The battle of Seven Pines

Front matter

■'. 4- oo

THE mm

LE OF SEVEN PINES.

Contents

PAGE.

Preliniiiiaiy chapter ..... 7

Cliapter II. — Fighting on the Williamsburg road, May 3J . oi Chapter III. — Alleged " slow movements '' of Iluger's

CHAPTER II. Fighting, on the Williamsburg Road, May 31

Federal Accounts. — General Silas Casey, commanding the advanced division of Keyes's corps, says, in bis official report : " I occupied with niy division the advanced position of the army, about three-fourths of a mile [west] from the cross-roads at the Seven Pines, where I caused rifle pits and a redoubt to be thrown up ; also an abatis to be commenced about one-third of a mile in front of the pits, and parties were employed upon these works on the morning of the 31st. . . . My pickets, . . . toward the right of my [skirmish] line, succeeded [about 10 a. m.] in capturing Lieutenant Washington, an aide of General Johnston. This circumstance . . . led me to exercise increased vigilance. Between 11 and 12 o'clock a mounted vedette wassent in from the advanced pickets to report tliat a body of the enemy was in sight, approaching on the Richmond road. I immediately ordered the One Hundred and Third Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers to advance to the front for the purpose of supporting the pickets. It was soon afterward reported to me by a mounted vedette that the enemy were advancing in force, and about the same time two shells were thrown over my camp. . . . [I] immediately ordered the division under arms, the men at work on the rifle-pits and abatis to be recalled and join their regiments, the artillery to be harnessed up at once, and made my dispositions to repel the enemy. While these were in progress the pickets commenced firing. I directed Spratt's battery of four pieces, 3-inch rifled guns, to advance [jnst north of the Williamsburg road] in front of the rifle pits about one-fourth of a mile. . . . [I] supported this battery by three regiments of Naglee's brigade and one of Palmer's."

General Casey then states in detail the preparations made for defense, and adds : " About fifteen minutes after these disposi-

FIGHTING ON THE WILLIAMSBURG KOAD. Sa

tions bad been completed I directed tbe advanced battery to open. . . . In a sbort time " tbe regiment," wbicb at tbe first alarm had been ordered to tbe support of tbe pickets, came down tbe road in some confusion, baying suffered considerable loss. . . . Tbe enemy now attacked me in large force on tbe centre and both wings. ... In order to save " Spratt's battery, I " ordered a cbarge of bayonets by tbe four supporting regiments at tbe centre, wbicb was executed in a most gallant and successful manner under tbe immediate direction of Brigadier-General Naglee, . . . Wben tbe cbarge bad ceased, but not until tbe troops bad reacbed tbe edge of tbe wood [west of tbe first abatis], tbe most terrible fire of musketry commenced tbat I bave ever witnessed. Tbe enemy again advanced in force, and tbe flanks being again severely tlireatened, a retreat to tbe works [tbe rifle-pits and tbe unfinisbed pentangular redoubt] became necessary. To be brief, tbe rifle-pits were retained until tbey were almost enveloped by tbe enemy. . . . Tbe troops tben retreated to tbe second line, in possession of General Coucb's division."

" Undei- tbe circumstances I tbink it my duty to add a few remarks witb regard to my division. On leaving Wasbington [a few weeks ago] eigbt of tbe regiments were composed of raw troops. It bas been tbe miBfortiine of tbe division in marcbing tbrougb tbe Peninsula to be sabjected to an ordeal wbicb would bave severely tried veteran troops. Furnisbed witb scanty transportation, occupying sickly positions, exposed to tbe inclemency of tbe weatber, at times witbout tents or blankets, and illy suppKed witb rations and medical stores, tbe loss from sickness bas been great, especially witb tbe ofiicers. . . . Notwithstanding all these drawbacks, and tbe fact tbat tliere were not 5,000 men in line of battle, tbey withstood for three hours tbe attack of an overwhelming force of the enemy. . . . It is true tbat the division, after being nearly surrounded by tbe enemy and losing one-third of the number actually engaged, retreated to tbe second line. They wQuld all bave been prisoners of war bad they delayed their retreat a few minutes longer."

