Daring and suffering: a history of the Andrews Railroad Raid into Georgia in 1862 ...

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Preface

THIS book, which is partly historical and partly personal, is written from the standpoint of frank egotism. It is far more easy to tell what the writer thought, felt and did, in the first person, than to resort to tedious circumlocution. As a large part of the interest of such a narrative must consist in describing the sensations experienced in passing through such appalling dangers and tremendous vicissitudes of fortune, it is clear that in a work of plain fact the writer cannot avoid making himself more prominent than his comrades. His own emotions and the incidents in which he participated will be indelibly engraven in his memory, while impressions received at second hand grow dim with the passage of years. It also happened that, in most cases where selection was practicable, the writer was made the spokesman of the whole party, and was thus brought into more frequent contact with both friend and foe. Many instances of this will be noticed all through the story.

Great care has been taken in the citation of authorities. The writer has not hesitated to claim for his own notes and memories the full weight to which they are entitled, and has carefully indicated the sources from which he has drawn all other facts. In no portion of war history of equal magnitude is there more abundant material preserved both on the Federal and the Confederate sides. This is indicated by the accompanying list of authorities ; and authority for separate incidents is adduced either in notes or at the

Preface.

beginning of chapters. With great care in sifting testimony and constant references to original documents, the writer hopes not only to give the exact and literal truth, but to carry the conviction of the judicious reader with him on every page. Whenever conjectures or statements of probabilities are hazarded to bridge any chasm in the narrative, they will be offered for what they are, and always clearly separated from known facts.

WM. PITTENGER, Haddonfield, N. J., October, 1887.

Contents

CHAPTER p AGE

I. A Secret Military Raid in the West 13

II. General Mitchel and J. J. Andrews Arrange a Second Raid . . 25

Chapter I. A Secret Military Raid In The West

IT is painful for me to recall the adventures of the year beginning April 7th, 1862. As I compose my mind to the task there rises before me the memory of days of suffering and nights of sleepless apprehension, — days and nights that in their black monotony seemed well nigh eternal. And time has not yet dulled the sorrow of that terrible day, when comrades made dear as brothers by common danger and suffering were suddenly dragged to a fearful death that I expected soon to share. A man who has walked for months in the shadow of the scaffold and escaped at last almost by miracle will never find the experience a pleasant one to dwell upon, even in thought. Yet it cannot be forgotten, and the easiest way to answer the inquiries of friends, and to satisfy the curiosity of the public, is to put the whole matter candidly, faithfully, and minutelv on record.

In the spring of 1862 a small secret expedition was sent from the Union lines into the very heart of the Confederate States. In its progress it aroused great excitement, first in the South and afterwards in the North, occasioned the most intense suffering to the soldiers engaged in it, and afterwards gave rise to many eager controversies. Several publications of a more or less ephemeral character have been devoted to it, and no story of the war seems to have fixed itself so firmly in the popular imagination. The present work is the full and complete edition of a small volume by the same writer, with the same title, which was hurriedly written before the freshness of personal impressions had faded, and while the horror and agony came back almost nightly in dreams. The writer is confident that this story, faithfully told, will give a more vivid picture of the spirit, feelings, and awful earnestness of the civil war than any more general war history. To do justice to brave men who pe-rished in a manner ignominious in form but not in reality, to place romantic and almost incredible events, for which there will soon be no living witnesses, upon a basis of unquestionable certainty, and to help a new generation to realize the cost of upholding the Union, is the writer's aim.

The manner in which this volume was produced leaves little room for that unconscious exaggeration to which even candid narrators are liable. The writer made phonographic notes of the principal events very near the time of their occurrence, — mostly on the margins of a small volume of "Paradise Lost." There were enough days of dreary leisure for this or any other kind of work ! On leaving the enemy's territory, he and his comrades were, by order of the Secretary of War, Edwin M. Stanton, brought to Washington, examined under oath, and their answers written down in shorthand, and officially published, together with a lengthened and eloquent report by Judge-Advocate-General Holt. Immediately afterwards the small volume, "Daring and Suffering," was written at the solicitation of friends — a crude and hasty sketch prepared before the author had recovered from the sickness that followed his unexampled privations— but preserving the facts in their freshness, and attested in its recital of incidents by all the survivors of the expedition. Now that twenty-five years have passed, and the passions of war and the bitterness of partisanship have declined, — now that the dispatches and letters of Generals and the captured Confederate archives are accessible, and that the author has been enabled to go carefully over the whole ground and explore every source of information, from friend or former enemy, it seems possible to supply all the deficiencies of the earlier edition without diminishing its intense personal interest, and thus to furnish a complete and well-rounded history of the most dramatic adventure of the Great Civil War.

