The revolutionary and Napoleonic era, 1789-1815.

Front matter

atamfetilrge ^iBtoxital ^txitB

EDITED BY G. W. PROTHERO, LiTT.D.

FELLOW OF king's COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE, AND PROFESSOR OF HISTORY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH.

Chapter I. The Political and Social Weakness of Europe

„ II. Louis XVI, the Parlements, and States General ....

III. The Constituent Assembly

IV. The Girondins and Europe

V. The Jacobins and the First Coalition

X. The Wars of Liberation .

XL The Reconstruction of Europe

78 92 119 148 184 238 293

Appendix

I, List of authorities

II. List of the chief dignities and appointments conferred by

Napoleon 279

MAPS AND PLANS.

Plan of the Partitions of Poland ...... 76

The Peace of Basle to face page 91 '

The Peace of Luneville and the Secularisations to face page 126 /

The Treaty of Tilsit to face page 175 ^

Napoleon's Empire at its height (1812) . . to face page 217

Plan of the Waterloo Campaign 349

THE REVOLUTIONARY AND NAPOLEONIC ERA, OR, FRANCE AND EUROPE,

1789—1815.

CHAPTER I.

The Political and Social Weakness of Europe.

"The corruption of each form of government commences with that of its principles." — Montesquieu.

T he F rench, JR.e volution was a conquest in the spheres of thoj.iglit,_societv, and fiolitics, -efifected by a people over the old systems of authority, class privilege, and absolute rule. In its course it came almost inevitably into collision with governments founded on the old ideas and customs; and the shock of arms favoured the rise of a miUtary dictatorship, which curbed the revolution in France while extending it over the Continent. The conflict with monarchical Europe is therefore the central fact^rthe revolution, determining not only the trend of events in"^ance, but also the extension of French influence over Europe, and the formation of the chief Continental States.

What was the old Europe which the revolutionary ideas were to permeate and transform? How came it that the revolution organised itself in France so effectively as to overthrow States which had defied the power of Louis XIV? In F. R. I brief, what was the potential strength of the new ideas; whence came the weakness inherent in the Continental States? A survey of the chief tendencies in pre-revolutionary Europe will serve as an answer to these questions and an introduction to the momentous events of 1789.

The Holy Roman Empire is the nebulous material from which most of the Continental States have been evolved. Central, Western, and Southern Europe with few exceptions acknowledged the sway of Karl the Great (Charlemagne) as "the Emperor," crowned by the Pope, and wielding the temporal power of Christendom, while the successor of Peter embodied the spiritual authority of the Church. Though many peoples never belonged to " The Empire," yet the underlying conception had been that of a central predominant State, not belonging to any one ruling house, or people. It was Catholic in a political, as well as in a religious sense. The great religious and political strife of the Thirty Years' War (1618 — 1648) shook old Europe to its base. The cosmopolitan Empire was divided by a perpetuation of the religious schism. North- Germany became definitely Protestant; South-Germany remained Roman Catholic and under the influence of the House of Hapsburg. By the Peace of Westphalia (1648) the Empire not only lost the Dutch Netherlands and the Swiss Confederation, but also relinquished the control of the foreign policy of the chief German States. The Thirty Years' War undermined the power of the Emperor, just as the Reformation had impaired the authority of the Pope. The European system was left without any dominant principle of government, and Central Europe became an ever-shifting mosaic of States tending to group themselves around Vienna or Berlin, around the House of Hapsburg-Lorraine, or the House of Hohenzollern. Even if Germany had not been open to the intervention of other powers, as Sweden and France, her history would have been ever distracted by this dualism of interests.

The House of Hapsburg had long made use of its tenure of the Imperial throne to aggrandise its hereditary States, Bohemia, Moravia, the Duchy of Austria, Styria, Carinthia, Tyrol, and scattered lands on the Upper Danube and Rhine ; for though the Imperial crown was in theory elective, yet the reigning Hapsburg was nearly always chosen by the princely Electors to be ' Emperor.' Now, when the Imperial power decayed, the Hapsburgs redoubled their attempts to make Germany an appanage of Austria ; but the diversity of peoples and constitutions of the Hapsburg States would have made this all but impossible, even if a vigorous purely German State had not opposed it.

