The army and navy of America ... from the period of the French and Indian wars to the close of the Mexican war

Front matter

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Preface

The work now presented to the public is one of a peculiar character, and the only one that gives the reader a good idea of the battles fought in our country, unless he searches for a description of them through prosy and ponderous volumes. Too much space has hitherto been devoted to legislative proceedings, and too little to the battles. Nor is this all. The various military operations are mixed together in inextricable confusion in our ordinary histories, the same chapter often containing a number of battles. We have corrected this, and made a chapter of every battle, to set it forth clearly and distinctly, connecting only those extended operations, that were intended to aid each other.

Part I Contains the nature of campaigns — the advance — the retreat

the encampment of armies — together with the plans of battles ; military maxims, from the great generals of every age and country, illustrated by their own battles ; with all the manoeuvres of fleets, and war at sea. This part prepares the reader to understand warlike operations on land and sea ; a kind of information, the want of which every reader of ordinary history must have felt. Such an arrangement has never been attempted before, and in this, especially, our work differs from all others; we hope to the advantage of the reader.

Part II. — Gives an account of the battles of the French and Indian wars, which were of the greatest importance to our fathers. It was a struggle between France and England as to which government should rule the American continent. To our fathers it was important, not only because it would decide whether they should be ruled by the French or English, Catholics or Protestants, but it even decided whether they should at all exist as a nation. This, independent of the interesting nature of many of these forest battles, will make this part of the work of infinitely greater importance than is generally imagined.

Independent of all this, the heroes of our revolution were nearly all schooled in this war. Washington himself received his first lessons of

iii

IV

PREFACE.

war during thid period, and terrible lessons they were indeed, which prepared him for those great achievements which he performed at a subsequent period. Nor is this all the interest this war possesses. As taxation was the cause of the revolution, so this war was the cause of taxation.

Part III. — Contains tlie battles of the revolution. Omitting all the more dull proceedings of Congress, and giving only the most important, so as to keep up the historical connection, we had ample space to make the description of all the battles very full. These are interspersed by poetical quotations, from all the great authors of ancient and modern times. We culled these flowers from many a beautiful garden, to strew them into the rugged paths of war, and to give interest and variety to the work. This is a new plan; and if the reader is willing to allow us to claim any merit for writing this work, we would ask it for the revolution.

Tiie heroes of the revolution are set forth in a more conspicuous light than they have ever before appeared in, and the brilliant talents of Washington, often spoken of too lightly even by Americans, are made to appear, by giving a full account of those bold and mighty efforts, which were ultimately crowned with success.

Part IV. — The late war, of which this part treats, is more distinguished for the numerous naval victories which the Americans gained over the most powerful nation that ever existed. These are all fully described, as well as the battles on land, fought during the same period.

Severe and protracted indisposition rendered it necessary for us to avail ourselves more freely of the laboilrs of others here than we should have done if in health ; but the selections were made with such care, and from such high and rare authorities, that we have no doubt thaj the reader will profit by this arrangement. We make this general acknowledgment here, for this part of the work, to throw off the odium of plagiarism.

Part V. — Gives a general account of the Florida war; and, by sketches of battles, developes the general character of this Indian warfare.

Part VI. — Presents a brief account' of the revolution in, and annexation of Texas; a graphic description of Taylor's campaign, from the landing at Corpus Christi until the battle of Buena Vista; of Scott's victories from Vera Cruz to the City of Mexico; with the other events of the war.

Part VII. — Closes the work by a general description of the calamities of war — giving examples from the wars of ancient and modern times; showing, in the meantime, when war is just or tyrannical.

Contents

PART I.

THE ART OF WAR.

