The will, its structure and mode of action

Preface

This essay was written during the summer of 1891, while I was a student in the University of Berlin, and presented to the Faculty of Cornell University as a thesis for the doctorate in the spring of 1892. At that time I hoped to be able to return to the subject and make what I had done the basis for a more extensive investigation. The press of other engagements and duties has, however, prevented me from carrying out this plan, and the essay is now published in the form in which it was first written. I have added one or two foot-notes while reading the proofs, but made no other alterations, though if I were writing today I should doubtless lay different emphasis upcn certain points.

My interest in the subject of the Will was due mainly to the psychological writings of Wundt, James, and Miinsterberg, and my treatment owes much to each of these writers. My other obligations I have tried to acknowledge in full throughout the essay itself.

J. E. C.

TABIvE OF CONTENTS.

Chapter I. The Concept Of Will

It is of the utmost importance to attempt, first of all, to define the conceptions which are to form the subject of our study. What do the terms ' Will ' and ' Willing ' signify ? The extension of these terms have varied widely, as is well known, with different authors. With many writers ' Will ' is only used to denote a conscious choice between alternative directions of activity, and is predicated only of such individuals as are capable of representing to themselves such possibilities.^ Other philosophers widen the conception by omitting from it the element of consciousness, and that of representation of alternatives, and thus extend the notion of will, so as to make it synonymous with force or energy in general. In this broader sense of the word. Will is predicable not only of persons, but also of all phenomena of the Universe, and of the Universe itself as a whole.^ Between these extreme limits, we find various definitions and uses of the term, as one or other of the elements constituting the concept has been emphasized or removed.^

As for the last mentioned theory, that of Schopenhauer and his school, we can only protest against such a confusion of ideas under one term. We know ' Will ' only through our own immediate experience, and as an element of our conscious life ; and, as thus known, consciousness, not less than force, is always an element of the empirically given fact. To quote from Sigwart : "From this point of view an unconscious Will is a contradictio in adjecto. It may be believed

^ Martineau, A Study of Religion, I. p, 198 ; II. p. 188. Sigwart, Kleine Schriften, Vol. II, p. 118 ff. ' Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille. Werke, II, pp. 113 ff. ' For various uses, see Martineau, Study of Religion, II., p. 188.

that unconscious activities take place, and have the same results as those which we call will ; we may perhaps even be justified in calling these activities Will in a wider sense, but only because we have first learned to know a conscious Will ; and it will always be safer to choose for the broader concept another term. " ^

On the other hand, it seems to me that the notion of will as a separate Faculty has tended to unduly limit the notion. The old Psychology regarded the activities of the self as manifested through a number of ' Faculties ' such as Thinking, Perceiving, Willing, etc. It was too often forgotten that these faculties were not each sui generis^ and that they indicated nothing in themselves apart from the nature of the conscious processes. Apart from the definite content of consciousness, the universal form of activity is only an abstraction which leads us astray and defies treatment. As a result of the same separation, too, a large part of our mental life was conceived as going on without any relation to the Will. It was supposed that ordinarily the Associative process, with its own peculiar laws, sufficed to explain mental occurrences. But at certain points, more or less frequent in the life of the individual, the Will as a kind of miraculous function, as a power of an algether new and unique nature, was supposed to intervene and to prove its superiority to the ordinary Associative law^s, by subordinating them to its commands, or reversing their direction.

Modern psychologists, on the other hand, refuse to make this sharp and absolute distinction between Will and the other processes of the mental life. They lay emphasis upon the fact that in " all sensation, all Association and Comparison a constant cooperation of the Will also takes place. " ^ " Association, " says Wundt, '* is only the reflex of that central unity of our consciousness which we immediately perceive in

^ Kleine Schriften, II., p. ii6.

the inner and outer activity of the Will. " ^ Thinking, Perceiving, etc., are different names which signify the employment of this activity in different spheres, and npon different kinds of subject matter.

We may name all psychical activity, all influence which the self exerts upon the course of events. Will i7i the broader sense of the term. In so far as the self asserts itself against inner or outer events, and modifies, or strives to modify them, it may be said to will. But, it may be asked, why should the other psychical activities be subsumed under willing ? The answer to this question is to be found in the fact which will be emphasized throughout this essay, that the will process has really its root in the selective activity of attention. And it is true that this activity finds employment in the construction of our perceptive world, and in the formation of our concepts and judgments regarding it, no less than in effecting changes in the stream of thought, or in bodies lying external to us.