The rise of Brandenburg-Prussia was due to the skill and foresight by which the early Electors of Brandenburg used their central position in North Germany to champion national interests against the Poles and the Swedes, or the encroachments of Hapsburgs and Bourbons. Prussia has always increased most in power and territory, when her policy has been truly German. She has fallen back, when, as in 1795 — 1806, or 1849 — 1 85 1, her government has been subservient to France or Austria.

The pohcy of Frederick the Great .had the result of making Prulsia' the 'first of purely German States, and one of "the^Great^ Powers of Europe. Frederick determined to unite his scaftered dominions of Brandenburg- Prussia, and add to them whatever lands could be welded on to his realm.

Thus, when the Hapsburg possessions were weakened by the contested succession of Maria Theresa, Frederick seized the opportunity to invade and conquer Silesia (1740). The revival of some old claims on this province formed an insufficient excuse for so glaring a violation of dynastic rights; but, if the end can justify the means, the seizure of Silesia may be paUiated. Community with the Protestant North in race, physical conditions and commercial interests, seemed to declare for a union of Silesia with Brandenburg, and its separation from the Slavonic and Roman Catholic states of the/ House of Austria; and Silesia has ever since remained Prussian. ) It was in Silesia and Prussia (proper) that the national rising of 1813 was most general and enthusiastic. The seizure of Silesia, however, was a signal instance of the spirit which since the Thirty Years' War had begun to undermine the European system. That respect for dynastic rights and treaty obligations which generally held sway when Christendom was more than a name, now gave place to a state policy which avowedly aimed at little else but gain of territory or markets.

The same incisive assertion of natural and national claims at the expense of governmental rights, is observable in Frederick's policy with regard to Poland. There seems to be an inherent antipathy between the Poles and Germans. For ages the two races have striven for supremacy on the banks of the Wartha, the Vistula, and the Niemen. In the i6th and 17th centuries, when the Polish nobles were public-spirited enough to prefer the public interest to personal gains, their martial spirit gained the victory ; but while the Electors of Brandenburg were slowly consolidating the North-German power, the Polish and Lithuanian realms were disintegrated by faction. The Polish nobles succeeded in making the Crown elective, in curtailing the political rights of the towns, and in reducing the peasants to abject serfdom. While in Western Europe aristocracy was yielding ground to the Crown or to the people, the reverse had been the case in Poland. The absorption of the governing powers by the Polish nobles was as fatal to the effective action of the government as to the liberties of the lower orders ; for in the General Diet, consisting of the nobles, the laws must be passed unanimously; the veto of a single noble could reduce the State to a deadlock. Montesquieu censured its government as being the worst of aristocracies, "where the part of the people which obeys is in civil slavery to that which l] Political and Social Weakness of Europe. 5

holds sway." In Prussia the iron will of the great Frederick linked closely together the different provinces and distinct orders of his people; and, though the Prussian Government and society had little of the unity which the Revolution was to impart in 1807 — 181 2, yet Frederick's abiHty and energy ensured a strength far greater than that of the more extensive Polish State.

In 1772 came the first of the three partitions of Poland, which by 1795 ended its existence as an independent Power. Frederick, in planning with the Czarina Catherine II and Maria Theresa the spoliation of Poland, could urge no legal claims. The restoration to Germans in West-Prussia and Ermeland of German rule, and their liberation from the rule of factious nobles who sought to impose the Roman Catholic creed, will now, however, be generally considered a valid excuse for Prussia's share in the first partition. By it Frederick gained West-Prussia (except Danzig and Thorn) and Ermeland, thus securing a continuous German territory from the Niemen to the Middle Elbe ; and North Germans were now freed from the danger resulting from the increase of Russian influence over the Polish Government. Frederick was no revolutionist, by theory or design. His aim was to consolidate his monarchy by all the means in his power, relying on his own vast faculties of organisation to control his ministers and officials, on the devotion of his nobles to officer his army, and on the subservience of the peasant-serfs to furnish the sinews of war, and the rank and file of the army. His public works aimed at making Prussia rich in herself, and as far as possible self-sufficing. Frederick's foreign policy was, however, distinctly fatal to the old order of things in Central and Eastern Europe. The seizure of Silesia and the first partition of Poland showed how a State might grow in size and strength, which furthered natural and national claims against treaty obligations. It will be seen how largely the power of Prussia at the death of Frederick (1786) was due to his forceful will and intelligence. Her territories were still straggling ; and parts, as Anspach, Baireuth, Cleves, and East- Friesland, were widely detached : her administration was cumbrous : her people were rigidly divided in the old orders : her power and prestige were due to an abnormally large army vigorously led.