Chapter I

Introductory Remarks. ^ I. Principle of Strength in an Army. II. Plan of Campaign — Definitions of Military Terms — Importance of Rapidity of Movement — Operations of large Masses on a single Point. III. Adaptation of Means to Circumstances — Genius of Napoleon. IV. Offensive Operations. V. Concentration of separate Forces. VI. Modifications of original Plans. VII. Of supporting the Wings of an Army. VIII. Depots. IX. Various Lines of Operations. X. Configuration of the Theatre of War — Illustrations. XI. Of passive Defence. XII. Fortresses. XIIF. .\dvances and Retreats. XIV. Attacks on both Extremities. XV. Spies. XVI. Order of Battle. XVII. Angles of Offence and Defence. XVIIF. Oblique Attack. XIX. Importance of constant Preparation, XX. Difficulties of Commander-in-Chief. XXI. Efficacy of Valour and Discipline. XXII. Operations when inferior in Force. XXIII. Of acting in detached Lines — Brilliant Success of Napoleon. XXIV. Of Flank Attacks. XXV. Importance of a single Line of Operations. XXVI. Of Distances between Marching Corps — Retreat of Moreau — Mountain Campaigns. XXVir. Of disappointing an Enemy's Wishes. XXVIII. Of the Importance of frequent Entrenchment— Successof the Duke of Berwick— Of Marshal Tureniic. XXIX. Of Courage and Decision when surprised by a superior Force — Marshal Turenne and the Prince de Cond6. XXX. Transition from Defensive to Offensive — Napoleon's first Campaigns in Italy. XXXI. Of abandoning and changing Line of Operations — Examples of Frederick the Great and Marshal Turenne. X-XXII. Operations with heavy Trains of Artillery. &c. XXXIII. Encamping in Position. XXXIV. Conduct when menaced with being surrounded. XXXV.

VI CONTENTS.

Proper Position of Caiilonments. XXXVI. Dangers in crossing Bridges in Rear. XXXVII. Of employing separate Corps against a central Force — Battle of Hohenlinden. XXXVIII. Conduct whch driven from first Position — Battle of Genola — Of Milesimo. XXXIX. Movements of a retreating Army. XL. Concentration of Forces on the Eve of Battle — Defeat of Jourdan. XLI. Duty of Commander previous to Battle. XLII. Of avoiding a Flank March before an Army in Position — Battle of Kolin — Of Rosbach. XLIII. Of Prudence in View of Battle — Rcsum()tion of Offensive during Retreat — Defeat of the Austrians at Marengo — At Torgau— Battle of Ulm— Of Jena— Of Waterloo. XLIV. Of the Aihanced Guard. XLV. Demosthenes and Phocion. XLVI. Disposition of Artillery. XLVII. Conduct of Alexander the Great. XLVIII. Of Intervals between Corps — Defeat of the Prince of Lorraine by Frederick — Of throwing Forces into the Inleivals of an Enemy's Line. XLIX. Qualifications of a General. L. Of Operations in the neighbourhood of a River. LI. Of the Passage of a River — Prince Eugene and the Duke of Savoy. LII. Of defending the Passage of a River. LIIL of Tites dii Pont. LIV. Of Encampments. LV. Of Sieges. LVI. Citadels. LVII. Of surrendering a Fortress. LA'^III. Of Capitulations. LIX. Obedience of Soldiers. LX. Union of Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery. LXI. Mingling of Infantry and Cavalry. LXII. Charges of Cavalry. LXIII. Duties of Cavalry. LXIV, Artillery. LXV. Batteries. LXVL Treatment of Prisoners. LXVII. Of Prisoners of War. LXVIII. Qualifications of General-in-chicf. LXIX. Of the Staff. LXX. Unanimity of Principle of great Warriors. LXXI. Battle of Waterloo Page 9—76

CHAPTER n.

WARHKB OPERATIONS AT SKA.

Of absolute and relative Force — Line of Battle — Modifications of naval Warfare-^ Pfi//-mc// Actions — Various Manoeuvres — Steam Vessels — Naval Tactics — Ordinary Division of Fleets — Definitions of Terms — Five Orders of Sailing — Order of Battle — Order of Retreat — Order of Convoy — Meihdd of Forming the various Orders of Sailing — To form Line of Battle — To manoeuvre in Line of

Battle In Fifth Order — Of the Naval Square — To restore the Order of Battle

on Shifts of the Wind — Circumstances to be considered in forming a Fleet for

Action Of the Weather-gage — Engagement between two Ships — Preparation —

Action Repair — Engagement between two Fleets — To dispute the Wealher-

(Tage To force an Enemy to Action — To avoid coming to Action — To Double

an F-nemy — To avoid being Doubled — Of Chasing — Defects of usual Line of

Battle De Grenier's Method of Tactics — Clerk's Tactics — Of firing at Hull or

Ringing — One Ship cannot be exposed to the Fire of many — Principles used in bringing Ships to Action — New Mode of Attack from Windward — From Leeward Page 76—137