Our perceptive world, the world with which we come into immediate contact in every day experience, is the result of choosing, out of the infinite variety of things by which we are surrounded, some objects which are to us particularly interesting. As no two men's interests are exactly identical, the worlds in which they live can not be absolutely identical. The painter's world is more rich in beautiful forms and colors than that of the ordinary man ; the musician detects in the moaning of the wind harmonies that are lost on an ear less sensitive. The scientist's perceptive world is made up of a variety of details which simply do not exist for the ordinary man.

The influence of the attention in constituting and determining our world for us is plainly seen as we pass from

1 Grimdzuge d. Physiol. Psychologic, ist Aufl. p. 726 ; Cf. also Hoffding Outlines of Psychology {'Bng. trans.) pp. 314: " It is not enough to saythat will precedes cognition and feeling, for these latter, looked at one from one side, are themselves manifestations of will in the Mdder sense."

V lo , The Will.

childhood to manhood. I was very much interested lately in walking with a little boy to find that the things he saw were almost entirely different from those which made an impression upon me. Talking to him afterwards of what he had seen, I found that the objects of his experience, what he had actually seen and remembered, were things which are practically absent for the ordinary adult.

This fact of the selective function of the will in perception is well illustrated by Professor James : " Let four men make a tour in Europe. One will bring home only picturesque impressions of costumes and colors, parks and views and works of architecture, picture and statues. To another all this will be non-existent ; distances and prices, populations and drainage statistics will take their place. A third will give a rich account of the theatres, restaurants, and public halls and naught beside ; whilst the fourth will perhaps have been so wrapped in his own subjective broodings as to tell little more than a few names of places through which he passed. Each has selected out of the same mass of presented objects those which suited his private interests, and has made his experience thereby." ^

Leaving now this field of perception, and coming to what is usually regarded as the higher mental activities, we find that they, too, manifest to a striking degree the selective activity of the self. Concepts are formed from percepts by abstraction, and attention. That is, the concept-process consists in picking out from a variety of percepts, those which seem to us, in accordance with our interests or practical needs, to be the most essential attributes of the things presented to us. The elements thus selected are bound together by means of a common name. While thus essentially individual in their nature, the common or universal aspect of concepts is intelligible from the fact that human beings, as members of the same world, have to a large degree the same practical

Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, p. 286.

The Concept of Will. ii

needs. Reasoning, again, may be described as a selection of one out of many conceptions each of which stands in subordination to a higher, and of that particular one which will serve as a connecting link between that higher and some lower concept or individual with which our practical interests lead us to connect it. Thus in the syllogism,

M is P,

Sis M,

Sis P, what we done is to select from the numerous notions which are comprehended in P, the appropriate one Mhy means of which S can be brought into relation with P} But not only this formal process of reasoning, but the very content of one's thoughts is the result of selection. As the accompaniment of physiological currents playing through the brain, there are constantly offered to consciousness ideas of which the greater number vanish immediately and without being reflected upon. I choose certain of these ideas, in accordance with my theoretical interests or practical needs, and ponder over them and their relation to other ideas. I deliberately make them the subject of my thought, direct my attention to them, and, at the same time, ignore the great rank and file of the actual mental processes, which, consequently, take no place in my thought series. Out of the infinitude of ideas in the stream of consciousness, I choose those about which I wish to think, I emphasize some and neglect others, and thus literally make my experience what I will it shall be.

It is, perhaps, so obvious as to scarcely require mention that our external actions are only the outcome of a series of selections. As a rule, when I perform any bodily act, contract this or that group of muscles, some other movement is always physically possible ; and in so far the act performed may be regarded as chosen. But to say that an act is willed, expresses something more than that an event has taken place which

^ Cf. James, Prijtciples of Psychology, Vol. II, pp. 331 ff.