There were two distinct railroad raids into Georgia, which have sometimes been confounded. The first was authorized by Major General Buell in March, 1862, and sent out from Murfreesboro',Tenn. The second starting from Shelbyville, Tenn., in April of the same year under the direction of Gen. O. M. Mitchel, was larger and more important, and had quite a different purpose.

Nearly everything which has been published on the subject refers to the second expedition. I will, however, write the history of the first also, that the relation between them may be clearly seen, and all future misunderstanding be prevented.

The Union cause looked bright in the spring of 1862. It was nearly three years before the Confederates saw again so dark a day. Our eastern army under Gen. McClellan, numbering more than 100,000, was about ready to advance on Richmond. Gen. Grant, after capturing Forts Henry and Donelson, had sent the bulk of his forces to Pittsburg Landing, and was hurrying forward every available man. Buell had occupied Nashville after the enemy — because of the capture of Fort Donelson— had retreated, and was now urged by Halleck to send a large part of his force by water to reinforce Grant. This he declined to do, fearing that the enemy might return to Tennessee and capture Nashville; but he at length divided his force, sending the larger portion by deliberate marches southwest toward Pittsburg Landing, and a single division of about 10,000 under Gen. O. M. Mitchel, supported by 7,000 more in garrison at Nashville and surrounding towns, in a southeast direction. To oppose these powerful forces the enemy had an army in Virginia not more than one half as large as McClellan's, and in the west, at Corinth, the commands of Beauregard and Johnston, which were not yet concentrated, and were much inferior to those of Grant and Buell. Gen. Mitchel had no organized enemy in his front, but was marching into a country of vast importance to the Confederates, which they were certain to strenuously defend. A few comparatively small Union and Confederate armies opposed each other west of the Mississippi, and at various points along the sea-coast and the borders, with the preponderance usually on the Union side; but these may, for present purposes, be left out of account. The main rebel armies, those of Virginia and Mississippi, were united by a chain of railroads running from Memphis, Huntsville, Chattanooga, Knoxville and Lynchburg to Richmond; and this constituted their new and strong line of defense. They had indeed no other railroad communication except a very circuitous and precarious one along the sea coast. At Chattanooga this direct line was intersected almost at right angles by another extending from Nashville to Atlanta, and from there to all parts of the south.

It was the object of the Union generals, while preserving all they had gained, to break this line, and thus isolate the rebel armies and render easy their defeat in detail. The first assault was to be made at Corinth, to which the Tennessee River formed an easy channel of approach. It was defended by a large army, for if captured, Memphis and all the upper Mississippi would also fall into Union hands. Unfortunately, this portion of the West was at that time in two different departments under the command of Generals Halleck and Buell, — both able strategists but slow and timid. For fear of exposing Nashville to attack, the latter declined to reinforce Gen. Grant, who was acting under the orders of Halleck, by steamboat transport over the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers; but instead marched toward his position through Franklin and Columbia. With the magnified estimate Buell had formed of the enemy's strength in Tennessee, this appeared to be the more prudent course; and had the advance been more vigorous and rapid, the imminent danger of disaster at Shiloh would have been removed. But even with this disposition, Buell feared that an army of the enemy might concentrate by rail somewhere in the direction of Chattanooga or Knoxville, and fall upon his rear. He believed 1 that a large force was gathering at Atlanta and also in Eastern

1 Buell to Halleck, Mar. 23, 1862. War Records. Ser. I. Vol. X., Part 2, Page 60.

Tennessee,. from which Nashville might be in great danger. These apprehensions, which delayed and weakened his movement towards Pittsburg Landing and endangered Grant, had at least one good effect. Gen. Mitchel was detached from the main army and ordered to Murfreesboro, with a primary view of guarding against any Confederate advance from the South or East; but he was able afterwards, by using his discretionary power to the utmost, to make the brilliant march upon Huntsville and to accomplish more against the enemy than any Union general with similar forces had been able to do up to this period of the contest.