CONTENTS. V"

Part II. French And Indian War

Pnpe Chapter I. — Introduction — Cause of the War — Washington's Mission. . . . 138

II. — Washington's first Campaign — Bravery of Provincials MH

III. — Expedition against Fort Du Qucsne — Braddock's Defeat .... 148

IV. — Formal Declaration of War — Plan of Campaign 160

V. — Expedition against Louisbourg — Siege of Fort William Henry. 161

VI. — Siege of Louisbourg — Frontignac and Fort Du Quesnc taken. 1G5

VII.— Defeat of Montcalm— Death of Wolfe — End of the War 175

Part III. The Revolution

Chaptee I. — Cause of the Revolution — Stamp Act — Boston Tea Party. . . 195 II. — Pitt's Peace Bill — Battle of Lexington — Boston blockaded. . . 223

III. — Preparations — Ticonderoga, Crown Point, &c., taken 230

IV. — Investment of Boston continued — Battle of Breed's Hjll 235

V. — Meeting of Continental Congress — Washington in command. 253 VI. — Americans fortify Dorchester Heights — Boston evacuated. . . . 272

VII. — Siege of Charleston — Declaration of Independence 278

VIII — Battle of Long Island — Defeat of American Troops 299

IX. — Capture of General Lee — Defeat of British at Trenton 318

X. — Expedition against Dan bury — Death of Wooster 328

XI. — Arri^val of Lafayette — Battle of Brandy wine 3.30

XU. — Philadelphia taken — Battle of Germantown 316

XIII. — Battle of Bennington — Of Saratoga — Surrender of Burgoyne. 354 XIV. — Attack on Forts Mifflin and Mercer — Death of Count Donop. 404

XV. — British evacuate Philadelphia — Battle at Freehold 409

XVI. — Arrival of Count D'Estaing — Attack on Newport 415

XVII. — Shocking Barbarity of the Indians — Massacre of Wyoming. . iS ^

XVIII. — Campaign in the South — Savannah taken 427

XIX. — Piratical Warfare of the British — Putnam's Escape 429

XX. — Storming of Stony Point 431

XXI. — Operations against the Indians 434

XXII. — Expedition against Charleston — Capitulation 434

XXIII. — Battle of Camden — Return of Lafayette 447

XXIV. — Treason of .\rnold — Execution of Andre 451

XXV. — Operations in the South — Battle of the Cowpens 456

XXVr. — Battle of CamJfn — Battle of Eutaw Springs 458

XXVII. — Siege of Yorktown — Surrender of Cornwallis 463 viii CONTENTS.

Part IV. The Late War

Page CBArrxR I. — Declaration of War against England — Battle of Tippecanoe . . 490

II General Hull's disgraceful Surrender 498

III. Engagement between the Constitution and Guerriere 499

IV. Invasion of Canada — Achievements of Col. Van Rensselaer. . . 502

V. — Capture of the Wasp by the Frolic 504

VI. — The United States and Macedonian 509

VII. — The Constitution and Java 524

VIII. — Bloody Action at the River Raisin 526

IX. — The Hornet and Peacock — Generosity of Americans 528

X. — Americans attack York — Death of General Pike 529

XI. — Loss of the Chesapeake — Death of L^rence 530

XII. — Capture of the United States Sloop Argus 537

XIII Boxer captured by the Enterprise — Cruise of the President. . . 537

XIV. — Perry's Victory on Lake Eric 539

XV. — Maiden taken — Battle of the Thames — Death of Tecumseh. . 564 XVI. — Harrison resigns — Invasion of Canada — Battle of Chippewa. . 571

XVII Cruise of the Essex — Captured by a superior Force 587

XVIII. — Capture of the Epervier by the Peacock 589

XIX. — Burning of the Capitol at Washington by Ross 589

XX. — Attack on Baltimore by Ross — Enemy repulsed 591

XXI. — Macdonongh's Victory on Lake Champlain 592

XXII.— Battle of New Orleans— Treaty of Peace 595

T«« Calamities of War 674

THE

ARMY AND NAVY.

Part I. Chapter I

MILITARY MAXIMS AND WARLIKE OPERATIONS.