12 Tke Will.

may be regarded as one of several possibilities. Because the results are the same as if willed, because events have occurred which from our point of view can be regarded as selections, we have no right to regard them as manifestations of Will, so long as we understand the term in its ordinarysignification. What I mean when I say ' I will' is not only that one out of a number of possibilities w^ill result, but that the selection is the outcome of a conscious activity which I identify with myself. There can be no meaning in the term ' Will ' unless we understand by it, the act of a conscious being.^

But we have still more difficult questions before us. So far, we are on ground which today is scarcely disputed. Selection and consciousness are universally admitted to be involved in the ordinary concept of willing. As soon, however, as we inquire into the degree of consciousness which must attend an act of Will, we find the greatest differences f opinion. Can there be an act of will without a repreitation of the end for the sake of which the act is permed ; and does such an act always involve the clear consciousness of the several possibilities or alternatives open at the time ? Many writers, with the ethical signification of acts of will in view, have answered both these questions in the affirmative. Thus Sigwart says the proposition, ' no will without end,' is analytic, just as ' no effect without a cause ' is analytic.^ It must certainly be admitted that all action is for the sake of something ; but this is not the same thing as to say that this 'something' for the sake of which we act, is clearly present to our ordinary consciousness. It appears to me that it is necessary to distinguish sharply between the ordinary unreflective consciousness which accom-

^ It might perhaps be said that not only consciousness, but also a rational consciousness is pre-supposed in a real act of will. As Professor Watson has lately remarked : " Onl}'^ a rational being can have a \N-ill. ' '

''■Kleine Schriften, II., Der Begriff des Wolletis.

panics a large part of our daily life, and the more deliberative critical consciousness which is evoked when we psychologize, or when some crisis arises which demands closer consideration. In every day life, a conscious end to which we refer each act is as much a fiction as the theory of separate isolated sensations which are consciously compared and related. But analysis proves that the end is always present in potcntia^ in the sense that it has been a real factor in the choice. Subsequent reflection, too, may bring to light the part which it has played.

We may perhaps make the matter clearer in another way. On an analysis of my consciousness, I find over and above the transient psychical states, certain more permanent elements. In addition to the passing sensations of sight, sound, etc., there are present the somewhat fixed muscular sensations ; besides the more ephemeral interests and ideals which from time to time becomes satisfied and realized, there are more abiding ends and interests which are more intimately connected with myself. Indeed, it is these which I group together as myself. I am not, however, conscious of them in detail during my ordinary life ; but just because they are comparatively permanent they are neglected. Their influence, however, can at once be percieved as soon as an analysis is made by reflecting on previous actions.

The other question, viz., whether in a case of willing there must be present the representation of at least two possible lines of action, is closely allied to this. As a general rule, in performing the routine of every-day life, we scarcely consider or reflect at all ; we act as we have been accustomed to act in like circumstances. In familiar circumstances, we act in accordance with certain practical maxims or receipts, and the one line of action is adopted without the others coming into clear consciousness at all. But inasmuch as the act performed was chosen or adopted, we cannot hesitate to say that it was willed. The most of cases that come up in ordinary life are at once adopted or rejected, because they are immediately perceived to be consistent or inconsistent with the purpose of the life, or of the day. It is only more rarely that it is not evident which one of several actions will be best adapted to our purpose, and that we find ourselves confronted by a problem which cannot be settled in the off-hand way described above. When, however, in consequence of a new combination of circumstances, such a crisis arises, the choice cannot be made without a clear representation of the various competing possibilities, nor without more or less prolonged deliberation upon the results of the various courses of action.

It may, perhaps, be advantageous to denominate cases of willing Will in the narrower sense ^ or explicit acts of will, where the choice has been made after a clear consciousness of different possible acts, and of their relation to an end. We may then distinguish from this fully conscious stage. Will in the broader sense ^ or implicit acts of will, where the consciousness of the other possibilities is not so clearly present, but where the act follows the representation of some one line of action as a matter of course. It must be kept in mind, however, that no hard and fast line can be drawn between explicit and implicit acts of will, nor between acts which are implicitly willed, and those which are merely manifestations of unconscious or subconscious tendencies and instincts.

We shall endeavor to show in Chapter II, that one species of act passes into another by infinite gradations. Just as on the spectrum we cannot say that at any fixed point red ends, and yellow begins, so, I think, we are unable to fix any dividing line in the gradual development of W^ill, as it passes from unconscious and instinctive manifestations to the clear light of deliberative choice. The distinction just made, however, although not absolute, will prove useful in avoiding confusions in our subsequent discussions.