In sharp contrast with the prudent boldness of Frederick stands the well-meaning but reckless policy of the reigning Hapsburg, Joseph II (1780 — 1790). He had noticed the power of Prussia, vigorously wielded by the able and ambitious Frederick, and determined to concentrate the government of his diverse territories at Vienna. His task was far more difficult than that of Frederick, for his States had their own constitutions, governments, and laws, which the House of Hapsburg-Lorraine had sworn to observe; and these differences were by no means artificial, but represented deep-rooted national distinctions: in fact, the golden link of the Crown had been hitherto almost the only bond of union. He now issued edicts canceUing the most cherished laws, customs, and privileges of his kingdoms of Hungary and Bohemia, though these were kingdoms when Austria was not yet a duchy. So far did he push his innovations as to remove to Vienna the sacred crown, sent by the Pope in the year 1000 a.d. as a gift to the first Hungarian king, St Stephen. This was rank sacrilege in the eyes of all true Hungarians, who thenceforth looked on Joseph as the " hatted king," not duly crowned. It is possible that he might have succeeded if he had introduced his revolutionary policy piecemeal in time of profound peace, and with the support of the Roman Catholic Church. The national feelings were still well-nigh dormant. It was Joseph II w^ho first aroused them to active hostihty by seeking to centralise all power at Vienna, and to make German the official language for his Hungarian and Slavonic States. At the same time he irritated the Roman Catholic Church at home, and created troubles abroad by his meddlesome foreign policy. As long as the Hapsburgs supported the power and privileges of the Roman Catholic clergy, these had oiled the complex wheels of the Hapsburg Governments ; but, when Joseph abolished the exceptional privileges of nobles and clergy alike, closed and confiscated the funds of most of the monasteries, and interfered with religious worship, he met with opposition everywhere, especially in his Austrian Netherlands.

As if it was not enough to provoke the privileged classes, as well as the religious and national sentiments, in his diverse States, Joseph II pursued an aggressive foreign policy which finally banded half Europe against him. Thus, he violated treaty engagements with the Dutch by declaring (1784) the navigation of the lower Scheldt completely open, even to his warships; and only the opposition of England and Holland, backed by the remonstrance of his ally France, led him to withdraw a claim which the French revolutionists were to revive in 1792. Despising the unreal glamour of his Imperial dignity, he sought the aggrandisement of his hereditary States, which then included numerous scattered lands along the upper Danube and Rhine. He desired to connect these with Austria by acquiring the Electorate of Bavaria, either by conquest or in exchange for his distant and troublesome Netherlands. This plan, which would have made Austria definitely the mistress of Southern and Central Germany, aroused the opposition of the German princes thus threatened ; and one of the last acts of Frederick's poHcy was to form the Fiirstenbund, or League of German Princes, joined by the spiritual Electors of Mainz and Treves, against the encroachments of the Emperor himself.

The next Prussian King, Frederick William II (1786 — 1797) for the first few years of his reign maintained a strongly anti-Austrian and anti-Russian policy. The identity of English and Prussian interests in maintaining the authority of the

8 TJie Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap,

House of Orange in the Stadtholdership of the Dutch Netherlands and in checking the democratic party which was supported by France, led to a Prussian invasion of Holland, and the formation of the important Triple AlHance between England, Prussia and Holland (1788). This aimed at maintaining the balance of power in Europe against the attempts of France in the Netherlands and the encroachments of Russia and Austria on Poland and Turkey. Some of the most important results of this conservative aUiance must here be noticed. In the second article of the Anglo-Dutch treaty of defensive alliance (April, 1788) the allies "guarantee each other mutually in the possession of all their Dominions, Territories, Towns, Places, Franchises, and Liberties." The two last designations of course included the rights of the Dutch Government over the lower part of the Scheldt, which, by the treaty of 1785 between the Emperor and the States General of Holland, were to belong to the latter and be "kept shut by them." The fact that the French Government gave a formal guarantee of the last-named treaty should also be noticed; for the abolition of the Dutch rights over the lower Scheldt by the French Convention in 1792, together with other menaces to our Dutch allies, was the chief cause of the outbreak of war between England and France which had so lamentable an influence on the French revolution and determined the general trend of European affairs throughout the whole era. Though the influence of the Triple Alliance on the west of Europe was distinctly conservative, yet in Eastern affairs its interests were complicated by the need of checking or outwitting those two restless and aggressive potentates, Catherine II and Joseph II. Knowing that they were planning the partition of Turkey, and were striving to obtain the aid of Poland, the Prussian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Herzberg, had already endeavoured to stir up war between Sweden and Russia, to encourage the Polish patriots to resist the Russophil poHcy of their King Stanislaus, to paralyse the Hapsburg States by l] Political and Social Weakness of Europe. 9

