construction of such a system, and that the principle which we have submitted by hypothesis as the ground principle of all philosophy, is the correct one, we can know only when it is proved such by the actual construction of such system of philosophy upon such ground principle. In so far, then, as the ground principle of all philosophy is unproved and unprovable, it may be said that the system of philosophy erected on such ground principle, can not be proved true. On the other hand, accepting such principle as true in itself, regardless of its relation to philosophy, the system of philosophy erected on it is absolutely proven, and it, in turn, is absolutely proven to be the ground principle of all philosophy when a satisfactory system of philosophy is actually erected upon it.

What, now, must a system of philosophy do, and how shall we know when it is satisfactory ? Philosophy is to explain experience, and it is satisfactory as a system when every fact of experience, regarded as a conditioned fact, can be traced back through all intermediate conditioned and conditioning facts, to the first principle as the unconditioned, upon which all conditioned facts of experience must ultimately depend ; and if, in reverse order, starting from the ground principle, every fact of possible conscious experience can be either deduced, or both deduced and proven from it. Starting from any fact of common experience, we trace it back to the most fundamental principle in common consciousness, which principle we postulate as the ground principle of all philosophy .1 Moving now from this principle, and with absolutely no reference to the facts of experience, we arrive, by means of a series of deductions and proofs, at a state of things corresponding exactly to our actual experience. Every fact of experience is included in our deduction, which was made with no reference to the facts of experience. We have gone from experience, the conditioned, to the ground principle, the unconditioned, and then, having reversed

Fichte's Method. 13

the order of procedure, we have gone from the ground principle by means of a series of deductions and proofs, back to experience. If such a course of thought is possible, then it forms a satisfactory system of philosophy, for it explains all experience. Now, such a course of thought is possible, for we have actually accomplished it, hence our postulated first principle is proven to be the real first principle, and the system of philosophy erected thereon is proven to be the correct philosophy.

But, although Pichte, in many passages, thus urges the demonstrated correctness of his system as a whole, he nevertheless asserts very definitely elsewhere, that it can never be completely proven in detail, but that, at most, it is only probably correct. True, the probability of its correctness may be, and indeed is, very great, and one who doubts the correctness of the system " may well be required to show the error in our conclusions ; but it will never do to lay claim to infallibility." ^ The system as a whole, and the general principles of it may be correct, and yet the details of it may be wrong. Correct general results may be obtained by means of counter-balancing mistakes, as, for example, the sum of a series of numbers may be correct, while, in the process of adding, two or more mistakes, counter-balancing one another, may have been made ; or, the correct sum may have been obtained by chance. The system of the human mind, of which the Wissenschaftslehre professes to be an exposition or a representation, is undoubtedly correct, and, if our philosophy be a correct representation of this, then it, too, is correct. But this is the very point in question, and of it we can never be certain.^ Pichte's real view concerning the validity of his system seems to be that he regarded it as completely proven in its main outlines, negatively by the clear insufficiency of the only other possible system, and positively by the fact that, so far as worked out, his own system does afford a satisfactory explanation of all experience. But he does not, on theoretical grounds, claim more than a high degree of probability for it in its details.

CHAPTER II.

THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY.

Turning now to Pichte's own philosophical discussions, it is well to begin with a brief presentation of the method and principles of the Wissenschaftslehre, since this is the best known of his speculative works, and forms the basis for all his philosophy. An examination of this treatise here will enable us to see later how his doctrine of freedom is related to the fundamental principles of his theoretical philosophy.

We already have before us Pichte's criticism of the dogmatic school for going beyond conscious experience to the thing-in-itself for the explanation of experience.^ A thing-in-itself, being without consciousness of being, either within or without itself, is a meaningless, and, indeed, an impossible conception for beings constituted like ourselves. If it exists at all, it must lie beyond the pale of all experience, and it can never enter as a factor in the explanation of experience. '' A finite, rational being has nothing outside of experience ; it is this that encloses the entire material of his thinking. The philosopher stands necessarily under the same conditions ; it, therefore, seems incomprehensible how he can raise himself

1 Zweite Einleitung, Werke I., 482-483. (15)

above experience." ^ ^^ I herewith declare it to be the innermost spirit and soul of my philosophy that man has in general nothing but experience, and he attains all that he dies attain only through experience, through life itself. All his thinking, whether it be loose or scientific, common or transcendental, proceeds from experience, and has experience in view again." 2 By experience, Fichte does not mean all conscious states, but only those accompanied by the feeling of necessity.^ Beyond consciousness we can not go except by abstraction. Philosophy, then, is to give the ground of explanation of that which appears to us in consciousness, accompanied by the feeling of necessity. We must, accordingly, look within and see what consciousness really gives us.