While at Nashville, Mr. J. J. Andrews, a spy in the service of Buell, proposed to that General a daring plan, which, if successful, would for the time effectually relieve his fears and render a very important service to the Union arms. He offered to take a very small party of fearless men, disguise them as Southern citizens, conduct them to Atlanta, where he would meet a friend of his who ran a locomotive on the Georgia State Railroad from Chattanooga; then to ride with his party as passengers to a favorable point; there to capture the locomotive and to cut the telegraph wires behind him; then to run through Chattanooga and from this point westward, burning the bridges behind him, especially the great one over the Tennessee River at Bridgeport. Whether bridges were to be burned South of Chattanooga or not is a point that cannot now be determined; if not, it seems singular that Andrews should have conducted his men so far south as Atlanta; neither is the limit of his proposed operations westward accurately known. That the complete success of such a scheme would have greatly injured the enemy can be seen at a single glance. It would have hindered the concentration of troops and supplies at Corinth a week or ten days before the battle of Shiloh, which probably would not have been fought. It would have relieved Buell from his fears as to a flank or rear attack, or a march upon Nashville, and probably have induced him to reinforce Grant promptly and vigorously. It would have cut the main communication for some days or weeks between the eastern and western armies of the Confederate states at a most critical period. It did not promise the greater positive results of the second expedition, mainly because Gen. Buell was not looking toward rapid and aggressive action in Southern Tennessee. But no candid mind can question the great importance of the results promised, or the daring character of the man who could plan such work 300 miles away in the heart of the enemy's country. We may safely assume that the scheme originated with the intrepid spy and not with his cautious chief. 1 The former probably saw that the commanding General was anxious for the destruction of the enemy's communications, and suggested the means for accomplishing that end. This

1 Gen. Buell confirms this view in a private letter to the writer January 1, 1887.

A Secret Military Raid in the West. \j

plan Buell accepted the more readily because it involved so little risk; that is, as Generals count risk, — only the life of a spy and eight 1 men; and General Mitchel, whose division was nearest the scene of the proposed enterprise, was instructed to furnish volunteers for the purpose.

James J. Anderws. Engraved from an old Ambrotype.

From this point the expedition comes within the direct knowledge of the writer. As will be explained further on, I had seen Mr. Andrews previous-

1 Gen. Buell says but six were authorized. In this he is probably mistaken, as eight were engaged.

ly, but did not know his real character. And there were also reasons why the 2nd Ohio Infantry of Sill's brigade, Milchel's Division, should furnish all the men required, and Co. G. of that regiment, to which I belonged, one half the number. These and many other things will be made clear in the narrative of the second expedition to which this sketch is but introductory.

The securing of volunteers was managed with the utmost secrecy. In addition to Generals Mitchel and Sill, a few of the officers of the 2nd Ohio were informed, in outline, of what was wanted, and they induced men to meet Mr. Andrews; these, after consulting with him, entered upon their strange and hazardous duties without opportunity to give the slightest hint to their comrades. To the common soldiers of the regiment who were not selected, the whole affair was wrapped in mystery. Eight of our best men suddenly disappeared, and we knew not what had become of them. Numberless were the conjectures that floated through the camp and were discussed around the camp-fires. Some asserted that they had been sent northward to arrest deserters; others that they were deserters themselves ! But there were few deserters to arrest at this stage of the contest; and the latter idea was contradicted by the character of the men, who were among the boldest and most faithful in the whole regiment, and had been seen in close and seemingly confidential communication with officers just before their disappearance. The most frequent assertion — a pure conjecture, however, suggested by the fact that they were absent without any leave-taking, and that no inquiries were officially made about them, — was that they had turned spies. But this notion I did not seriously entertain, for sending such a number of spies from the private soldiers in the ranks of one company seemed absurd. At the most 1 supposed that they had gone on some scouting expedition or some attempt to surprise an enemy's post, such as we had been familiar with in Eastern Kentucky the year before. But I was not long left to my own conjectures. Indeed I had two reasons for urgent inquiries, one solely personal and not of a very exalted character, the other less selfish.

My position in Co. G., James F. Sarratt, captain, was then that of first corporal, and I was looking anxiously for promotion to the next grade of non-commissioned officers, that of sergeant. To a civilian these petty grades seem utterly unimportant and almost undistinguishable, but they are not so to a soldier. On many a lonely guard line and dark night on picket, they make all the difference between commanding and being commanded; and authority is sweet anywhere. A sergeant had died at Nashville, and his place would naturally become mine unless some one below me was considered more meritorious, in which case the captain had the authority to carry him, whether a lower corporal or only a private, over my head into the vacant sergeantcy. This would have been bitterly distasteful, not so much because of the increased wages and privileges of a sergeant, as because of the humiliation of being considered less worthy of promotion than a comrade, inferior in rank. One of the missing men happened to be second corporal, a splendid soldier in every respect, competent to fill any position in the company, and a great friend to the captain. I had heard that he might be preferred to me, if for no other reason, because I was near-sighted. Now, some of the members of my army mess said:

"Pittenger, when those men come back with feathers in their caps, the captain will be sure to make Surles sergeant." At the first opportunity I called Capt. Sarratt aside and told him what I had heard, and my own fears. He assured me, somewhat impatiently, that my rights should be cared for, and added, "Pittenger, this is a very little matter of yours. I only wish the men were back in the camp again."