When we speak of Will, we denote a mental occurrence which has for its object either the production of something which does not yet exist, or the holding fast of something which we already possess, and which is in danger of being displaced by something else. In both cases, there is a representation of what is willed ; and if the act of will has been explicit, there is also a representation of other possibilities. In the first case, when the will is directed towards realizing something that does not yet exist, the act follows oftentimes without the competition of other representations. So soon as the act is thought of, it is at once consented to, and adopted. In the other case, where the will is exerted to maintain the present condition of affairs, it is more likely to be explicit. Very often we simply enjoy the present without willing its continuance. It is only when something else comes into competition with the employment or enjoyment of the present that the will is called into exercise at all. If I am seated at my desk reading or writing, I do not require to constantly exercise my will to remain there. It is only when some other alternative presents itself, e. g.^ that of taking a walk, or of making a visit, that an act of will is necessary to continue my work. If, however, these competing attractions present themselves and I still decide to remain where I am, it is because this has been willed in opposition to the other courses which have presented themselves to me.

Further, Will must be directed to something which I believe myself capable of realizing. It must have reference to an act which I can perform, or believe that I can perform. It is not possible that I should will that a rainy day should become fine ; because I can not represent this to myself as lying within my power. The means for the realization of any end which I will must be such as seem to be subject to my control. To will the end implies the willing of the means ; and, further, a belief that these means are such as lie within our reach. It is true that subsequent deliberation may teach us that we were mistaken, that the end can only be obtained through the employment of means which we are unable or unwilling to adopt, but when this becomes obvious, we do not any longer will that the end shall be realized.

What has just been said enables us to distinguish between ' Desire ' and ' Will '. The former implies only a mere looking towards the end, without any consideration of means. The latter is practical, it sets the machinery agoing to accomplish the end, and begins with the member of the series which lies nearest to hand. A wish, then, may be directed to what lies wholly beyond one's power to realize, and it may be wholly unpractical ; i. e.^ take no account whatever of the means. Thus, for example, one may desire wings, or the power to be in two places at the same time. For the same reason, it is quite possible to desire certain ends while the sole means for their realization is not at all desired. For example, I may desire to become learned or rich, and still may not desire to burn the midnight oil, or to practice prudence and economy, as these ends demand.

One word further regarding the relation of Desire and Will. We have seen that mere Desire is inoperative and ineffectual in attaining its object. Desire, however, passes into Will when the unpractical ' would that it were ' is reinforced by the rational ' let it be,' or it ' must not be ' of the self, which speaks with a consciousness of what the act really involves. Desire, we may say, is the expression of the nature of a sensitive being, while Will, in the sense in which we propose to use the term, belongs only to a rational being who has already attained some capacity for ' looking before and after," and who is able to perceive the essential unity of end and means.

In conclusion, we may emphasize the fact that will is a mental and not a physical phenomenon. It is not necessar}^, that is, that an act of will shall be manifested in a series of muscular movements. W^e may will without moving a muscle. All the phenomena of will may be present in consciousness though there is no perceptible result so far as the external world is concerned. As Professor James somewhere sa^^s, ' willing is a relation between the mind and its ideas, not between the mind and the external world.' The phenomena which are to form the subject of this study, then, are psychological processes, and it is mainly with an analysis and description of these phenomena that we shall be concerned throughout the two following chapters. When this task has been completed, we shall, however, proceed to discuss the relation of mind and body, and shall finally consider in what sense it is possible to speak of the freedom of the will.

Chapter II. The Development Of Will

There is no doubt that it will be more easily possible to analyze an overt and clearly conscious act of will, than to determine the nature of process which are largely instinctive, and which go on for the most part below the threshold of consciousness. In attempting to analyze the phenomena present in consciousness during an act of volition, we shall accordingly select such an overt act as the subject of our analysis. Before we begin this undertaking, however, it seems advantageous to see what light is thrown upon the nature of the explicit will processes by attempting to trace briefly their genesis from earlier and more simple forms.

In the first place, w^e remark that the will is an elementary and original process of our conscious life. No matter how far back we may push our investigations, we shall always find the will present as a reaction of the self upon the conscious content. All attempts to derive wall from something which is generically from it, must necessaril}^ prove fruitless. This assertion scarcely needs proof at the present time, and we may perhaps content ourselves by referring to the futility of Herbart's attempt — which is perhaps now almost universally acknowledged — to derive will from the relation between representations. While emphasizing the uniqueness of the will process, however, modern psychology also points out the organic unity and interrelation of the whole mental life. While the old faculty theory separated sharply between knowledge and volition, modern psychologists maintain that in all sensation, all association and comparison, will is also present as a factor. The voluntary control of thoughts is regarded as a process involving will not less than what we usually call voluntary acts, and which produce an effect in the external world. In short, we may say with Hoffding, " the problem of will is concerned with the right conception and understanding of attention. " ^ To understand the nature of will, that is, we must begin with will itself. In other words, our development must be autogenetic^ not heterogenetic.'^ We must give up all attempts to derive will from something different from itself, and confine ourselves to an investigation of how complex deliberative acts are evolved from more simple purposeless acts. There are, says Wundt,^ two questions to be answered : (i) " What are the relations of the primitive inner activity of will to the other phenomena of consciousness ? (2) How does the outer activity of will arise from the inner?" We shall so far as possible treat these questions separately, although it will be found, as we proceed, that inner and outer manifestations of will act and react upon each other.