fomenting the discontent everywhere prevalent, and to strengthen Turkey's power of resistance. He was for a time completely successful. Gustavus III of Sweden, after consolidating the royal power by a successful coup d'etat^ longed to recover parts of Finland from Russia, and marched his troops towards St. Petersburg (July 1788), which they would probably have taken but for the defection of some of their Finnish troops and an attack of the Danes on their western frontier. The troops of Catherine and Joseph encountered unexpectedly vigorous resistance from the Turks ; and the PoHsh patriots seemed about to seize the opportunity to cast off the Czarina's influence, expel her troops from their land, and rehabilitate their distracted State. The PoUsh Diet, which met in Oct. 1788, proclaimed its intention of abolishing the libenwt veto and of declaring the right of the majority to carry any measure; while Catherine as clearly showed her determination to perpetuate the anarchy of that unhappy land, by proclaiming that she would regard the least change in the Polish Constitution of 1775 as a violation of treaties. Prussia, feeHng sure of the ultimate support of England, promised to help the Poles to recover their former Lithuanian lands, secretly stipulating for the cession of Thorn and Danzig as the price of her aid ; and Frederick William in 1789 was only deterred from making war on the two Imperial Governments by the pacific advice of Pitt and the possibility of France and Spain joining them. But the projected Quadruple Alliance of Austria, Russia, France and Spain could not be formed owing to Louis XVI's dislike of Russian plans against Poland ; besides which the impending troubles in France forbade the adoption of an energetic foreign policy. Even so, however, the prowess of Russian and Austrian troops later in the campaign gained some important victories over the Turks. Sweden was soon compelled to desist from her invasion of Russia by the invasion of the Danes and a conspiracy of the Swedish nobles against the Crown; and though

Gustavus III drove out the Danes, and in the Swedish States General succeeded in reducing his nobles to submission (Feb. — May 1789), yet Sweden was for the time reduced to the defensive. The influence of the Triple Alliance saved her from any severe pressure by Russia, and further prevented the two Imperial Powers from reaping the fruits of their victories over the Turks. The ferment in Poland still distracted the attention of Russia, while the discontent in Hungary and Belgium, which threatened to subvert the Hapsburg throne, was openly fomented by Prussia.

Joseph II's difficulties were vastly augmented, when the Belgian discontent against his sweeping reforms burst into open revolt (Dec. 1789). The student must, however, carefully distinguish between this Belgian or Brabant insurrection, headed by nobles and clergy, and the essentially democratic and social revolution which was swiftly transforming France into a modern State. In Hungary and in the Austrian Netherlands it was the ruler who was the revolutionist; and the discontent arose solely from his abolition of local privileges and charters, and his infraction of the historic rights and privileges of the nobles and clergy. In the Belgic provinces especially the revolt was strongly conservative and religious. Its leader. Van der Noot, appealed in his manifesto to the "primitive and imprescriptible rights" of the Belgian people and declared Joseph II deposed from the sovereignty for his violation of the fundamental charter of the land. On the overthrow of the Imperial troops by the patriots, Van der Noot entered Brussels in triumph, and with the nobles and "their mightinesses the Estates of Brabant," marched to the cathedral, where a Te Deum was sung to celebrate the restoration of the old religious and civic customs so heedlessly abolished by the Imperial innovator. In Jan. 1790 the Estates of the provinces assembled at Brussels and decreed the establishment of the United States of Belgium with a loose form of federal l] Political and Social Weakness of Europe. 1 1

union similar to that connecting the provinces of the Dutch Netherlands. In its essential features this Belgian revolution resembles the revolts of the Vende'ans in 1793 ^^^d the Tyrolese in 1809. The three risings were protests against the heedless application of a cast-iron Liberahsm. The Brabant revolution, therefore, faintly foreshadows the beginnings of that national reaction which was finally to roll back the eastward rush of French democracy. Its immediate influence on the political situation in 1789 — 1790 was fatal to the sovereign who sought to reform and revolutionise by royal prerogative. Overwhelmed by this last of many bitter disappointments and failures, the well-meaning but unfortunate Hapsburg ruler came to an untimely end (Feb. 1790) ; and his policy was soon reversed by his cautious and diplomatic brother Leopold II.