"But where are they ? " I asked, "and when will they be back? I would like to know something about it, especially for Mills's sake."

"I am not permitted to tell anything," he responded; "I don't know when they will be back myself, but I know that till they do come I can't sleep much."

The look of weariness on his face smote to my heart, and in view of such anxiety my errand looked utterly contemptible. But my own uneasiness in another direction was greatly increased, and when I left him, with sincere apologies, it was with the resolve to find out where these men were.

Captain David Mitchel of Co. K., 2nd Ohio, was an intimate friend of mine, and a distant relative of our commander. His company had supplied one of the missing adventurers, — my cousin, B. F. Mills, who had been my messmate during the three months service terminating with the battle of Bull Run. It was especially for his sake that I felt such solicitude for the absent men, and this, even more than my own interest, had moved me to speak to Captain Sarratt. I resolved to make an attempt on Mitchel, with stronger hopes of success. The opportunity soon presented itself. I was War Correspondent of the Steubenville Herald as well as / soldier — the letters being intended principally to inform a wide circle at home of the welfare of sons and brothers. It was time to write again or there would be anxiety by many a fireside among the Ohio hills. Taking pencil and notebook I strayed through the level streets of the white-tented city that had suddenly sprung up in the level fields bordering the clear and beautiful little Stone River. A congenial spot was found on the sloping bank of the stream and I sat down to write. It was in the afternoon of a beautiful day, and the bustle of the camp was all around, but not near.

The warm sunshine and the rest were doubly grateful after the rainstorms and hard marches, knapsack laden, of the two preceding days. Occasionally I would look around to note the occupations of the soldiers, either in the camp, or strolling along the river. But I was especially attracted by the view presented a short distance down the stream, where stood the ruined fragments of a railroad-bridge that had been burned by the enemy a few days before. Now a large working force was engaged in putting the bridge in repair with all possible celerity, and our General was stimulating them by word and example. Large timbers were being hewed, framed, and slowly raised to their places. There was precision and speed such as I had never noticed before in similar work. The general himself seemed nervously eager, encouraging the willing workers, and heartily rebuking those who seemed inclined to shirk. Once I saw him precipitated with a splash into the shallow water, and to those who, like myself, were watching from the shoreward side, it seemed to be done purposely by a soldier whom Mitchel had hurried with a rotten piece of wood; but no sign of anger was manifested, and the General urged on the building as before. To a soldier who is "off duty" for a day, nothing is more enjoyable than to see others work; and the whole afternoon realized to me the ideal life of the soldier. A comrade strolled along and I read to him my letter. It was very boyish, intensely partisan, its attempts at wit not very striking, and its estimate of Fremont as a leader, and of the Union people in the South, not such as would have been made later; but as it may serve to show something of the feeling of the soldiers at that stage of the contest, a portion of it is here inserted; besides, it has a pathetic interest, for when it was printed and read by home-friends, the trivial hardships mentioned in it were forgotten, and the writer was in a situation desperate as imagination can paint; while those who read believed him to have perished on the scaffold !

LETTER TO THE STEUBENVILLE HERALD.

Murfreesboro, Tenn., March 21, 1862.

"Friend Allison: — Again we have made amove, and an important one. The divisions of Nelson and McCook started before us, and no one knows where they are gone. But one thing is sure ; the northern frontier of the Gulf States, which has so long enjoyed immunity from the horrors of war, will soon hear the clash of arms, and the Union men of those States (if there are any) will have an opportunity of safely showing their devotion to the good cause. These movements are hopeful and of good omen.

" On Tuesday last (18th), we broke up our camp near Nashville, and with banners waving, and the sun shining brightly on the glittering muskets, we started over a smooth and level turnpike. There was only one drawback — we had so many stores to take with us that our wagons were filled, and most of the men had to carry their knapsacks. Transportation is abundant in this country, but our Generals are too generous and chivalric {vide Buckner) to use it. The rugged Fremont was not sufficiently versed in polite American warfare to prefer the convenience of citizen rebels to the comfort of his own soldiers. He would ride up to a house and demand the use of a driver and team fur so many days, and at the expiration of that time, send them back. The result was that he was able to march twice as far as we do, and with less fatigue. But then, such a procedure might offend the "noble South," and when the Union is restored, they might refuse to hold office over us ! Whenever we see a fine house, the ranks are straightened up and the band commences playing some patriotic air. Doubtless when the victorious march of our armies has carried a brass band past every house in the land of cotton, the inhabitants of that land, hearing the dulcet sound, will be moved to return to their rightful allegiance!