War, in the hands of the tyrant, is the science of wholesale murder, plunder and desolation-^the science of defence in the hands of the patriot. The one employs it against the people ; the other, in their behalf. The one seeks it as a trade ; the other adopts it as a dreadful necessity to' avoid or arrest greater evils. The one gains for his reward the fears and curses of the people ; the other, their heartfelt applause and esteem.

Aware that no man" can read descriptions of battles, or other military movements, understandingly, without some previous knowledge of the fundamental principles and maxims of war, we shall endeavour to place a kind of information at the disposal of the reader, which many have hitherto been unable to obtain.

We have always considered ordinary histories defective, from a total neglect of a scientific and piiilosophical account of the governing principles of warlike operations. In reading such works, we might almost be led to suppose that a general had nothing to do but to " trust in Providence and keep his powder dry" — to march his army against the enemy with no other thoughts than how io fight. But let the general reader once get an insight into the mighty projects of the chief olficer before and during his march, all based on profound scientific

10 TUE ARMV AND NAVY.

principles, and a new and ample field is opened to his astonished view, lie then not merely looks upon a Washington, a Lafayette, a Schuyler or a Greene, as a brave man fighting with enthusiasm and skill in the cause of the people, with a plan confined to the narrow limits of the battle-field ; but he sees operations developed by the minds of great men, so vast, so extensive, for hundreds of miles around, that he reads accounts of their achievements as mental, as well as 7noral and physical, victories over the invading foe. ll is this great plan that constitutes the interest of the science of war; it is this that exhibits the majesty of mind ; it is this iha-t, even now, may elevate our veneration for the living, and reverence for the dead, heroes of our army and navy — that may exalt their merits still higher in the estimation of the American people ; it is this that gives defensive war, in the hands of men engaged in a just cause, a dignity that God himself, in his providence, has smiled upon it, w hen our fathers struggled for the rights of man.

In laying down the fundamental principles of war in this chapter, we shall avail ourselves of the information of the very best authorities now extant, to draw rich stores of knowledge from the latest English, French and German works, which it was heretofore impossible to obtain without much labour or expense.

If it should be asked why we obtain much of our information from European works, let it be remembered that we owe our tactics to Europe, and that it was against European tactics that our heroes had to exercise their powers. It•^vas not so much the possession of superior tactics on the part of the Americans that crowned their effort^ with victory, as the superior application of them to practice. Many of our illustrations of principles are taken from foreign -wars, but they are merely to develope principles, as carried out by various distinguished chief commanders of ancient and modern times, under different circumstances, to make the subject more clear and comprehensible to those who have not made war a particular study, or who have not had the good fortune of seeing those few rare works on this subject in the different languages.

Independent of the numerous other advantages resulting from such an arrangement, \vhich are too obvious to need any further comment, by rendering these maxims clear, (which are applicable to wars in all countries), by foreign examples chieHy, we shall avoid repetition in describing the American campaigns, wiiich will, incidentally, develope their own governing principles with clearness and perspicuity to those acquainted with military movements ; or who first carefully peruse this key to the wonderful projects of the great general, and the thrilling and startling secrets of his success.

I

To throw, by a combined operation, the greatest mass of forces upon the decisive or primitive objective point, in which resides the principle of strength in the enemy, so as to destroy this point ift the shortest, most decided and effectual manner, constitutes the one great governing principle — the maxim of maxims in war; in other words, to attack the most vulnerable point of the enemy, which conquered, would be most decisive in terminating the war. All other maxims or precepts are intended to instruct us in the mode of accomplishing this great object.

II

The application of the first maxim to a great and perfect operation ought to include these three primitive combinations : — First, fortning the plan of a campaign, offensive or defensive, embracing the lines of operation in the best manner. The second is the art of moving the mass of forces with the greatest rapidity upon the objective point of the line of operations. This is the mode of execution or strategy. The third "is the art of combining the mass of forces to act simultaneously on the most important point on the battle-field.