The first words of the JErste Einleitung^ which was written to explain more fully the principles of the Wissenschaftslehre^ are these : ^' Attend to thyself; turn thy gaze from all that surrounds thee and into thy own consciousness (^dein Inner es), is the first command that philosophy gives to its learner. It considers nothing that is outside of thee, but only thee thyself."* What, now, does this inward gaze disclose ? It reveals, in every act of consciousness, a knowing and a known. I can be conscious of absolutely nothing without recognizing these two elements, myself as the subjective, the knower, and

2 Sonnenklarer Bericht, Werke II., 333.

4 Werke I, 422.

something else as the objective, the thing known. We may regard these various conscious states as so many determinations of consciousness, in which the two factors, the knowing and the known, always appear. A careful comparison of these various determinations of consciousness, or ideas, as we may call them, reveals a marked difference between them. Some appear and disappear at our pleasure. We will their presence, and they are with us. We will their absence, and they are gone. Others force themselves on us, with a feeling of necessity, and we can not escape them. They are present with us, we know not how. They appear as a ^ given ' something in consciousness, for whose presence we are in no way responsible. Not only do these ideas appear necessarily, but they appear to be just such as they are, and no other, necessarily. We have, then, in consciousness, two distinct kinds of ideas, the one, apparently, the product of our own freedom, the other, appearing as a ' given ' something, and forcing themselves upon us with the feeling of necessity.

'' It would be irrational to ask the question why those ideas that are dependent on freedom are determined just so and not otherwise; for, since it is posited that they are determined freely, all applicability of the notion of ground is taken away. They are so because I have so determined them, and, had I determined them otherwise, they would have been different.

^'But, it is undoubtedly a question worthy of consideralion, what is the ground of the system of ideas accompanied by the feeling of necessity, and what the ground of this feeling of necessity itself. To answer this question is the task of philosophy, and, there is, according to my thinking, no philosophy, except Die Wissenschaftslehre which accomplishes the task. The system of ideas accompanied by the feeling of necessity, is also called experience, internal as well as external. Philosophy has, accordingly, as I may say in other words, to explain the ground of all experience." 1 To determine the ground of these ideas, these determinations of consciousness that are accompanied by the feeling of necessity, is the task of philosophy.

Let us again reconnoitre and see just what point we have reached, and how we have reached it. It is the task of philosophy to explain experience. Experience includes all that appears necessarily in consciousness and nothing more. In every consciousness there are the subjective and the objective, the knowing and the known. The known, or ideas, appear now as products of our own freedom, now as a ^ given ' forced upon us by necessity. It is irrational to ask why those ideas, which are produced by our own freedom, are just as they are, but we must inquire into the nature of those ideas which are accompanied by the feeling of necessity. The Ego, the subjective, stands opposed to the Non-Ego, the objective, in every consciousness. This Non-

Ego appears as dead matter ( Stoff), without activity, as opposed to the conscious activity of the Ego. How, now, are we to explain this duality in consciousness ? How can the objective become the subjective, or the subjective the objective? This is our problem.

As the case now stands, two distinct and opposed elements appear in consciousness. Philosophical thought requires that they shall be reduced to one, either by referring both to a third something different from either, or, by referring the one to the other, thus making them identical and asserting that they are really one. We are left with these two alternatives, and we must choose between them if we are to explain consciousness at all. If we take the former alternative, we imply the existence of a third something, different from either, existing beyond consciousness. But of what exists beyond consciousness we can know nothing, not even its existence. Hence such a third something can not serve as the solvent of the duality within consciousness. We are driven, then, to take the other alternative, and to say that the objective and the subjective in consciousness are ultimately one. Though always appearing in consciousness as separate and opposed, they must be thought as one, seen from different points of view. This implies a deception and requires further explanation. Either the subjective must be the same as the objective, and hence itself deceptive in appearance, or the objective must be the same as the subjective, and therefore itself deceptive in appearance. In other words, the subjective and the objective, the Ego and the Non-Ego, are one. But which one? The Non-Ego appears as stuff, inert matter, mere being without consciousness of being. Can the Ego be explained by identifying it with the Non-Ego? No, for the Ego implies not only being but consciousness of being as well, and to explain being and consciousness of being in one, from mere being, would be to explain the higher category from the lower. We are driven, then, to the other alternative; and instead of saying the Ego is the Non-Ego, that is, consciousness is matter, we say the Non-Ego is the Ego, that is, matter is activity; for activity is the only form in which intellectual intuition ever reveals to us the nature of the Ego.^ The necessary separation of subjective and objective, of Ego and Non- Ego, in consciousness, is called the form of consciousness, their necessary union in thought is called the principle of consciousness.