We have already asserted, that in every stage of conscious development, there is always some activity manifested by the individual, which, however, becomes explicit onl}- in volition. This is the activity of apperception ; and without this our experience would be a mere series of separate feelings, entirely wanting in any unity. Biit since it is in virtue of the synthetic and dynamic character of consciousness that our experience forms a whole, we may regard apperception as an original element. iVs we find this activity in lower forms of consciousness, however, it is a blind, irrational response to some object which is immediately pleasant or unpleasant. When strong or absorbing sensations fill consciousness, this activity seems crowded out and to give no sign of its existence. Attention in such cases seems to be ' a function of the object ' rather than of the subject. But a more or less rapid change of content is a condition both of conscious activity and of consciousness itself. When a change takes place, when a new sensation makes its appearance, the activity of the Will is man-

2 Cf. also Baldwin, Feeling and Will, p. 34-7.

2 Wundt, Griuidzuge der Physiol. Psychologies 3*^'' Aufl. Bd. II, p. 465.

ifested in the mode of its reception. The tvv'o ways in which this involuntary apperception manifests itself are by attraction and repulsion. If the new state is interesting^ i. e.^ if it introduces a pleasant change into the existing state of consciousness, the attention is directed towards it ; if, for any reason, it is unpleasant, the activity is employed in suppressing it so far as possible. This constitutes, as Hoffding remarks " an elementary choice, and determines the manner in which things shall appear to us. As plants turn to the light, so our perceptive faculties turn to that which excites pleasure and interest, and away from that which excites pain. " '

The selection at this stage, however, is altogether blind and instinctive. It is a mere straining towards what is immediately pleasant, and away from what is immediately painful. A higher stage can only be attained through the development of memory and intellect. This is reached when the action is guided by the idea of the result, as based on previous experience, and represented to consciousness. There is thus a kind of preparation for the result. The function of the representation thus present to consciousness is to determine to a great extent what shall be perceived. We see and hear mainly what we look for and expect. This preparatoryaction of attention, or of the will, is also shown in the experiments on reaction time. When attention is directed to the movements to be performed, the reaction time is much less than in the cases where it is directed toward the expected stimulus. At this period of development, we have got beyond the stage of blind instinctive action, and are at the stage of impulse. We have not as yet Will in the narrower sense of a choice between motives, but Will which follows a single representation. There can, under these circumstances, be no voluntary choice in the strict sense of the word ; for there is only a single motive present, and the action follows unhesitatingly in its direction.

^Hoffding, Outlines of Psychology, p. 314.

The Develop7nent of Will. 2i

/ A real choice first arises when different impulses conflict

with each other, and we are accordingly compelled to pause and settle the rival claims of possible competing lines of action. It is evident that we do not find such power of deliberation to any extent among the lower animals. In their case, there is no balancing of motives, no weighing of attractions against each other. In the same way, the child's acts are at first all impulsive in character. The object of the whole course of his practical education is to make him think ; i. e.^ to inhibit impulsive action by the idea of consequences ; or, at a later stage of development, by the desire to bring all the acts of the individual life into relation with something which he regards as an end in itself. Such a choice requires a degree of mental development, and a power of deliberation and comparison, which is not found in young children nor in most animals. However important an advance is marked by a deliberate choice between several competing motives, yet it is evident that such selections have developed gradually from impulse acts. In a given case, it is often difficult to say whether the act has been determined by a single motive, or whether other considerations were also present, but have been, in comparison with the victorious motive, so weak and ineffectual, that they obtained no hold upon consciousness. According to Lotze and some English ethical writers, Will implies a deliberate choice between two or more competing possibilities.' But this is not something radically different from manifestations of which we have been treating at an earlier stage, but is the highest and most complete development of Will. " The selection of passive, the attention of reactive actions, find their fruition in the fiat of volitional consciousness."^ We may describe these phenomena as constituting a complex and intensified form of Will. It is com-