1. In laying a plan of campaign, six essential points present themselves to our consideration: a, the political situation of both parties ; b, the situation at the particular time ; c, the relative force and means of carrying on the war ; d, the location and distribution of the armies of both parties ; e, the natural lines of operations ; /, the most advantageous line of

{"i THE AUMY AXD NAVY.

operations. The relative means of war between the parties are only to be viewed as tliey are of importance. Territorial or manauvring lines of operation, says a late writer, are the principal object ; and though they are subject to many accessory considerations,. the rules of the art must nevertheless form their basis. Originality and great boldness are not fncompatible with their application.

But, before we proceed, it will be proper to give a definition of several military terms.

.7 base or basis of operations is the frontier, a large river, a coast, chains of mountains, fortresses, deserts or any topographical or political extent of country, upon the imaginary line of which the corps of an army assemble, offensively, to take their departure from thence into the country of the enemy, and to which, if they fail, they intend ft) retreat ; defensively, to counteract all the measures of an invading foe.

Lines of operations are territorial and manceuvring lines. The territorial lines are those traced by art or nature for the defence or invasion of states. Frontiers covered with fortresses, or having a natural defence, as mountains, rivers, &c., form their constituents. Manauvring lines are the dispositions of the general to traverse them oflensively, or cover them defensively. Both these lines of operations are intimately connected. In offensive war, the line is an imaginary perpendicular upon the base, along which Sn army operates against the enemy ; in defensive war it is often the same, but still oftener parallel to the territorial line. A line of communication is either the same as that of operations, or any other by which the army receives its supplies and communicates with the base.

Some examples will render the definition more intelligible. France and Austria have three great lines of operations against each other ; by Italy on one side, Switzerland and Tyrol on the centre, and by Germany on the other. In these the Po, the Maine, the Danube, or a principal road, constitutes the materiel of lines, which are amenable to only a few rules presented by their nature. Between Prussia and Austria are again three lines — through Moravia, Lusatia, and

MILITAKV MAXIMS A>D W'AULIKE OPEIIATIONS. 13

Saxony. Lines of operations are divisible into collateral or separate points. Frederick entered B(^hemia by his central line npon four points. The French invaded Germany, in 179(3 and 1700, upon two subdivided lines. Napoleon always operated upon one principal line, as did the Duke of Wellington in Spain.

2. Rapidity of movement increases the force of an army by enabling the mass to be carried alternately on every point of the line. " The whole mi/sferi/ of ua/lihe operations is centred in the legs /'' says Marshal Saxe. Napoleon holds nearly the same language : " The strength of an army, like the power in mechanics, is estimated by multiplying the mass by the rapidity ; a rapid'march augments the morale of an army, and increases all the chances of victory." Washington said so, if you please, when he took possession of Dorchester Heights, and compelled the British army to leave Boston without firing a gun; thus icinning the game by the very first move. He again acted in accordance with the same principle, when he rushed like a meteor from the north to the south, to besiege Yorktown and strike the decisive blow before John Bull got his spectacles fairly adjusted to see where he was. liapidity, says Montecuculli, is of importance in concealing the movements of an army, because it . leaves no time to divulge the intention of the commander. It is, therefore, an advantage to attack the enemy unexpectedly — to take him off his guard — to surprise him, and let him feel the thunder before he sees the flash. But if too great celerity exhausts your troops, while on the other hand delay deprives you of the favourable moment, you must weigh the advantage against the disadvantage, and choose between. Marshal Villars observes, that in war everything depends upon being able to deceive the enemy ; and, having once gained this point, in never allowing him time to recover himself A^'illars has united practice to precept. His bold and rapid marches were almost always crowned with success. It was the opinion of Frederick the Great, that all wars should be short and rapid ; because a long war insensibly relaxes discipline, depopulates the state, and exhausts its resources. The principle of rapid-

14 TILE ARMY AND NAVY.

ity, carried to the extent of ^'illars and Frederick, however, must be received with s<jnie caution: in the case of the hitter, in adopting it as a maxim ; in that of the former, in tlie manner of carrying it into execution. In the one we must be governed by circumstances; in the other by prudence. If the movements of an army are too slow, their antagonists will not only guard against surprise, but be prepared for their reception. General Schuyler retreated before Burgoyne, but he threw so many obstacles in his way, that by the time he arrived at Saratoga the Americans were prepared to meet him.