" But seriously, the disgraceful subserviency to the South is carried by tactics to an unpardonable extent. Two negroes were sent by their masters to aid in the fortification of Nashville, but escaped to our troops. They were confined in the guard-house of our regiment to wait for their masters to claim them ! This is clearly against the act of Congress on that subject.

" The first day was beautiful, the air warm, and the grass just beginning to show a faint sheet of green. The next day, however, was rainy and muddy. It was fairly pouring down when the tents were struck, and everything got wet. It was a dreary morning march, with the rain running down the backs of our necks and splashing under our feet, wading through creeks or making long detours through the muddy fields to avoid standing pools of water. But after awhile, the sun shone out and dried our wet clothes. In the evening we halted, still eight miles from Murfreesboro', which we reached the next mor ing through another rain.

"We are now encamped here, 30 miles nearly directly south of Nashville, though we came much further around to avoid bridges the enemy had burnt. We will stay here till we have the bridges at this place repaired, then on southward.

"Our camp here is a beautiful one, situated on a small river, and is very level. The country around looks to me to be healthful, and in fact the whole line of march south of our division leads throngh an eminently healthy district. This is fortunate, for the warm weather in the malarious and swampy regions of the Gulf States would be far more fatal than southern steel." * * *

"WM. PITTENGER."

* had scarcely finished reading when the opportunity I had longed for came. Captain Mitchel joined us and asked me what I had been writing to the papers — always a subject of interest among volunteers. I began to read the letter again, and the soldier, not wishing to hear it a second time, walked away. Every incident of this momentous interview is stamped indelibly on my memory. A fter the reading had been finished, we talked for a time on the prospects of the war, which seemed to us very favorable, and then I led the conversation to the subject that was uppermost in my thoughts — the destination of the men who had vanished from our midst. From the manner of my own captain and all other circumstances, I was convinced that they were somewhere secretly within the enemy's lines, and in great danger. I induced Mitchel to accompany me to a more retired spot, and directly asked him to tell me where Mills and his companions were, saying that I knew they had gone south on a very adventurous expedition. He was startled at my positive assertion, and imagined that I possessed some direct information on the subject; but feeling that he could trust me, and saying that he was very uneasy about the matter himself, he gave the full information I had desired. Nothing I had ever heard so fired my imagination. The idea of a few disguised men suddenly seizing a train far within the enemy's lines, cutting the telegraph wires, burning bridges, and leaving the foe in helpless rage behind, was the very sublimity and romance of war.

How I wished that I was with them ! Of course I knew that any accident to the train, any premature discovery, or any failure of preconcerted plans, would mean death in its most repulsive form. But a soldier's business is to face death, and I had always been accustomed to look on the brighter side of everything, and was little troubled with forebodings or gloomy presentiments. The importance of burning bridges and destroying railroads was self-evident: and the thought of thus doing so much more for the country than a common soldier could accomplish in any other way was irresistibly attractive. While thinking over these things, I became silent, until aroused by Mitchel's asking me whether I thought they did right in letting the men enter on such risks. I gave my opinion strongly in the affirmative, providing only they were perfectly sure of the fidelity of Andrews, and of his competency to undertake such an enterprise. Of the first Mitchel had no doubt, and he assured me that his confidence was shared by all who were in the secret; but of the latter he could not judge, as such a thing had never before been tried by anybody. Mitchel expressed anxiety almost equal to that of Sarratt, and further informed me that it was the expectation of this work being soon and successfully accomplished which made the General so anxious to have the bridge repaired, declaring that we would then march swiftly for Chattanooga, and get there ahead of the enemy. This was probably mere conjecture on his part, based upon considerations of sound military policy, which ought to have governed army movements, but might not influence Halleck and Buell. He was doubtless wrong as far as this first expedition was concerned, for it is sure that whatever hopes of ulterior results might have occupied the daring mind of Gen. Mitchel, his position at that time did not permit such a dash into the Confederacy. It would be necessary for him to get a new superior, or get more completely detached from Buell, before he would be able to achieve any great result.

I was surprised, also, to learn that only the eight men from our own regiment were engaged. This seemed altogether disproportioned to the magnitude of the enterprise; but of course a few could travel more safely through the enemy's country than a larger force. But it is probable that this number was selected, not because Andrews considered it enough, but because it was all that Buell would grant. It was not enough to overcome a handful of train guards or drive away the weakest picket at a bridge.