Joseph II was the last and by far the most reckless of those great eighteenth century rulers who sought to remodel their realms according to the precepts of philosophy but who in effect only strengthened the central power at the expense of local liberties. So obviously was this the case that it is questionable whether even the most enlightened of these crowned reformers, Frederick the Great, Joseph II, and the statesmen Turgot in France and Pombal in Portugal, would in the least degree have sympathised with Rousseau's doctrine of the sovereignty of the general will. As for the reforms of Catherine II in Russia and the expulsion of the Jesuits from all the Bourbon realms, France, Spain, Naples and Parma, as well as from Portugal, they were certainly inspired mainly by the desire of strengthening the central power. However diverse were their motives, the crowned innovators of the latter half of the eighteenth century began that process of simplification and centraHsation of governing powers which is so prominent a characteristic of the revolutionary and Napoleonic era. The sequel of this narrative will reveal the strange paradox that the revolutionary doctrines, and the dictatorship

12 The RevoliUionary and Napoleonic Ei^a. [Chap.

which a warlike policy necessitated, were soon to end in a far more sternly centralised rule than that for which Joseph II had vainly striven.

Instead of leaving the Hapsbiirg States strong and united from the upper Danube to its mouth, with Vienna as the political centre of the Continent, Joseph II left them no larger than at his accession, and eager to throw off his innovations. His policy, foreign and domestic, was essentially revolutionary, and bears some striking resemblances to that of Napoleon. Imbued with the new ideas, both sought to level privileges and distinctions of rank, religion, and nationality : both sought to centralise their power by subordinating the Church to the State, and the State to the ruler; while their rash or premature attempt at a cosmopolitan sway, complicated by a grandiose and ill-proportioned policy, was overthrown by a strongly national reaction championed by the conservative Powers. There is however this sharp distinction between the careers of Joseph II and Napoleon, that whereas the latter, as " heir to the Revolution," only completed the work of social reconstruction marked out by the French Convention, Joseph II sought to force on his States a social revolution, for which there had been little or no intellectual preparation. Consequently, while the Hapsburg ruler had to lament the miscarriage of all his schemes, Napoleon's measures of social reconstruction form the basis of the France of to-day.

Even in many of the smaller European States there was a division of interests and sympathy between the rulers and ruled. Thus in the Bishopric of Liege the Prince Bishop endeavoured to encroach on the constitutional rights of his subjects. In the neighbouring Republic of the Dutch Netherlands, the House of Orange, which had long held the Stadtholdership, had for some time attempted to change this precarious dignity into an hereditary monarchy ; and civil strifes ensued, in which France supported the democrats or

" patriots." Finally England by diplomatic pressure on France, and Prussia by armed intervention in the Netherlands restored the Stadtholder to more than his old powers (1787). This victory of the two Northern Powers marked the recovery by England of her former place in Europe, and by revealing the financial and political weakness of France, dealt a fatal blow to the prestige of the Bourbons. In the Austrian Netherlands and Liege, however, Prussia helped the people to resist the innovations of Joseph II and the Bishop respectively. Indeed, there was nowhere any consistent support of poHtical principles. Thus, Louis XVI, yielding to his courtiers and his army, supported the American colonists in their struggle against the Enghsh monarchy ; but none the less did he help to crush the Swiss democrats.