3. Among the first principles in battle is that of operating with a superior force upon a decisive point, because the physical force of organic numbers in arms furnishes the unerring means of victory when the moral qualities in both armies are equal. The means of bringing this force to bear in the most advantageous manner is the art of fighting; consequently, courage and fortune being nearly balanced, that general who can operate with the largest mass upon the most decisive point must be successful : but, to effect this purpose, the combinations must be such as to produce a unity of n\ovements, conducing simultaneously to the same object.

It is necessary to avoid dispositions which have generally proved fatal; such 'as, 1st, forming isolated divisions; 2d, ordering extended movements, which deprive the army of a part of its strength, and enable the enemy to ruin either the main body or the detachment; 3d, positions with too great an extent of front ; 4th, allowing obstacles to separate the wings, or obstacles which prevent the connexion of columns, and expose them to separate defeats. •

The first combinations are those which produce an oblique order of battle — those with a wing reinforced, those which outflank the enemy, and those which form a perpendicular upon a hostile extremity, or upon a scattered centre. These are almost always successful, because they present a whole line to an extremity, and therefore a greater mass than the enemy. Thus the fundamental principle of all military combinations, namely, to effect with the greatest mass of forces a combined attack upon the decisive point, is applied ; and it is easy to understand how a general of ability, with G0,000 men, may be able to defeat 100,000, if he can bring 50,000 into action upon a single part of his enemy's line ; for battles are decided, not by troops upon the muster-rolls, nor even by those present, but by those alone who are simultaneously engaged.

III

In the selection of the 2^articular line of operations, the rulers of a country must be governed by circumstances. The situation of the belligerents; their resources; nature of the fortresses ; strength of their forces ; distance from sea ; direction of a chain of mountains ; course of a river ; the condition of neutral powers, or apprehensions of an ally,] should all receive due consideration. It is requisite to foresee everything the enemy may do, and be prepared to meet it. It is true we sometimes see bad selections succeed, the plans of which are entirely at variance ^vith the principles of war ; but these are either the results of the caprices of fortune or of the errors committed by the enemy. A good general should never trust either ; and if his government lays a plan which he considers faulty, to attempt to execute it would be culpable, if it were his opinion that he thus allowed himself to be made instrumental in his army's ruin. It would become his duty to represent his reasons against it, and endeavour to persuade a change of plan, sffid, if unsuccessful, rather resign than do violence to his conscience and wrong to his countrymen.

" In general, the initial application of military masses should be when the belligerents are neighbours on some part of the frontier which projects into the hostile state, as Bohemia with regard to Prussia, or 8ilcsia with regard to Austria. But it is a maxim that lines of operations have their key as well as fields of battle : in the former, the great strategical points are decisive ; as in the latter, the points which command the weak part of a position constitute the key."

Of all the obstacles on the frontier of states, says Napoleon, the most difficult to overcome is^he desert — mountains next ; and large rivers occupy the third place. These are important considerations in the invasion of a country, comin" as they do from a man of so much experience, independent of his great military genius. He appears to have been called uj)on to surmount every kind of difficulty incidental to warfare in his military career.

In Egvpt he traversed burning deserts, suffering dreadfully from heat and thirst, and vanquished and destroyed the IMamelukes, so celebrated for their courage and address, in a country ill adapted to supply the wants of his troops. In the conquest of Italy he twice crossed the Alps by difficult passes, and at a season which rendered the undertaking truly formidable. In three months he passed the Pyrenees, beat and dispersed four Spanish armies. In short, from the Rhine to the Borysthenes, no natural obstacle could be found to arrest the rapid march of his victorious army.

IV

When an army undertakes an invasion or acts offensively, it takes the lead, in the movements, and those of the enemy are necessarily subordinate to them. If it occupies with a division each of the great avenues leading to the enemy, he will be in doubt and perplexity as to the point of the intended attack, and will not know where to concentrate his masses to oppose them. Although it is absolutely necessary to move with a mass of force near the enemy, yet if the army takes the lead in the movements it may gain great advantages by marching in separate corps while still at a distance from him, if he has not a concentrated mass ready to act, and there be several roads leading concentrically towards the point intended to be occupied. Five corps of 20,000 men each, w ill, of course, move forward more rapidly towards any point, than a hundred thousand men marching on the same road, who can only advance with the tardiness natural to large bodies. They arc not only interfering with the movements of each other, but they must necessarily be encumbered with the immense train of baggage for subsistence.