This vindication of bis division was called out by tbe following telegram, sent from the battlefield, by General JVIcClellan to Secretary Stanton, on tbe 1st of June : " Casey's division, wbicb was the first line, gave way iinaccoimtably and discreditably. . . . "With the exception of Casey's division our men behaved splendidly." That telegram did cruel injustice to Casey's division and was, perhaps, too complimentary to some of the other troops.

As already stated, Casey's division was encamped in rear of the earthworks of the Federal first line of defense, across the Williamsburg road, nearly at right angles to it, and five-eighths of a mile West of Seven Pines. It was composed of I^aglee's brigade, five regiments, on the right ; Wessells' brigade, four regiments, in the centre, across the road ; and Palmer's brigade, four regiments, on the loft. The latter two brigades were composed entirely of raw troops. Two of Naglee's regiments and some two or more companies were detached in support of the right of the picket line.

When the Confederate advance was reported, the One Hundred and Third Peimsylvania, of Wessells' brigade, was ordered forward on the Williamsburg road to support the pickets ; two regiments of this brigade were placed in the rifle-pits, extending from the redoubt across the road, and one regiment was a short distance in advance of the rifle pits. General Wessells says the *' actual strength [of his brigade] in action [was] less than 1,500 men."

General Palmer says that one of his regiments " was dej)loyed in the field to the extreme left of our line and in front of the woods [south of the redoubt] through which the enemy made the flank movement ;" one of his regiments was in the rifle-pits, immediately on the left of the redoubt, and two regiments " were ordered to the front and to the support of the batteries." " I estimate the whole fighting force [in this brigade] on the ground, at less than 1,000 ofiicers and men."

Naglee's brigade was partly in support of Spratt's battery, partly in support of the picket line and partly on duty in the picket line. In his official report General I^aglee says : " There were taken into action [in his brigade] eighty-four officers and 1,669 men." On these data the actual fighting force, of the three brigades which constituted Casey's division, was 4,253.

The commander of that regiment of Wessells' brigade which was ordered to support the j^ickets, says : " At about 1

FIGHTING ON THE WILLIAMSBURG EOAD. 37

o'clock P. M., . . . under orders from Brigadier- General Wesseils', I marched my regiment out and formed it immediately in rear of the picket reseryes and about half a mile from our camp. . . . When the pickets were fired on and driven in I ordered the reserve to take their places in the regiment. . . . The enemy's fire now opened along the whole line and we were also subjected to a very heavy cross fire from both flanks, . . . I ordered my men to fall back slowly, which they did, and formed on a road running nearly at right angles to the one on which we had entered the woods. Tho overwhelming force of the enemy, which now almost surrounded us, compelled me again to retire, to prevent being entirely cut off. Owing to the nature of the ground, which was marshy and covered with underwood and fallen timber, it was impossible to retire in order. The regiment when marched out consisted of 430 men."

General Wesseils gives this regiment credit for having fought well, until driven from the woods '" exposed to the terrific fire from the front and both flanks ; '' " followed by the enemy, who was [now] seen to emerge from the woods and advance."

After losing nearly one-fourth of its numbers, in a few minutes, the regiment seems to have broken to pieces whilst being hurled back through the abatis in front of Casey's rifle-pits. General Keyes says : It " broke shortly and retreated, joined by a great many sick. The numbers as they passed down the road as stragglers conveyed an exaggerated idea of surprise and defeat,"

The real hard fighting now began ; and there was a prolonged contest in the abatis in front of Spratt's battery. The bayonet charge referred to by General Casey is described in the ofiicial report of Colonel Davis in command of the One Hundred and Fourth Pennsylvania, of IS'aglee's brigade. He says : " The regiments sprang forward towards the enemy with a tremendous yell. . . , The battle now raged with great fury and the firing was much hotter than before. , , . The enemy being largely re-enforced, pressed us in front and flank, , , . We could not hold our position much longer unless re-enforced,

, , Receiving no re-enforcements, we were ordered with Spratt's battery to retire, but unfortunately, the horses of one of the pieces being killed, we were compelled to abandon tbat piece."