The succession of Leopold to the Hapsburg dominions soon effected a change in the policy of those distracted States and in the general diplomatic situation. In order to hold Prussia in check and regain his power over the Austrian Netherlands, Leopold made friendly overtures to England with the hope of dissolving the Triple Alliance. They were well received; for Pitt now distrusted the ambitious designs of the Prussian Court which threatened to lead to a general conflagration. Moreover, it was a cardinal principle of EngHsh policy to keep the Belgic provinces in the hand of a strong friendly government as a barrier against French encroachments on the north. English influence was therefore used to aid in the restoration of Austria's power in her Netherlands, provided that she would guarantee to the patriots their ancient rights and customs. Thus began the breach between England and Prussia which was eventually to paralyse the First Coalition and lead to open hostility in 1800 — 1805. An Anglo-Austrian alliance now supplanted the enteiite cordiale between Paris and Vienna ; and Pitt w^as able to take a high tone in the Nootka Sound dispute with Spain, in which Louis XVI by virtue of

14 TJie Reiwhitionary and Napoleonic Era. [Chap.

the Bourbon Family Compact for a time seemed about to take vigorous action against us. In spite of the beginnings of an Anglo-Austrian alHance, the Prussian Court persisted in its warhke pohcy against that of Vienna, though the poHcy of the latter had lost its aggressive character. An alliance with the Polish Government (March 1790) promised to strengthen Frederick William's hands, and he massed a large army on the Bohemian frontier. At once the prudent Hapsburg ruler made an armistice with the Turks (gaining Orsova), and turned to face Prussia. This Power suddenly found herself isolated; for the Poles energetically refused to promise the cession of Thorn and Danzig to Prussia as the price of her aid. Frederick William II, a blase sentimentalist, was disgusted at suddenly finding himself involved by Herzberg's ambitious policy in a single-handed contest with Austria, at a time when the principles of the French Revolution were beginning to sap the foundations of the old governments. Now that the prospect of humbling Austria and of gaining two important fortresses from Poland had completely vanished, the Prussian king remembered that his duty as a German sovereign forbade an almost fratricidal war. He therefore favourably received overtures of peace which Leopold made at Reichenbach with a view to an alliance based on monarchical principles and the maintenance of the status quo. The Austrian Government deftly insinuated that the French Revolution was the foe to be faced ; and the Prussian envoy at Paris also hinted to his master that one or two eastern districts of France midit

o

become the prize of an Austro- Prussian war against the revolution. The more pressing reason, however, for the peace finally agreed on at Reichenbach (July 27, 1790) was that both the Central Powers were in military or diplomatic difficulties. Leopold desired to pacify the discontent in Hungary and Brabant, and to secure his election as Emperor; while Prussia was not loth to extricate herself from the false position in which Herzberg's diplomacy had involved her. Indeed, while appearing to dictate the following terms of peace, she really accepted them. Austria was to negotiate peace with Turkey on the basis of the status quo. Prussia agreed not to intervene in Belgian affairs save with the accord of England and Holland, and would recognise the restoration of Austrian authority there if an amnesty were granted to the Belgian patriots.

The consequences of this peace were most important. Austria speedily regained her authority in the Netherlands and her prestige in Europe; while Prussia, which had appeared about to dictate terms to her, withdrew baffled and disconcerted. The Poles, annoyed at the insidious policy of Berlin, turned to Austria as a more trustworthy ally; and Sweden, left without support, had to conclude a disadvantageous peace at Werela with Russia (Aug. 1790). Catherine II was thus able to push on the war against Turkey; and until a definite settlement had been arrived at on the Danube it was impossible for the Eastern Powers to act vigorously elsewhere. The tardiness with which a definite peace was finally arranged between Austria and Turkey at Sistova (Aug. 5, 1791), proved the hollowness of the pretended European concert against revolutionary France. Austria, in fact, could not spare a great army to march on Paris while Catherine was still successfully pursuing the war against Turkey; and it was not till the Czarina signed (Aug. 11, 1791) the preliminaries of peace at Galatz and the definitive Treaty of Jassy five months later, whereby she gained the Turkish lands east of the Dniester, that there was any possibility of united and vigorous action by the other Continental Powers against the French Revolution.

After peace was restored on the Pruth and Danube, the Polish question threatened war on the Vistula. At the close of 1791 Catherine massed 130,000 men on the borders of Poland, intending to subject that land to her authority, and if

Austria and Prussia opposed her by force, to buy off their hostility by offering them a share in the partition, or ''compensation" elsewhere.. In the hope of diverting all their energies westwards, the ambitious and unscrupulous Czarina affected great indignation against the French revolutionists and ostensibly prepared to take part in a monarchical crusade, the better to conceal her design of subjugating the whole of Poland.