When the troops in front were withdrawn, they formed in the rifle-pits, and the contest continued hot along the whole of Casey's line. One regiment of Peek's brigade was sent forward, from the second line, in the woods south of the main road, by General Keyes ; and the Fifty-fifth New York, of the same brigade, was directed to move on that road, led by General Naglee, to aid in protecting the heavy artillery in the unfinished redoubt. General Naglee says he placed that regiment " about fifty yards in advance of the redoubt, the left resting a short distance from the road." He adds : " Leaving the Fifty-fifth, my attention was directed toward the rio-ht, where I found the Fifty-sixth New York with the Eleventh Maine [of his own brigade that had been detached supporting the picket line] . . . had fallen back about 400 yards . . . and were again placed . . . about midway between the Williamsburg road and the railroad, and about 300 yards in front of the Nine-miles road. Near by I found the Fifty-second Pennsylvania. . . . At this time the fire here had considerably slackened, but was increasing on the left. . . . The enemy had discovered, what I had long feared, that there were none of our troops between the White Oak Swamp and a line parallel with and but 200 yards from the Williamsl)n]'g road. . , . At the time of my return [the Confederates] had driven our men from the rifle-pits," " being successful in turning our left flank." '• The entire field in front of and including the redoubt being in possession of the enemy."

In falling back from their rifle pits and redoubt, Casey's forces, whilst moving across the abatis in front of Couch's rifle-pits, endeavored to make a stand. But their own guns, which they had lost, were turned upon them ; this, added to the fire of the advancing Confederate infantry and artillery, hurled them back in great disorder through the second abatis ; and a portion of Casey's troops, fiiiding the short rifle-pits of Couch's line already occupied and overcrowded, continued their retreat.

In the meantime Naglee's regiments, that had been supporting the picket line on the right, retained the ground on which he had last placed them — in the woods, half way between the Williainsburg road and the railroad, 300 yards in front of the Nine-miles road.

On his retnrn to these troops, ISTaglee says : " The enemy had opened a most destructive cross-fire npon them from the pieces near the redoubt that had not been spiked, and this, with the fire from their immediate front, was no longer to be endured, and they were withdrawn and marched down the Nine-miles road, and placed in position in rear of this road, about 300 yards from the Seven Pines, when soon their services were [again] required."

Casey's troops had resisted for two hours and more a very determined attack in front; and fell back, fighting, after their left flank was turned, and an enfilade and reverse fire, within short range, was brought to bear upon the rifle-pits.

The second line of defense, held by Couch's division, was composed of Peck's brigade, five regiments, on the south side of the Williamsburg road ; Devens's brigade, three regiments, across that road ; and Abercrombie's brigade, five regiments, on the right. Two regiments and a battery of the latter brigade were detached, guarding the depot of supplies at Fair Oaks station. In describing the operations in the second line. General Keyes eays : " As the pressure on Casey's division became greater, he applied to me for re-enforcements. I continued to send them as long as I had troops to spare. . . . The Ninety-third Pennsylvania, Peck's brigade, engaged the enemy on the left [of Casey's line] . . . until overwhelming numbers forced him to retire, whicli he did in good order. ... I ordered the Fifty fifth New York ... to 'save the guns,' meaning some of Casey's. The regiment moved up the AVilliamsburg road at double-quick, conducted by General l^aglee. . . . I ordered Neill's Twenty-third and Rippey's Sixty-first Pennsylvania regiments to move to the support of Casey's right. . . . Under the immediate command of General Couch, these two regiments assailed a vastly superior force of the enemy. . . . Almost immediately after ordering the Twenty-third and Sixty-first to the right, and as soon as they could be reached, I sent the Seventh Massachusetts, Colonel Pussell, and the Sixty-second ISTew York, Colonel Piker, to re-enforce them."

But, before either of these four regiments were in position to

40 BATTLE CF SEVEN PINES.

support Casey's right, the latter's left flank was turned, and the Federal first line of defense was lost. The two regiments ordered to re-enforce Couch in his attempt to relieve the pressure on Casey's right did not reach him, but joined the two reigments that were already at Fair Oaks Station.

General Couch says : "I advanced with Neill's and Rippey's regiments through a close wood, moving by the flank. Directing Neill where to move, and pushing on with Rippey, we at once came upon a large column of the enemy in reserve, but apparently moving towards Fair Oaks. . . . They [Neill and Rippey] immediately engaged, but were finally compelled to retire. . . . Here Colonel Rippey and all his field ofiicers fell, and in twenty minutes the enemy had passed over the [Nine-miles] road leading to my centre, cutting off the advance at Fair Oaks, now re-enforced by the Seventh Massachusetts . . . and Sixty-second New York . . . ordered up by General Keyes."

In speaking of this engagement, General Keyes says : " Both regiments were badly cut up. . . . The casualties of the Sixty-first amount to 263 and are heavier than in any other regiment in Couch's division. After this attack the Twenty-third took part in the hard fighting which closed the day near Seven Pines. The Sixty-first withdrew in detachments, some of which came again into action near my headquarters."

In the meanwhile events of interest were taking place in the immediate vicinity of Seven Pines. General Devens, in his official report says : " At about 4 p. m., the line of General Casey then having been driven back, ... an order was received from General Keyes that the Tenth Massachusetts should advance up the Richmond [Williamsburg] road through the felled timber and endeavor to hold the ground in front. Colonel Brigga moved accordingly up the road, . . . [and] found himself immediately assailed on the left flank and rear by heavy volleys of musketry. . . . Colonel Briggs gallantly struggled . . . to maintain his position. From the nature of the ground, entirely covered with fallen timber, it was not possible for him to effect this [necessary change of front], and the left wing was soon thrown into much confusion from the heavy fire of the enemy.

. . . I directed Colonel Bn'ggs to fall back and re-form the regiment at the rifle-pits before occupied bj him. ... It was not possible for him to effect this in good order ; but at a short distance behind the Fair Oak^ [Nine-miles] road Colonel Briggs rallied his regiment successfully and led it forward in good order to the position indicated. Re-enforcements arrived in a ehort time and were thrown forward to the left and front."

Thus, the Tenth Massachusetts, of Couch's division, after a few minutes' experience in the second abatis, could not, at first, be rallied in their own vacant rifle-pits, in the second line of defense.

Keyes's affairs were then in a very critical condition. A large portion of Casey's troops, in falling back from their earthworks, had been thrown into, almost, inextricable confusion whilst crossing the second abatis under destructive cross-fire, and had left the field ; the two regiments under Couch, on the right, had been badly cut up, one of them routed and out of the fight, exposing the right flank and rear of Couch's earthworks ; four regiments and a battery Avere cnt off north of Fair Oaks ; one of Devens's regiments on the Williamsburg road had been hurled back from the felled timber in disorder ; and the Confederates were pressing into the second abatis and in the woods south of the road, seriously threatening the left flank of Couch's main line. Such was the state of tilings with Keyes when the leading regiment of Berry's brigade, of Kearney's division of Heintzelman's corps, reached Seven Pines.

About noon, May 31, Berry's brigade halted at the third line of defense on the Williamsburg road, having come up that morning from Bottom's Bridge ; and Birney's brigade reached that line of defense, but near the railroad, almost at the same time.

General Kearney, in his official report, says : "At 3 p. m. I received an order to send a brigade of my division by the railroad to support Keyes's corps, said to be severely engaged. Birney's brigade was designated, and getting most promptly under arms, advanced accordingly.* Captain Hunt, Aide to General Heint-

* Owing to subsequent conflict of orders, for which General Birney was not responsible, his brigade was not in action that day. — G. W. S.

zelman, arriving from the iield, made me aware of the discomfiture of most of Casey's division. Tlie retiring wagons and a dense stream of disorganized fugitives arrived nearly simultaneously. . . . I, however, soon received General Heintzelman's directions to order forward, by the Williamsburg road the remaining brigade [Berry's], and to retrieve the position the enemy had driven us from. I put myself at the head of the advanced regiment and set forward without delay. I also sent written orders for Jameson's brigade, camped at the tete-de-pont, near Bottom's Bridge (three miles in rear), to come up without delay. This order met with General Heintzelman's approval. On arriving at the field of battle we found cei'tain zig-zag rifle-pits sheltering crowds of men and the enemy firing from abatis and timber in their front. ... I had but the Third Michigan up, but they moved forward with alacrity, dashing into the felled timber, and commenced a desperate but determined contest."

General Kearney speaks of the prompt conring up of other regiments of Berry's brigade and their hard fighting and steady advance in the felled timber, and the woods on the south side of the Williamsburg road ; re-enforced later by two regiments of Jameson's brigade that arrived from Bottom's Bridge.

General Berry, in his official report, says : " We steadily drove the enemy so far that I had serious fears of being flanked. . . . We were at this time in the woods extending from the edge of the slashings below, up the woods and on the left of the camping ground of General Casey's division, completely commanding his old camp and the earthworks with our rifles."

In the meantime the contest continued across the abatis in front of Coach's main line. Whilst Keyes's left flank was protected by Kearney's advance in the woods on the south side of the Williamsburg road, the danger to his right flank became more and more imminent after Naglee's detached regiments had been withdrawn, and Couch's two regiments, farther to the right, had been so badly cut up. The Confederates, on that side, had now crossed the Nine-miles road and were moving toward Seven Pines, on ground east of that road.

General Keyes says : " To make head against the enemy approaching " — from the direction of Fair Oaks — " it was found

FIGHTING ON THE WILLIAMSBURG KOAD. 43

necessary to effect an almost ])erpendici'ilar cliaiige of front of tlie troops on the right of the AVilliamsburg road. . . . This line long resisted the progress of the enemy with the greatest firmness and gallantry, but by pressing it verj closely by overwhelming numbers, probaljly ten* to one, they were enabled finally to force it to fall back so far upon the left and centre as to form a new line in rear. . . . Seeing the torrent of enemies continually advancing, I hastened across to the left beyond the fork to bring forward re-enforcements. Brigadier-General Peck" with two regiments, " was ordered, with the concurrence of General Heintzelman, to advance across the open space and attack the enemy, now coming forward in great numbers. . . . After contending against enoi'mous odds those two regiments were forced to give way, Peck, and '' one regiment " crossing the Williamsburg road to the wood," the other regiment " passing to the right [along that road], where thej^ took post in the last line of battle, formed mostly after 6 p. isr. . . . As soon as Peck had moved forward I hastened to the Tenth Massachusetts, Colonel Briggs, which regiment I had myself once before moved, now in the rifle-pits on the left of the Williamsburg road, and ordered them to follow me across the field. . . . After seeing the Tenth Massachusetts and the adjoining line well at work under a murderous fire, I observed that that portion of the line 150 yards to my left was crumbling away, some falling and others retiring. I perceived also that the artillery had withdrawn, and that large bodies of 1)roken troops were leaving the centre and moving down the Williamsburg road to the rear. ... I tried in vain to check the retreating current, ... I found General Heintzelman and other oflicers engaged in ralljnng the men, and in a very short time a large number were induced to face about."

Before describing the fighting that occurred, later, on this part of the field, attention is called to those two regiments of Kaglee's brigade which had held position to the right of Casey's main line after the latter was driven from the earthworks. General Naglee says that when he " was compelled to retreat about

* But, see Confederate official reports that will be quoted later.

M BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES.

500 yards'' toward Seven Pines, these two regiments formed line with the Sixty-seventh New York, facing the enemy now advancing from the direction of Fair Oaks ; and adds : "Tlie men were ordered to lie down, that they should escape the mnrderoiis fire that was incessantly pouring in from the front. Scarcely was this done when the Eighty -seventh New York* . . . came along the Nine-miles road with rapid step, cheering most vociferously, passed " the three regiments in Naglee's line ''about fifty yards, received a volley, broke, and passed [to the rear], the whole of them runnir.g over the backs of those lying down, the latter remaining undisturbed until ordered to rise and meet the accumulating force that was bearing all before it. Volley after volley was given and received. An order was given to charge, but 100 yards brought us into such close proximity with the enemy that a sheet of fire was blazing in our faces. The ranks on both sides were rapidly thinning, but still the great disparity in our number continued. So close were the contending forces, that our men in many instances whilst at a charge poured their fire into the breasts of the enemy within a few feet from the points of their bayonets."

Another portion of Naglee's brigade had " crossed to the left of Couch's position, and advanced 200 yards into and along the woods to the left and in front of the Seven Pines, where they remained actively employed."

It has already been seen that whilst the fighting just described by Generals Keyes and Naglee was going on, Berry's brigade, of Kearney's division, in the woods south of the Williamsburg road, had reached a point " completely commanding " Casey's " old camp and the earthworks." Berry was supported by two regiments of Jameson's brigade ; " the other two regiments of that brigade having been diverted — one to Birney and one to Peck.'* The latter was the Eighty -seventh New York, sent from the left of Couch's line to aid in resisting the advance against Keyes's right flank. The regiment sent to Birney took part only in the last fighting that day on the Williamsburg road.

General Kearney says: It "was perhaps near 6 o'clock when

* This regiment was in Jameson's brigade. It did good service on other parts of the Meld.

our centre and right, defended by troops of the other divisions, with all their willingness, could no longer resist the enemy's right central flank attacks, pushed on M'itli determined discipline and with the impulsion of numerous concentrated masses. Once broken our troops fled incontinently, and a dense body of the enemy pursuing rapidly, yet in order, occupied the Williamsburg road [about three-eighths of a mile east of Seven Pines] the entire open ground, and penetrating deep into the woods," on the south side of that road, "soon interposed between my division and my line of retreat. It was on this occasion that seeing myself cut off, and relying on the high discipline and determined valor of the Thirty-seventh New York Yolunteers, I faced them to the rear against the enemy, and held the ground, although so critically placed, and despite the masses that gathered on and had passed us, checked tlie enemy in his intent of cutting us off against the White Oak Swamp. This enabled the advanced regiments, averted by orders and this contest in their rear, to return from their hitherto victorious career, and to retire by a remaining foot-path known to our sconts (the Saw-mill road), until they once more arrived at and remanned the impregnable position we had left at noon at our own fortifled division camp [the Federal third line of defense]." *

]VIost of Peck's brigade, a portion of Naglee's, and some detached portions of other commands retreated with Kearney's troops. The tighting, however, was continued on the Williamsburg road, east of Seven Pines.

After the Federals, who were retiring on this part of the field, "were induced to face about," as already related by General Keyes, he says : " These were pushed forward and joined to others better organized in the woods, and a line was formed stretching across the [Williamsburg] road in perpendicular direction. General Heintzelman requested me to advance the line on the left of the road, which I did. . . . The last line, formed of portions of Couch's and Casey's divisions and a portion of Kearney's division [one of Jameson's regiments that had been sent to Birney],

* It will be seen later that this ' ' grand commotion " was caused by three Confederate regiments only.

checked the advance of the enemy and finally repulsed * him^ and tliis was the beginnino; of the victory, which on the following day was so gloriously completed."

In Keyes's corps there were eight batteries of artillery ; seven of which were actively engaged in the contest around Seven Pines, and one was detached, " cut off," at Fair Oaks. None of the artillery of Ilcintzelman's corps was brought to the front because of the miry condition of the ground. The Federal official reports give great credit to their artillery in this action.

General Keyes says " the number actually engaged " in his corps "did not amount to more than 12,000;" from which there should be deducted four regiments and one battery, north of Fair Oaks, not engaged in the action on the Williamsburg road. He adds : " The Confederates outnumbered us, during a great part of the conflict, at least four to one, and they were fresh, drilled troops, led on and cheered by their best generals and the President of their Republic. They are right wlieu they assert that the Yankees stubbornly contested every foot of ground. Of nine generals of the Fourth Corps [his own] who were present on the field, all, Avith one exception, were wounded or his horse was hit in the battle. A large proportion of all the field officers in the action were killed, wounded, or their horses were struck. These facts denote the fierceness of the contest.""